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INTRODUCTION
The year 2000 brought some major changes for the Federal
1
Circuit: the addition of two new judges (Richard Linn and Timothy
2
Dyk ); the semi-retirement of a third judge (S. Jay Plager, who elected
to take Senior Judge status in November 2000); and, for patent
practitioners, the issuance en banc of a critical new opinion, now
being considered by the Supreme Court, dealing with one of the
most controversial aspects of patent practice, the doctrine of
3
equivalents. Additionally, the court continued to wrestle with a
number of other thorny but recurring issues in patent law, including
questions of patentability, trial court procedure, and sanctions. In
the pages that follow, we will address these and many other
developments reflected in the Federal Circuit’s Y2K patent
jurisprudence, concluding with an addendum that discusses the
statistical output of the Federal Circuit and its judges.
I.

FEDERAL COURT AND AGENCY PRACTICE

The cases decided by the Federal Circuit in the year 2000 involved
numerous procedural issues. Particularly significant were cases
4
5
involving sanctions, the use of stipulations at trial, questions of
6
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction, and the standard of review for
7
decisions of the PTO and Board of Patent Appeals.

1. Nominated to be Circuit Judge by President William J. Clinton on September
28, 1999, confirmed by the Senate November 19, 1999, and assumed duties of the
office on January 1, 2000.
2. Nominated to be Circuit Judge by President William J. Clinton on April 1,
1998, confirmed by the Senate May 24, 2000, and assumed duties in office on June 9,
2000.
3. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519
(2001).
4. See infra Part I.A.18.
5. See infra Part I.A.13.
6. See infra Part I.B.1.
7. See infra Part I.C.
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A. District Court Practice
1.

The prevalence of summary judgment
The frequency with which district courts grant summary judgment
in patent cases is remarkable. Of the Federal Circuit’s seventy-nine
published opinions in cases arising from the district courts in the year
2000, forty-eight of them involved resolution of at least one
8
substantial issue on summary judgment or dismissal. As discussed in
8. See Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment for noninfringement by defendant and supporting jury verdict against defendant for literal
infringement); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Dragon Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment on nonpatented claims and findings of infringement for certain claims, but vacating and
remanding for further findings on issue of obviousness applying Graham standard);
LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d
558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct.
2519 (2001); Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement of
defendant’s product); Bottom Line Mgmt., Inc. v. Pan Man, Inc., 228 F.3d 1352, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district court’s grant of
summary judgment to appellee and finding its actions of repair to be within the
scope of the patent and not reconstruction, which could constitute infringement);
Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(reversing and remanding district court’s grant of summary judgment where there
was a genuine issue as to whether an implied-in-fact contract existed that assigned
the patent rights); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary
judgment for defendant for non-infringement holding that infringement is not
established under the doctrine of equivalents where a change in the arrangement of
elements produces the same results); Cultor Corp. v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d
1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district court’s grant of
summary judgment to defendant and finding no literal infringement or
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Deere & Co.,
224 F.3d 1374, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating district court’s
grant of summary judgment because it failed to raise genuine issues of material fact
to a jury); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming in part the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on one claim on the grounds that the invention was “obvious” and
“anticipated,” but reversing and remanding the judgment invalidating several other
claims); C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s decision awarding damages to the plaintiff
for violation of a trade secret, finding a Kansas statute preempted any fraud claims,
but reversing the dismissal for failure to state a claim); CAE Screenplates, Inc. v.
Heinrich Fiedler GMBH & Co., 224 F.3d 1308, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (upholding district court’s summary judgment and dismissal of claims because
no reasonable jury could find literal infringement or infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents); KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s grant of summary
judgment to appellee where prosecution history showed the device in question did
not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222
F.3d 973, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Genetech, Inc. v. Chiron
Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1636 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hilgraeve Corp. v.
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McAfee Assocs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(vacating and remanding district court’s summary judgment ruling where there was a
genuine issue as to the opposing opinions offered by proffered experts and an
unresolved question); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc.,
222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 221
F.3d 1310, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Canton Bio-Med., Inc. v.
Integrated Liner Techs., Inc., 216 F.3d 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (upholding district court’s summary judgment holding that prosecution
history estoppel barred the infringement claim); Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
216 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s
summary judgment in favor of defendant where it invalidated inappropriately the
plaintiff’s claims based upon plaintiff’s deposition testimony); Glitsch, Inc. v. Koch
Eng’g Co., 216 F.3d 1382, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming
district court’s summary judgment where plaintiff tried to circumvent the appeal
process by seeking an improper declaratory judgment); Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N.
Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming
district court’s summary judgment where there was no genuine issue of fact
regarding infringment); N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s summary
judgment invalidating plaintiff’s patent for violation of best mode requirement);
Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement
because there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendants supplied or
caused to supply any element of the patent in question); Reiffen v. Microsoft Corp.,
214 F.3d 1342, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s
summary judgment due to an error in application of the “written description”
requirement where plaintiff’s definition at the time of filing described accurately the
patent in question); Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d
1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s summary
judgment holding of infringement because it erred in claim construction); Vehicular
Techs. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment for defendants, holding that no
reasonable jury could find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Bayer
AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1710 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants
holding no infringment); Aqua-Aerobic Sys., Inc. v. Aerators Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (same); Envirco Corp. v. Clestra
Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(vacating and remanding district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants
because the court erred in construing the relevant claim as a means-plus-function
element under 35 U.S.C. § 112, and thus improperly limited that element to
structure described in the specification); Helfgott & Karas, P.C. v. Dickenson, 209
F.3d 1328, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating and remanding
district court’s summary judgment for defendant because the Commissioner of the
Patent and Trademark Office abused his discretion under the Administrative
Procedure Act); Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s judgment for the
defendants, agreeing with the claim construction, and holding no literal
infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); STX, LLC v. Brine,
Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district
court’s summary judgment for the defendant holding that its invention was ready for
patenting and that plaintiff’s contentions were unfounded); Kemco Sales, Inc. v.
Control Papers Co., 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(affirming district court’s partial summary judgment for appellee holding no
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208
F.3d 1339, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating district court’s
summary judgment for the plaintiff because unresolved factual questions existed);
Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289
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Part III below, one reason for the prevalence of summary-judgment
determinations may be the recent clarifications that claim
construction is an issue of law, thereby making many infringement
9
disputes amenable to summary-judgment determinations, and that
infringement-by-equivalents claims are subject to several threshold
10
legal limitations.
One thing is certain: the Federal Circuit has
authorized, even encouraged, a liberal use of summary judgment to
dispose of patent claims.
2.

Standing
A party has standing to bring suit only if he has a legally sufficient
“personal stake” in a dispute to justify exercise of a court’s remedial
11
powers on his behalf. The Patent Act provides that a “patentee” may
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s summary judgment for defendants
holding no literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents);
Clearstream Wastewater Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Action, Inc., 206 F.3d 1440, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating and remanding district court’s summary
judgment for defendants because it erred in its claim construction of the patent);
IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating district court’s summary judgment for defendants, holding
that the court erred in claim construction and that there was a genuine issue of
material fact that could result in a holding of infringement); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs.
Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant
supporting its right to refuse to sell patented products to plaintiff because its right to
exclude did not conflict with antitrust laws); Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co.,
203 F.3d 1362, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district
court’s holding of no literal infringement but remanding because the court
misapplied the doctrine of equivalents); Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d
1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s holding
of no literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, but
remanding to address defendant’s trademark claim); In re Spalding Sports
Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating
district court’s decision requiring petitioner to produce an invention record and
granting a writ of mandamus holding that the attorney-client privilege protects the
invention record); Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating district court’s denial of transfer of action and granting
transfer); Automated Bus. Machs. v. NEC Am., Inc., 202 F.3d 1353, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment
for defendant based on a holding of non-infringement and awarding full attorneys’
fees to defendant and its parent company where the latter was the original
manufacturer and participated in the litigation); Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
201 F.3d 1363, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding district
court’s summary judgment for defendant holding that plaintiff’s patent was invalid).
9. See Markman v. Westview Instruments., Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
10. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (1997) (declaring two principal legal limitations:
prosecution history estoppel and the “all elements” rule); see also Festo Corp., 234 F.3d
at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69 (articulating that the first limitation to be
addressed is prosecution history estoppel, and that estoppel does not bar the
doctrine of equivalents from proceeding with an “all elements” analysis).
11. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
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bring an action for “infringement of his patent.”
The term
“patentee” includes “not only the patentee to whom the patent was
13
issued but also the successors in title to the patentee.” The courts
have recognized that in some instances a patent licensee may have
14
standing to sue for infringement, but in others it may not.
The Federal Circuit decided three cases in the year 2000 involving
the issue of whether a party suing for patent infringement had a
sufficient ownership interest in the patent at issue to confer
15
16
standing. In Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., the Federal Circuit
held that an exclusive license that did not transfer “all substantial
rights” in the patents did not confer standing on the licensee such
that it could maintain a suit for patent infringement without joining
17
the patentee as a co-plaintiff. Prima Tek I was granted an exclusive
worldwide license to make, use and sell the products and processes
covered by the patents for a two-year term that could be extended by
18
the parties. The license to Prima Tek I, however, was limited to exist
“only to the extent necessary to grant a license to Prima Tek II” to
make, use and sell the products and processes covered by the
19
patent. The license also contained provisions granting Prima Tek I
the exclusive right to sue third parties for infringement of the patents
at issue and providing that the patentee would be bound by any
judgment regarding the validity, infringement, and enforceability of
20
the licensed patents. The defendant, A-Roo, urged that standing
was lacking because (1) the license agreement between the patentee
and Prima Tek I was limited in duration, and (2) the agreement
granted Prima Tek I only the rights to sub-license the substantive

12. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994 & Supp V. 1999) (declaring the right to a civil action
as a “remedy for infringement” under the Patent Act).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (1994).
14. Compare, e.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (holding that
an exclusive territorial licensee has standing to sue for patent infringement), and
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding same), with Rite-Hite Corp. v.
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (holding that a non-exclusive licensee does not have standing to sue for patent
infringement).
15. See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that the plaintiff has standing); Ajinomoto Co. v. ArcherDaniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(finding standing). But see Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding plaintiff lacked standing).
16. 222 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
17. Prima Tek II, 222 F.3d at 1379-80, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.
18. See id. at 1374, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 .
19. See id. at 1374-75, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743-44.
20. See id. at 1374-75, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000

1443

21

rights in the patent to Prima Tek II. The court rejected A-Roo’s first
challenge to standing, holding that the mere presence of a
termination clause did not prevent a licensee from suing in its own
22
name. The court, however, embraced A-Roo’s second challenge,
reversing the district court and holding that Prima Tek I lacked
standing because—both prior and subsequent to its contemplated
sub-license to Prima Tek II—it did not possess the “right to exclude
23
others from making, using and selling the patented inventions.”
Finally, the court concluded that the patentee’s agreement to be
bound by any judgment regarding the patents did not preserve Prima
Tek’s standing, for if it had, patent owners would be allowed to grant
improper “hunting license[s]” to other parties for the purposes of
24
litigation.
25
In contrast, in Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., the court held that a
licensee (Speedplay) had obtained all substantial rights to the patent
26
at issue and thus had standing to sue for infringement. There, the
court rejected the argument that a provision of the licensing
agreement erroneously referring to an unrelated patent meant that
27
Speedplay did not have a license for the patent at issue.
More
substantively, the court rejected the argument that Speedplay lacked
standing based upon the patentees’ retention of a reversionary right
to institute infringement litigation in the event that Speedplay did
not bring such litigation within three months of discovering
28
infringement. The court held that such a right to sue “would not
hinder Speedplay’s enjoyment of the patent rights in any meaningful
way” because Speedplay could have rendered that right “nugatory” by
29
granting the alleged infringer a royalty-free sublicense.
Furthermore, the court held Speedplay’s inability to assign its rights
21. See id. at 1378-79, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746-48.
22. See Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1378, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1742, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro
Italia, 944 F.2d 870, 874, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1045, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
23. See Prima Tek II, 222 F.3d at 1380, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
24. See id. at 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (citing Crown Die & Tool v. Nye
Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 42 (1923) in emphasizing that standing is
established by proprietary interests and not by agreements that bind parties to
judgments or that contain “right to sue” clauses).
25. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
26. See Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1250, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1987.
27. See id. at 1250-51, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1987.
28. See id. at 1251, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1987.
29. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988 (distinguishing Abbott Labs. v. Daimedix
Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1771 (Fed. Cir. 1995) from the case at bar
where the licensee is permitted to grant licenses, bring an action on its own behalf
without including the licensor and is not bound solely to making, using and selling
products reflecting the patented invention).

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

1444

11/20/01 4:51 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1435

in the patent without the patentees’ consent (which the license
agreement provided “shall not be withheld unreasonably”), its
obligation to assign to the patentees all improvements that would
then be licensed back to Speedplay, and its obligation to permit the
patentees to dictate the markings sold abroad and to inspect its books
and records, were not “substantial rights” that divested Speedplay of
30
standing to sue for infringement in its own name. Finally, the court
noted that there were few concerns about multiple suits on the same
operative facts because of the close relationship of the licensee to the
patentee (an employee of Speedplay); the judgment would, by
operation of agency principles, have “preclusive effect with respect to
31
any parallel claim that might be brought” by the patentee.
The court also rejected a standing challenge in Ajinomoto Co. v.
32
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., where the accused infringer questioned
the authenticity of Ajinomoto’s rights in the patent at issue because
neither of the two documents transferring the rights from the
33
inventors to Ajinomoto were present in the record.
The court
rejected the challenge, holding that the lack of written
documentation confirming the transfer of the foreign patent rights
from the Soviet government to the inventors was unimportant in the
absence of any evidence demonstrating that such a transfer had not
34
occurred or that the transfer ran afoul of Soviet law. The court also
held that the accused infringer was estopped from objecting that the
assignment to Ajinomoto from the inventors was not introduced at
trial because the standing challenge was commenced after the trial
had concluded; thus, the accused infringer’s litigation tactics had
35
“effectively prevented” Ajinomoto from proffering the document.
3.

Personal jurisdiction
A federal district court has personal jurisdiction over a party so

30. See id. at 1252-53, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988-89.
31. See Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1984, 1989 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
32. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
33. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1343-44, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336-37.
34. See id. at 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 (noting that according to Soviet
policy, the government owned the inventions in question because the inventors were
employees of state institutions and when the government conveyed the patents back to
the original institutions, the originator of the patent was able to properly assign the
patent rights to Ajinomoto).
35. Compare Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335, with
Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1254, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting, in a
similar vein, that the accused infringer could not “reasonably complain” that the
patentee had not been joined as a party, since the accused infringer had opposed
Speedplay’s motion in the district court to join the patentee).
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long as two requirements are fulfilled: “[f]irst, a defendant must be
amenable to process in the forum state. Second, the court’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction must comply with the precepts of federal due
36
process.” A party is “amenable to service of process” if it could be
“subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the
state in which the district court is located,” such as under a state
37
“long-arm” jurisdictional statute or “nonresident motorist statute.”
38
In LSI Industries, Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., the court examined
whether an accused patent infringer, Hubbell, was subject to personal
39
jurisdiction in Ohio.
The district court held that there was no
40
personal jurisdiction over Hubbell. According to the district court,
Hubbell was not subject to Ohio’s long-arm jurisdictional statute
41
because it did not sell its accused product in Ohio. The Federal
Circuit reversed, holding that personal jurisdiction did exist,
pursuant to Ohio Supreme Court precedent that permitted
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation “doing business” in Ohio,
even when the cause of action did not “arise” or “relate to the
42
corporation’s business transacted” in Ohio.
The Federal Circuit
explained:
In essence, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a federal due process
general jurisdiction standard as a hook for prong one of the
personal jurisdiction inquiry.
That is, when an out-of-state
defendant conducts “continuous and systematic” business in Ohio,
it is “doing business” in Ohio and is amenable to process there,
43
even if the cause of action did not arise from activity in Ohio.

The court held Hubbell was subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio
44
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because
Hubbell had “significant” contacts with Ohio, including “millions of
dollars of sales” and “a broad distributorship network” in Ohio, and,

36. LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1965, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of
Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
37. LSI, 232 F.3d at 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967.
38. 232 F.3d 1369, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
39. See LSI, 232 F.3d at 1370-71, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965-67.
40. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
41. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
42. See id. at 1373, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968 (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 107 N.E.2d 203, 205 (Ohio 1952)).
43. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968.
44. See LSI Indus., Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 n.5, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1965, 1969 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that in federal question
cases, such as patent cases, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, like the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, requires sufficient minimum contacts
with the relevant venue as a prerequisite to personal jurisdiction).
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45

therefore, LSI had jurisdiction under Ohio law. Accordingly, LSI
demonstrates that amenability to process in a forum state can be
established by state common law as well as by state statute.
4.

Res judicata/collateral estoppel
The doctrines of res judicata (or claim preclusion) and collateral
estoppel (or issue preclusion) serve to prevent unnecessary multiple
lawsuits on matters that parties have had a “full and fair” opportunity
46
to litigate. Under the doctrine of res judicata/claim preclusion, “a
final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their
47
privies based on the same cause of action.” Thus, such a judgment
prevents relitigation of claims that were or could have been brought
48
in the first action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue
preclusion, “once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in
subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party
49
to the prior litigation.”
The Federal Circuit issued three rulings in the year 2000
50
implicating these doctrines.
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering
51
Corp., the court determined that a challenge to Embrex’s standing
52
was precluded for two reasons. First, a consent judgment in prior
litigation between the parties had incorporated by reference the
parties’ settlement agreement, which stated that “Embrex has
53
standing as exclusive licensee under the ‘630 patent”. Accordingly,
the court held that, under the doctrine of res judicata, the agreement
precluded the alleged infringer’s challenge to Embrex’s status as an
54
exclusive licensee.
Second, the court held that the standing
challenge was barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel/issue
preclusion because the alleged infringer’s attack on Embrex’s status
as an exclusive licensee had been rejected on the merits in a different

45. See LSI, 232 F.3d at 1375, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970.
46. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
47. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
48. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998).
49. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
50. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Speedplay, Inc. v. Bepop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209
F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
51. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
52. See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (affirming district
court’s decision dismissing SEC’s standing defense because of the applicablity of res
judicata).
53. Id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
54. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
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55

lawsuit. Thus, the court reasoned, the alleged infringer “has had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the standing issue at least
56
once . . . .”
57
In Speedplay, Inc. v. Bepop, Inc., the court addressed the
relationship between a patentee and an exclusive licensee for
58
purposes of preclusion. The court observed in dicta that, because
both patentee and licensee had been actively involved in the
licensee’s infringement litigation, “the judgment in this case will have
preclusive effect with respect to any parallel claim that might be
59
brought” by the patentee. Presumably, the court concluded this
because the patentee and licensee were in privity with one another,
60
and thus a subsequent suit would be barred by res judicata.
61
Finally, in Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., the court addressed
the preclusive effect of a district court’s rejection of an invalidity
defense when it ultimately rendered a judgment of non62
infringement. The Federal Circuit ruled that because the district
court had made a ruling of non-infringement, “the district court’s
resolution of the issue of invalidity was not necessary to the judgment.
For that reason, the court’s invalidity ruling will have no collateral
estoppel effect in any possible future dispute between the parties
63
involving the ‘346 patent.” Thus, Hill-Rom demonstrates that if the
resolution of an issue is not “necessary” to a court’s judgment, e.g.,
the judgment is bottomed on alternative grounds, that resolution will
not have a preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral
64
estoppel/issue preclusion.
5.

Estoppel based on conduct
The Federal Circuit addressed three varieties of estoppel based on
conduct in the year 2000: the doctrines of “quasi-estoppel,” “judicial
65
estoppel,” and “equitable estoppel.” In In re Baker Hughes, Inc., the
55. Id. at 1352, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
56. Id. at 1352, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
57. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
58. See Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1253-54, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989.
59. Id. at 1253, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989.
60. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (holding that
parties or their privies are barred from further claims where there has been a final
judgment on the same cause of action).
61. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1877) and Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349
U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
62. See Hill-Rom, 209 F.3d at 1344, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
63. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
64. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. h, illus. 14 (1982).
65. 215 F.3d 1297, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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court rejected the government’s position that Baker Hughes was
precluded under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel from defending, in a
reexamination proceeding, a patent that it had initially challenged in
66
a third-party request for reexamination.
In the reexamination
request, Baker Hughes raised a “substantial new question concerning
67
the patentability” of claims of the 1991 patent. Subsequently,
however, Baker Hughes became the owner of that patent and
68
The
ultimately defended it in the reexamination proceeding.
government argued that such an about-face was precluded under the
69
doctrine of “quasi-estoppel,” also known as the “duty of consistency.”
This is apparently different from the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The
latter doctrine prohibits a party from taking a position in a legal
proceeding and then taking a contrary position in the same or a
70
subsequent legal proceeding. The court noted that quasi-estoppel
originated in tax cases to prevent a taxpayer from taking a position in
one year to his advantage and then in a future year “shifting to a
71
contrary position touching on the same facts or transaction.” The
court then explained that the doctrine applied only (1) “when the
earlier position amounts to a misstatement of fact, not of law,” and
(2) when the misstatement is “one on which the government
reasonably relied, in the sense that it neither knew, nor ought to have
known, the true nature of the transaction mischaracterized by the
72
taxpayer.” The court held that the doctrine did not apply in the
case at bar for three reasons: (1) the government had not shown that
Baker Hughes had made “any specific factual misstatements” or that
the government had “relied on any such misstatements”;
(2) regardless of Baker Hughes’ change in position, the PTO had a
“duty to conduct the reexamination”; and (3) the government had
not shown “that the PTO or the public has suffered any harm from
73
the change in Baker Hughes’ position.”
Accordingly, the court
concluded that the public interest lies in having patents “reexamined
when a substantial question of patentability is raised,” regardless of

66. See Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
67. See id. at 1299, 1301-02, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149-50.
68. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
69. See id. at 1302, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151-52 (citing Lewis v. Comm’r, 18
F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1994)).
70. See id. at 1302 n.2, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 n.2.
71. See In re Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149,
1152 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. United States, 612 F.2d 558,
566 (Ct. Cl. 1979)).
72. Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1302, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (citations
omitted).
73. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
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which party initiates or defends in the reexamination proceedings.
The Federal Circuit discussed the doctrine of judicial estoppel on
75
three occasions in 2000. That doctrine generally “prevents a party
from contradicting previous declarations made during the same or a
later proceeding if the change in position would adversely affect the
76
proceeding or constitute a fraud on the court.” The Federal Circuit
applies the law of judicial estoppel of the circuit from which the case
77
arose. Most, but not all, courts apply judicial estoppel only “where a
party [has] successfully urge[d] a particular position in a legal
proceeding” and later takes “a contrary position” in the same or
78
subsequent proceeding.
79
In Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products, Inc., the court
considered whether Lampi was judicially estopped from arguing that
the patented invention had not been on sale prior to January 31,
1986 because Lampi had stated to the PTO that the device had been
80
Lampi had submitted
“use[d] in commerce” in July 1985.
declarations and its attorneys had argued to the PTO in the course of
an application for a trademark that the external design of the
patented product, a fluorescent light, had been “use[d] in
81
commerce” since July of 1985. Thus, in the district court, American
Power urged that Lampi was judicially estopped from taking the
position that the patented product had not been on sale before
January 31, 1986, and therefore that the patent was invalid under the

74. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152.
75. See Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prods., Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000); N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 215 F.3d 1251,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d
1366, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Interactive Gift Express,
Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (noting that “a party will be judicially estopped from asserting a position on
appeal that is inconsistent with a position it advocated at trial and persuaded the trial
court to adopt”) (discussing Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 71516, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1916 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
76. Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1302 n.2, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154 n.2 (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 571 (7th ed. 1999)).
77. See Lampi, 228 F.3d at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
78. See Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1302 n.2, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154 (quoting
Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). See generally Kelly L.
Morron, Time for the Federal Circuit to Take a Judicious Approach to Judicial Estoppel, 28
AIPLA Q.J. 159, 171-77 & nn.69-108 (2000) (noting that the Tenth and D.C. Circuits
have rejected entirely application of judicial estoppel in cases presenting federal
questions but also noting that, of the remaining circuits, only the Third Circuit does
not have a requirement that a litigant have achieved “success” or “litigation benefit”
from its original position before a change in that position can lead to judicial
estoppel).
79. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
80. See Lampi, 228 F.3d at 1371, 1376-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
81. See id. at 1370-71, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450.
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82

on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The district court rejected this
argument and held that Lampi should not be judicially estopped
because the Lampi officer who had made the relevant statements to
the PTO had “misunderstood” the meaning of “use in commerce,”
and as of July 1985, Lampi had only submitted preliminary plans to a
manufacturer, whereas the patented products had not gone on sale
until September 1986; furthermore, after the statements were made,
Lampi had amended its trademark application to assert that the
83
products had not gone on sale until September 1986. The Federal
Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had not abused its
discretion in determining that Lampi’s original statements to the
PTO were mistaken, that the patented products were actually on sale
as of September 1986 and that Lampi had not gained an “unfair
advantage” before the PTO because trademark protection was
84
available even if the products were not sold until September 1986.
The court did note, however, that it was “troubled by the
inconsistencies between Lampi’s statements to the PTO—particularly
the statements made by Lampi’s attorneys—and the position taken by
85
Lampi in this litigation.” Thus, the court deferred to the district
court’s evaluation of whether Lampi’s assertion of contradictory
positions was intentional and whether it provided an unfair
86
advantage.
87
In Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., the court
addressed whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits parties
from challenging on appeal a claim construction it advocated in the
88
same case at the trial level. In the district court, Samsung had urged
that the terms “aluminum and aluminum oxide” meant “pure
aluminum and aluminum oxide—that is, not any other metals or
alloys in combination with aluminum”; on, appeal, however, Samsung
argued that the definition it had urged below was incomplete, and
that, as properly construed, “the aluminum must be arranged in a
‘layer’ to meet the requirements of the ‘aluminum and aluminum
89
oxide’ limitation.” The Federal Circuit decided not to rule upon
the question of “whether Samsung is judicially estopped from

82. See id. at 1376-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
83. See id. at 1370-72, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450-51.
84. See id. at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
85. See Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prods., Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1445, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
86. See Lampi, 228 F.3d at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
87. 215 F.3d 1281, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
88. See N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1290, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
89. Id. at 1290, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
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challenging its own claim construction adopted by the trial court”
because it found meritless Samsung’s argument that the district court
90
erred in adopting its original claim construction. The court noted,
however, that judicial estoppel “prevent[s] a party from changing its
position over the course of judicial proceedings when such positional
91
changes have an adverse impact on the judicial process,” and that
“we look with ‘extreme disfavor’ on appeals that allege error in claim
constructions that were advocated below by the very party now
92
challenging them.”
It is neither clear nor free from controversy that judicial estoppel
should bar a party from articulating different claim constructions at
trial and on appeal. On the one hand, the doctrine of “invited error”
usually precludes a party from “complain[ing] on appeal of errors
93
that he himself invited.” Indeed, in Key Pharmaceuticals v. Hercon
94
Laboratories Corp., the court noted that the doctrines of “invited
error” and “judicial estoppel” preclude a party from urging that “the
95
trial court erred by adopting the position it advocated at trial.” On
the other hand, because claim construction is a question of law,
96
reviewed “without deference” to the trial court, it is entirely possible
that the Federal Circuit will adopt a claim construction different from
any asserted in, or adopted by, the district court. Thus, the Federal
Circuit has stated that in construing patent claims the court’s role is
“not to decide which of the adversaries is correct,” but to “determine
the meaning of the claims, notwithstanding the views asserted by the
97
98
adversary parties.” In Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
the court purported to do just that, adopting a claim construction
90. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
91. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (quoting Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727,
738 (9th Cir. 1991)).
92. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071 (citing Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp.,
161 F.3d 709, 714-15, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
93. Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 715 n.1, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1911, 1916 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting 9A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2558, at 470 (2d ed. 1995)). Two of the
authors were counsel to Hercon Laboratories in this case.
94. 161 F.3d 709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
95. Key Pharms., 161 F.3d at 715, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915. The court did not
apply such preclusion doctrines in Hercon because the court had not previously publicly
condemned a party from urging on appeal that the claim construction advocated in
the district court was error and because Key had not objected to Hercon’s conduct or
sought to invoke estoppel. Id. at 715-16, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916.
96. See Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1556, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1803 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the issue of claim
interpretation is reviewed on appeal “without deference to the trial judge”). Two of
the authors were counsel to The Lubrizol Corporation in this case.
97. Id. at 1555-56, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803.
98. 64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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that, while virtually identical to that advocated by Lubrizol, was
asserted by the court to be different from that urged by the parties as
99
well as that adopted by the district court. Accordingly, while it may
be appropriate in some circumstances to prohibit a party from
challenging the precise claim construction it urged in the trial court,
such a prohibition conflicts with the notion that the Federal Circuit
itself may issue claim interpretations never proposed by either party
in the course of district court litigation.
100
Finally, in Zacharin v. United States, the court addressed whether
the government could be estopped from asserting the on-sale bar as a
defense although it had not raised the issue when the patent
101
application was filed.
The government argued that the patent at
issue was invalid under the on-sale bar because the patented
invention was offered for sale by a contract signed in April 1980,
more than one year before Zacharin’s patent application had been
102
Zacharin, an Army employee, asked Army counsel in
filed.
September 1980 to file a patent application for the invention but was
told by Army counsel that due to a backlog, the application might be
delayed for more than a year; the application was in fact submitted to
103
the PTO on September 24, 1981.
Zacharin argued that the
government was estopped from asserting the on-sale bar as a defense
because the government attorney who filed the patent application
had not raised the on-sale bar issue at the time of the patent
104
application.
The court rejected this argument noting that “if
equitable estoppel is available at all against the government some
105
The court
form of affirmative misconduct must be shown . . . .”
held that “[t]here is no evidence that any representative of the
government gave Mr. Zacharin incorrect legal advice or engaged in
any other affirmative misconduct . . . .”; and thus, that the
106
government could not be equitably estopped.
99. See Exxon, 64 F.3d at 1556-61, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803-07 (providing
independent claim construction); see also Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,
77 F.3d 450, 451, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1768 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Mayer, J.,
concurring in denial of rehearing in banc) (opining that “[t]wo judges have divined an
interpretation of the claim that occurred to no one else in this extensive litigation.”).
100. 213 F.3d 1366, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
101. See Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1371-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
102. See id. at 1368-69, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
103. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
104. See id. at 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051 (discussing Zacharin’s equitable
estoppel argument).
105. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
106. Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 1371-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047,
1051 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In light of this holding, the court declined to address a second
argument against the assertion of equitable estoppel stating that to preclude the
government from asserting the on-sale bar would provide Zacharin with a money

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000

1453

6.

Waiver and collateral attack
107
In Glitsch, Inc. v. Koch Engineering Co., the court held that a party
that had failed to timely raise a patent misuse defense in an
infringement action could not later bring a declaratory judgment
action seeking a declaration of patent misuse and vacatur of any
108
damages award in the original action. In the original infringement
action, Glitsch had attempted to amend its answer to assert defenses
of patent and trade-secret misuse after the district court had ruled on
liability but before it had ruled on damages. The district court
denied Glitsch’s motion to amend as untimely because the defenses
109
at issue related to the already-determined issues of liability. Glitsch
then filed a separate declaratory-judgment action seeking to have the
patent and trade secrets at issue in the first action declared
unenforceable because of patent and trade-secret misuse and any
110
award of damages in first action vacated.
The district court held
that Glitsch had waived its right to have the patent and trade-secret
misuse claims litigated by failing to raise them timely in the original
111
action.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, but on the ground that Glitsch could
not circumvent its error in the first action via a collateral attack in its
112
second action. As the court stated,
[w]hen a court enters an order that a party does not like, the
party’s recourse is to seek relief on appeal; it is not appropriate for
the party to contest the court’s order by filing a new action seeking
a declaratory judgment challenging the court’s ruling in the first
113
case.

The court explained that permitting Glitsch’s declaratory
judgment action would be tantamount to permitting “an
interlocutory appeal of an adverse ruling” on the merits of the misuse
114
defenses. The court noted that its holding was compelled by three
remedy that Congress had not authorized, contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426 (1990). Id. at 1371-72, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1051.
107. 216 F.3d 1382, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
108. See Glitsch, 216 F.3d at 1383-86, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375.
109. See id. at 1383, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375-77 (discussing the proceedings in
the district court).
110. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375-77.
111. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375-77.
112. See id. at 1384, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. The court ultimately made clear
that it was taking no position on the merits of the waiver ruling which presumably can
be raised on any appeal that may be taken in the original infringement action. Id. at
1386, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
113. Glitsch, Inc. v. Koch Eng’g Co., 216 F.3d 1382, 1384, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
114. See Glitsch, 216 F.3d at 1385, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
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important policies of federal procedure: “(1) that litigation relating
to a single matter should take place in a single action”; “(2) that a
district court’s order in one action should be reviewed by the
statutory method of appeal, not by a collateral proceeding for
declaratory judgment”; and “(3) that, with limited exceptions, review
of a district court’s ruling should take place only after a final
115
judgment is entered in that case.”
Finally, the court rejected Glitsch’s argument that the Supreme
Court had established that patent-misuse defenses cannot be
116
waived.
The Federal Circuit noted that in the Mercoid case, the
Supreme Court ruled that failing to assert a patent-misuse defense in
an infringement action against a party’s privy did not preclude that
party from raising that equitable defense in a subsequent action
directly against that party in which the equitable remedy of an
117
injunction was sought.
The Federal Circuit distinguished that
situation, involving the balance between patent misuse and res
judicata, from the case at bar which did not involve successive
infringement actions and in which Glitsch still had the right to appeal
118
Consequently, the court held that “the
in the original action.
rationale of Mercoid does not justify allowing a party to launch a
collateral attack on a ruling in the first action, the effect of which
119
would be to alter the judgment in that action.”
7.

Order of addressing arguments
120
In Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., the court made clear that a
district court may decide the issue of patent validity, “even if the issue
was raised only as an affirmative defense and even if the court finds
121
that the patent was not infringed.”
There, the district court’s
opinion stated both that the patent was not infringed and that the
affirmative defense of invalidity was meritless; however, the judgment
stated only that “judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants
122
On
Kinetic Concepts Inc. and KCI Therapeutic Services Inc.”
115. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (citations omitted).
116. See id. at 1385-86, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (analyzing Mercoid Corp. v.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944)).
117. See id. at 1385, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (discussing Mercoid, 320 U.S. at
670).
118. See id. at 1386, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (discussing Mercoid).
119. Glitsch, Inc. v. Koch Eng’g Co., 216 F.3d 1382, 1386, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
120. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
121. Hill-Rom, 209 F.3d at 1344, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442 (citing Multiform
Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1481, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1436
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
122. Id. at 1340, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
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appeal, KCI argued that, should the Federal Circuit uphold the
judgment on noninfringement grounds, it should vacate the district
123
court’s discussion of validity in its opinion.
Although the Federal
Circuit upheld the judgment on grounds of noninfringement, it
declined to vacate any part of the district court’s judgment or
opinion. First, the Federal Circuit found it unnecessary to vacate any
part of the judgment because the district court’s ruling on invalidity
124
was not mentioned anywhere in the judgment. Second, as noted in
Part I.A.4, supra, the court reasoned that because the ruling on
invalidity was not necessary to the court’s judgment, it would have no
125
binding effect in any future proceedings between the parties. Thus,
the Federal Circuit had no reason to modify the district court’s
judgment or opinion in any way.
8.

Trial procedure/motions to dismiss and adequacy of pleading
The Federal Circuit carefully scrutinizes dismissals under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to adequately plead a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Because the question of
whether a district court’s ruling on such a motion “is a purely
procedural question not pertaining to patent law,” the court applies
the rule of appellate review of the regional circuit in which the case
126
127
Thus, in Phonometrics v. Hospitality Franchise Systems, the
arose.
court noted that the Eleventh Circuit “has made clear that the
dismissal standard is extraordinary, and one not to be taken
128
129
lightly.”
Similarly, in C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., the court
emphasized that the Seventh Circuit has held that a complaint “need
not specify the correct legal theory, or point to the right statute, to
130
survive a motion to dismiss.”
In Phonometrics, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of
131
an infringement complaint for pleading deficiencies.
After the
second remand in that case from the Federal Circuit on claim123. See id. at 1343, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
124. See id. at 1344, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
125. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
126. See C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1306, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1871 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Seventh Circuit law); see also Phonometrics, Inc.
v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 793, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762, 1764
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Eleventh Circuit law to the same issue).
127. 203 F.3d 790, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
128. Phonometrics, 203 F.3d at 793, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764 (citing Brooks v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997)).
129. 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
130. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1306, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (citing Tolle v.
Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (7th Cir. 1992)).
131. Phonometrics, 203 F.3d at 793-94, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764-65.
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construction issues, the district court had dismissed the complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) and granted leave to amend the complaint
requiring Phonometrics to include specific infringement allegations
for each claim element, in accordance with the Federal Circuit’s
132
claim construction.
Rather than amend the complaint,
133
Phonometrics appealed the dismissal to the Federal Circuit.
The
Federal Circuit held, contrary to the district court’s ruling, that “Rule
12(b)(6) pleading requirements for a complaint of infringement
cannot be extended to require a plaintiff to specifically include each
134
element of the claims of the asserted patent.” Rather, “a patentee
need only plead facts sufficient to place the alleged infringer on
notice. This requirement ensures that an accused infringer has
sufficient knowledge of the facts alleged to enable it to answer the
135
complaint and defend itself.”
To require otherwise “would
contravene the notice pleading standard, and would add needless
136
steps to the already complex process of patent litigation.”
In C&F Packing, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s
137
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). There, C&F had argued that Illinois
law governed its claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and
alleged a violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. The district court
138
disagreed, concluding that Kansas law governed C&F’s claims. The
district court thus dismissed C&F’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6)
because they had purportedly been brought under the wrong
139
statute. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that even if C&F had
chosen the “law of the wrong state under which to bring its claim,
such a mistake is akin to that of bringing a case under an incorrect
legal theory” and, consequently, “the district court should have
proceeded to try the case on its merits under the state law it found
140
more appropriate.”
The Federal Circuit also criticized the district
court’s dicta that C&F’s claims should have been dismissed even
141
under Kansas law as barred by the statute of limitations. The court
noted that the parties disputed when C&F knew or should have
132. See id. at 792, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763-64.
133. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763-64.
134. See id. at 794, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
135. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
136. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
137. See C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1306-07, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1871 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
138. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1306, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (discussing the
district court’s holding).
139. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
140. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
141. See id. at 1306-07, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (noting that the district court’s
dicta “foreshadows a possible verdict on remand”).
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known that its trade secrets had been misappropriated and explained
that Kansas law requires such a dispute to be resolved by “the trier of
142
fact.” Accordingly, the court remanded for further fact-finding on
143
those limitation issues.
9.

Trial procedure/motions for judgment as a matter of law
In 2000, the Federal Circuit addressed a few important procedural
issues regarding motions for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”).
A JMOL is appropriate if “during a trial by jury a party has been fully
heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis
144
Such a
for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.”
145
motion must be made before submitting the case to the jury.
In
reviewing district court judgments in patent cases, the Federal Circuit
applies Federal Circuit law to patent law issues, which include
procedural issues relating to patent law, but applies “the law of the
146
circuit in which the district court sits” to nonpatent issues.
Consequently, the court applies Federal Circuit procedural law to
JMOL decisions on patent issues, and regional circuit procedural law
147
to JMOL decisions on nonpatent issues.
With regard to patent law issues, the Federal Circuit reviews district
court decisions on motions for JMOL by applying the same standard
148
used by the district court.
Thus, the court determines “whether
‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party,’ and giving the non-movant ‘the benefit of all reasonable
inferences,’ there is sufficient evidence of record to support a jury
149
In doing so, the court does
verdict in favor of the non-movant.”
“not weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses, or
142. See id. at 1307, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (citing McCaffree Fin. Corp. v.
Nunnink, 847 P.2d 1321, 1331 (Kan. App. 1993)).
143. See C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1307-08, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1).
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2).
146. See, e.g., Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1674-75 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
147. Compare, e.g., Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 128990, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Federal Circuit
procedural law to decision on JMOL regarding patent infringement), with C&F
Packing, 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Seventh
Circuit procedural law to decision on JMOL regarding misappropriation of trade
secrets).
148. See Southwest Software, 226 F.3d at 1289, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (citing
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 975, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) in reviewing the lower court’s holding by reapplication
of the same standard).
149. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1167 (quoting Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1573, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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decide disputed facts,” but rather determines whether “there can be
but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable jurors could have
150
reached.”
The Federal Circuit, however, cannot determine that a district
court should have granted a JMOL on a ground not properly
151
advanced in the district court. “Failing to properly move for JMOL
at the close of evidence precludes a challenge to the sufficiency of the
152
evidence underlying fact findings.” Thus, in Southwest Software, Inc.
v. Harlequin, Inc., the court held that Harlequin had waived its right
to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on a particular
infringement claim because it had failed to move for JMOL on that
153
claim at the close of evidence. Similarly, in Advanced Display Systems,
154
Inc. v. Kent State University, the court held that Kent had waived its
right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the claim that its
patent was invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because it
155
had not moved for JMOL at the close of evidence.
Kent was not
foreclosed, however, from challenging the verdict and seeking a new
trial on the ground that the judge had given the jury a legally
erroneous jury instruction relating to the anticipation claim because
156
Kent had properly objected to the jury instruction.
The court does not hold parties to particularly severe standards of
form in complying with the requirement that a JMOL motion be
157
Thus, in Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v.
made at the close of evidence.
158
Hoffinger Industries, Inc., the court held that Hoffinger had not
waived its right to renew its JMOL on infringement, even though it
had not presented argument on that element of its JMOL motion
159
after the close of evidence.
The district court, in granting JMOL,
noted that it “understood [Hoffinger] to be renewing its Rule 50
motion in its entirety, but only rearguing the point relating to the
160
issue of lost profits.” The court characterized the question of “what
constitutes a directed verdict” as a purely procedural issue governed
150. Id. at 1289-90, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168 (quoting Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at
1573, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841).
151. See id. at 1290, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
152. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
153. See Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1290, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
154. 212 F.3d 1272, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
155. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1282-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679-80.
156. See id. at 1281-82, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
157. See Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206 F.3d 1408, 1412, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
158. 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
159. See Zodiac Pool Care, 206 F.3d at 1412, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
160. Id. at 1412-13, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
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by regional circuit law and noted that the Eleventh Circuit took a
161
“liberal view” on that issue.
The court then held that “in light of
the trial judge’s declaration of this understanding, we find no
compelling reason why counsel for Hoffinger should have
emphasized issues that have already been ruled upon by the trial
162
court”; accordingly, the Court affirmed the grant of JMOL. Thus,
the court largely deferred to the district court’s determination in
light of the “wide discretion” given a trial judge in characterizing the
163
arguments of counsel.
10. Trial procedure/post-judgment motions to amend
District court rulings on motions to amend complaints or
judgments are generally governed by the law of the regional circuit
from which the case originated and are reviewed for “abuse of
164
In reviewing a denial of a motion to amend a
discretion.”
complaint following summary judgment, a party must at least present
a “colorable argument of possible success” on other claims; a distrcit
court need not allow a proposed amendment if it would be futile to
165
166
do so.
Thus, in Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., the
court affirmed the district court’s denial of such a motion, even
though the district court had denied the motion “without
167
comment.”
The court acknowledged that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a) permits a complaint to be amended “when justice so
168
requires,” and stated that “[o]rdinarily, courts of appeals frown on
169
unexplained exercises of discretion by trial judges.” However, the
court held that any amendment of the complaint at issue to assert
infringement of additional claims of the patent would have been
“futile,” since under the “district court’s claim construction,” none of
161. See id. at 1416, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
162. See id. at 1417, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
163. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (relying on Motorola Inc. v. Interdigital
Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1470, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1487 (Fed. Cir. 1997))
(citations omitted).
164. See, e.g., Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 1332-33, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Second Circuit law to motion
to amend complaint after grant of summary judgment and reviewing for “abuse of
discretion”); Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1350, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Third Circuit law to motion
to amend judgment and reviewing for “abuse of discretion”).
165. See Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
166. 224 F.3d 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
167. See Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1332-33, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211-12 (rejecting
Cultor’s argument that the court’s lack of explanation was antithetical to the Federal
Rules).
168. See id. at 1332, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)).
169. Id. at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
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170

the claims could have been infringed.
Accordingly, the court
171
affirmed the district court’s “terse ruling.”
172
In Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels Midland Co., the court affirmed
173
the district court’s denial of a motion to amend the judgment. The
court noted that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), as
interpreted by the Third Circuit:
A proper motion to alter or amend the judgment “must rely on one
of three major grounds: ‘(1) an intervening change in controlling
law; (2) the availability of new evidence [not available previously];
[or] (3) the need to correct clear error [of law] or prevent
174
manifest injustice.’”

The court reasoned that there had been no change in the law and
that the evidence the defendant had wished to submit after the
judgment—that it had changed to a non-infringing product—had
been available to it and within its control prior to the entry of
judgment on damages, and that the defendant made numerous
strategic choices during the pendency of the litigation not to
175
introduce that evidence.
Therefore, the court concluded that the
district court had not abused its discretion in refusing to “re-open”
176
the case to permit an additional evidentiary hearing on that issue.
11. Trial procedure/motion to transfer venue
Pursuant to statute, a district court may transfer an action to
another district court for “the convenience of parties and witnesses,
177
in the interest of justice.” The Federal Circuit reviews a decision on
such a procedural motion under the law of the regional circuit from
178
which the case arose. Thus, in Winner International Royalty Corp. v.
179
Wang, the court applied the law of the District of Columbia Circuit
to determine whether the district court had abused its discretion in
denying Wang’s motion to transfer to the Central District of
180
California.
The court affirmed the district court’s decision,
170. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
171. Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.2d 1328, 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1208, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
172. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
173. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1349-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341-42.
174. Id. at 1350, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (quoting N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
175. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341-42 (holding the defendant’s silence
justified the lower court’s decision).
176. Id. at 1351, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
177. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1352, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1580, 1589 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994)).
178. See Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1352, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
179. 202 F.3d 1340, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
180. See Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1352, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589-90.
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reasoning: (1) that with numerous witnesses close to either the
District of Columbia or California, it was just as convenient to litigate
in the District of Columbia; and (2) that the case was tried and
resolved in just six months after the motion for transfer was denied,
“presumably much more quickly than would have been the case if the
181
action were transferred.”
12. Trial practice/challenge to jury instructions
A party may challenge a jury verdict on the ground that an
182
instruction to the jury was legally erroneous.
To make such a
challenge, a party must establish that “(1) it made a proper and
timely objection to the jury instructions, (2) those instructions were
legally erroneous, (3) the errors had prejudicial effect, and (4) it
requested alternative instructions that would have remedied the
183
error.”
(It is questionable whether the fourth requirement, of
correct alternative instructions, should apply in all cases in light of
Rule 51’s prescription that a party need only “stat[e] distinctly the
184
matter objected to and the grounds of the objection,” and Rule 46’s
command that “formal exceptions” to district court actions are
unnecessary so long as a party expresses its “objection to the action of
185
the court and the grounds therefor.”
Indeed, in many
circumstances, a party will request that no instruction at all be given
rather than propose an alternative instruction.)
186
In Advanced Display Systems v. Kent State University, the court
reversed a jury finding of patent invalidity by anticipation because of
187
an erroneous jury instruction. The court first sought to determine
whether Kent had objected timely to the relevant jury instruction, a
procedural issue determined by the law of the regional circuit from
188
which the case arose.
Applying Fifth Circuit law, the court ruled
that, by objecting to the relevant jury instruction before the jury had
been charged and explaining the basis for the objection, Kent had
189
properly objected.
The court next examined whether the
181. See id. at 1352, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1589-90.
182. See, e.g., Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that a “jury verdict may be
altered if the instructions ‘were incorrect or incomplete as given’”) (quoting Biodex
Corp. v. Loredan Biomed. Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 854, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252, 1255
(Fed. Cir. 1991)).
183. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citations omitted).
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 51.
185. FED. R. CIV. P. 46.
186. 212 F.3d 1272, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
187. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1281-84, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-80.
188. See id. at 1281-82, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
189. See id. at 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing A.B. Baumstimler v.
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instruction, which required the jury to determine whether a prior-art
document had incorporated by reference other material such that
the substance of both could be considered to evaluate whether the
190
patent at issue had been anticipated, was legally erroneous.
The
court held that the instruction was erroneous because “[w]hether
and to what extent material has been incorporated by reference into
a host document is a question of law” that the court below should
191
have determined, rather than leaving it to the jury.
Further, the
court held that the error was “prejudicial” because “determining what
material was incorporated by reference into the Haas patent was a
critical question of law for the [court] to resolve before submitting
192
the factual issue of anticipation to the jury.” Finally, the court held
that Kent had properly demonstrated that its objection would cure
the defect because “the proper jury instruction on incorporation by
193
reference would have been no instruction at all.”
Consequently,
194
Advanced
the court remanded for a new trial on anticipation.
Display demonstrates that, where no instruction would have been
appropriate, the court will not require that an alternate instruction
195
should have been proposed.
196
In Environ Products, Inc. v. Furon Co., the court examined whether
a jury instruction contained the correct burden of proof—“clear and
197
The
convincing evidence”—for a party claiming inventorship.
court first concluded that the proper burden of proof would have
been the “preponderance of the evidence” standard applicable in a
patent interference proceeding because both parties had patent
applications that were “co-pending,” and thus the higher burden of
proof usually placed upon a challenger to a presumptively valid
198
patent should not have been applied.
The court next examined
whether the district court’s error was prejudicial; it concluded that
there was no prejudice because, regardless of the burden of proof,
Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1069, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 575, 581-82 (5th Cir. 1982)).
190. See id. at 1282-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing Ultradent Prods., Inc. v.
Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc., 127 F.3d 1065, 1069, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1336, 1339-40
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
191. Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1283, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
192. Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1283, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (noting that
“[p]rejudicial legal error exists when it ‘appears to the court [that the error is]
inconsistent with substantial justice’”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 61).
193. Id. at 1284, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
194. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
195. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
196. 215 F.3d 1261, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
197. See Environ Prods., 215 F.3d at 1265-66, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041-42.
198. See id. at 1266, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
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the jury’s determination of the identity of the inventor would have
been the same—the jury found that the named inventor was the
actual inventor, by a preponderance of the evidence, which negated
the possibility that the challenger could have been the inventor,
199
regardless of what burden the challenger had to shoulder.
Thus,
the court held that the error was “harmless” and that Furon was not
200
entitled to a new trial.
A variation on the problem of an erroneous burden of proof was at
201
issue in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.
There the district
court had improperly instructed the jury that “willfulness” of
infringement (for which enhanced damages can be awarded) could
be proven by “a preponderance of the evidence” instead of the
correct and more exacting “clear and convincing evidence”
202
standard. The jury found, based on this improper statement of the
burden of proof, that the defendant’s infringement had been
203
The defendant, however, had not timely objected to the
willful.
204
erroneous jury instruction. Under Fourth Circuit law, applicable to
this procedural issue, appeal would still be permitted if the error were
“plain,” if it affected the aggrieved party’s “substantial rights,” and if
205
failure to correct the error “would result in a miscarriage of justice.”
The court concluded that the error was plain, but it held that failure
to correct it would not result in a miscarriage of justice because in the
court’s evaluation of the evidence presented at trial, “the jury would
have reached the same conclusion under either” evidentiary
206
The accuracy of this court’s holding, where a
standard.
“willfulness” finding required the jury to determine its certainty of
willful infringement (a determination which required the jury to
evaluate the evidence through the prism of the burden of proof—i.e.,
if the jury were only fifty-one percent convinced of willfulness, it
could not render a willfulness verdict under the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard), is less clear than the court’s holding
in Environ, where the jury’s answer to other interrogatories gave the

199. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042-43.
200. See id. at 1266-67, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043 (noting that “[e]rrors in
instructions routinely are ignored if . . . the error could not have changed the result”)
(quoting 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2886 (2d ed. 1995)).
201. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
202. See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
203. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
204. See id. at 1350-51, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
205. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165 (quoting United States v. Jennings,
160 F.3d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1998)).
206. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
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court more assurance that any error assigning burdens of proof was
207
in fact harmless.
208
Lastly, in C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., the court found that the
jury instruction on the definition of trade secret misappropriation
209
The court, in applying Seventh Circuit law to
was not erroneous.
the procedural issue of the “correctness of jury instructions,” noted
that the instruction needed only to “convey the correct message to
210
the jury reasonably well.”
Based upon that standard, the court
concluded that the instruction did not mislead the jury because it
conveyed the critical message that it may be relevant to, but cannot
be dispositive of, the question of trade secret misappropriation that
the alleged wrongdoer had hired a former employee of the
211
complaining party.
13. Trial practice/use of stipulations
The use of stipulations between the parties either before or during
212
trial is an increasingly common litigation practice. As a handful of
Federal Circuit cases from year 2000 demonstrate, the use of such
stipulations can have significant consequences for the parties. In
213
Watts v. XL Systems, Inc., the parties agreed to the following
stipulations prior to a determination on summary judgment: “that
XL (1) does not infringe any of the three claims [at issue in the
litigation] when [two] functional statements [in the claims] are
construed as means-plus-function limitations; (2) does not use
differing taper angles between connecting pipe ends; and (3) does
not use any structure that is insubstantially different from the use of
214
differing taper angles.”
Based upon its claim construction and
207. Compare Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2000), with Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (illustrating the difficulty in determining
whether an erroneous jury instruction regarding the assignment of burden of proof
was harmless or prejudicial).
208. 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
209. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1303, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869-70.
210. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (citing Dawson v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
135 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1998)).
211. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869-70.
212. See, e.g., Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
213. 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
214. Watts, 232 F.3d at 879-81, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, para. 6, “an element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material or
acts, in support thereof,” and “such claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof.” Such claims are generally referred to as “means-plus-function” or
“step-plus-function” claims.
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these stipulations, the district court concluded that the claims had
215
not been infringed. On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that
the “functional statements” in the claims were not means-plus216
function claims. Watts had argued on appeal that noninfringement
217
was not conceded by the stipulations. However, the Federal Circuit
disagreed, holding that the second and third stipulations, which do
not refer to means-plus-function restrictions, precluded Watts’s
infringement arguments regardless of the resolution of the means218
plus-function claims.
The court reasoned that the claims at issue,
regardless of whether the claim elements were in means-plus-function
format, required “differing taper angles,” but that the second
stipulation “unequivocally concedes” that XL did not use such
219
angles; moreover, the third stipulation disclaimed any possible basis
220
for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Therefore, the
stipulations Watts had agreed to in the district court ended up
221
foreclosing its arguments on appeal.
222
Similarly in Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., the court
held that ADM’s pre-trial admissions foreclosed one of its arguments
on appeal. ADM argued that it should be permitted to have an
evidentiary hearing before the district court to present evidence
regarding damages—that it had allegedly begun to use a non223
infringing product—never previously proffered to the district court.
However, ADM’s pre-trial admissions and the parties’ joint pre-trial
statement of stipulated facts both contained statements that ADM was
224
Thus, the court
using only the product found to be infringing.
held that ADM was bound by those admissions, at least until it
expressly informed the district court that they were incorrect,
225
something it did not attempt to do until after trial. Ultimately, the
court ruled that the district court had not abused its discretion in
226
refusing to grant ADM a hearing to present its desired evidence.
215. See id. at 879-80, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
216. See id. at 884-85, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42.
217. See id. at 884, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
218. See id. at 884-85, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42.
219. See Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 884, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1842
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
220. Watts, 232 F.3d at 885, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
221. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
222. 228 F.3d 1338, 1350-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
223. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1350, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.
224. See id. at 1351, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
225. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342 (noting that “[a]ny matter admitted under
this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or
amendment of the admission”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b)).
226. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
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While the court did refer to other factors, such as ADM’s resistance to
discovery on the issue and the actual testimony at trial in upholding
227
the district court’s ruling, ADM’s admissions plainly played an
228
important role in the court’s rejection of its arguments on appeal.
229
In Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., the parties’
stipulations had the effect of advancing, rather than hampering,
Interactive Gift Express’s (IGE) appeal. There, after the district court
had completed its claim construction of five disputed claim
limitations, the parties entered into a Stipulated Order and Judgment
providing that there was no infringement of any of the five claims as
230
construed by the district court. Based upon this stipulation, which
permitted a rapid appeal, counsel for IGE acknowledged at oral
argument that “IGE must show that the district court was wrong in its
construction of all five of the disputed claim limitations to prevail in
231
[its] appeal.”
Hence, IGE’s stipulations required it to sustain a
heavy burden on appeal. Nonetheless, it was able to do so, as the
court held that the district court had erred “in at least one aspect of
its construction of each of the five claim limitations”; consequently,
the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further
232
proceedings.
These cases demonstrate the advantages and disadvantages of the
use of stipulations in the trial court. They are very likely to bind the
parties even on appeal, and may therefore preclude certain
arguments a party may wish to pursue in the Federal Circuit. On the
other hand, such stipulations can be used to narrow the issues in a
case and/or facilitate a rapid appeal. The use of stipulations may be
especially helpful in light of the court’s ruling in Markman v. Westview
233
Instruments, Inc.,
that claim construction is an issue of law
234
determined exclusively by the court.
As we discuss in Part III.A,
infra, in most infringement cases, the real (indeed, the only) dispute
235
Thus, it may be increasingly
is over claim construction.
advantageous for parties to stipulate to factual issues such as literal
infringement—if there is no real dispute about the resolution of the
227. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
228. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1351, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
229. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
230. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
231. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1651.
232. Id. at 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662.
233. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
234. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
235. See infra notes 1192- 1311 and accompanying text.
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issue should a particular claim construction be adopted—to expedite
review of an adverse claim-construction ruling.
14. Trial practice/admissibility of evidence
District court decisions regarding the admission or rejection of
evidence at trial are reviewed under the deferential “abuse of
236
discretion” standard. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has noted that,
237
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), “the right to be ‘fully
heard’ does not amount to a right to introduce every shred of
evidence that a party wishes, without regard to the probative value of
238
that evidence.”
Thus, in Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical v. Danbury
239
Pharmacal, Inc., the court held that the district court had not abused
its discretion in refusing Danbury’s request to present testimony of
240
The Federal
the inventor of the patent alleged to be invalid.
Circuit embraced the district court’s reasoning that the inventor’s
testimony would be offered only to contradict the testimony of
Danbury’s own expert and that Danbury could have previously
241
deposed the inventor but chose not to do so.
Hence, the court
242
agreed that Danbury had been “fully heard” at trial.
In a similar
vein, the court upheld the district court’s exclusion of hearsay
243
evidence in Rotec Indus. v. Mitsubishi Corp. There, Rotec wished to
introduce a declaration from its President recounting the statements
244
of others regarding the activities of a competitor. The district court
held that the plainly hearsay statement could not properly be
characterized as a statement furthering a conspiracy or as describing

236. See, e.g., Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339,
1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1256, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
237. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(c) states:
JUDGMENT OF PARTIAL FINDINGS. If during a trial without a jury a party had
been fully heard on an issue and the court finds against the party on that
issue, the court may either enter judgment as a matter of law against the
party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling
law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue, or
the court may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the
evidence. Such a judgment shall be supported by findings of fact and
conclusions of law as required by subdivision (a) of this rule.
238. See Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (quoting First
Va. Banks, Inc. v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 206 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2000)).
239. 231 F.3d 1339, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
240. See Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (holding that
the right to be fully heard at trial does not indicate that the district court lacks
discretion in excluding testimony).
241. See id. at 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
242. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
243. See 215 F.3d 1246, 1255-56, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
244. See Rotec Indus., 215 F.3d at 1256, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007-08.
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the statement of an agent of Mitsubishi, since the statement
245
recounted information provided by innocent third parties.
Thus,
the Federal Circuit held that the district court had not abused its
246
discretion in excluding the declaration.
Likewise, the court deferentially reviews decisions by district courts
to admit evidence of questionable probative value. In Winner
247
International Royalty Corp. v. Wang, the court found that the district
court had not abused its discretion in allowing Winner to introduce
evidence from allegedly late-disclosed witnesses and a survey
248
regarding the commercial success of the patented invention. The
Federal Circuit held that Wang’s failure to identify precisely which
249
witnesses were purportedly disclosed late
and its incorrect
argument that the survey was relevant demonstrated that the district
250
court’s decision was within its sound discretion. Similarly, in Fiskars,
251
Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co., the court upheld the district court’s
refusal to strike Fiskars’ damages case for failure to disclose certain
252
The district court ruled that Hunt’s argument
sales information.
was suspicious because Hunt had declined the court’s offer to
exclude the same sales information prior to trial and could not after
253
trial “attack an evidentiary ruling it requested.” The Federal Circuit
254
held that such a ruling was within the district court’s discretion.
15. Trial practice/expert testimony
Expert testimony is admissible in patent cases for a variety of
255
purposes. It is particularly common with regard to issues of patent
infringement and is frequently offered to oppose summary
256
257
In Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd., the
judgment.
court held that an expert’s unsupported conclusion of infringement
245. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
246. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
247. 202 F.3d 1340, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
248. Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1351-52, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
249. See id. at 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
250. See id. at 1351-52, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589.
251. 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
252. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
253. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
254. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
255. See Aqua-Aerobic Sys., Inc. v. Aerators, Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 1244 n.3, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1567, 1568 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.”) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
256. For a detailed discussion of the role of extrinsic evidence in claim
construction, see infra Part III.A.
257. 216 F.3d 1042, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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did not defeat summary judgment of noninfringement.
There,
Collins proffered an expert declaration that purported to generate
genuine issues of material fact regarding the structures of the
accused products: the patent required “TST switches” and the expert
259
declared that the accused products were TST switches.
The court
noted that this was an unsupported declaration and explained that
“an expert’s unsupported conclusion on the ultimate issue of
infringement is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
260
fact.”
Hence, the court affirmed the district court’s summary
261
judgment of noninfringement.
In the proper circumstances, however, expert testimony can
preclude summary judgment. In Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar
262
Avionics, the court relied upon an expert declaration and report to
vacate and remand the district court’s determination of
263
noninfringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
The expert’s
submissions there contained a “detailed” factual analysis of the patent
claims and the accused device and concluded that there was
264
infringement.
The Federal Circuit noted that “[n]o evidence was
offered by Del Mar in rebuttal,” and concluded that a reasonable
factfinder could find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
265
based on Optical Disc’s expert submissions.
These cases demonstrate that expert testimony can, in the proper
circumstances, defeat motions for summary judgment. If the
testimony is factually specific, it can, as in Optical Disc, demonstrate a
genuine issue for trial. If, however, the testimony is conclusory, it will
fail to prevent summary judgment.
16. Trial practice/management of discovery
266
In Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., the Federal Circuit
noted that “[i]ntrusions into a district court’s trial management are
267
rarely appropriate on appeal.”
There, the court affirmed the
258. See Arthur A. Collins, 216 F.3d at 1046, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146
(maintaining that Collins relied on an unsupported expert declaration in opposing
summary judgment and failed to set forth specific facts sufficient to demonstrate a basis
for the claim).
259. Id. at 1045-46, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
260. See id. at 1046, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (citing Zelinski v. Brunswick Corp.,
185 F.3d 1311, 1317, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
261. See id. at 1047-48, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147-48.
262. 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
263. See Optical Disc, 208 F.3d at 1336, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296-99.
264. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
265. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296-97.
266. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
267. Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
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district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement and
refusal to permit Moore to conduct additional discovery in the hopes
268
of averting summary judgment. In response to Standard’s motions
for summary judgment, Moore had filed declarations under Federal
269
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), stating that it required additional
270
discovery to respond adequately to those motions.
The district
court had refused Moore’s request, stating that it would not permit
Moore “to conduct ‘fishing expeditions in hopes of finding products
271
that might be infringing’ to oppose summary judgment.”
The
Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Moore’s Rule 56(f)
declarations did not indicate how additional discovery would create a
genuine issue of material fact regarding infringement and did not
contest Standard’s claim that Moore had been allowed to inspect all
272
the accused products at Standard’s headquarters.
The court
concluded that the “district court here should be applauded for his
expedient handling of this case” and rejected Moore’s claim that the
273
district court’s grant of summary judgment should be overturned.
17. Trial practice/privilege issues
In 2000, the Federal Circuit addressed important issues regarding
the attorney-client privilege and its application to patent documents.
274
In In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., the court analyzed a petition
for mandamus to hold that the attorney-client privilege applied to
protect from discovery an “invention record prepared and submitted
275
to house counsel relating to a litigated patent.” The court began by
holding that Federal Circuit law would apply because the decision
“whether particular written or other materials are discoverable in a
276
patent case . . . relate[s] to an issue of substantive patent law.”
Next, the court noted that the attorney-client privilege “exists to
268. See id. at 1115-16, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242-43.
269. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) provides:
WHEN AFFIDAVITS ARE UNAVAILABLE. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that the party cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order
a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
270. See Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1115, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
271. Id. at 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242 (internal citation omitted).
272. Id. at 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
273. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
274. 203 F.3d 800, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
275. Spalding Sports, 203 F.3d at 803, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
276. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (citing Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan, 175
F.3d 1356, 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc in relevant
part)).
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protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act
on it, but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him
277
to give sound and informed advice.”
Because the “invention
record” at issue was compiled for and submitted to Spalding’s patent
counsel “for the purpose of making patentability determinations,” the
court held that the record “constitute[d] a privileged
278
communication.”
In response to Wilson’s contention that the
technical portions of the invention record should be disclosed in
redacted form, the court also held that:
to the extent that Spalding’s invention record may contain
technical information, or refer to prior art, the inclusion of such
information does not render the document discoverable, because
requests for legal advice on patentability or for legal services in
preparing a patent application necessarily require the evaluation of
279
technical information such as prior art.

Having ruled that the attorney-client privilege applied, the court
subsequently determined that the “crime-fraud exception” to the
280
privilege did not apply. The court explained that “[t]o invoke the
crime-fraud exception, a party challenging the attorney-client
privilege must make a prima facie showing that the communication
281
was made ‘in furtherance of’ a crime or fraud.” Wilson argued that
its allegations of “inequitable conduct”—that Spalding had
purportedly made a misrepresentation to the Patent and Trademark
Office by failing to cite a relevant prior art reference—satisfied this
282
The court
standard for invocation of the crime-fraud exception.
disagreed, holding that Spalding’s alleged misrepresentation, while it
might demonstrate inequitable conduct, did not rise to the higher
level of fraud necessary to invoke the crime-fraud exception because
283
Wilson had failed to provide any evidence of “fraudulent intent.”
Accordingly, the court granted a writ of mandamus vacating the
284
order directing the invention record to be produced.

277. Id. at 805, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449
U.S. 383, 390 (1981)).
278. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
279. Id. at 806, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
280. See In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 806-08, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1747, 1752-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
281. See Spalding Sports, 203 F.3d at 807, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
282. Id. at 807-08, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
283. See id. at 808, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
284. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
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18. Sanctions
The year 2000 produced several notable sanctions rulings from the
Federal Circuit.
In most circumstances, the court is highly
deferential to sanctions determinations by district courts and has
maintained that “in matters of trial management and attorney
discipline, marked deference is owed to the discretionary rulings of
285
The court will not disturb such
the judge conducting the trial.”
286
rulings “[a]bsent a clear abuse of the trial judge’s discretion.”
287
Thus, in Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co., the court affirmed
the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees as a sanction against Hunt
288
for advancing a frivolous inequitable conduct claim.
The district
court had awarded the sanction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for
“multiply[ing] the [trial] proceedings . . . unreasonably and
289
vexatiously” because Hunt had charged Fiskars with intentional
withholding from the PTO of a prior art citation that Fiskars, in fact,
290
The
had disclosed “in accordance with the rules of the PTO.”
Federal Circuit noted that Section 1927 does not require a showing
that “the actions were taken in bad faith,” and upheld the district
court’s ruling as a legitimate exercise of discretion in light of Hunt’s
291
plain failure to “make out a prima facie case” of inequitable conduct.
292
In Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed Inc., the court upheld the
district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions for an allegedly insufficient
293
pre-filing investigation of a patent infringement claim.
In
Hoffmann-La Roche, defendants moved for sanctions after a settlement
of the case, which had included the dismissal of plaintiffs’
294
complaint. Defendants urged that Hoffman’s pre-filing inquiry was
285. Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
286. Id. at 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577-78 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Brennan,
952 F.2d 1346, 1351, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
287. 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
288. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577-78.
289. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides:
Counsel’s liability for excessive costs.
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct.
290. Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
291. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577.
292. 213 F.3d 1359, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
293. See Invamed, 213 F.3d at 1363, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
294. See id. at 1360-61, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
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inadequate under Rule 11 because the inquiry did not confirm that
295
defendants had infringed any of Hoffman’s patents.
The district
court had denied any sanctions, reasoning that, since plaintiffs’ presuit investigation resulted in “neither evidence of infringement nor
non-infringement,” plaintiffs were permitted, consistent with Rule 11,
296
to “file suit and engage in discovery.” The Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s ruling, explaining that plaintiffs’ pre-filing inquiry
was “extensive,” including chemical analysis of the allegedly
infringing drugs, and that “[i]t is difficult to imagine what else”
297
plaintiffs could have done as part of their investigation.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court had not
298
abused its discretion.
But parties will not be able to escape sanctions when they bring
infringement claims without performing any claim-construction or
written infringement analysis prior to filing suit. In View Engineering,
299
Inc. v. Robotic Vision Systems, Inc., the court upheld a district court’s
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. There, the district court held that
Robotic had failed to investigate counterclaims of infringement for
six of eight patents at issue in violation of Rule 11 and the court
awarded almost one hundred thousand dollars in fees as a “future
deterrent” to other attorneys who might consider filing claims
300
without first investigating their merits.
The Federal Circuit
affirmed, reasoning that Robotic had done very little to investigate its
301
infringement counterclaims.
The court noted that Robotic
302
admitted it had no factual basis for those claims, that its attorneys
had not performed any claim-construction or written infringement
303
analysis prior to filing suit, and that it had four months after View
filed suit to conduct a reasonable inquiry before it filed its
304
counterclaims. The court also rejected Robotic’s primary argument
that View’s lack of pre-suit cooperation prevented Robotic from
gaining access to the accused devices to make a full infringement
assessment, reasoning that View had no duty to permit pre-litigation
discovery and had not conducted itself improperly during the
295. See id. at 1361-62, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847-48.
296. Invamed, 213 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
297. Id. at 1363-64, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
298. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., 213 F.3d 1359, 1365, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846, 1850 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
299. 208 F.3d 981, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
300. See View Eng’g, 208 F.3d at 984, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
301. See id. at 984-85, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181-82.
302. See id. at 984, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
303. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1182.
304. See id. at 986, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183.
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305

litigation.
The Federal Circuit also analyzed the amount of the
306
sanctions and held that they were reasonable.
View had
documented over $240,000 in fees and costs incurred in defending
307
against Robotic’s counterclaims. The district court then reduced
that amount by roughly $4000 to account for the rates charged by
308
View’s attorneys, which were slightly higher than normal. Because
only six of the eight counterclaims were completely baseless, and
because a substantial amount of the work was focused on the two
non-baseless counterclaims, the district court reduced the sanctions
309
by a further forty percent.
Finally, the district court looked at
Robotic’s counsel’s ability to pay and reduced the sanctions by
310
another twenty-five percent.
The court arrived at a figure just
311
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district
under $100,000.
court’s analysis had been thorough and proper and affirmed the
312
sanctions amount.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Advanced Display Systems v. Kent
313
State University, stands as a rare exception to the court’s general
deference to sanction determinations by district courts. It also is a
314
There, the court reversed a magistrate
truly exceptional case.
315
judge’s denial of a new trial as a sanction for discovery abuse.
During discovery in a different (but related) case, counsel for
Advanced Display attempted to terminate a deposition that would
316
have been damaging in the Kent case, instructed the court reporter
317
not to make a transcript of the damaging deposition, and ultimately
failed to disclose the deposition’s existence during discovery in the
318
Kent case.
Counsel also failed to list the deponent in the Kent
litigation as a person with knowledge even though he had been
305. View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 986, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
306. See View Eng’g, 208 F.3d at 987-88, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1183-85.
307. See id. at 987, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184.
308. See id. at 987-88, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184 (noting the trial court utilized an
economic survey published by the American Intellectual Property Law Association to
determine what the normal rate for each attorney who worked on the case should have
been in reaching its decision to lower the sanctions by $4000).
309. See id. at 988, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184.
310. See id. at 988, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1184-85.
311. See View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 988, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1179, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting the final sanction amount was
$97,825.48).
312. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1185.
313. 212 F.3d 1272, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
314. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1288-89, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
315. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
316. See id. at 1288, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
317. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
318. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
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directly involved in developing the accused product at issue in Kent.
Moreover, counsel had withheld a damaging photograph as
“Attorney Work Product” on the sole basis that an attorney had
320
photocopied the original copy of the photograph. The magistrate
judge had been “deeply concerned” by this conduct, but refused to
321
award the extraordinary remedy of a new trial as a sanction.
The
Federal Circuit, however, determined that the conduct “evinced a
brazen disregard for the legal process” and constituted “bad faith
322
conduct on the part of [Advanced Display’s] counsel.” Therefore,
the Federal Circuit held:
[T]he acts of [Advanced Display’s] counsel strike at the heart of
the discovery process, and they deprived Kent of its full measure of
a right to a fair trial based upon all the relevant evidence.
Accordingly, we reverse the magistrate judge’s denial of a motion
323
for sanctions by granting a new trial.

Finally, the court “strongly encourage[d] the magistrate judge to
follow through on his desire to review very carefully the conduct of
ADS’s counsel and to consider, within his discretion, imposing
disciplinary actions and additional sanctions beyond the granting of a
324
new trial.”
B. Federal Circuit Practice and Procedure
While there were many notable decisions in year 2000 concerning
Federal Circuit practice and procedure, one significant appellate
practice development involving unpublished opinions took place in
the Eighth Circuit. In 2000, the Federal Circuit decided several
hundred appeals dealing with issues of patent law; of that number,
the court issued—by our count—only ninety-two published,
325
“precedential” patent or patent-related opinions.
The remainder
326
were decided by unpublished, “nonprecedential” opinion or by
319. Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1288, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1673, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
320. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1288-89, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
321. See id. at 1288, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
322. Id. at 1289, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
323. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
324. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
325. See FED. CIR. R. 47.6(a) (“A disposition may be cited as precedent of the court
unless it is issued bearing a legend specifically stating that the disposition may not be
cited as precedent.”).
326. See FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b):
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION OR ORDER. An opinion or order which is
designated as not to be cited as precedent is one unanimously determined by
the panel issuing it as not adding significantly to the body of law. Any
opinion or order so designated must not be employed or cited as precedent.
This rule does not preclude assertion of claim preclusion, issue preclusion,
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327

summary affirmance.
In a highly publicized but now vacated
opinion, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
328
Circuit in United States v. Anastasoff declared that court’s rule
regarding reliance on not-for-publication opinions to be
unconstitutional, based on a historical evaluation of Article III and
the original understanding of what “precedent” is: “8th Circuit Rule
28A(i), insofar as it would allow us to avoid the precedential effect of
our prior decisions, purports to expand the judicial power beyond
329
the bounds of Article III, and is therefore unconstitutional.” What
is potentially remarkable for purposes of future Federal Circuit
practice is the fact that the Federal Circuit’s rule on not-forpublication opinions is mandatory and thus even more restrictive
than the Eighth Circuit’s formerly unconstitutional rule, which was
330
merely hortatory.
While the panel opinion in Anastasoff was later
vacated by the Eighth Circuit en banc without consideration of that
issue, a panel of the Ninth Circuit nonetheless took a recent
331
opportunity to attack that panel decision, and the Anastasoff panel

judicial estoppel, law of the case, or the like based on a decision of the court
designated as nonprecedential.
327. See FED. CIR. R. 36 (stating that the Court of Appeals may issue a summary
affirmance when the case has no precedential value and one of the following
conditions applies: the judgment, order, or decision below was not clearly erroneous;
there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings; summary judgment,
judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict is supported by the record; the statute
authorizing a review of an agency decision supports affirmance; or there has been no
error of law in entering the judgment or decision).
328. 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
329. Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
330. Compare FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (“Any opinion or order so designated must not be
employed or cited as precedent.”) (emphasis added), with 8TH CIR. R. 27A(i)
(“Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them.”)
(emphasis added).
331. See Hart v. Massanari, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 1111647, *15 (9th Cir. Sept. 24,
2001). Writing for a unanimous panel in Massanari, Judge Kozinski stated:
Unlike the Anastasoff court, we are unable to find within Article III of the
Constitution a requirement that all case dispositions and orders issued by
appellate courts be binding authority. On the contrary, we believe that an
inherent aspect of our function as Article III judges is managing precedent
to develop a coherent body of circuit law to govern litigation in our court
and the other courts of this circuit. We agree with Anastasoff that we—and
all courts—must follow the law. But we do not think that this means we must
also make binding law every time we issue a merits decision. The common
law has long recognized that certain types of cases do not deserve to be
authorities, and that one important aspect of the judicial function is
separating the cases that should be precedent from those that should not.
Without clearer guidance than that offered in Anastasoff, we see no
constitutional basis for abdicating this important aspect of our judicial
responsibility.
Id. at *15.
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decision has already been the subject of scholarly criticism.
Nevertheless, the first Anastasoff opinion and its reasoning remain
available for whatever persuasive value they might have in future
cases. Given the Federal Circuit’s extensive reliance on unpublished
dispositions, we would not be at all surprised to discover that the issue
is already percolating in a case now pending in the Federal Circuit.
Indeed, already in year 2001, the Federal Circuit has made the very
important determination—that the court’s en banc holdings in Festo
333
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. regarding patent
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents apply retroactively—
334
in the guise of an unpublished opinion.
Other areas in which the Federal Circuit issued significant
decisions in the year 2000 regarding appellate practice and
procedure are discussed below.
1.

Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction
One of the more complex areas of Federal Circuit procedure is
that of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. In the year 2000, the court
helped to clarify its jurisdiction to hear patent appeals. Pursuant to
335
statute, the court has jurisdiction to hear appeals “arising under
336
patent law in a district court.” The Supreme Court has made clear
that such patent-law jurisdiction
extends only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action
or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that
patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded
337
claims.
332. See, e.g., Constitutional Law—Article III Judicial Power—Eighth Circuit Holds that
Unpublished Opinions Must Be Accorded Precedential Effect—Anastasoff v. United States, 223
F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 940, 940-41 (2001) (“Although the policies
implemented in Anastasoff are sound—courts should not be able to ignore the body of
law they have created—the Eighth Circuit jeopardized the viability of its decision by
basing its interpretation of the Constitution on an inadequate historical inquiry.”); Alex
Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We Don’t Allow Citation to
Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43 (contending that policy
considerations argue against giving unpublished decisions precedential effect).
333. 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S.
Ct. 2519 (2001).
334. See Insituform Tech., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 2001 WL 294164, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1392 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 2001) (unpublished disposition); see also 61
PAT. COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK J. 538-39 (Apr. 6, 2001) (commenting that it is
“surprising that the court chose to issue this ruling in a non-precedential opinion”).
335. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994).
336. U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834, 1837
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
337. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837 (quoting
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338

In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, the Federal Circuit described this
339
standard as a “lenient” one.
There, the court held that it had
jurisdiction over a patent-licensing dispute because “[t]o show that
Dray sold valves in contravention of U.S. Valves’ exclusive rights to
such sales, U.S. Valves must show that Dray sold valves that were
covered by the licensed patents,” a determination which, in turn,
required an “interpret[ation]” of the patents and an
340
“[infringe]ment” analysis—obviously issues of patent law.
Hence,
the court determined that “patent law is a necessary element of U.S.
341
Valves’ breach of contract action.” Similarly, in Helfgott & Karas v.
342
Dickenson, the court held that it had jurisdiction over an appeal of a
343
challenge to the actions of the Commissioner of the PTO.
The
court reasoned that the “performance (or lack thereof) of the
Commissioner’s duties under the provisions of” the Patent
Cooperation Treaty “clearly raise[d] substantial questions under the
344
patent laws.”
345
A somewhat different question arose in Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc.
There, the Federal Circuit addressed whether it had jurisdiction over
an appeal from an action in which the patent-law claims had been
dismissed without prejudice before the district court had rendered its
346
judgment on non-patent claims.
In Nilssen, Judge Lourie, writing
for the majority, held that the dismissal of the patent claims without
347
prejudice had divested the Federal Circuit of jurisdiction.
Judge
Lourie noted that the complaint “originally contained a well-pleaded
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809 (1988)). The Federal
Circuit has also held that it had jurisdiction over a state tort claim of injurious
falsehood where a necessary element of the claim was that a patent was invalid. See
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1769 (Fed. Cir. 1998), partially overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v.
Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1019 (1999). The Federal Circuit further held that it had jurisdiction
over an appeal of state-law business disparagement where a necessary element of the
claim was that a patent was not infringed. See Additive Controls v. Flowdata, 986 F.2d
476, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
338. U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834, 1837
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
339. U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
340. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
341. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
342. 209 F.3d 1328, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
343. See Helfgott, 209 F.3d at 1333-35, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428-29 (holding that
while the claims raised in this case involved the Administrative Procedure Act, the
conduct of the officials involved in the case is ultimately governed by patent law and
must be judged by those standards).
344. Id. at 1334, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
345. 203 F.3d 782, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
346. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 783-84, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765-68.
347. Id. at 784-85, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
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claim for patent infringement and that the court’s jurisdiction at that
348
point was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.”
He also noted that
“[j]urisdiction normally attaches at the time of filing based on
349
pleadings.”
However, Judge Lourie reasoned, “when the patent
claims were dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(b), the
district court’s jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims ceased
350
to be based, either in whole or in part, on § 1338.”
Judge Lourie
351
followed the court’s prior ruling in Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
in which the court had held that the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of
his patent claim under Rule 41(a) divested the Federal Circuit of
352
He concluded that, in the
appellate jurisdiction over the case.
somewhat different context of an involuntary dismissal of a patent
claim under Rule 41(b) present in Nilssen, Gronholz nonetheless
compelled the conclusion that the Federal Circuit had been divested
353
of appellate jurisdiction.
Judge Rader dissented in Nilssen. He believed that the “overriding
354
and compelling logic” of Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., should
355
have governed the case.
In Atari, the court had held as a general
matter that “jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1338 according to
356
the terms of the complaint as originally filed.” Judge Rader argued
that Atari should have controlled over Gronholz for three reasons:
357
(1) Atari was an en banc pronouncement; (2) Atari had dealt more
thoroughly with the statutory language and jurisdictional policies at
358
stake such as forum shopping; and (3) Atari was procedurally more
apposite than Gronholz because the latter case involved a voluntary
dismissal of claims, whereas Atari had involved a separation of claims

348. See id. at 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767. Section 1338 confers jurisdiction
in the district courts for, among other things, “any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 295, the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over district court
decisions “based, in whole or in part, on section 1338.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
349. Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
350. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
351. 836 F.2d 515, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
352. See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765,
1767 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
353. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 784-85, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767-68.
354. 747 F.2d 1422, 1431, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
355. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 785, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (Rader, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Atari is more applicable than Gronholz because Atari was an en banc
decision, dealt more with the relevant jurisdictional and statutory issues and because
Atari is closer procedurally than Gronholz).
356. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768.
357. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768.
358. See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 785, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765,
1768 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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for trial.
While, as Judge Rader conceded, neither Atari nor Gronholz directly
360
controls the issue, it would appear that Judge Lourie’s position—
the court’s holding—is slightly more persuasive. For one, while the
court in Atari disclaimed application to circumstances such as those
361
in Nilssen, to the extent it were applicable as Judge Rader contends,
the court in Atari emphasized that “[t]he controlling fact here is that
the district court’s jurisdiction of the case was and still is based in part
362
on § 1338.”
Of course, in Nilssen the district court’s jurisdiction
ceased to be based on § 1338 once the patent claims were voluntarily
363
For another, forum-shopping concerns would tend to
dismissed.
favor the court’s view over Judge Rader’s. Under Judge Rader’s view,
a procedurally defective or facially implausible patent claim could be
intentionally added to non-patent claims to gain appellate access to
the Federal Circuit, for even when such a claim were dismissed
without prejudice the appeal would—under Judge Rader’s analysis—
364
be within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. By contrast, under the
365
court’s holding in Nilssen, such a tactic would be foreclosed.
Finally, contrary to Judge Rader’s position, the procedural posture of
Nilssen would seem to be much closer to that in Gronholz than to that
in Atari. The only difference between the disposition of the patent
claims in Nilssen and Gronholz is that in Nilssen the district court
suggested a dismissal without prejudice to which the plaintiff did not
366
object,
whereas in Gronholz, the plaintiff himself moved for
367
In Atari, however, the patent and non-patent
voluntary dismissal.
claims remained in the same case at all times; while they were
separated for trial, the patent claims were never removed from the
case entirely—hence the court’s observation there that the district
368
court had retained jurisdiction under Section 1338.
359. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 795, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (Rader, J., dissenting).
360. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768 (Rader, J., dissenting).
361. See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1428, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1074, 1077-78 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (stating that the court explicitly does not
“explore” in its opinion any questions regarding jurisdiction not currently before it).
362. Id. at 1429, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1079 (emphasis added).
363. See Nilssen, 203 F.3d at 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (noting that the
plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal left only a single claim that did not concern patent
law).
364. See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 785, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765,
1768 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J. dissenting).
365. See id. at 784, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767.
366. See id. at 783, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
367. See Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 516, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1269, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
368. See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1429-30, 223 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1074, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
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2.

Appealable orders
Another type of jurisdictional quandary—the question of when a
district court order is sufficiently final to permit appeal—was
369
addressed in Phonometrics v. Hospitality Franchise Systems.
There,
Phonometrics filed its notice of appeal after the district court
dismissed its complaint for failure to state a claim, but before the
370
period to amend expired. The court determined that the dismissal
371
was sufficiently final to permit the appeal. The court first held that
the “finality of [a] dismissal” is a “procedural issue not related to
372
patent law” such that regional circuit law applied to that issue.
Under Eleventh Circuit law, a party may appeal a dismissal of a
complaint in such circumstances after the amendment period has
expired, or before the period has expired, “provided the plaintiff
373
Consequently, the court
stands on his complaint as dismissed.”
held that, based upon that rule, and since the appellee had not
identified any prejudice from the filing of the premature notice of
374
appeal, the court did have jurisdiction over the appeal.
The question of whether a district court order was sufficiently final
to permit appeal was also addressed, albeit in a somewhat different
375
context, in CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG.
The district court granted partial summary judgment to Fiedler on
noninfringement but denied partial summary judgment on patent
376
invalidity. Subsequently, the parties jointly moved for the entry of
final judgment by the district court and invited the district court to
“make its judgment of non-infringement final and certified under
377
Rule 54(b).” The district court granted the parties’ motion but did
369. 203 F.3d 790, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
370. See Phonometrics, 203 F.3d at 792-93, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1763-64.
371. See id. at 793, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
372. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
373. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764 (citing Briehler v. City of Miami, 926 F.2d
1001, 1003 (11th Cir. 1991)).
374. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
375. 224 F.3d 1308, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
376. See CAE Screenplates, 224 F.3d at 1313, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807-08.
377. Id. at 1313, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (noting the district court left one
issue remaining for trial). FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination
and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
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not certify it under Rule 54(b), after which CAE appealed.
The
Federal Circuit addressed whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal,
noting that ordinarily, “[a]n order granting partial summary
judgment is not a final appealable order under [the final judgment
rule of] section 1291, because it does not dispose of all claims raised,”
but that a partial summary judgment ruling can be appealed if the
379
district court makes a proper Rule 54(b) certification.
The court
then looked to the law of the regional circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, to
determine whether the order of judgment, even though not certified
380
under Rule 54(b), was sufficiently final to permit appeal. The court
noted that the Eleventh Circuit has held that “there is some flexibility
in this [finality] rule in order that justice and the economic
termination of litigation may not suffer from an overly strict
381
adherence to formalism.”
The court then examined CAE’s
statement regarding infringement, which implied that it was
conceding infringement of the accused products under the district
court’s claim construction, but used contingent language and stated
expressly that it was “not an admission that there is no
382
infringement.”
The court noted that the statement itself was not
sufficiently clear or definite as to concede infringement based on the
challenged claim construction, and would itself not have rendered
383
the district court’s judgment appealable.
The court stated,
however, that “[a]t oral argument, counsel for CAE conceded under
questioning that the district court’s claim construction resolved the
384
issue of non-infringement” for all of the accused products.
The
court held that, because that “concession, although more appropriate
had it been made before the district court, appears to satisfy the
general purpose of the finality requirement,” the Federal Circuit
385
exercised jurisdiction over the appeal.
The court’s resolution of the jurisdictional issue in CAE is notable.
As the court recognized, it is extremely unusual for a partial summary
judgment ruling to be held appealable in the absence of a Rule 54(b)
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
378. See CAE Screenplates, 224 F.3d at 1314, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
379. See id. at 1314, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
380. See id. at 1315, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
381. CAE Screenplates v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG., 224 F.3d 1308, 131516, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804, 1809 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc.,
616 F.2d 191, 194 (11th Cir. 1980)).
382. Id. at 1314, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
383. See id. at 1315, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
384. Id. at 1316, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
385. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
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386

certification. Indeed, Rule 54(b) allows for an appeal from a partial
judgment “only upon an express determination” of finality by the
387
388
district court, which was not made in this case. Thus, CAE cannot
be understood as allowing a Rule 54(b) appeal, but instead must be
viewed as an application of the final judgment rule on the particular
facts of the case. Even so, CAE’s concession at oral argument should
have been made much earlier, for example, by stipulation in the
389
district court.
Indeed, the court criticized CAE for its use of “noncommittal language” in its stipulation in the district court, stating that
390
it is “loath to sanction this type of appellate practice.” It is thus most
likely that in future cases CAE will be viewed as an application of the
final judgment rule under unique circumstances. Nonetheless, CAE
could have the perverse effect of encouraging gamesmanship in
drafting district court stipulations by providing hope that, should a
crafty stipulation ultimately be rejected by the Federal Circuit, the
drafter could simply concede the relevant point in the stipulation and
suffer no adverse consequence. CAE might also encourage litigants—
wrongly—to seek appeals of partial summary judgment rulings
without the benefit of a Rule 54(b) certification.
3.

Mandamus
“A writ of mandamus may be granted to overturn a district court
order ‘only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion or
usurpation of judicial authority in the grant or denial of the
391
order.’”
To obtain the writ, a petitioner must establish “‘that its
right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, . . . and that it
392
lacks adequate alternative means to obtain the relief sought.’” In In
393
re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., the court addressed whether
mandamus was an appropriate form of relief for a trial court order
394
The
compelling discovery of an allegedly privileged document.
386. See id. at 1314, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
387. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (emphasis added).
388. See CAE Screenplates v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG., 224 F.3d 1308,
1315, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
389. See CAE Screenplates, 224 F.3d at 1316, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.
390. Id. at 1315, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809 (“The demands placed on the
dockets of both this court and those of the federal district courts are severe enough
without the added burden created by uncertain concessions made by parties eager for
appellate review.”).
391. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1747, 1750 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Connaught Lab. Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham
P.L.C., 165 F.3d 1368, 1370, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1540, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
392. Id. at 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (quoting In re Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1387, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1784, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
393. 203 F.3d 800, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
394. See id. at 802, 804-05, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749-51.
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court held in Spalding that mandamus was an appropriate remedy to
prevent the disclosure of a privileged communication, explaining
that:
When a writ of mandamus is sought to prevent the wrongful
exposure of privileged communications, the remedy of mandamus
is appropriate “because maintenance of the attorney-client
privilege up to its proper limits has substantial importance to the
administration of justice, and because an appeal after disclosure of
395
the privileged communication is an inadequate remedy.”

Other factors favoring mandamus noted by the court were that the
substantive privilege question was an “important issue of first
impression” and that “immediate resolution” of the question would
avoid the development of discovery practices that could undermine
396
the attorney-client privilege.
4.

Pendent appellate jurisdiction
397
In Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., the court addressed the doctrine
of pendent appellate jurisdiction. The district court denied Helifix’s
request for a preliminary injunction after it granted Blok-Lok’s
398
motion for summary judgment of patent invalidity.
While it was
undisputed that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) over the denial of Helifix’s request for a
preliminary injunction, Helifix also appealed the adverse summary
399
judgment determination.
The court noted that it could exercise
“pendent appellate jurisdiction” over the summary judgment
determination if the determination were “inextricably intertwined”
400
with the denial of the preliminary injunction. The court held that,
because the district court “based its denial of the preliminary
injunction request on its summary judgment ruling,” the two decision
395. Id. at 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (quoting Regents, 101 F.3d at 1387, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785).
396. Id. at 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750. For a discussion of the substantive
privilege question at issue in Spalding, see supra notes 274-284 and accompanying text.
397. 208 F.3d 1339, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
398. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
399. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
400. Id. at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302-03 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681, 707 n.41 (1997)) (finding that review of the cross-appeal was “inextricably
intertwined” with Clinton’s appeal and necessary to ensure meaningful review). The
court also articulated the standard for pendent appellate jurisdiction as whether the
grant of summary judgment was “‘closely interrelated factually’ to the preliminary
injunction.” See id. at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302-03 (quoting Gerber Garment
Tech., Inc. v. Lectra Sys., Inc., 916 F.2d 683, 686, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1439
(Fed. Cir. 1990)). The court did not state which of the standards articulated would
govern but, through its silence, indicated that meeting the less exacting standard of
Gerber would be sufficient. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302-03.
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401

were “inextricably intertwined.” Accordingly, the court did exercise
pendent appellate jurisdiction over the summary judgment
402
determination.
5.

Joinder of parties to appeal
In 2000, the Federal Circuit also addressed the issue of the
circumstances under which a party can be joined to an appeal. In
403
Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., the court held that Prima Tek II, a
licensee that did not possess all substantial rights under certain
patents, lacked standing to bring its patent infringement action
404
absent the participation of the patents’ owner. Prima Tek II urged
that it should be permitted, under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 27 (the general motions rule), to join the owner as an
405
indispensable party to correct standing. The court rejected Prima
Tek II’s argument and refused to join the owner to cure the standing
406
deficiency. The court noted that its “authority to join or dismiss a
407
The court then
party on appeal ‘should be exercised sparingly.’”
reasoned that A-Roo had specifically challenged Prima Tek II’s
standing in the district court and that A-Roo would likely be
“prejudiced” by the joinder of the owner on appeal because it had
been deprived the opportunity to conduct discovery on the patent
408
owner in the district court. Consequently, the court held that “the
facts of this case do not warrant exercise of [the] power” to join the
409
owner on appeal.
6.

Choice of controlling appellate law
A fairly common, albeit thorny issue of Federal Circuit practice is
the choice of controlling appellate law in cases involving procedural
and/or non-patent issues. The general rule is that, in reviewing
district court judgments in patent cases, the Federal Circuit applies
401. Id. at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
402. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
403. 222 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
404. See Prima Tek II, 222 F.3d at 1379-80, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746.
405. See id. at 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (noting that the licensing
agreement did not convey the right to sue and therefore subsequent licencees can
possess only what the original licensee had to transfer).
406. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
407. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v. AlfanzoLarrain, 490 U.S. 826, 837 (1989).
408. Id. at 1381-82, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (noting that A-Roo was unable to
conduct discovery on the patent owner, Southpac, because Southpac was beyond the
reach of the district court).
409. Prima Tek II L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1742, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Federal Circuit law to “patent law issues,” which include “procedural
issue[s]” that “pertain to patent law,” but applies “the law of the
410
circuit in which the district court sits” to “nonpatent issues.”
The distinction between patent law and non-patent issues can
411
sometimes be easily drawn. Thus, in U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, the
412
court applied Illinois state law to a state breach-of-contract action.
But the line between patent and non-patent issues is not always so
413
clear. In In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation,
the court noted that “when reviewing a district court’s judgment
involving federal antitrust law,” a non-patent issue, the court applies
414
the law of “the regional circuit in which that district court sits.”
However, the court also explained that, for questions such as
“whether and to what extent patent law preempts or conflicts with
other causes of action,” the court applies Federal Circuit law to fulfill
the court’s “obligation of promoting uniformity in the field of patent
415
law.” Thus the court in Independent Service held that:
The district court’s grant of summary judgment as to [the] antitrust
claims arising from Xerox’s refusal to sell its patented parts is
therefore reviewed as a matter of Federal Circuit law, while
consideration of the antitrust claim based on Xerox’s refusal to sell
or license its copyrighted manuals and software is under Tenth
416
Circuit law.

The line between procedural issues that pertain to patent law and
those that do not can also be very difficult to discern. In In re
Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., the court held that Federal Circuit law
410. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (stating that the purpose of
the distinction is to “promote uniformity in the law with regard to subject matter within
our exclusive appellate jurisdiction”). See also, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal
Sovereign Co., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(applying Federal Circuit law to questions of personal jurisdiction in a patent suit);
Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 n.12, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191,
1195 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (applying Federal Circuit law to questions of preliminary
injunctions in a patent suit); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824
F.2d 953, 954-55 n.3, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310, 1311 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (applying
Federal Circuit law to questions involving declaratory judgment in a patent suit);
Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng’g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (applying Federal Circuit law to questions of discovery
under FED. R. CIV. P. 26 in a patent suit).
411. 212 F.3d 1368, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
412. See id. at 1373, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
413. 203 F.3d 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
414. Indep. Serv. Orgs., 203 F.3d at 1325, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854 (noting that
intellectual property does not confer a privilege to violate antitrust laws, nor do
antitrust laws negate a patentee’s right to exclude).
415. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854 (citing Midwest, 175 F.3d 1360, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1676).
416. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
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applied to the question of whether the attorney-client privilege
applied to an “invention record prepared and submitted to house
417
counsel relating to a litigated patent.” The court reasoned that “a
determination of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to
Spalding’s invention record clearly implicates, at the very least, the
substantive patent issue of inequitable conduct” because the record
“relates to an invention submitted for consideration for possible
418
patent protection.”
The court went to great lengths, however, to
distinguish a prior ruling which held that regional circuit law did
apply to determine whether “communications between a licensor and
the attorneys of its licensee were protected by the attorney-client
419
privilege.” Apparently, the key distinction for the court was that the
relationship at issue in Spalding was between a patent applicant and
the PTO, whereas the relationships at issue in the prior case were
420
merely between “parties to a contract.”
While such a distinction
may have theoretical merit, as a practical matter, it must have been
extremely difficult for the parties to foresee.
7.

Waiver of appellate argument
Parties that do not carefully preserve their appellate arguments
may be found to have waived those arguments. As a general matter,
“absent exceptional circumstances, a party cannot raise on appeal
421
In
legal issues not raised and considered in the trial forum.”
Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., the court found that
Harlequin had waived two arguments on appeal for failure to raise
422
them in the district court. First, the court held that Harlequin had
“waived” its argument that the patent at issue was invalid due to an
on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because it had “failed to
423
adequately raise this issue before the district court.”
Second, the
court concluded that, because Harlequin “did not properly move for
[judgment as a matter of law] concerning infringement under [35
U.S.C.] § 271,” it could not challenge the “sufficiency of the

417. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1747, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recounting that the district court had held that a showing
of inequitable conduct was enough to pierce the attorney-client privilege).
418. Id. at 803-04, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
419. Id. at 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
420. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
421. Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1289 n.7, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,
926 F.2d 1574, 1577, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1914, 1916 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
422. See Southwest Software, 226 F.3d at 1289 n.7, 1290, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167
n.7.
423. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 n.7.
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evidence” underlying the jury’s verdict on that issue. Thus, in both
instances, failure to raise the argument in the district court precluded
assertion of the argument on appeal.
425
In a somewhat different context, the court in In re Hyatt ruled
that the appellant had failed to preserve an appellate argument in
426
the trial forum.
There, Hyatt argued that the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences had erred in its ruling that certain claims
of his patent were invalid as having been anticipated by the prior
427
art. Hyatt had raised his specific argument with the Board, but only
428
The court
in a “second request for rehearing on that issue.”
examined the regulations applicable to the Board and discerned that
a party is normally entitled only to one request for rehearing on an
429
Indeed, the Board had rejected Hyatt’s second request for
issue.
430
rehearing on that basis.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that
Hyatt had not “properly” raised his argument before the Board and,
“[a]s such, he is not entitled to rely on it as a basis for overturning the
431
Board’s decision.” Thus, Hyatt had waived his argument by failing
to raise it earlier at the required phase of the litigation.
Shortly before publication of this Area Summary, the Federal
Circuit explained how the doctrine of waiver applies in the context of
432
claim construction. In Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
Compuserve argued that Interactive Gift (“IGE”) had waived any
claim-construction arguments based on portions of the specification
433
of the patent at issue that were not pointed out to the district court.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that, because IGE’s
arguments did not “change[] the scope” of any of its prior claimconstruction position; rather, the court held, IGE “is not barred . . .
from proffering additional arguments from the specification in
434
support of its existing claim construction.”
The Federal Circuit
explained that the doctrine of waive has been held to “preclude a
424. Id. at 1290, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
425. 211 F.3d 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
426. See Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1373, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
427. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
428. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
429. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (stating the appellant may file one request
for rehearing “unless the original decision is so modified by the decision on rehearing
as to become, in effect, a new decision, and the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences so states.”) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.197(b) (1997)).
430. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
431. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1373, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
432. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1346-49,
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, ___ (Fed. Cir. 2001).
433. See id. at 1348, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
434. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
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party from adopting a new claim construction on appeal” only when
its “new” construction “changed the scope of the claim
435
construction.” The court explained the concerns relating to waiver
as:
(1) whether the claim construction and arguments on appeal are
consistent with those tendered at trial; (2) whether there is a clear
presentation of the issue to be resolved; (3) whether there was an
adequate opportunity for response and evidentiary development by
the opposing party at trial; and (4) whether there is a record
reviewable by the appellate court that is properly crystallized
436
around and responsive to the asserted argument.

The court found, however, that “ a party’s proffer of additional
support from a specification, for an existing claim construction, will
437
Accordingly, the court held that
not violate these concerns.”
“arguments that are based on a specification in evidence and that are
in support of an existing claim construction are not barred by the
doctrine of waiver for the sole reason that they were not first
438
presented to the trial court.”
8.

Appellate review/need for clear district court ruling
In the year 2000, the Federal Circuit twice addressed unexplained
district court rulings and how the court was to review them. In
Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on
noninfringement of certain claims of the patents at issue because the
439
district court had not adequately justified its ruling.
The court
explained:
The district court ruled from the bench when it granted
Harlequin’s motion for JMOL and did not provide any written
opinion, so it is not entirely clear under what reasoning the court
granted the motion. In addition, the court did not state at any
time its construction of the disputed “mapping means” claim
limitation. In short, the record does not reflect any claim
construction or analysis by the district court as to the “mapping
means” limitation. Under these circumstances, we are unable to

435. Id. at 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
436. Id. at 1357, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___ (citing Finnegan Corp. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 180 F.3d 1354, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and Sage
Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
437. Interactive Gift Express, 256 F.3d at 1347, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
438. Id., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at ___.
439. See Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1298, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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440
441

Accordingly, the court vacated the district court’s ruling.
But a district court’s failure to explain its ruling is not always fatal.
442
In Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., the court affirmed
the district court’s denial without explanation of Cultor’s motion to
443
amend its complaint. The court noted that “[o]rdinarily, courts of
appeals frown on unexplained exercises of discretion by trial
444
judges.” However, in Cultor the reason for the trial court’s decision
was “apparent”—based on the district court’s claim construction, the
445
proposed amendments to the complaint would have been “futile.”
Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s decision
would be sustained based upon the “[f]utility” of the requested
446
Accordingly, the reasoning and outcomes of Southwest
relief.
Software and Cultor imply that unexplained district court rulings will
not be upheld by the Federal Circuit unless their bases are readily
apparent.
9.

The record on appeal
Parties are generally not permitted to supplement the record on
447
448
appeal. In Moore U.S.A., Inc. v . Standard Register Co., the Federal
Circuit refused to permit a party to supplement the record on
449
appeal.
The court noted that the evidence at issue (allegedly
showing patent infringement) “had been made available to” Moore
during the district court litigation and that Moore had possession of
450
the evidence even before it filed its lawsuit.
Consequently, the
court concluded that Moore had offered “no reasonable basis for its
failure to produce the preferred evidence at an earlier time,” and
held that Moore would not be permitted to supplement the record
451
on appeal with that evidence.
The ruling in Moore stands in contrast to the panel opinion on

440. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
441. See id. at 1298-99, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175 (remanding on the issue of
infringement).
442. 224 F.3d 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
443. See Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1332-33, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
444. Id. at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
445. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212.
446. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 (finding no abuse of discretion in a “terse
ruling”).
447. Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
448. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
449. See Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1116, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
450. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
451. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
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remand from the Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
452
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
There, the court did permit supplementation
of the record on appeal, but only in the rather unusual circumstances
453
As the Festo panel
of a “GVR” decision by the Supreme Court.
noted, “[a] GVR occurs when intervening developments, or recent
developments that [one] ha[s] reason to believe the court below did
not fully consider, reveal a reasonable probability that the decision
below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject if given
the opportunity for further consideration, and where it appears that
such a redetermination may determine the ultimate outcome of the
454
litigation.”
Thus, the court explained that, in those unique
circumstances, it was appropriate to permit the supplementation of
the record on appeal to “ improv[e] the fairness and accuracy of
455
judicial outcomes and to full[ly] implemen[t] the GVR.”
10. Sanctions for frivolous appeals
456
In Sparks v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Federal Circuit decided to
457
“comment on the concept of frivolous appeals.” Kodak urged that
the court’s disposition of the appeal “without a written opinion”
458
under Federal Circuit Rule 36 justified an award of sanctions. The
court emphatically rejected the notion that a summary affirmance is
either a necessary or sufficient condition for the imposition of
sanctions for a frivolous appeal, stating that “[o]ur legal system is . . .
currently biased toward maintaining open courts rather than
deterring appeals. It favors the allowance of appeals, even in cases
having little chance for success, without subjecting appellants to an
459
undue risk of damages for a frivolous appeal.” Therefore, the court
identified two categories of appeals that would be considered
frivolous:
First, an appeal is considered “frivolous as filed” when an appellant
has raised issues that are beyond the reasonable contemplation of
fair-minded people, and “no basis for reversal in law or fact can be
or is even arguably shown” . . . [s]econd, an appeal is considered
452. 172 F.3d 1361, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 187 F.3d 1381,
51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc, rev’d, 234 F.3d 558, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
453. A U.S. Supreme Court order that certiorari is granted, the judgment vacated,
and the case remanded. See generally Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163 (1996).
454. Festo, 172 F.3d at 1365, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
455. See id. at 1374, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (quoting Lawrence, 516 U.S. at
167).
456. 230 F.3d 1344, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
457. See Sparks, 230 F.3d at 1345-46, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159.
458. See id. at 1345, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160.
459. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159.
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“frivolous as argued” when an appellant has not dealt fairly with the
court, has significantly misrepresented the law or facts, or has
abused the judicial process by repeatedly litigating the same issue
460
in the same court.

The court held that Sparks’s appeal fell into neither category,
explaining that so long as a party identifies what it sees as the district
court’s error, it may raise the same claims on appeal that it raised
461
below.
Consequently, the court denied Kodak’s motion for
sanctions, explaining that “the doors of the courthouse must remain
462
open for losing appeals as well as winning appeals.”
C. Review of Decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
The Federal Circuit reviews legal conclusions of the Board “without
463
formal deference,” and reviews the Board’s findings of fact “for
substantial evidence because they are ‘on the record of an agency
464
hearing provided by statute.’”
To review the Board’s rulings,
however, the Federal Circuit must have “a clear understanding of the
465
Therefore, in a Board
grounds for the decision being reviewed.”
decision, the “[n]ecessary findings must be expressed with sufficient
particularity to enable [the] court, without resort to speculation, to
understand the reasoning of the Board, and to determine whether it
applied the law correctly and whether the evidence supported the
466
underlying and ultimate fact findings.”
Thus, in In re Hyatt, the
court held that the Board had adequately articulated its ruling that
certain claims of Hyatt’s patent were invalid as anticipated by the
467
prior art.
There, the Board “addressed the limitations of each
claim,” and while “the Board could have been more expansive,” its
analysis was “sufficient to apprize [the Federal Circuit] of the basis on
460. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159-60 (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo
Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 1573, 1578, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 1991))
(internal citations omitted).
461. See id. at 1345, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1160 (citing Connell v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 722 F.2d 1452, 1454, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 203 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
462. Sparks v. Eastman Kodak Co., 230 F.3d 1344, 1346, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1158,
1160 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
463. In re Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1300, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149, 1151
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)).
464. In re Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1300, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151 (quoting In re
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
465. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1666 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (quoting Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030,
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (explaining that the “central threat of Gechter” is that the
Patent Board must explain sufficiently its rulings in order to facilitate meaningful
judicial review )).
466. Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666 (brackets in original)
(quoting Gechter, 116 F.3d at 1457, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1033).
467. See id. at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
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which [it] rejected each of the disputed claims.” Accordingly, the
court refused to vacate the Board’s decision on the grounds that its
469
ruling had been insufficiently explained.
Another procedural issue was addressed in Winner International
470
Royalty Corp. v. Wang.
There, Wu, a party to an interference
proceeding, brought a complaint in district court pursuant to 35
471
U.S.C. § 146. The court noted that in such appeals, unlike in direct
appeals to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 141, “the
parties before the district court are not limited to the evidentiary
472
record before the Board.” On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Wang
argued that the district court was not permitted to hear live testimony
473
from witnesses who had already testified before the Board.
The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, holding that “[t]he fact that
the district court heard live testimony, gave more weight to some
witnesses than to others, and came to a different conclusion than that
474
The court explained
reached by the Board, was not improper.”
that “the admission of live testimony on all matters before the Board
in a section 146 action, as in this case, makes a factfinder of the
475
district court and requires a de novo trial.”
Consequently, because
the district court had conducted a de novo trial and made de novo
factual findings, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s
476
actions had been proper.
468. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666-69 (rejecting the appellant’s argument
that the Board failed to address his claims on “an element-by-element and claim-byclaim basis”).
469. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
470. 202 F.3d 1340, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
471.
Any party . . . dissatisfied with the decision of the Board . . . may have remedy
by civil action . . . [i]f there be adverse parties residing in a plurality of
districts not embraced within the same state, or . . . residing in a foreign
country, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall
have jurisdiction.
Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1345, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584.
472. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1994), which states
that “the record in the Patent and Trademark Office shall be admitted on motion of
either party . . . without prejudice of the right of the parties to take further
testimony.”).
473. See id. at 1346, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1584 (arguing that the testimony was
not dissimilar enough to prior testimony to be allowed).
474. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585.
475. Id. at 1347, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585 (explaining that such review presents
the district court with a profound advantage over the patent examiner and the Board).
476. See Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1347-48, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1580, 1585 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting as well that the district court should “trea[t]
the record before the Board when offered by a party ‘as if [it was] originally taken and
produced in the district court.’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 146). The Federal Circuit’s
holding that a de novo trial was appropriate also means, of course, that when it
functions as a factfinder, the district court does not apply the “substantial evidence”
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D. International Trade Commission Practice and Procedure
The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from final
477
determinations of the International Trade Commission (“ITC”)
and may rule on issues of ITC practice in cases originating in the
478
district courts. In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., the court
held that proceedings before the ITC are properly characterized as
479
There, the parties had been engaged in a patent
“litigation.”
licensing dispute involving a license agreement with a “Governing
Law” clause providing that “any litigation between the parties relating
480
to this Agreement shall take place in California.” Tessera initiated
an ITC investigation, charging that Texas Instruments’ (“TI’s”)
importation of certain devices arguably covered by the license
481
agreement infringed Tessera’s patents.
Texas Instruments, citing
the governing law clause, brought suit in district court in California
seeking an injunction to prevent Tessera from participating in the
482
ITC proceeding.
The district court denied TI’s application for
injunctive relief, holding that TI was not likely to succeed on the
merits of its claim because “the agreement’s governing law clause ‘is
limited to “litigation” and that [TI] has not established a likelihood
standard of review usually accorded the PTO’s findings of fact. See In re Gartside, 203
F.3d 1305, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2000). For a discussion of the
“substantial evidence” standard and its application, see generally infra notes 555-567
and accompanying text.
477. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1994) (stating, in part, “[a]ny person adversely affected
by a final determination of the Commission. . . . may appeal such determination . . . to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit”); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6)
(1994) (stating that “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
have exclusive jurisdiction . . . to review the final determinations of the United States
International Trade Commission . . . made under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930”).
478. 231 F.3d 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2000). All four of the
authors were counsel to Texas Instruments in this case.
479. See Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1329-32, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-79.
480. Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675. The clause stated in its entirety is as
follows:
Governing Law. The Agreement shall be governed, interpreted and
construed in accordance with the laws of the Stat[e] of California as if
without regard to its provisions with respect to conflicts of Laws. Both
[parities] shall use their best efforts to resolve by mutual agreement any
disputes, controversies, claims or differences which may arise from, under,
out of or in connection with this Agreement. If such disputes, controversies,
claims or differences cannot be settled between the parties, any litigation
relating to this Agreement shall take place in California. The parties hereby
consent to personal jurisdiction and venue in the state and federal courts of
California.
Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
481. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (regarding TI’s exportation of microchip
technology for which negotation proved fruitless).
482. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675-76 (seeking to enjoin Tessera “from
pursuing any disputes, controversies, claims or differences” outside of California).
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of proving that [Tessera’s] action before the ITC is litigation.’”
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the term “litigation” in
484
the governing law clause did encompass the ITC proceeding. Judge
Rader, writing for the majority, first noted that Federal Circuit
procedural law governed review of the district court’s denial of the
485
requested preliminary injunction.
The court then held that
interpretation of the license agreement, pursuant to the governing
486
Turning to
law clause, would be governed by California state law.
the merits, the court stated that both Tessera and TI are
“sophisticated corporations with experience in patent licensing,” and
would have been “well aware” of the remedies for alleged patent
487
infringement, including proceedings in the ITC. Judge Rader then
stated that in the relevant field of “patent law . . . ‘litigation’ does not
exclude ITC proceedings under section 337”:
Section 337 proceedings are inter partes actions initiated by the
filing of a complaint and including discovery, filing of briefs and
motions, and testimony and arguments at a hearing before an
administrative law judge. See 19 U.S.C. § 337(c). In section 1337
proceedings relevant to patent infringement, the ITC follows Title
35 of the United States Code and the case law of this Court. See 19
U.S.C. § 337(c). In sum, this court has consistently treated section
488
337 patent infringement proceedings as litigation.

Judge Rader next explained that, under California law, “[i]n
interpreting contracts, words are given their ‘clear and explicit’
meaning in the field of agreement unless it is clearly shown that the
489
parties intended a different meaning.”
The court concluded that
“[t]he governing law clause, therefore requires any litigation between
the parties, including ITC proceedings, to take place in California.
Because ITC actions cannot be brought in California, it follows that
483. See Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (relying
on the definition of “litigation” in Section 391(a) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure, the district court found that the licensing agreement did not extend to
Federal administrative proceedings) (brackets in original).
484. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1328-32, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674, 1678-79 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that “this court has
consistently treated section 337 patent infringement proceedings as litigation.”).
485. See id. at 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (stating that the court “generally
views the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction as a procedural issue not unique
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit”).
486. See id. at 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd.
of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1988) as stating, “the
interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law”).
487. Id. at 1329-30, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
488. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1330, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1674, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
489. Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 1638, 1649).
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the parties did not agree to the ITC as a forum for litigation.” The
court also emphasized that the injunction TI sought would not enjoin
the ITC proceeding per se, but would merely enjoin Tessera’s
491
participation in that proceeding.
Accordingly, the court reversed
the district court’s ruling and remanded for a determination of
whether the other preliminary injunction factors (irreparable harm,
balance of hardships, and the public interest) support granting an
492
injunction.
Judge Lourie dissented, conceeding that while “[e]veryone familiar
with patent litigation knows that ITC proceedings are considered
‘litigation,’” the parties to this license agreement did not intend ITC
493
proceedings to be covered by the governing law clause.
Judge
Lourie reasoned that the limitation in the clause to “California”
referred only to the location of litigation and not to the “type of
494
forum.”
Judge Lourie also stated that the injunction, while not
enjoining the ITC, “would potentially impede and complicate the
Commission’s opportunity to pursue its own statutory duty to
investigate possible violations of the Tariff Act” because Tessera could
495
not participate to vigorously advance its case. Finally, Judge Lourie
noted that, although contract interpretation is a matter of law, the
Federal Circuit should be reluctant to overturn a district court’s
496
denial of an injunction.
497
In Nutrinova Nutrition v. International Trade Commission, the court
498
addressed the standard of review over ITC determinations.
The
490. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (re-emphasizing that the court “attributes
knowledge of patent law and its language and usages” to both contracting parties).
491. See id. at 1332, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (explaining that the ITC action
could continue with Sharp Corporation and Sharp Electronics Corporation as
respondents, but that litigation between TI and Tessera would have to take place in a
California court).
492. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
493. See id. at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (arguing
that as sophisticated parties, had they intended to exlude the ITC as a forum, the
parties would have explicitly said so).
494. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1674, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Lourie, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the
governing law clause was a geographical limitation, i.e., Texas or Delaware, and did not
apply to the type of court).
495. Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1333, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681 (Lourie, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that while TI could assist Sharp in ITC proceedings, Tessera
would have effectively “one hand tied behind its back”).
496. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (implying that the
majority had not adhered to the standard that denials of injunction be reviewed for
“abuse[s] of discretion”).
497. 224 F.3d 1356, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
498. See Nutrinova Nutrition, 224 F.3d at 1359-60, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951-53
(reviewing a patent infringement claim brought to enjoin the importation of allegedly
infringing artificial sweetener from China).
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court rejected Nutrinova’s invitation to overturn the ITC’s fact
findings, noting that the standard of review is “whether substantial
evidence in the record supports the agency’s findings”; thus, the
court will not “reweigh the evidence and reexamine the credibility of
499
the witnesses.”
Accordingly, because substantial evidence
supported the ALJ’s determination that the burden-shifting
500
provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 295 did not apply, the Federal Circuit
501
affirmed that determination.
The substantial evidence standard is marginally different from the
“clearly erroneous” standard that governs appellate review of district
court factual findings: the substantial evidence standard is “highly
deferential” and can be satisfied by showing “a rational connection
502
exists between an agency’s factfindings and its ultimate action,”
while the clearly erroneous standard has been described by the
Supreme Court as “somewhat” less deferential, requiring the
reviewing judge to have a “‘definite and firm conviction’ that an error
503
has been committed.” However, in practice, the difference between
the two standards is “subtle” and highly unlikely to be outcome
504
dispositive. That is because of the “similarity of the reviewing task,
which requires judges to apply logic and experience to an evidentiary
505
record, whether that record was made in a court or by an agency.”
499. Id. at 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953 (declining to extend appellate review
even where the appellate body “might have found some of the facts differently . . . or
drawn some inferences . . . differently”).
500. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953-54 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 295 (1994)).
Section 295 states:
In actions alleging infringement of a process patent by virtue of the
importation, sale, offer for sale or use of a product made from that process
(so-called “product by process” infringement), the product shall be
“presumed” to have been made by that process if the court finds (1) “that a
substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the patented
process,” and (2) “that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to
determine the process actually used in the production of the product and
was unable so to determine.
Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
501. See Nutrinova Nutrition, 224 F.3d at 1360, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954-55.
502. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312-13, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir.
2000); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (describing the
substantial evidence standard “as requiring a court to ask whether a ‘reasonable
mind might accept’ a particular evidentiary record as ‘adequate to support a
conclusion.’”) (citation omitted).
503. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 162 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
504. Id. at 162-63 (asserting that the difference is one “so fine that . . . we have
failed to uncover a single instance” where the application of the other standard
would have been outcome determinative).
505. Id. at 163 (opining that this subtle difference also may reflect the difficulties
of capturing intangible factors in judicial decsion-making, or the weight accorded to
agency expertise, or other more influential factors than the standard of review).
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Accordingly, it is quite unlikely that the somewhat more deferential
standard by which the Federal Circuit reviews ITC factual findings
than by which it reviews district court factual findings would be
outcome determinative in any given case.
E. Interference Proceedings
An interference is a proceeding in the PTO or a district court to
determine the priority of inventorship when two or more parties have
506
claimed the same patentable invention.
The Federal Circuit has
507
jurisdiction over appeals from interference proceedings.
In the
year 2000, the Federal Circuit addressed both jurisdictional issues
regarding interference proceedings and substantive issues of priority
of inventorship.
508
In In re Gartside, the court examined whether the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences has jurisdiction to continue an
interference proceeding to determine whether the patentability of a
party’s claims after the other party asserting priority has withdrawn
509
from the proceeding.
Initially, Gartside provoked an interference
proceeding by copying claims from an existing patent held by Forgac,
and arguing that its application should be granted priority over
510
Forgac’s patent.
After substantial proceedings before an
Administrative Patent Judge (“APJ”), Forgac withdrew from the
proceeding and authorized the APJ to cancel certain claims from his
506. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 291 (1988) (stating that “[t]he owner of an interfering
patent may have relief against the owner of another by civil action”); id. § 135(a)
(providing that “[w]henever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion
of the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with any
unexpired patent, an interference may be declared”); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305,
1308 n.1, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1770 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“An interference is a
proceeding instituted in the Patent and Trademark Office before the Board to
determine any question of patentability and priority of invention between two or more
parties claiming the same patentable invention . . . . An interference may be declared
between one or more unexpired patents naming different inventors when, in the
opinion of an examiner, any application and any unexpired patent contain claims for
the same patentable invention.”) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i) (1999)).
507. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), 1295(a)(4)(A) (1994) (“The United States Courts
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a
final decision of a district court of the United States . . . [and] of an appeal from a
decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office with respect to patent applications and interferences . . . .”).
508. 203 F.3d 1305, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
509. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1316-18, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776-78.
510. See id. at 1308-09, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770-71 (noting that the claims that
Gartside copied all pertained to catalytic cracking processes, whereby low-weight,
purified hydrocarbons are created through the breaking down of feed oil). Even
though Gartside copied the claims, the judge designated Gartside the “senior party” in
the interference proceedings since Gartside filed the patent application prior to
Forgac. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770-71.
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511

patent.
The APJ held that despite Forgac’s withdrawal, the
interference should proceed to determine the patentabilty of
Gartside’s claims, and ultimately held that many of those claims were
512
unpatentable.
On appeal, the Board held that the APJ had
properly retained jurisdiction over the patentability issues raised in
the interference because those issues had been fairly raised and fully
513
developed in the earlier proceedings.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court affirmed the Board’s
514
conclusion that the APJ had properly retained jurisdiction.
The
515
court first noted that it reviewed de novo the Board’s jurisdiction.
The court then emphasized that, pursuant to statute, when an
interference is declared, it is imperative that the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences decide issues of priority, but that the panel
516
must resolve questions of patentability. The court has interpreted
this language to mean that “the Board should decide issues relating to
priority and patentability that are fairly raised and fully developed
517
during the interference . . . .”
The court then explained that in a
518
prior case, Guinn v. Kopf, it had held that the Board should decide
priority issues that have been fairly raised and fully developed, even
when a party attempts to terminate the interference and disclaim
519
priority of inventorship.
Based on this precedent, the Federal
Circuit held in Gartside that “Forgac’s withdrawal did not divest the
511. See id. at 1309-10, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771-72 (indicating that prior to
Forgac’s withdrawal, both parties requested a final hearing after the APJ ruled that
certain claims were unpatentable, and the parties’ responses to the judge’s
reconsideration were unpersuasive).
512. See id. at 1310-11, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (determining that Gartside’s
claims had been fairly developed and should be resolved in the name of public
interest) (citing Perkins v. Kwon, 886 F.2d 325, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
513. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (holding that the APJ did not abuse his
discretion in declaring that Gartside had failed to demonstrate certain claims were
patentably distinct from other claims in dispute).
514. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1318, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1778 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (agreeing that Forgac’s withdrawal did not preclude the APJ from
adjudicating the case since the interference had been declared properly prior to the
submission of the withdrawal request).
515. See id. at 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775 (noting also, on a related but
distinct issue, that the court reviews for an abuse of discretion “the Board’s decision to
resolve issues of patentability that were not placed in issue by the parties during the
interference . . . .”).
516. Id. at 1316, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (“The Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences shall determine questions of priority and may determine questions of
patentability.”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)).
517. Id. at 1316-17, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776 (citing Perkins, 886 F.2d at 328-30,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310-11) (emphasis in original).
518. 96 F.3d 1419, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
519. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1317, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1777 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (explaining that Guinn extended the holding in Perkins).
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Board of jurisdiction over the interference, and that the Board did
not abuse its discretion in deciding the patentability of Gartside’s
520
claims.”
The Board then explained that the resolution of
patentability issues serves the public interest by settling the rights of
521
concern to the public.
The Federal Circuit also addressed substantive issues relating to the
criteria for determining priority of inventorship in the year 2000. To
determine priority, the PTO or district court primarily evaluates the
522
parties’ dates of conception and reduction to practice of the
523
“A conception must encompass all limitations of the
invention.
claimed invention, and ‘is complete only when the idea is so clearly
defined in the inventor’s mind that only ordinary skill would be
necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive
524
research or experimentation.’”
To establish a reduction to
practice, a party “must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) the party
constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met every
element of the interference count, and (2) the embodiment or
525
process operated for its intended purpose.”
In Singh v. Brake, the court examined whether Singh had conceived
of the invention at issue—a DNA construct—before January 12, 1983,
526
the date of Brake’s patent application. The Board held that Singh
had failed to prove that he “had formulated a clear and complete
picture in his mind” of the invention prior to January 12, 1983,
527
thereby awarding priority to Brake.
However, the Federal Circuit
vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further

520. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1317, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777 (concluding that
Forgac’s withdrawal and consequent cancellation of claims were analogous to
Guinn’s disclaiming of a claim corresponding to the patent’s count and that the
patentability issues in Forgac were similar to the priority issues raised in Guinn).
521. Id. at 1318, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777.
522. See Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1676 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“Conception is ‘the formulation in the mind of the inventor[] of a
definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is
thereafter to be applied in practice.’”) (brackets in original) (quoting Kridl v.
McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1449, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1686, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
523. Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1698 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (noting that in a priority determination, the court also may consider “‘the
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice,
from a time prior to conception by the other [party]’”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
(1994)).
524. Singh, 222 F.3d at 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (quoting Burroughs
Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915, 1919
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
525. Eaton, 204 F.3d at 1097, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
526. Singh, 222 F.3d at 1365-66, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-76.
527. Id. at 1366, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (explaining why the court awarded
priority to Blake) (quoting Singh, Paper No. 164, 29 (BPAI May 11, 1998)).
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528

proceedings. In its review of the case, the court focused on a key
piece of evidence: Singh’s notebook entry of December 21, 1982,
which noted a DNA construct of the same precise length and
complementarity needed to complete the experiment to create the
529
construct at issue in the interference. The court concluded that the
Board should have considered this notebook entry in determining
whether Singh had, in fact, conceived the invention prior to January
530
12, 1983.
Accordingly, the court remanded for consideration of
531
that evidence and a reevaluation of the conception issue.
532
In Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., the court examined whether
Genentech had reduced its invention—a genetically engineered
533
protein—to practice prior to Chiron’s patent application.
The
critical issue presented was whether the “fusion protein” created by
Genentech scientists had been properly recognized as operating for
534
its intended purpose. The Board held that the tests performed on
the protein did not confirm that it functioned for its intended
purpose and ruled that Genentech had not reduced the invention to
535
practice before Chiron’s application date.
When Genentech
challenged the Board’s decision in district court, they submitted new
528. See Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
529. See Singh, 222 F.3d at 1368-69, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677-78 (noting that the
Board disregarded the case notebook entry contained in a “synthetic DNA” request
form as well as a notation next to the order explaining Singh’s intended use for the
special DNA despite the fact that they served as important corroborating evidence).
530. See id. at 1369-70, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (clarifying the use of notebook
entries to corroborate conception and emphasizing that a failure to witness such
entries in prompt fashion does not automatically reduce its corroborative value) (citing
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1378, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 81, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); Mikus v. Wachtel, 542 F.2d 1157, 1161, 191 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 571, 575 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (holding that notebook entries not witnessed until
several months to a year after entry were not incredible nor of little corrobative value).
The court went on to explain that notebook entries are more likely to be considered
corroborative in a conception analysis than in a reduction to practice analysis. See id.,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
531. See id. at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
532. 220 F.3d 1345, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1636 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
533. See Genentech, 220 F.3d at 1348-49, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638-39 (noting that
since Chiron was the senior party in the proceeding, it was Genentech’s burden to
establish that the invention had been reduced to practice before the filing date of
Chiron’s application).
534. See id. at 1349-50, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639-40 (explaining that, in general,
Genentech must prove a reduction to practice by showing “(1) its inventors had made
an embodiment of the count prior to the critical date; (2) that sufficient tests had been
conducted prior to the critical date . . .; and (3) that the inventors recognized, prior to
the critical date, that the invention worked for its intended purpose.”).
535. See id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638-39 (indicating that the results from
a radioreceptor assay test, which determines the ability of a protein to bind to a
receptor, did not correlate to the use of a fusion protein as a growth promoting
therapeutic agent, which was the intended purpose of the invention).
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536

evidence.
The new evidence included testimony that the test
performed on the protein would have indicated to one skilled in the
537
art that the protein worked for its intended purpose. Based upon
that evidence, the district court ruled that Genentech had reduced
the invention to practice before Chiron’s date of conception, and
538
awarded priority to Genentech.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that Genentech
had not properly reduced the invention to practice before Chiron’s
539
date of conception. The court first noted that the district court had
properly considered the reduction to practice issue de novo and heard
live testimony on the issue of whether Genentech had established a
540
practical use for the fusion protein. The court explained that it had
previously held that reduction to practice does not occur unless
testing conducted to prove practical utility is deemed successful by
541
the appropriate parties and emphasized that the record established
that the Genentech scientists who had created the fusion protein did
not contemporaneously understand that the tests they had performed
would have established that the protein worked for its intended
542
Therefore, the court considered whether the
purpose.
contemporaneous recognition of the significance of the tests
performed for Genentech by an outside scientist, Dr. Hintz, would
543
“inure” to Genentech’s benefit.
The court held that the findings
would not inure to the benefit of Genentech because the Genentech
scientists had not known that the tests they had asked Hintz to
perform could have established that the protein worked for its

536. See id. at 1349-50, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
537. See id. at 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640 (indicating that Genentech’s
intended purpose for the fusion protein, use as a growth-promoting therapeutic
agent, did relate to the results gleaned from the radioreceptor assay test).
538. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1636, 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (amending its initial judgment, and noting that despite the
inventor’s failure to recognize the practical utility of the invention prior to the critical
date, the scientist who ran the radioreceptor assay test actually appreciated the results
of the test and thereby, through association, the inventors could be held to have
reduced the invention to practice).
539. See Genentech, 220 F.3d at 1352-54, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640-43.
540. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1640 (stating that the court heard live
testimony from seven experts on whether Genentech had established a practical utility
for the fusion protein).
541. See id. at 1352, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642 (“When testing is necessary to
establish utility, there must be recognition and appreciation that the tests were
successful for reduction to practice to occur.”) (quoting Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal,
S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 594-95, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1610, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
542. See id. at 1352-54, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1641-43 (affirming the Board’s initial
decision).
543. See id. at 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642 (defining “inurement” as a
situation where the inventor benefits from the actions of another individual).
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544

intended purpose.
Accordingly, the court concluded that
545
Genentech should not be awarded priority of the invention.
546
In a similar vein, the court in Eaton v. Evans evaluated whether
Evans had reduced to practice his invention—an electric memory
547
The Board
cell—before Eaton had filed his patent application.
held that Evans had reduced the invention to practice because he
had performed tests that reasonably established that the invention
548
would operate for its intended purpose.
The Federal Circuit,
however, reversed, holding that the tests relied upon by the Board
might have satisfied the second prong of the test for reduction to
practice, which requires that an invention work for its intended
549
purpose.
However, Evans failed to satisfy the first prong, which
requires the party to have constructed an embodiment, to include
550
each element listed in the interference count. While Evans argued
that the device he used was the equivalent of the “sense amplifier”
required by the interference count, the court emphasized that “the
551
doctrine of equivalents does not pertain to an interference.” Thus,
Evans must have used an actual “sense amplifier” to fulfill the first
552
Consequently, the court vacated the Board’s
prong of the test.
553
priority decision and remanded for further analysis.
All three Federal Circuit rulings in the year 2000 addressing the
substantive issues of priority in interference proceedings reversed the
554
decisions of the lower tribunals (the Board or the district court).
544. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1636, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Because the inventors did not submit the fusion protein
samples to Dr. Hintz for testing for growth-promoting activity, his uncommunicated
recognition that the fusion protein has that activity does not inure to their benefit.”).
545. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (asserting that the district court erred, and
that the Board’s determination should be reinstated).
546. 204 F.3d 1094, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
547. See Eaton, 204 F.3d at 1095-96, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696-97.
548. See id. at 1098, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (concluding that Evans had
reduced the invention to practice from testimony given by Evans’ colleague and notes
taken in his laboratory notebook).
549. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (recognizing that proof of the second
prong does not automatically satisfy the first prong).
550. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (indicating that Evans did not use a sense
amplifier, one of the elements in the count, as part of his single-cell memory circuit).
551. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698.
552. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698 (noting that an oscilloscope or other
similar tool could not have been used in place of the amplifier).
553. See Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1098, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1699 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
554. See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1636, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding the district court erred in its holding);
Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (concluding that the Board erred in denying priority to Singh by failing to
address important issues); Evans, 204 F.3d at 1096, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1697 (reversing
the Board’s holding that the inventor had reduced the invention to practice).
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While such a small sample may merely reflect happenstance, one
could also conclude that the rules for priority are sufficiently unclear
that they have created problems for the lower tribunals on these
difficult issues.
F.

PTO Practice & Procedure

The Federal Circuit resolved an important issue of PTO practice in
555
In re Gartside. There, the court held that the “substantial evidence”
556
standard applies to the court’s review of PTO’s findings of fact.
The Federal Circuit had previously reviewed factual findings under
557
the “clearly erroneous” standard of review. However, in Dickinson v.
558
Zurko, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit could no
longer use that standard and directed the Federal Circuit to select
one of the standards of review set forth in the Administrative
559
Procedure Act (“APA”).
Thus, the court considered whether the
extremely deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard or the
somewhat less deferential “substantial evidence” standard would
560
apply.
The Zurko Court noted that the arbitrary and capricious
standard is “highly deferential,” can be satisfied by demonstrating a
rational connection exists between the agency’s fact findings and the
actual result, and becomes the default standard when the substantial
561
evidence standard does not apply.
In contrast, the substantial
evidence standard reviews the agency’s record as a whole and takes
into account the evidence that supports as well as negates an agency’s
562
determination. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[s]ubstantial
555. 203 F.3d 1305, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
556. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
557. See id. at 1311, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73.
558. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
559. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1311, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73 (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1994)). The relevant part of the APA is found at 5 U.S.C. § 706,
providing that “the reviewing court shall . . . (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law, . . . (E) unsupported by
substantial evidence in a case subject to Sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.” Id. at 1311-12, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
560. See id. at 1312, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (recognizing that the Supreme
Court did not decide which standard is the correct one for PTO findings in Zurko).
561. Id. at 1313-14, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773-74 (citing Hyundai Elec. Indus. Co.
v. ITC, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1396, 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting
that rationality is the basis for the arbitrary and capricious standard); Assoc. of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting the arbitrary and capricious standard applies when all else
fails)).
562. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1773 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (explaining that the substantial evidence standard “involves examination of
the [agency’s] record as a whole, taking into account evidence that both justifies and
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evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion . . . Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
563
constitute substantial evidence.”
The court found the substantial evidence standard was more
564
appropriate than the arbitrary and capricious standard.
It noted
that the substantial evidence standard usually applies under the APA
565
to review “on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.”
The court then determined that the Federal Circuit plainly reviews
566
PTO factual decisions on the record developed by the Board.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the substantial evidence
567
standard governs review of PTO factfindings.
Another Federal Circuit decision in the year 2000 implicating PTO
568
practice and procedure is Helfgott & Karas, P.C. v. Dickenson.
In
Helfgott, the issue was whether the Commissioner had abused his
discretion in refusing to grant Helfgott relief from a series of mistakes
569
that had led to the rejection of an international patent application.
In March 1996, Helfgott filed two international patent applications
570
with the PTO—the ‘856 and ‘218 applications. Applicants for such
a patent have a right to file a “Demand for International Preliminary
Examination” to gain an initial evaluation of the patentability of the
571
claimed invention.
Thus, in October 1996, Helfgott filed such a
Demand for the ‘856 application, but had mistakenly included the
application number, filing date, and priority date for the ‘218
572
application. The PTO treated the Demand as applying to the ‘218
application and sent an “Invitation to Correct Defects in the
Demand,” which contained the reference number for the ‘218
detracts from an agency’s decision.”).
563. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1312, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938)).
564. See id. at 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
565. Id. at 1313, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(1994)).
566. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774 (“The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record
before the Patent and Trademark Office.”) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1994)).
567. See id. at 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775.
568. 209 F.3d 1328, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (addressing
questions of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion on part of the PTO).
569. See Helfgott, 209 F.3d at 1330-33, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426-28.
570. See id. at 1330, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
571. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426 (explaining that the Demand is a request
for international examination of patentability that must be filed with an international
authority such as the PTO in accordance with the provisions of the Patent Cooperation
Treaty, which is an international agreement enabling inventors to obtain patents more
efficiently).
572. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
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573

application.
Since the ‘218 application had been abandoned, a
Helfgott employee deposited the Invitation into the “dead file” of the
574
‘218 application.
Subsequently, the Commissioner sent Helfgott
575
other documents pertaining to the ‘218 application. In September
1997, when Helfgott had still not received documentation regarding
the ‘856 application and having discovered the errors on the original
Demand, he filed a “Petition for Expedited Action,” requesting that
576
the errors be corrected. The Commissioner dismissed this petition
as untimely, so Helfgott requested an examination of the
circumstances and a suspension of nonstatutory rules under 37 C.F.R.
577
§ 1.183, which permits suspension when justice requires.
The
Commissioner rejected this request and two other requests for
578
Helfgott then filed suit in district court,
reconsideration.
challenging the Commissioner’s decision as arbitrary and capricious,
579
and the district court sustained the Commissioner’s positions.
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the PTO had
contributed to the series of errors and that the Commissioner should
580
have exercised his discretion to rectify the situation.
The court
emphasized that under the applicable regulations, the Commissioner
had discretion to suspend or waive the PTO’s non-statutory
requirements, including the time limits it imposed to Helfgott’s
581
The court further explained that the Commissioner’s
detriment.
position was “wooden,” that the changes to its application requested
by Helfgott were “obvious,” and that the PTO had amplified

573. See id. at 1331, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426-27.
574. Helfgott & Karas, P.C. v. Dickenson, 209 F.3d 1328, 1331-32, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1425, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
575. See Helfgott, 209 F.3d at 1332, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427 (stating that the
Commissioner sent Helfgott a “Notification of Receipt of Demand,” an “Opinion on
Patentability,” an “International Preliminary Examination Report,” and a “Notification
of Transmittal of International Preliminary Examination Report”).
576. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427.
577. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1427-28 (noting that Section 1.183 permits the
PTO Commissioner to suspend nonstatutory rules when justice requires and the
circumstances are extraordinary).
578. See id. at 1332-33, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (noting that the Commissioner
maintained that it would be inappropriate to correct the errors not only because the
preliminary examination had already taken place for the ‘218 application, but also
because the errors did not constitute the type of obvious mistakes that are
characterized as correctable under the PCT).
579. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (upholding the Commissioner’s decisions
regarding the untimeliness of Helfgott’s application under 36 C.F.R. § 1.181 as well as
the inappropriateness of allowing Helfgott to correct his errors under PCT Rule 91.1).
580. See Helfgott & Karas, P.C. v. Dickenson, 209 F.3d 1328, 1335, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1425, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
581. See Helfgott, 209 F.3d at 1335-36, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430-31 (referring to
37 C.F.R. § 1.183).
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582

Helfgott’s errors.
Ultimately, the court, noting that substance is
more important than form, but attention to detail in all aspects of the
583
patent application process is vital to insure success, held that the
Commissioner acted unreasonably by refusing to correct the
584
Demand.
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
A. Preliminary Injunction—Validity
For a moving party to obtain a preliminary injunction, that party
must establish that “(1) it has a reasonable likelihood of succeeding
on the merits; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is
not granted; (3) the balance of hardships tips in its favor; and (4) an
585
injunction would be consistent with the public interest.” In Helifix,
Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., the Federal Circuit considered the patentee’s
request to overturn the district court’s denial of a preliminary
586
injunction.
The court explained that for the patentee to be
successful in overturning the denial, the patentee must demonstrate
(1) clear error by the district court on one or more factors, and
587
(2) an abuse of discretion in denying preliminary relief.
The
Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction
despite reversing the district court’s summary judgment decision of
invalidity, which formed the basis for the district court’s denial of the
preliminary injunction. The court held that the patentee had not
sufficiently demonstrated a clearly erroneous finding and an abuse of
588
discretion.
The patent holder bears the burden of establishing a likelihood of
success on the merits to the patent’s validity when seeking a
589
The court in Helifix explained that the
preliminary injunction.
presumption of validity created by 35 U.S.C. § 282 does not relieve
the patentee of the burden of proving that it will likely succeed at
582. See id. at 1336-37, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430-31 (holding that Helfgott’s
errors were synonymous with those described in the PCT and were correctable).
583. See id. at 1330, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1426.
584. Id. at 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
585. Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1350-51, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
586. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1351, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
587. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307 (quoting New England Braiding Co. v.
A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1625 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
588. See id. at 1351, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
589. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307 (citing Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930
F.2d 867, 869, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
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trial on all matters of disputed liability regardless of whether the issue
590
is patent validity.
Where the alleged infringer raises a substantial
question concerning validity through an invalidity defense, and the
patentee cannot prove the defense lacks substantial merit, the court
591
should not issue a preliminary injunction.
Although the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment of invalidity,
the court nonetheless stated it could not conclude, based on the
record, that the district court abused its discretion in denying the
592
preliminary injunction.
Recognizing the summary judgment
requirement that the accused infringer must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,
the court still refused to equate that standard with the patentee’s
burden at the preliminary injunction stage to show that the invalidity
593
defense lacks substantial merit.
The court concluded that the
record raised a significant question of patent invalidity even though
the district court did not substantiate a granting of summary
594
judgment.
Furthermore, in view of the substantial question
regarding likelihood of success on the merits of validity, the court did
not find error in the district court’s failure to consider the other
595
preliminary injunction factors.
B. Standard of Review—Generic Validity
596

In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit
reviewed the district court’s decision on cross-motions for summary
judgment that claims of the patent in suit were not invalid for either a
failure to comply with the best mode requirement or for double
597
patenting.
In its decision, the Federal Circuit repeated the wellknown standard under 35 U.S.C. § 282 that patents enjoy a
presumption of validity that can be overcome only through clear and

590. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307 (explaining that the presumption of
validity “does not relieve a patentee who moves for a preliminary injunction from
carrying the normal burden of demonstrating that it will likely succeed on all
disputed liability issues at trial, even when the issue concerns the patent’s validity.”)
(quoting New England Braiding, 970 F.2d at 882, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625)).
591. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1351, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
592. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1351, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
593. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
594. See id. at 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308.
595. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308 (“A district court may properly deny a
motion for preliminary injunction simply based on the movant’s failure to establish a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.”) (quoting Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. J. Baker
Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1784 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
596. 222 F.3d 973, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
597. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 976, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
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598

convincing evidence. To invalidate a patent on summary judgment,
therefore, the moving party must submit clear and convincing
evidence of invalidity to the extent that no reasonable jury could find
599
otherwise.
On the other hand, a party seeking to have a patent
held not invalid through summary judgment must show that the nonmoving party, who bears the burden of proof at trial to show
invalidity, “failed to produce clear and convincing evidence on an
essential element of a defense upon which a reasonable jury could
600
invalidate the patent.”
In the context of summary judgment
motions, the panel noted that the evidence must be viewed in the
601
light most favorable to the non-moving party.
C. Anticipation
Each of the Federal Circuit’s year 2000 cases that addressed
anticipation to any significant degree began by stating that
602
anticipation is a question of fact, even when considered on appeal
603
Therefore, the Federal Circuit will
from a rejection in the PTO.
affirm a trial court’s finding regarding anticipation if substantial
604
evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
When considering an
anticipation decision from a bench trial, the Federal Circuit stated it
605
The court,
reviews the district court’s decision for clear error.
598. See id. at 980, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613 (citing United States Surgical Corp.
v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
599. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613.
600. Id. at 980, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613-14.
601. See id. at 980, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
602. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 995, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1227, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“This court reviews a finding of anticipation as a
question of fact.”); Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Blok-Lok had to establish that there were no
material facts in dispute relating to its assertion of anticipation.”); Advanced Display
Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1678 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“Anticipation is a question of fact.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate
Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 20, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“Whether such art is anticipating is a question of fact.”).
603. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1666-67 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (“[A]nticipation is a question of fact.”).
604. Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 995, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (“[T]his court must
affirm the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law.”); Advanced Display,
212 F.3d at 1281, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (holding that an appellate court may
reverse a judgment as a matter of law motion only if substantial evidence does not
support the jury’s factual findings) (citing Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d
1321, 1332, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1233 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
605. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison, 227 F.3d 1361, 1367, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1068-69 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v.
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1462, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 488 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
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however, reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment of
606
anticipation de novo.
Whereas the first step of an anticipation analysis is claim
607
the second step involves a comparison of the
construction,
608
construed claim to the prior art. Furthermore, “to be anticipating,
a prior art reference must disclose ‘each and every limitation of the
claimed invention[,] . . . must be enabling[,] and [must] describe . . .
[the] claimed invention sufficiently to have placed it in possession of
609
a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.”
The panel in Advanced Display Systems v. Kent State University defined
invalidity by anticipation in a slightly different fashion, requiring the
prior art document to be so precise in its description of the invention
that anyone with average skill in the art can construct the invention
610
without difficulty.
True to their word, a great number of the
anticipation cases decided by the Federal Circuit expend many pages
considering construction of the claims and applying those claim
611
constructions to the facts presented. A recitation of each case and
its facts, thus, provides minimal insight into the overall state of the
612
Nevertheless, the decisions warrant an
Federal Circuit law.
examination of the relevant legal issues and facts.
606. See Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363, 1365, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1377, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96
F.3d 1423, 1425, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
607. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303; see also Union Oil,
208 F.3d at 995, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (“The first step in any invalidity . . .
analysis is claim construction.”) (quoting Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147
F.3d 1358, 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
608. See Helifix, 208 F.3d 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1911, 1915, (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
609. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303 (quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 147879, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 20, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057, 1061 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires the disclosure in a single piece
of prior art of each and every limitation of a claimed invention.”).
610. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that anticipation requires
“that the four corners of a single, prior art document describe every element of the
claimed invention, either expressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill
in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation.”) (citing
Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943, 1947
(Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[T]he reference must be enabling and describe the
applicant’s claimed invention sufficiently to have placed it in possession of a person of
ordinary skill in the field of the invention.”).
611. See supra note 607.
612. See generally Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 994-96,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227, 1230-32 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (observing that the Federal
Circuit simply reviewed the claim construction as well as the facts applied by the
district court to conclude that the alleged references did not anticipate).
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In Helifix, for example, the Federal Circuit considered whether a
613
brochure anticipated the claims at issue.
The parties agreed that
the alleged anticipatory reference did not expressly disclose (in
614
words) elements eight through ten of the claim at issue. However,
the court acknowledged the possibility of the brochure being
anticipatory in the event someone would understand elements eight
through ten, as being otherwise disclosed by the brochure, and could
615
construct the invention on his own. The court reversed the district
court’s determination of invalidity on this basis because it concluded
the district court applied an incorrect standard to determine what
616
constituted a person of ordinary skill in the art. The district court
did so by determining which persons working in the field of the
invention were likely to be familiar with the relevant literature; the
Federal Circuit, however, held that the district court should have also
617
considered other relevant factors in reaching its conclusion.
The
court held that neither party presented evidence of how such a
person of ordinary skill would consider the brochure, which raised a
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to overturn the trial court’s
618
summary judgment decision.
Additionally, in Helifix, the court explained that a disclosure that is
not enabling will not suffice as prior art, despite the claimed

613. Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1346-49, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303-05 (stating that the
district court did not find error in the claim construction but did find that Blok-Lok
failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the brochure enables a person
of ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed method).
614. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (instructing that elements eight through ten refer to the
description in the patent for a tool that “impactingly drives the tie and rotably
permits the same to rotate”) (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,687,801 (issued Sept. 27,
1996)).
615. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (“The brochure might nevertheless be
anticipating if a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the brochure as
disclosing elements (8)-(10) and if such a person could have combined the
brochure’s description of the invention with his own knowledge to make the claimed
invention.”) (citing In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 619, 621
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
616. See id. at 1347, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (noting the district court’s
assumption that because a person of ordinary skill in the art is aware of relevant prior
art, he or she is familiar with the pertinent literature and is likely to attend trade
shows).
617. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (noting other such relevant factors as “the
educational level of the inventor; the type of problems encountered in the art; the
prior art solutions to those problems; the rapidity with which innovations are made;
the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of workers in the
field.”).
618. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (stating that the only evidence relating
to the brochure’s meaning is the testimony of an author of the brochure, who is also
an inventor of the claimed invention).
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invention being disclosed in a printed publication.
The court
concluded that the accused infringer had failed to provide clear and
convincing evidence that the brochure would have enabled a person
620
of ordinary skill to practice the claimed method.
The Federal
Circuit explained that the accused infringer failed to present any
621
evidence to meet the standard. On the enablement issue, the court
concluded that the accused infringer did not present sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the brochure enabled the claimed
method; therefore, clear and convincing evidence did not exist to
622
show that the brochure anticipated the patent in suit.
In Ecolochem, the court considered whether two articles and a
623
related presentation anticipated the claims at issue.
The Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s determination that the articles
anticipated, holding that the trial judge had clearly erred by
misconstruing the relationship between a figure in the article and the
624
Despite its holding that the articles did not
text of the article.
anticipate, the court affirmed the district court’s holding of
anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), based upon the
625
presentation.
In affirming this portion of the district court’s
decision, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the patentee’s argument
that the presentation alone cannot anticipate the asserted patent
626
claims.
The court quoted Section 102(a) and explained that “[a]
presentation indicative of the state of knowledge and use in this
country . . . qualifies as prior art for anticipation purposed under
627
§ 102.”
In response to the patentee’s argument that the
presentation could not qualify as anticipatory prior art because Dr.
Martinola, the presenter, could not remember what he had said
twelve years earlier, the Federal Circuit said that whether Dr.
Martinola remembered correctly was an issue of credibility, and it
would review the lower court’s factual determination with

619. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
620. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1348, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
621. See Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1348, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (citing In re
Sheppard, 339 F.2d 238, 242, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 42, 45 (C.C.P.A. 1964)).
622. See id. at 1349, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305.
623. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison, 227 F.3d 1361, 1363-64, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
624. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1363, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.
625. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066 (remanding the case for a damages
determination because the district court’s findings of willful infringement were
unchallenged).
626. See id. at 1369, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
627. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
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628

deference.
The Federal Circuit, however, did not agree that the
presentation anticipated all of the claims at issue and reversed the
district court’s finding that certain claims were invalid based on the
629
presentation.
The Federal Circuit reversed because the evidence
regarding the presentation did not demonstrate all claim elements
630
had been discussed at the presentation.
In Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., the court considered
whether a document, together with a second document that the first
one incorporated by reference, could anticipate the claimed
631
invention.
The court held that it could, and explained that
“[m]aterial not explicitly contained in the single, prior art document
may still be considered for purposes of anticipation if that material is
632
incorporated by reference into the document.” The court went on
to describe incorporation by reference as a method for integrating
material from documents into a host document, and citing such
material so as to make clear that the material is effectively part of the
633
host document.
The court stated that the degree and extent of incorporation by
634
reference is a matter of law. Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted
that “one reasonably skilled in the art should be used to determine
whether the host document describes the material to be incorporated
635
by reference with sufficient particularity.”
The court summarized
the analysis by stating that a factfinder’s role is to determine whether
the claimed invention is described by the single reference while the
court is to determine “what material in addition to the host
636
document constitutes the single reference.” The factfinder should
“determine whether that single reference describes the claimed
637
Because the trial judge gave the entire determination
invention.”
628. Id. at 1369-70, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
629. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison, 227 F.3d 1361, 1369-70, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
630. See id. at 1370, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071.
631. Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1283, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1678, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
632. Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1282, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (citing
Ultradent Prods., Inc. v. Life-Like Cosmetics, Inc., 127 F.3d 1065, 1069, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1336, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
633. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (explaining that in order to incorporate
material by reference, the host document must be specific regarding what material it
incorporates and where that material is found in the various documents) (citations
omitted).
634. See id. at 1283, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (citing Quaker City Gear Works,
Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446, 1453-54, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
635. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
636. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
637. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (explaining that anticipation is a
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to the jury and did not answer the first question, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the trial judge had committed legal error and
638
remanded for a new trial on anticipation.
639
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., the court clarified
and corrected several aspects of the trial court’s holding that each of
640
the asserted claims was anticipated. The patentee argued that the
district court’s claim construction caused the patent in suit to read on
prior art considered by the examiner during prosecution, and, as a
result, the court should interpret the patent more narrowly to avoid
641
that art.
Although the Federal Circuit agreed that the district
court’s interpretation caused the claims to read on the art considered
by the examiner, it nevertheless rejected the patentee’s argument
642
aimed at narrowing the construction. The court explained that the
fact the district court’s construction reads on the prior art of record
did not negate the district court’s claim construction or its finding of
anticipation; rather, the court held that it provides further evidence
643
that the claimed invention was not novel.
The Apple panel also
acknowledged the axiom that a court should ordinarily avoid reading
644
claims such that they would ensnare prior art. The court, however,
countered with the often-stated response: “[w]here ‘the only claim
construction that is consistent with the claim’s language and the
written description renders the claim invalid, then the axiom does
645
not apply and the claim is simply invalid.’” Finally, the court noted
the district court failed to review each claim independently and noted
that a patent claim is presumed valid independent of other claims:
646
therefore, a claim dependent on an invalid claim is still valid.
question of fact while incorporation by reference is a question of law).
638. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1283, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the district court had a
duty to determine whether and to what extent the material was incorporated by
reference).
639. 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
640. See Apple Computer, 234 F.3d at 20-26, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061-67.
641. See id. at 23, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
642. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
643. See id. at 23-24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064.
644. Id. at 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064 (“[C]laims should be read in a way that
avoids ensnaring prior art if it is possible to do so.”) (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1556, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1743
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
645. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1057, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345,
51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R.
Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 799 n.6, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1102 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (holding that judicial redrafting of claims to preserve validity is
impermissible).
646. Apple Computer, 234 F.3d at 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
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647

In In re Hyatt, a patent applicant appealed an anticipation
648
rejection of certain claims by the Patent Office. Because this appeal
originated from the Patent Office’s Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, the Federal Circuit undertook an analysis somewhat
different than the anticipation analysis arising in enforcement
649
litigation. The court described the analysis in three parts. First, the
650
court reiterated that anticipation is a question of fact. Second, the
court explained that it upholds decisions of the Board on factual
matters if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
651
Board’s findings.
Third, so long as they are consistent with the
specification, claims are given their broadest reasonable
652
interpretation during the examination proceedings.
This
proposition, the court noted, “‘serves the public interest by reducing
the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given broader scope
653
than is justified.’”
Relying on the notion that it must apply the
claims in their broadest possible way, the court concluded that the
Board had correctly rejected the claims on the basis of anticipation
654
and affirmed the decision.
D. On-Sale Bar
The on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is properly considered as a
655
specific subset of anticipation. In STX, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., the court
explained the burden of proving an on-sale bar as follows:
[The party challenging validity] must demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that there was a definite sale or offer to sell
more than one year before the application for the subject patent,
and that the subject matter of the sale or offer to sell fully
anticipated the claimed invention or would have rendered the

647. 211 F.3d 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
648. Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1369, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665 (stating that the patent
office upheld the rejection of several of Mr. Hyatt’s patent application claims).
649. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665.
650. Id. at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (citing Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 812, 814-15, (1869); In re Schriber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1429, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
651. See id. at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (citing In re Gartside, 203 F.3d
1305, 1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
652. See id. at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (citing In re Graves, 69 F.3d 1147,
1152, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697, 1701 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858,
225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
653. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing In re Yamamoto, 74 F.2d 1569, 1571, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 934, 936 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
654. See Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1372-73, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668 (noting that
although the Board’s interpretation was broad, it was not unreasonable).
655. 211 F.3d 588, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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The Supreme Court recently revised the test to determine whether
a patent is invalid based on an on-sale bar in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics,
657
Inc.
Under the Pfaff test, a claimed invention is considered to be
“on sale” within the meaning of Section 102(b) if, more than one
year before the filing date to which the claim is entitled (the critical
658
date), two conditions are satisfied.
First, the product must be the
subject of a commercial offer for sale more than one year before the
659
subject patent application was filed.
Second, the invention must
have also been ready for patenting more than one year prior to the
660
filing of the subject patent application. This second prong can be
satisfied by (1) proof of reduction to practice prior to the critical
date, or (2) by proof prior to the critical date, that the inventor had
prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention, and the
drawings were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art
661
to practice the invention.
The overriding concern of the on-sale
bar is to protect against an inventor’s “attempt to commercialize his
662
invention beyond the statutory term.” In Vanmoor, the court stated
that the determination of whether a product was placed on sale is a
663
question of law, based on underlying facts.
In Vanmoor, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
summary judgment that the invention was on sale prior to the critical
664
The court explained that the facts were not typical of most
date.
on-sale bar cases, wherein a “‘patentee has placed some device on sale
prior to the critical date and the accused infringer must demonstrate
656. STX, 211 F.3d at 590, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1349.
657. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
658. See Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
659. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049; Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201
F.3d 1363, 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Helifix Ltd. v.
Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1349, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2000); see also Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67.
660. See Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049; Vanmoor, 201
F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379 (explaining that the second prong of the
Pfaff test is a departure from the previous “totality of the circumstances” test).
661. Helifix, 208 F.3d at 1349, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305; Vanmoor, 201 F.3d at
1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379; see also Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68.
662. STX, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 590, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Ferag AG v. Quipp Inc., 45 F.3d 1562, 1567, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1512, 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
663. See Vanmoor, 201 F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379 (explaining that
the ultimate determination is reviewed by the court without deference, and subsidiary
fact finding is reviewed for clear error) (citing Ferag AG, 45 F.3d at 1566, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1514-15); see also STX, 211 F.2d at 590, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
664. See Vanmoor, 201 F.3d at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379-80 (concluding
that Vanmoor failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact because he proffered
no evidence in support of his trade secret misappropriation allegations).
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that this device actually embodied or rendered obvious the patented
665
invention.’”
Rather, in Vanmoor, Wal-Mart and the other
defendants asserted that they had been selling the actual devices in
666
dispute prior to the critical date.
While the court acknowledged
that the defendants bore the burden of proving the products that
were the subject of the pre-critical date sales anticipated, the court
also noted that the defendants were able to carry that burden based
on the patentee’s allegation that the very same products infringed the
667
patent in suit. The court rejected the patentee’s argument that no
evidence had been presented to show the accused products were
ready for patenting by noting that the products had been actually
reduced to practice, which itself satisfied the second prong of the
668
Pfaff test.
In Zacharin v. United States, the Federal Circuit also affirmed a
669
finding of invalidity based on an on-sale bar. The issue in Zacharin
boiled down to whether the alleged on-sale activity actually
670
Zacharin, the
constituted a sale; the court held that it did.
patentee, asserted that the alleged invalidating contract did not
constitute a commercial offer to sell because the contract was not a
commercial supply contract with fixed unit prices and a definite
671
supply schedule.
Additionally, the patentee asserted the contract
was simply an extension of joint work between the inventor and the
672
United States Army for the evaluation of the patented invention.
673
The court rejected Zacharin’s arguments.
First, the court defined a sale as “a contract between parties to give
and pass rights of property for consideration which the buyer pays or
674
promises to pay the seller for the thing bought or sold.” The facts
showed that the contract required a manufacturer to produce 6000
units of the invention, deliver them to the Army and that Mr.
Zacharin inspected and accepted the devices for the Army. The court

665. Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 1363, 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Evans Cooling Sys. Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
125 F.3d 1448, 1451, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1037, 1039-40 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
666. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
667. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
668. See id. at 1366-67, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379 (finding that the specification
drawings were used to produce the accused cartridges).
669. 213 F.3d 1366, 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
670. See Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049-50.
671. See id. at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
672. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
673. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
674. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050 (quoting In re Caveney, 761 F.3d 671, 676,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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675

held that this constituted a sale.
The court further noted that
Zacharin had disclosed his invention to a third party, the Army, with
the hope and expectation that his design would be used; moreover,
676
he placed no restriction on this disclosure. Finally, the court held
that the “fact that the sale in question was made in the context of a
research and development contract and that there was no fixed price
set for the [invention products] does not suffice to avoid the on-sale
677
bar.”
The fact that the Army used the devices for testing, rather
than routine production units also did not avoid the effect of the on678
sale bar.
Ultimately, the court concluded that “[a] contract to
supply goods is a sales contract, regardless of the means used to
calculate payment and regardless of whether the goods are to be used
679
for testing in a laboratory or for deployment in the field.”
In STX, the court also affirmed a district court’s grant of summary
680
judgment of invalidity based on an on-sale bar.
The court
succinctly addressed and dismissed each of the patentee’s arguments
681
First, the court explained that the fact that
against invalidity.
delivery of the invalidating articles was set for a time after the critical
682
Next, the court rejected the
date was of no consequence.
patentee’s assertion that the pre-critical date product did not embody
all of the claim limitations because the purposes and objectives stated
in the claim’s preamble had not been shown to be present in the
683
early device.
The court responded by explaining that “where a
patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body
and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the
684
invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation.” In this case, the
court held, the preamble did not state a limitation, and therefore the
685
patentee could not rely on it to avoid the on-sale bar. Finally, after
reviewing the facts, the court confirmed that the device was ready for
675. See Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
676. See Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050.
677. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050 (citing RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887
F.2d 1056, 1062-63, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
678. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States,
654 F.2d 55, 59 & n.6, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867, 871 & n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1981)).
679. Zacharin, 213 F.3d at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050-51.
680. See STX, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 589-90, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
681. See STX, 211 F.3d at 589-90, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
682. See id. at 590, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
683. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.
684. Id. at 591, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349 (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473,
478, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
685. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349 (concluding that the first prong of the
Pfaff test requiring an offer to sell was satisfied).
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patenting prior to the critical date, and reiterated that the patentee
could not rely on the preamble’s subjective product quality
recitations, such as “improved playing and handling,” as an escape
686
hatch to circumvent the bar.
In the other two year 2000 cases in which the court considered the
on-sale issue, the court held that the patents were not invalid by
reason of pre-critical date sales. In Helifix, the court reversed the trial
court’s summary judgment ruling and held that material issues of fact
existed relating to both of the Pfaff conditions because the evidence
of record was not shown to disclose or enable each element of the
687
claimed method.
And, finally, in Lampi Corp. v. American Power
688
Products, Inc., the court refused to overturn the trial court’s decision
689
In Lampi, the patentee had made
regarding Section 102(b).
statements during the course of trademark prosecution that indicated
690
the claimed product was on-sale prior to the critical date.
The
defendant sought to use those statements as admissions of pre-critical
691
The district court refused to apply the
date commercial activity.
doctrine of judicial estoppel to those statements based on testimony
692
The Federal Circuit noted
and other evidence presented at trial.
that it applies the law of the regional circuit when considering the
693
issue of judicial estoppel, and in this case the Seventh Circuit
provided the trial court with discretion in the application of the
doctrine. The Federal Circuit concluded that the record did not
694
support a holding that the district court abused its discretion.
E. Obviousness
The Patent Act defines obviousness in Section 103(a):
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been made obvious at the time the invention was
686. See STX, v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 591, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
687. See Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1349-50, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
688. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
689. See Lampi, 228 F.3d 1376-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
690. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
691. See id. at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
692. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
693. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454.
694. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (noting that although the court was
troubled by Lampi’s inconsistent statements, the inconsistency alone did not warrant
a holding that the district court abused its discretion).
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made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the
695
manner in which the invention was made.

The Federal Circuit has uniformly defined this issue as a question
696
of law based on underlying factual questions. The Federal Circuit
reviews obviousness de novo but reviews the underlying factual issues
for clear error because the ultimate conclusion of obviousness is a
697
legal conclusion.
Furthermore, the court has clarified that, with
respect to decisions originating from the patent office, like jury
698
decisions, it reviews the factual record for the presence or absence
699
of substantial evidence.
In In re Baker Hughes, Inc., the court also
explained that it reviews claim construction decisions made by the
patent office de novo, like it reviews district court claim construction
700
decisions.
The PTO, however, does not apply the same rules of
claim construction as does the district court. Unlike the district
court, the PTO reviews claims with the broadest reasonable
701
interpretation consistent with the written description.
695. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
696. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1284-85, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v. Wang,
202 F.3d 1340, 1348, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that
“[o]bviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual inquiries”); In re
Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149, 1152 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Whether an invention satisfies the section 103 nonobviousness requirement
is a question of law with subsidiary factual inquiries.”); Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v.
Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1930 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (explaining that several factual inquiries underline the determination of
obviousness).
697. See Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1348, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586 (observing that
this court renews a district court’s determination of obviousness de novo while reviewing
the underlying factual inquiries for clear error); Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury
Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1643 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“This court reviews the conclusion on obviousness, a question of law, without
deference, and the underlying findings of fact for clear error.”); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1124, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456,
1459 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“This ultimate determination of obviousness is reviewed
without deference, while any factual findings are reviewed for clear error.”).
698. See Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1310, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the underlying factual findings made
by a jury on the issue of obviousness are reviewed merely to ascertain whether they
are supported by substantial evidence).
699. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1776 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (explaining that the court now reviews the Board’s factual determinations
for substantial evidence); In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the Board’s underlying factual findings
are reviewed for substantial evidentiary support).
700. See Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (comparing
the standard of review for claim construction used for reviewing decisions made by the
patent office and the district court).
701. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152 (citing In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1459,
1464, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1464, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
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The Supreme Court defined the underlying factual questions in
702
Graham v. John Deere Co., to include the following: “(1) the scope
and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the prior
art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
703
art; and (4) objective evidence of nonobviousness.”
In Brown &
Williamson, the court expounded on the statutory standard for a
determination of obviousness as “whether the prior art would have
suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that this process should
be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of success,
704
viewed in light of the prior art.”
The Brown & Williamson panel
705
went on to divide the obviousness criterion into two requirements.
First, the court emphasized that there must be a showing of a
suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the prior art
706
Second, there must be a “reasonable expectation of
references.
707
success.”
Additionally, in Ruiz, the court stressed that a district
court must make Graham findings before invalidating a patent for
708
obviousness and that failure to do so may result in a judgment that
702. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) (stating that several factual inquiries must be
satisfied to determine patent validity).
703. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120,
1124, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Upjohn, 225 F.3d at
1310, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289 (stating that these facts must support a jury
verdict of obviousness); Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d
1349, 1355, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“These [factual]
inquiries include the scope and content of the prior art, the level of ordinary skill in
the field of the invention, the differences between the claimed invention and the
prior art, and any objective evidence of non-obviousness such as long-felt need, and
commercial success.”); Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d
1339, 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1643-44 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing the
several critical factual underpinnings used to determine obviousness); Ruiz v. A.B.
Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 662-63, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(setting forth the four factual inquiries that need to be made to determine
obviousness).
704. Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1124, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (citing In
re Dow Chem., 837 F.2d 469, 473, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
705. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459.
706. See id. at 1124-25, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (noting that a showing of the
motivation to combine is an “essential evidentiary component of an obviousness
holding”) (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
707. Id. at 1125, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459 (noting the second requirement of
obviousness “’does not require absolute predictability of success’”) (quoting In re
O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
708. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 663, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1166 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529, 220 U.S.P.Q (BNA)
1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (“Graham was cited but its guidance was not applied,
resulting in the application of hindsight and speculation.”); Custom Accessories, Inc.
v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1196, 1200 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (“[W]hen significant legal errors are reflected in the opinion . . . which
themselves shed doubt on the district court’s use of Graham, the need for findings
becomes greater and their absence rises to the level of error.”).
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709

must be vacated, remanded, or reversed.
Of all the factors recited by the Federal Circuit regarding
obviousness, the court focused most on the issue of “motivation to
710
combine.”
Because inventions almost always result from the
711
combination of old elements, the court has stressed the need to
find a motivation to combine these old elements into one new
invention.
In In re Kotzab, the court explained, “every element of a claimed
invention may often be found in the prior art.
However,
identification in the prior art of each individual part claimed is
712
insufficient to defeat patentability of the whole claimed invention.”
The court went on to state that in order to establish obviousness
based on a combination of elements in the prior art, there must be a
showing of “some motivation, suggestion or teaching of the
desirability of making the specific combination that was made by the
713
applicant.” Indeed, the court repeated the point that combination
claims need not be declared invalid based solely upon finding similar
elements in separate prior patents because such a practice would
714
negate nearly all patents.
In Ecolochem, the court explained that the need for finding a
motivation to combine helps to guard against an illegitimate
715
hindsight reconstruction of the claimed invention.
709. See Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 664, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (reasoning that the
district court’s failure to apply the Graham factors can require that the previous
judgment be vacated and the case remanded).
710. See Sibia Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1931 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that a factual question
subsidiary to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness is determining whether there is
a motivation to combine a prior art reference); In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1369, 1370,
55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reiterating the standard that to
establish obviousness based on a combination of references, there must be a showing of
some motivation or suggestion to make the specific combination that was made);
Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1371, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065,
1073 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that the best defense against hindsight-based
obviousness is application of the requirement for a showing of a motivation or
suggestion to combine the prior art references), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1607 (2001);
Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (indicating that the court has recently
re-emphasized the importance of the motivation to combine).
711. In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313, 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that most inventions arise from a combination of old
elements).
712. Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
713. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316 (citations omitted).
714. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1167 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561,
1575, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593, 1603 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
715. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1371-72, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that “[o]ur case law makes
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The court stressed this point in Yamanouchi as well, repeating its
716
previous warning from In re Rouffet, where the court explained that
the counter to the fact that virtually all inventions are combinations
of old elements is “the suggestion to combine requirement[, which]
stands as a critical safeguard against hindsight analysis and rote
717
application of the legal test for obviousness.”
In several of its decisions from the year 2000, the court described
the motivation–to-combine analysis in detail. In Ecolochem, for
instance, the court explained that in matters of rejection or
invalidation on a combination of art references, “[o]bviousness
cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to
produce the claimed invention, absent some teaching or suggestion
718
supporting the combination.”
The court further stated that the teaching or suggestion to
combine may flow from the nature of the problem but cannot define
719
the problem in terms of its solution. To do so, the court explained,
would impermissibly allow one to rely on hindsight in selecting prior
720
art for purposes of determining obviousness.
In examining a
patent application where two known elements have been combined,
the issue is whether the prior art contains something to motivate the
721
combination, thereby creating obviousness.
In Ruiz, the court stated that the motivation to combine may be
found:
(1) in the prior art references themselves; (2) in the knowledge of
those of ordinary skill in the art that certain references, or
clear that the best defense against hindsight-based obviousness analysis is the
rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of a teaching or motivation to
combine the prior art references. ‘Combining prior art references without evidence
of such a suggestion, teaching, or motivation simply takes the inventor’s disclosure as
a blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability—the essence of
hindsight.’”) (citations omitted).
716. 149 F.3d 1350, 1357-58, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
717. Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1343, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305,
1319, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Dembiczak, 175
F.3d 994, 999, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
718. Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1372, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (quoting ACS Hosp.
Sys., Inc. v. Montfiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929, 933 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
719. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
720. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (quoting Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp.
v. Sulzer Morat GmbH, 139 F.3d 877, 880, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1977, 1981 (Fed.
Cir. 1998)).
721. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1372, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen determining the patentability of a
claimed invention which combines two known elements, the question is whether
there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability, and thus
obviousness, of making the combination.”) (internal citations omitted).
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disclosures in those references, are of special interest or
importance in the field; or (3) from the nature of the problem to
be solved, leading inventors to look to references relating to
722
possible solutions to that problem.

Additionally, the court explained that neither the parties, the
district court, nor the patent office may satisfy this requirement with
conclusory statements and must produce specific evidence of
723
motivation to combine.
With this background, the following section specifically explores
the obviousness decisions issued by the Federal Circuit during 2000.
In Winner International Royalty Corp. v. Wang, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court decision holding that a patent was not
724
obvious. The Federal Circuit found no clear error in either the trial
court’s factual findings relating to obviousness or its ultimate
725
determination of non-obviousness. The Federal Circuit agreed with
the district court’s finding of no motivation to combine the alleged
invalidating references because: (1) there was no perceived
disadvantage in the cited reference that would motivate one of
ordinary skill to combine references, and (2) the primary reference
726
relied upon taught away from the patent’s claimed invention. The
court also noted that a “teaching away” from the claimed invention
727
After reviewing the first
alone can defeat an obviousness claim.
728
three Graham factors, and holding in favor of patentability, the
court explained that if the party asserting obviousness had succeeded
on these issues, the burden would have shifted to the patentee to
722. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1167
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“While the references need not expressly teach that the disclosure
contained therein should be combined with another, the showing of combinability
must be clear and particular”) (quoting Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lake Plastics,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1572, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626, 1630 (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal
citations omitted).
723. In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (“Broad conclusory statements standing alone are not ‘evidence.’”) (citing In
re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
724. 202 F.3d 1340, 1353, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580, 1590 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 530 U.S. 1238 (2000).
725. Winner Int’l, 202 F.3d at 1342, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1581.
726. See id. at 1349, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587 (describing the district court’s
reasoning in concluding that no motivation to combine existed). The court also
explained that “[w]hat a reference teaches and whether it teaches toward or away
from the claimed invention are questions of fact.” Id. at 1349, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1587.
727. See id. at 1349-50, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587 (noting that a reference
teaches away “if it suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference’s
disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant”)
(quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130, 1131 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
728. See id. at 1350, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
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show objective indicia of non-obviousness such as commercial
729
success. Because the patent challenger failed to satisfy its burden,
the court held the burden did not shift, and that the patentee had
shown commercial success attributable to the patent.
In In re Gartside, the court faced an appeal from the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences, wherein the Board found certain
730
claims of a patent were unpatentable as obvious. In a brief opinion,
the court reviewed and accepted the Board’s explanation and
731
evidence showing a motivation to combine the cited references.
With respect to other claims, the court agreed that a motivation to
combine the references existed based upon the teachings of the
732
references themselves and the problem to be solved. The court also
agreed with the Board’s decision not to rely on a declaration
733
The
submitted by the patentee regarding “unexpected results.”
court held that the examples in the declaration did “not correspond
to any process within the scope of the claims” and, therefore, was
734
“not probative of non-obviousness.”
735
In Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., the court affirmed
736
the trial court’s conclusion that the claim at issue was not obvious.
The patent challenger asserted invalidity based on the same
references that were before the examiner during prosecution, and
the Federal Circuit identified the added burden placed on the party
attacking validity. The court quickly dismissed the challenge,
737
concluding that the party had offered no serious argument.
In Advanced Display Systems, the court remanded the case for a new
738
trial on the obviousness issue. The court focused on the objective
739
considerations of non-obviousness in its decision.
The court first
explained that the patent challenger’s repeated failures to design the

729. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588.
730. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1308, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1770 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
731. See Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1319-20, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780 (concluding
that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, and the Board
did not err in finding the claim invalid as obvious).
732. Id. at 1320-21, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779 (agreeing with the Commissioner
that substantial evidence existed to support the Board’s finding that a motivation to
combine the claims arose from the teachings and references and from the nature of
the problem to be solved).
733. See id. at 1321, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
734. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
735. 204 F.3d 1360, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
736. See Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d at 1367-68, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
737. See id. at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
738. 212 F.3d 1272, 1289, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1673, 1684-85 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
739. See Advanced Display, 212 F.3d at 1285, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
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740

claimed invention supported non-obviousness.
“[E]vidence of
failed attempts by others could be determinative on the issue of
741
obviousness.” Next, the court wrote that the evidence showed the
patent challenger had “wholesale” copied the claimed invention and
replicated the claimed invention, rather than copying one in the
public domain. This evidence is demonstrative of indicia of non742
obviousness. As discussed in Section I, supra, the overall decision in
Advanced Display Systems seems geared toward giving the patentee a
second trial because of severe discovery abuses committed by the
743
patent challenger’s counsel.
Indeed, much of the objective
evidence of non-obviousness was improperly withheld from the
744
patentee until very late in the proceedings.
745
In Riverwood International Corp. v. Mead Corp., the court reversed
the district court’s conclusion that the patent claims were not invalid
746
for obviousness. The art primarily relied upon indisputably showed
747
three of the four elements of claim one. The court agreed with a
special master’s decision, (rejected by the district court) regarding a
748
person’s level of skill in the art. With respect to objective factors of
non-obviousness, the court also sided with the special master’s
finding that the success of the product was attributable to factors
749
outside the scope of the claims at issue. The patentee also failed to
prove copying, a long-felt need for improvement in the field of the
750
In view of these findings, the
invention, and failures of others.
objective factors lacked sufficient weight to reverse the court’s

740. See id. at 1285, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681-82 (recognizing that the court has
previously held that an infringer’s inability to develop a product made possible by the
claimed invention supports a finding of non-obviousness).
741. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
742. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 (citing Specialty Composites v. Cabot
Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 991, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1608 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
743. See id. at 1287, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (reasoning that the earlier trial
was “manifestly unjust” due to all the discovery abuses).
744. See Advanced Display Sys. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1286, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1683 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the patentee did not
receive important evidence until after the jury went into deliberations).
745. 212 F.3d 1365, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1763 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1012 (2000).
746. See Riverwood, 212 F.3d at 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766.
747. See id. at 1366-67, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765 (agreeing with the special
master that the first three limitations were admitted).
748. See id. at 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765 (concluding that the claimed
invention would have been obvious to someone of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the invention).
749. Id. at 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765.
750. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1765 (stating that much of the patent
challenger’s evidence of commercial success was attributable to factors outside the
scope of the claims).
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751

determination of obviousness.
752
In In re Baker Hughes, the Federal Circuit reversed the patent
office’s decision that the claims at issue were unpatentable as
753
obvious. The court based its decision primarily on its holding that
754
the PTO had erred in construing the term “hydrocarbon.”
After
construing “hydrocarbon” correctly, the court concluded that readily
755
apparent differences existed between the claims and the cited art.
756
In In re Kotzab, the court similarly reversed the patent office’s
757
determination that the claims were unpatentable as obvious.
The
invention at issue involved “an injection molding method for forming
plastic articles,” and the claims at issue required the use of a single
758
temperature sensor to control a plurality of flow control valves. The
patent applicant argued, and the court agreed, that the reference did
759
not teach or suggest this limitation. The court held that “[n]one of
the Board’s comments relate to the issue of . . . teaching or
760
suggesting the use of one sensor to control” the plurality of valves.
The court explained that the PTO’s decision lacked substantial
evidence to show the one sensor element, and thus rejected the
PTO’s argument that the reference teaches that a single sensor may
761
be used.
Ultimately, the court found that the evidence failed to show the
762
The court
necessary motivation to combine the references cited.
751. See Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. Mead Corp., 212 F.3d 1365, 1367, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1763, 1765 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
752. 215 F.3d 1297, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
753. See Baker Hughes, 215 F.3d at 1304, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154 (concluding
that because the Board misconstrued the claims, it erred in finding that the claims
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art).
754. Id. at 1302, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153 (agreeing with Baker Hughes that the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences erred in constructing the term
“hydrocarbon” as including gases).
755. Id. at 1303, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1153 (explaining the differences in the
processes).
756. 217 F.3d 1365, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
757. See Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
758. Id. at 1367, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314.
759. Id. at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317 (agreeing with the applicant that the
reference at issue in view of secondary references does not teach or suggest the use of a
single temperature sensor to control a plurality of flow control valves).
760. Id. at 1370, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
761. Id. at 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317 (“While the test for establishing an
implicit teaching, motivation, or suggestion is what the combination of these two
statements of [the reference] would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the
art, . . . they must be considered in the context of the teaching of the entire
reference.”). The court went on to note that “particular findings must be made as to
the reason the skilled artisan, with no knowledge of the claimed invention, would
have selected these components for combination in the manner claimed.” Id., 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
762. See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1318 (Fed.
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wrote that the examiner had fallen into “the hindsight trap.” The
court warned that in cases with relatively simple concepts, finding
prior art statements that appeared in the abstract to suggest the
solution was not difficult; the court must nevertheless still make a
determination of the specific principle that motivated the inventor to
764
make the combination. There being no such evidence, the Federal
765
Circuit reversed.
In Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharmaceutical Corp., the court reversed a
jury’s finding that the patent in suit was invalid on the ground of
766
obviousness.
With respect to the first combination of references,
the court held that the record lacked substantial evidence in support
of the challenger’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to
767
The court emphasized the
realize the claimed invention.
requirement for factual support for an expert’s conclusory opinion of
obviousness, and the challenger’s lack of factual support gave the
768
expert’s testimony little probative value.
The court also dismissed
the second combination, holding that the challenger’s expert had
failed to provide documentary support for his statements, and that
recollections about what “general scientific knowledge” was widely
known required “support by documentary evidence in order to
769
receive probative weight.”
On the final piece of art, the Federal
Circuit repeated its conclusion that the patent challenger had failed
770
to present evidentiary support for the jury’s obviousness verdict.
In Sibia Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharmaceutical, the court considered
whether the trial court erred in denying the accused infringer’s
Cir. 2000) (concluding that there was not substantial evidence in the record to modify
the teachings of the reference).
763. Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
764. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (noting that a court must make a
“finding as to the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of a
skilled artisan that would have motivated one with no knowledge of [the claimed]
invention to make the combination in the manner claimed.”).
765. See id. at 1371-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (concluding that the decision
must be reversed because the Board did not make out a prima facie case of
obviousness).
766. 225 F.3d 1306, 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1286, 1293-94 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(ruling that the judgments of invalidity based on obviousness were without adequate
evidentiary support and must be reversed).
767. See Upjohn, 225 F.3d at 1311, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290 (finding that there
was not substantial evidence to support the experts’ conclusion that the claimed
invention was obvious).
768. Id. at 1311, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290 (citing Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital
Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1473, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1997));
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 657, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
769. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
770. See id. at 1312, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291 (finding that the challenger
provided no evidence to support the verdict of obviousness).
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judgment as a matter of law motion that sought to overturn a jury
771
verdict in favor of the patentee. The jury found the patent was not
772
invalid for obviousness.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district
773
The
court’s denial and held the patent invalid for obviousness.
accused infringer asserted that a single prior-art reference was
sufficient to invalidate the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and the
court recognized that in “appropriate circumstances, a single prior
774
art reference can render a claim obvious.”
As with any other
obviousness attack, even with a single reference, there must be
evidence of a motivation to modify the teachings of the single
775
reference.
Contrary to the jury’s conclusion, the Federal Circuit
found that there was a motivation to modify the single reference such
776
The court held that
that it covered the claimed invention.
undisputed evidence (in the form of an article and a patent)
777
provided the motivation to modify the single reference. The court
continued that the undisputed teachings, “‘as filtered through the
knowledge of one skilled in the art,’ as well as the nature of the
problem to be solved, provide a suggestion and motivation” to modify
778
the reference to cover the claimed invention. The patentee tried to
rebut this “undisputed evidence” by pointing out that the article itself
does not teach the modification, yet the court rejected the argument.
The court explained that such a claim fails to provide substantial
evidence of no motivation to modify, and that the patentee ignored
the possibility that the motivation to modify can be found outside the
779
reference.
Additionally, the court disregarded persuasive the
testimony from the author of the reference because the court found
771. 225 F.3d 1349, 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(reviewing the denial of a judgment as a matter of law motion on the issues of
infringement and invalidity).
772. See Sibia, 225 F.3d at 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
773. See id. at 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933 (holding that the “district
court’s denial of Cadus’s motion for JMOL on the issue of invalidity must be
reversed”). Chief Judge Mayer dissented, arguing that the majority was making “an
end-run around the requirement that there must be a motivation to modify.” Id. at
1360, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
774. Id. at 1356, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931.
775. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (setting forth the standard that to
support a claim of obviousness, there must be a showing of a suggestion or
motivation to modify the teachings of that reference to the claimed invention).
776. See Sibia Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharm., 225 F.3d 1349, 1357, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1927, 1932 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
777. See id. at 1357, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932 (stating that the motion to
modify the reference stemmed from the nature of the problem to be solved).
778. See id. at 1357-58, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932 (quoting Motorola, Inc. v.
Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1472, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1489 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
779. See id. at 1358, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932-33.
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his testimony irrelevant to the fundamental issue of whether the
hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, when confronted with
the relevant problem, would have been motivated to use the
780
reference.
The Sibia panel also rejected the patentee’s arguments regarding
781
secondary considerations. The court noted that the licenses relied
upon to show commercial success were part of larger licensing
782
packages, and did not exclusively encompass the patent in suit.
Finally, based on its holding of invalidity of independent claim one,
783
The court
the court also held the dependent claims invalid.
explained that the patentee had failed to argue validity of the
784
dependent claims separately from the independent claim.
In Ecolochem, the court sustained the trial court’s summary
judgment decision of invalidity based on obviousness for one claim
785
but reversed the decision of invalidity for the remaining claims. In
its reversal, the court opined that the trial judge had used the patent
in suit as a “blueprint” for determining obviousness and by doing so
786
violated the rule against using hindsight. The court also held that
the district court had provided no support for its conclusory
statements of obviousness or any evidence that suggested, taught or
787
motivated one of ordinary skill to combine the recited art.
The
Federal Circuit went on to explain that the primary reference actually
788
taught away from the necessary combination. The court regarded

780. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
781. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
782. See Sibia Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharm., 225 F.3d 1349, 1358, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1927, 1933 (stating that “the mere existence of these licenses is insufficient to
overcome the conclusion of obviousness, as based on the express teachings in the
prior art that would have motivated one of ordinary skill to modify [the reference’s
teachings.]”).
783. See Sibia, 225 F.3d at 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
784. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933 (“[T]hese claims do not stand on their
own, and given our determination that claim 1 is invalid, the remaining dependent
claims must fall as well.”) (citing MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d
1362, 1367, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Gardner v. TEC Sys.
Inc., 725 F.2d 1338, 1350, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 777, 786 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
785. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
786. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1372, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (reasoning that
the district court used the claimed invention as a blueprint and looked to other prior
art for the elements present in the claimed invention but missing from the prior art
reference).
787. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (explaining that the district court did not
discuss any specific evidence of motivation to combine, but only made broad
conclusory statements, which did not constitute evidence).
788. See id. at 1373, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074 (establishing that the district court
erred in finding that the claimed reference implicitly suggests the combination of the
two elements).
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the lack of a convincing discussion regarding motivation to combine
as a “critical omission” in the district judge’s decision and rebuked
the judge for a “reference-by-reference, limitation-by-limitation
analysis” that used hindsight and an erroneous “obvious to try”
789
standard.
In its decision sustaining the invalidity of claim 20, the Ecolochem
panel carefully reviewed secondary considerations of non790
First, the court reviewed whether a long-felt, but
obviousness.
791
unresolved need existed in the field of the invention.
The court
agreed with the district judge that no such need existed, and pointed
out that guidelines urging the use of what became a part of the
patented invention were issued in 1982, and the patentee filed its
patent application approximately one year later, in December,
792
1983. Second, the court considered alleged commercial success of
793
the invention. The court explained that “a presumption arises that
the patented invention is commercially successful ‘when a patentee
can demonstrate commercial success, usually shown by significant
sales in a relevant market, and that the successful product is the
794
The court also
invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.’”
explained that once a patentee makes this showing, the burden shifts
to the patent challenger to show that the commercial success resulted
795
from factors extraneous to the patented invention.
The Federal
Circuit disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the patent
challenger had met its burden, holding that the patentee had instead
met its burden of showing that the success resulted from the patented
796
invention. Third, the court reviewed whether others had tried, but
797
failed, to make the claimed invention.
The Federal Circuit
determined that this question, in this case, rested on credibility
789. Id. at 1374, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
790. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076 (stating that it is necessary to
review the district court’s findings on the evidence of secondary consideration).
791. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
792. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077 (finding no clear
error in the district court’s decision that no long-felt need existed).
793. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
794. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077 (quoting J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste &
Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1571, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
795. See id. at 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077 (explaining that “[o]nce [the
patentee] made the requisite showing of nexus between commercial success and the
patented invention, the burden shifted to the [patent challenger] to prove the
commercial success . . . due to other factors”).
796. See id. at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078 (holding that the district court
clearly erred in finding that the patent challenger met its burden).
797. See Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1378-79, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1077, 1078-79 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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issues, and deferred to the district court’s decision on that basis.
Fourth, the court acknowledged that the “fact of near-simultaneous
invention, though not determinative of statutory obviousness, is
strong evidence of what constitutes the level of ordinary skill in the
799
art.”
The district court found that the facts in the case favored
800
obviousness, and the Federal Circuit agreed.
Fifth, the court
disagreed with the district court and held that the prior art did teach
801
Finally, the
away from combining the references relied upon.
Ecolochem panel held that the district court had clearly erred when it
discounted evidence of copying simply because it did not believe the
802
claimed process to be novel. Nonetheless, the court held that the
error did not carry substantial weight because evidence of copying is
only “equivocal evidence of non-obviousness in the absence of more
803
compelling objective indicia of other secondary considerations.”
After weighing all of the factors together, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court’s obviousness conclusion as to claim 20 was not
804
clearly in error.
805
In Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical v. Danbury Pharmacal, the court
affirmed the trial court’s decision that the patent was not invalid as
806
obvious. This case focused on whether a chemical compound was
obvious, and the court explained that for a chemical compound, “a
prima facie case of obviousness requires ‘structural similarity between
claimed and prior art subject matter . . . where the prior art gives a

798. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1378-79, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078-79
(acknowledging that the district court’s decision was based on the credibility of a
witness and because the court “gives great deference” to such decisions, there was no
clear error in finding no evidence of failure by others).
799. Id. at 1378-79, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (quoting Int’l Glass Co. v. United
States, 408 F.2d 395, 405, 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 434, 442 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
800. See id. at 1379, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (reasoning that the district court
found the expert’s testimony credible on the issue of obviousness, and there was no
clear error in that decision).
801. See id. at 1379-80, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079 (holding that the body of
available evidence clearly shows that the prior art taught away from the claimed
reference).
802. See id. at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (stating that it was clearly
erroneous that the district court gave little credit to the copying argument and found
only that the process was novel).
803. Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1077, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
804. See Ecolochem, 227 F.3d at 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080 (holding that the
secondary considerations, taken as a whole, do not overcome the other evidence of
obviousness).
805. 231 F.3d 1339, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
806. See Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (“Because
Danbury did not show even a prima facie case for obviousness, this court has
considered, but need not separately address, the strong objective of nonobviousness.”).
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reason or motivation to make the claimed compositions.’”
The
court defined the issue of validity as whether one of skill in the art
would have found the motivation to combine pieces from
808
compounds found in prior art patents.
The Federal Circuit held
that the district court correctly rejected the patent challenger’s
arguments because it had failed to show sufficient motivation to
809
combine by one of ordinary skill in the art.
In its decision, the
court noted that there must be a reasonable expectation of success
through the combination, and that no such expectation existed,
particularly given the large numbers of possible compounds that
810
exhibit the desired activity, without the unwanted side effects.
811
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision of invalidity based on
812
The court examined the facts relating to each
obviousness.
reference relied upon by the accused infringer and held that the
district court did not commit clear error when it concluded that
813
there was a motivation to combine these references. Furthermore,
814
the court closely examined the issue of commercial success.
Like
the Ecolochem panel, the Brown & Williamson panel also recognized
that a nexus between commercial success and the patent is presumed
815
if the marketed product embodies the claimed features.
If the
presumption stands, the burden shifts to the party asserting
816
obviousness to show the contrary. The court found ample evidence
817
to rebut the nexus. The Federal Circuit, however, went on to hold
that the district court erred when it did not consider the commercial
818
success of the accused product, which had been found to infringe.
807. Id. at 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (citing In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
808. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
809. See id. at 1344-45, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-45.
810. See id. at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (“If activity alone was the sole
motivation, other more active compounds would have been the obvious choices . . . .”).
811. 229 F.3d 1120, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
812. See Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1132, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
813. See id. at 1125-29, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459-63.
814. See id. at 1130-31, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464 (stating that the district court’s
error in not considering the success of the product is harmless “because the modest
level of commercial activity and limited market share achieved by the VSSS cannot
overcome the strong evidence of obviousness.”).
815. See id. at 1130, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
816. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463 (“In this case, a nexus should be
presumed because the Capri encompasses the claimed features.”).
817. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120,
1130, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1463-64 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (describing the “ample
evidence of record”).
818. See Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1130, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464
(“considering the commercial success of the infringing product as evidence of the
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The court also noted (1) the absence of evidence relating to attempts
and failures of others to create the claimed invention, long-felt need,
and no unexpected results; and (2) that there was evidence that the
defendant was skeptical, and had praised the invention as well as
819
copied it.
In the end, the court held that the patentee had not
820
shown the district court’s decision was clearly erroneous.
821
Finally, in Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., the Federal Circuit vacated the
district court’s judgment of obviousness and remanded the case to
822
the district court to make Graham findings. Essentially, the district
court simply found the invention obvious because the necessary
823
According to the Federal Circuit, this
combination was apparent.
conclusion did not constitute specific findings that proved why such
combinations were apparent, and the court could not determine
what evidence the district court considered in its obviousness
824
analysis.
The court also remanded for a more specific finding of
the level of ordinary skill in the art although the court acknowledged
that the uncertainty in this aspect of the district court’s decision did
825
not alone warrant reversal or vacating the decision. Ultimately, the
Ruiz panel explained that it could not determine whether the district
court considered the secondary considerations of non-obviousness,
and remanded with instructions for the judge to make findings
regarding secondary considerations and whether a nexus between the
826
claimed invention and commercial success existed.

commercial success of the claimed invention”) (citing Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1384. (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
819. See id. at 1130-31, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463-64 (describing the secondary
indicators of non-obviousness).
820. See id. at 1131, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (“The district court’s errors in not
considering various secondary indicators are, therefore, harmless.”).
821. 234 F.3d 654, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
822. See id. at 663-64, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (discussing the necessity of
making the Graham findings).
823. See id. at 665, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (“The district court concluded that
it would have been obvious to combine screw anchors and metal brackets, because the
need for a bracket ‘was apparent.’”).
824. See id. at 666, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (reviewing the district court’s
analysis).
825. See id. at 666-67, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (stating that the district court’s
failure to make this and other Graham findings shows that Graham was not likely
applied by the court).
826. See id. at 667-68, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (“Our precedents clearly hold
that secondary considerations, when present, must be considered in determining
obviousness.”).
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Enablement

Section 112, paragraph one, requires a patent application to
“adequately disclose the claimed invention so as to enable a person
skilled in the art to practice the invention at the time the application
827
was filed without undue experimentation.” In Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., the court faced an enablement question,
and wrote that enablement is determined from the viewpoint of
828
individuals skilled in the art. The court in In re Swartz, classified the
enablement inquiry as “a legal conclusion based on underlying
829
factual inquiries.”
In In re Swartz, Swartz appealed a holding of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences that a patent application for cold fusion
neither enabled nor satisfied the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C.
830
§ 101.
The Board found that Swartz had failed to provide a
831
In addressing this issue,
disclosure of an operative embodiment.
the court explained that “to practice the claimed invention, a person
of ordinary skill in the art would have had to rely on the art known at
832
the filing date, September 19, 1991.”
The court affirmed the
Board’s finding that no evidence showed that one of skill in the art
would have been able to rely on the known art at the time, and
833
ultimately concluded lack of enablement.
In Ajinomoto, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that the
834
patent at issue fulfilled the enablement requirement.
While
reviewing the evidence considered by the district court, the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed that the enablement requirement did not reach
835
subject matter well known in the art.
The Federal Circuit agreed
827. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1703, 1703 (Fed. Cir.
2000); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371-72, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
828. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1345, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
829. Swartz, 232 F.3d at 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
830. See id. at 863-64, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703-04 (discussing the “utility”
holding in the case).
831. See id. at 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (“[T]he PTO found that the
written description in Mr. Swartz’s application contains no disclosure of any
operation embodiment.”).
832. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
833. See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1703, 1704 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (rejecting all of Swartz’s arguments).
834. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland, 228 F.3d 1338, 1345-46, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (describing and agreeing with the
district court’s analysis).
835. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (asserting that

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

1536

11/20/01 4:51 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1435

with the district court that the evidence of record showed that the
process at issue applied conventional genetic engineering
836
techniques. Finally, the court recognized the validity of depositing
biological products pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 122 to satisfy the
837
In such cases, the court explained that
enablement requirement.
PTO and international treaty procedures require a deposit of physical
838
samples that are available to the public before granting a patent.
The Federal Circuit faced another enablement issue in Singh v.
839
Brake, which also reached the court from the Board of Patent
840
Appeals and Interferences. The court, however, did not resolve the
841
enablement issue and decided instead to remand to the Board.
The court based its decision on the determination that the Board did
not explicitly reach any of the parties’ Section 112, paragraph one
842
arguments and that the Board should decide such arguments first.
G. Utility
According to the utility requirement of Section 101, an invention
843
While considering an
must be operable to achieve useful results.
appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the
Federal Circuit explained that the issues of utility and enablement
844
are closely related.
The court elaborated further that application
“[a] patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”)
(quoting Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 94. (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
836. See id. at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (“ADM has not shown clear error
in the district court’s findings and in the conclusion that invalidity on the ground of
enablement has not been shown.”).
837. See id. at 1345-46, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337-38 (“The deposit of biological
organisms for public availability satisfies the enablement requirement for materials
that are not amenable to written description or that constitute unique biological
materials which cannot be duplicated.”).
838. See id. at 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338 (noting it is “a condition of the
patent grant that physical samples of such materials be deposited and made available
to the public, under procedures established by the PTO and by international
treaty.”).
839. 222 F.3d 1362, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
840. See Singh, 222 F.3d at 1370-71, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (regarding
interference of DNA construct).
841. See id. at 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-79 (finding the Board’s analysis
inconclusive).
842. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (“We remand to the Board for a
determination of those issues that were properly raised during the earlier
proceedings.”).
843. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1703, 1703-04 (Fed Cir.
2000) (“The utility requirement of § 101 mandates that the invention be operable to
achieve useful results.”).
844. See Swartz, 232 F.3d at 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703 (“The questions of
whether a specification provides an enabling disclosure under Section 112, paragraph
1, and whether an application satisfies the utility requirement of Section 101 are closely
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claims that do not meet the utility requirement because the invention
845
cannot be operated also fail to meet the enablement requirement.
The court held, moreover, that the issue of utility is a question of
846
fact.
When issues of utility arise at the patent office, the court explained
that the PTO bears the initial burden of challenging the patent’s
847
utility.
To sustain this burden, the PTO should provide evidence
showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt
848
the asserted utility.
If the PTO presents such evidence, then the
burden shifts to the applicant to submit sufficient evidence that
would convince a person of ordinary skill of the invention’s alleged
849
utility. In In re Swartz, the PTO shifted the burden to the applicant
when it provided several references showing that cold fusion (the
subject of the application) results were irreproducible; the PTO
resolved that the applicant had failed to submit sufficient evidence of
850
On appeal, the
operability to overcome the PTO’s evidence.
applicant invited the court to review the voluminous record
submitted to the PTO, but apparently failed to cite to any specific
851
evidence.
The Federal Circuit refused this invitation, stating that
the applicant’s use of “conclusory allegations” was insufficient to
852
prove the Board erred on the issue of utility.
The court affirmed

related.”).
845. See id. at 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (“[I]f the claims in an application
fail to meet the utility requirement because the invention is inoperative, they also fail
to meet the enablement requirement because a person skilled in the art cannot
practice the invention.”) (citing Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190
F.3d 1350, 1358, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also In re
Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1197, 1200, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600, 1603 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The
how to use prong of section 112 incorporates as a matter of law the requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 101 that the specification disclose as a matter of fact a practical utility for
the invention.”).
846. See id. at 863, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
847. See id. at 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (asserting that “[t]he PTO has the
initial burden of challenging a patent applicant’s presumptively correct assertion of
utility.”) (citing In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1441
(Fed. Cir. 1995)).
848. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.
849. See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1703, 1704 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (describing the shift of burden from the PTO to the applicant).
850. See Swartz, 232 F.3d at 864, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (“The examiner
found that Mr. Swartz had not submitted evidence of operability that would be
sufficient to overcome reasonable doubt.”).
851. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (stating that Mr. Swartz invited the court
to review record material that he claimed supported his position on the utility issue).
852. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (“Such conclusory allegations in an appeal
brief are quite insufficient to establish that the Board’s decision on the issue of utility
is not supported by substantial evidence or to establish that the Board’s ultimate
conclusion of a lack of enablement is incorrect as a matter of law.”).
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853

the Board’s decision.

H. Adequate Written Description
Paragraph one of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
854
connected, to make and use the same.

The provision’s purpose is to ensure that the scope of the
exclusion right does not exceed the ambit of the inventor’s
855
contribution to the field of art.
The primary consideration in
written description cases depends on the invention’s nature and the
856
knowledge provided by the disclosure.
To comply with the written-description requirement, the patentee
need not describe precisely the subject matter claimed; rather, the
857
description must be clear to individuals of ordinary skill in the art.
Stated another way, by a different panel, a patentee need not
“provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at
858
Nevertheless, the Purdue panel explained that “the
issue.”
disclosure must . . . convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in
859
the art that . . . [the inventor] was in possession of the invention.”
In other words, the court wrote that one skilled in the art must be

853. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704 (holding that “the Board did not err in
concluding that the utility of Mr. Swartz’s claimed process had not been established
and that his application did not satisfy the enablement requirement”).
854. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000).
855. See Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1345-46, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1915, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the
scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does not overreach the scope
of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art as described in the patent
specification.”); see also Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Adequate description of the
invention guards against the inventor’s overreaching by insisting that he recount his
invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to be encompassed
within his original creation.”) (quoting Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535,
551, 211 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 303, 321 (3d Cir. 1981)).
856. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 996, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1227, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262, 191
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 96 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
857. See Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 997, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (stating that “the
description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that
[he or she] invented what is claimed”) (quoting In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1012, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) (citations omitted).
858. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1570,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895, 1904 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
859. Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1323, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
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able to understand the limitation of the claims. Furthermore, the
disclosure may convey the information either explicitly or
861
inherently. Because the written-description analysis is a factual one,
the Federal Circuit reviews the district court’s decision for clear
862
error.
In Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the Federal
Circuit reviewed and affirmed the trial court’s denial of a judgment
863
as a matter of law motion, after a jury verdict, that the patent
complied with the written-description requirement. The patent at
issue claimed its “inventive products in terms of ranges of chemical
properties, which work in combination with ranges of other chemical
864
properties to produce a gasoline that reduces emissions.”
The
appellee, Union Oil, argued that the specification failed to satisfy
Section 112, paragraph one, because it did not describe the exact
chemical component of each combination that falls within the range
865
of claims of the patent. The court held that the Patent Act does not
866
require such specificity. To the contrary, the court explained that
describing an invention in terms of ranges does not offend Section
867
The court noted, before it undertook its
112, paragraph one.
analysis, that the focus was not whether the ranges found in the
claims corresponded exactly to those found in the specification, but
whether those skilled in the art could derive the claimed ranges from
860. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483 (stating that “one skilled in the art,
reading the original disclosure, must immediately discern the limitation at issue in
the claims”) (citing Waldemar Link GmbH & Co. v. Osteonics Corp., 32 F.3d 556,
558, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1855, 1857 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
861. See Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1915, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Cont’l Can Co. USA v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d
1264, 1268, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (descriptive matter may
be inherently present in a specification if one skilled in the art would necessarily
recognize such a disclosure)).
862. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1323, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483 (“When the
question whether a patent satisfies the written description requirement is resolved by a
district court’s sitting as the trier of fact, we review the court’s decision for clear
error.”).
863. See Union Oil Co. of Cal., 208 F.3d 989, 997, 1001-02, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1232, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the court went out of its way to recognize
and repeat that the trial judge required the jury to answer special verdicts, and by
doing so the jury answered forty-one times that the patent satisfied the written
description requirement of § 112).
864. Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 997, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
865. See id. at 997, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (describing the written description
requirement).
866. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (noting that the written description
requirement does not demand that the applicant describe the exact subject matter
claimed).
867. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 (stating that Section 112, ¶ 1 “ensures that, as
of the filing date, the inventor conveyed with reasonable clarity to those of skill in the
art that he was in possession of the subject matter of the claims.”).
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868

the disclosure.
Indeed, to emphasize this point, the court quoted
from its predecessor court’s decision in In re Wertheim:
If lack of literal support alone were enough to support a rejection
under § 112, the statement of In re Lukach . . . that “the invention
claimed does not have to be described in ipsis verbis in order to
869
satisfy the description requirement of § 112,” is empty verbiage.
870

The court also cited to Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co., Inc., to
reiterate that the same component proportion ranges in an
applicant’s claims are not required to correspond with what is shown
871
in the patent application.
The court indicated that it would “let
form triumph over substance” if it allowed the written description
requirement to supercede claims that are narrowed during
872
prosecution. Ultimately, the court held that the written description
requirement does not demand that the applicant provide an identical
description of claimed compounds; rather, that the inventor provide
adequate disclosure in the patent to show one skilled in the art that
873
After reviewing
the applicant actually invented the claim at issue.
the evidence, including testimony presented at trial, the court found
that substantial evidence existed in the record regarding written
description to support the verdict that the inventors had possession
874
of the claimed subject matter.
875
In Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., the Federal Circuit
reached an opposite holding and found that the patent at issue failed
to satisfy the written-description requirement. In Purdue, the patent
claimed methods of treating pain in patients by administering an

868. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233 (“The Patent Act and this court’s case law
require only sufficient description to show one of skill in the refining art that the
inventor possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing.”).
869. 541 F.2d 257, 265, 191 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 90, 98 (C.C.P.A. 1976). The court
explained that, “[i]n Wertheim, the circuit court held that the specification supported
the claimed range, even though the precise range of the claim was not repeated
verbatim in the specification . . . .” Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 1000, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1235. The majority asserted that Judge Lourie, by his dissent, would require just
such a verbatim repeat. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235 (stating “as the dissent
in this case would appear to require”). Furthermore, the Union Oil majority stressed,
again by reference to Wertheim, that written description questions are intensely
factual and should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1000, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1235.
870. 772 F.2d 1570, 1575, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 177, 179 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
871. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 1001, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1227, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
872. Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 1001, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
873. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
874. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (“Because the record shows substantial
evidence of adequate written description for each claim as the jury found, this court
affirms.”).
875. 230 F.3d 1320, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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876

opioid, such as morphine, once a day.
The claim included a
limitation that the maximum plasma concentration (“Cmax”) is more
than twice the plasma level of the opioid at about twenty-four hours
877
(“C24”) after administration of the dosage. At issue was whether this
limitation requiring Cmax/C24 to be greater than two was adequately
878
described in the disclosure of the application as originally filed.
The district court found that the specification of the patent failed to
convey that the Cmax/C24 limitation fell within the original application,
and the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not commit
879
clear error in its finding.
Recognizing that written-description inquiries are intensely factual,
the Federal Circuit painstakingly reviewed the evidence, including a
detailed study of the patent’s specification and other evidence
880
including publications and expert testimony presented at trial. The
court addressed at length the patentee’s argument that two examples
881
The Federal Circuit,
within the patent disclose the Cmax/C24 ratio.
however, agreed with the district court’s finding that the patent
included examples that also disclose a Cmax/C24 ratio of less than
882
The Federal Circuit, like the district court, explained that
two.
while the examples showed the various ratios, nothing in the
specification emphasized the Cmax/C24 ratio; therefore, “one of
ordinary skill in the art would not be directed to the Cmax/C24 ratio as
883
an aspect of the invention.”
Nothing in the written description
indicated that the particular ratio was an important element of the
884
formulation. Seemingly scolding the patentee, the court went on to
say:
What the ‘360 patentees have done is to pick a characteristic
possessed by two of their formulations, a characteristic that is not
discussed even in passing in the disclosure, and then make it the
876. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1322, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482 (stating
that the patent disclosed “a once-a-day formulation exhibiting a rapid initial rise in
the opioid in the patient’s blood.”).
877. See id. at 1322-23, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482-83 (describing the claims at
issue in the case).
878. See id. at 1323, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483-84.
879. See id. at 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
880. See id. at 1324-28, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-88.
881. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1324-38, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1484-88 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (detailing Purdue’s arguments and
evidence).
882. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1325-26, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485-86.
883. Id. at 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485-86.
884. See id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (“[T]here is nothing in the
written description of [the examples] that would suggest to one skilled in the art that
the Cmax/C24 ratio is an important defining quality of the formulation, nor does the
disclosure even motivate one to calculate the ratio.”).
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basis of claims that cover not just those two formulations, but any
formulation that has that characteristic. This is exactly the type of
overreaching the written description requirement was designed to
885
guard against.

The court also rejected the patentee’s arguments that the trial
886
court had committed errors of law.
During this review, the court
stated one of the written description legal rules, namely, that the
amended claims must define and provide support for the invention.
The patentee must also include the support in the specification as
887
filed without the aid of amended claims.
In other words, the
amended claims cannot be used to support claims themselves.
Finally, the patentee argued that during prosecution the examiner
stated in an interview summary that the claims are supported by the
patent’s specification, and that this statement is binding on the
888
district court.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument,
explaining that (1) even if the examiner’s statement was directed to
the issue at hand, the district court properly concluded that any
deference due the examiner had been overcome by clear and
convincing evidence, and (2) that the substantial evidence standard
889
enunciated in Dickinson v. Zurko did not apply because this was not a
890
review of an administrative decision. After reviewing this evidence
and the legal arguments, the court held that the trial court had
reached the proper conclusion and affirmed the decision invalidating
885. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487 (“What the ‘360 patentees have done is to
pick a characteristic possessed by two of their formulations, a characteristic that is
not discussed even in passing in the disclosure, and then make it the basis of claims
that cover not just those two formulations, but any formulation that has that
characteristic.”). “This is exactly the type of overreaching the written description
requirement was designed to guard against.” Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487.
886. See id. at 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487 (stating that the court
“examined each of the claimed legal errors and conclude[d] that the district court
did not commit any error of law that had a material effect on the court’s judgment”).
887. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
888. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 (“Purdue
argue[d] that the district court should have deferred to the examiner’s finding on
that issue and that the district court failed to do so because the court improperly
regarded the written description issue to be an issue of law rather than an issue of
fact.”).
889. 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999) (“A reviewing court reviews an agency’s reasoning to
determine whether it is ‘arbitrary or capricious,’ or, if bound up with a record-based
factual conclusion, to determine whether it is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’”).
890. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488 (noting,
with respect to Dickinson, that decisions of the PTO are accorded “deference that
takes the form of the presumption of validity provided under 35 U.S.C. § 282”). The
court, however, clarified that it is “not bound by the examiner’s finding in the ex parte
application proceeding that the new claims were supported by the specification,”
particularly in view of the extensive evidence heard by the trial court. Id. at 1329, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
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the claims for failure to satisfy the written-description requirement.
The respective panels in Union Oil and Purdue Pharma both
892
addressed In re Ruschig, where the Federal Circuit’s predecessor
court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, found that the claim
893
The way in
at issue violated the written-description requirement.
which Ruschig was handled by the different panels is noteworthy. In
Union Oil, where the Federal Circuit found that the patent complied
with the written-description requirement, the panel distinguished
894
Ruschig. The court seemed to rely heavily on the fact that the claim
in Ruschig was copied from another patent to provoke an
895
The Union Oil panel therefore explained that
interference.
“[b]ecause another inventor, not Ruschig, drafted the claim at issue
to fit another specification, it is not surprising that the disputed claim
did not find support in Ruschig’s specification, even though the
896
inventions were similar.”
Additionally, the Union Oil panel wrote
that the Ruschig court was concerned over the extent to which the
897
Such
patentee had relied on variables to describe structures.
concern apparently did not exist for the Union Oil panel because the
court determined that “[a]rtisans skilled in petroleum refining, in
contrast, are aware of the properties of raw petroleum sources and
know how to mix streams of such sources to achieve a final product
898
with desired characteristics.”
In Purdue Pharma, however, the court did not look so favorably
899
upon the level of skill in the relevant art.
The Federal Circuit
quoted a passage from Ruschig, where the court analogized the
importance of documenting the steps taken in inventing a product to
891. See id. at 1329-30, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1488.
892. 379 F.2d 990, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 118 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
893. The Purdue Pharma panel described Ruschig as a case where the claim at issue
was directed to a single compound, and “[t]he applicants argued that, although the
compound itself was not disclosed, one skilled in the art would find support for the
claimed compound in the general disclosure of the genus of compounds to which
the claimed compound belonged.” Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d
1320, 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
894. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 1000, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227, 1234-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing the various reasons why
Ruschig is different than the case at bar).
895. See Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 1000, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234 (stating that
“the Ruschig case involved a copied claim (another inventor’s claim copied into
Ruschig’s application), which did not find support in Ruschig’s application because
Ruschig had invented and disclosed a broad set of the compounds that was similar,
but not entirely within the scope of the claim.”).
896. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
897. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
898. Id. at 1000-01, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
899. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the marking of a trail by making blaze marks on trees. The Purdue
Pharma panel noted that its case differed from Ruschig, which
involved a genus encompassing potentially half a million
901
compounds.
Nevertheless, the Ruschig rationale applied equally
because the patent in Purdue Pharma disclosed many pharmacokinetic
parameters without any evidence of the process followed to explain
902
the Cmax/C24 ratio or what value that ratio should exceed.”
The
Purdue Pharma panel applied Ruschig, therefore, to state that the
patentee must demonstrate in its original disclosure the steps taken
903
to achieve its result to meet the written-description requirement.
Two of the Federal Circuit’s decisions dealing with the written904
description requirement—Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp. and Lampi Corp.
905
v. American Power Prods., Inc. —did so in the context of 35 U.S.C.
§ 120, the provision of the Patent Act that permits continuation
applications. First, in Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., the court held that the
district court erred when it looked to an original 1982 patent
application to determine if the patents at issue, filed in 1990 and
906
1994, complied with the written description requirement.
The
Federal Circuit reasoned that the district court should only rely on
the earlier application for relevant specifications when a patentee
907
seeks the benefit of the earlier date under 35 U.S.C. § 120. Indeed,
the Federal Circuit noted that Microsoft did not dispute that the 1990
and 1994 patents met the written description requirement as to their
908
claims.
Instead, Microsoft had the district court look at the 1982
grandparent application for compliance with the written-description
requirement, in apparent reliance on Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline
900. See Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (“It is an
old custom in the woods to mark trails by making blaze marks on the trees. It is of
no help in finding a trail or in finding one’s way through the woods where the trails
have disappeared—or have not yet been made, which is more like the case here—to
be confronted simply by a large number of unmarked trees.”) (quoting In re Ruschig,
379 F.2d 990, 994-95, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 118, 122 (C.C.P.A. 1967)). The court went
on to say that “[w]e are looking for blaze marks which single out particular trees. We
see none.” Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
901. See id. 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
902. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
903. See id. at 1326-27, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (“In order to satisfy the written
description requirement, the blaze marks directing skilled artisans to that tree must
be in the originally filed disclosure.”).
904. 214 F.3d 1342, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
905. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
906. See Reiffin, 214 F.3d at 1345, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
907. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917 (“For purposes of § 112, ¶ 1, the
relevant specifications are those of the [1990 and 1994] patents; earlier specifications
are relevant only when the benefit of an earlier filing date is sought under 35 U.S.C.
§ 120.”).
908. See id. at 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
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909

Corp.
The court explained, however, that this reliance was
misplaced because Gentry did not invoke prior applications, and the
910
original disclosure belonged with the issued patent. Furthermore,
Reiffin, the patentee, stated that he did not need the benefit of the
911
The Federal Circuit explained that analysis of
1982 filing date.
ancestor applications is appropriate when the benefit of the earlier
912
filing date is sought under Section 120. The court, therefore, held
that the district court had erred when it invalidated the claims of the
patents, and at worst, those claims would not receive the benefit of
913
the 1982 application’s filing date.
In the second case, Lampi, the Federal Circuit reiterated that in
order for a claim in a subsequently filed application to receive the
filing date of a previously filed application, the earlier application
914
must describe the invention.
The accused infringer in Lampi
asserted that the claims of the patent at issue, a continuation
application, were not entitled to the filing date of the parent
application due to its failure to meet the written description
915
requirement.
Specifically, the claims at issue encompassed “nonidentical half-shells,” and the defendant argued the original
application did not support claims for “non-identical half-shells,” only
916
“identical half-shells.”
The district court held, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed, that the patent satisfied the written description

909. 134 F.3d 1473, 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498, 1503 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[The
inventor’s] original disclosure serves to limit the permissible breadth of his laterdrafted claims.”).
910. Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915,
1917-18 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]here were no prior applications and the original
disclosure was that of the issued patent . . . [this] ‘original disclosure’ reference
simply recognized that ‘the sufficiency [of a disclosure] under § 112, first paragraph
must be judged as of its filing date.’”) (quoting Application of Glass, 492 F.2d 1228,
1232, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 31, 34 (C.C.P.A. 1974)).
911. See Reiffin, 214 F.3d at 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
912. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918 (“In accordance with § 120, claims to
subject matter in a later-filed application not supported by an ancestor application in
terms of § 112 ¶ 1 are not invalidated; they simply do not receive the benefit of the
earlier application’s filing date.”).
913. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918 (“The district court erred in holding the
‘603 and ’604 claims invalid for failure to comply with the written description
requirement.”).
914. Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prods., 228 F.3d 1365, 1377, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1445, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“For a claim in a later-filed application to be entitled to
the filing date of an earlier-filed application under 35 U.S.C. § 120, the earlier
application must comply with the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, that the
specification ‘contain a written description of the invention.’”).
915. See id. at 1377-78, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454-55.
916. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (“APP argues that the specification of the
875 patent describes only identical half-shells and thus does not provide sufficient
support for claims . . . which encompass non-identical half-shells.”).
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917

requirement.
In so holding, the Federal Circuit relied on the
principle that claims need to be limited to a preferred
918
embodiment.
Using this statement of law, the fact that nonidentical half-shells were not specifically disclosed in the original
919
application did not bother the court. Indeed, the panel pointed to
references in the specification where half-shells appeared without the
modifier “identical,” which the court stated were not critical to the
920
invention.
The fact, moreover, that the drawings only disclosed
identical half-shells also did not trouble the court because “drawings
921
in the patent are merely a ‘practical example’ of the invention.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit made passing reference to the writtendescription requirement in three additional cases. In KCJ Corp. v.
922
Kinetic Concepts, Inc.,
the court used the written-description
requirement in the context of performing its claim-construction
analysis, not surprisingly, to determine whether the article “a”
923
received a singular or plural interpretation.
The KCJ decision,
however, does not provide an analysis of the patent to determine
compliance with Section 112, paragraph 1. Also, in Hockerson924
Halberstadt v. Avia Group International, Inc., the court addressed the
issue of whether patent drawings appear to scale. The court cited to
925
In re Wright, to explain that the established rule of law is that patent
drawings do not define the precise proportions of the elements and
may not be relied on to show particular sizes if the specification is
completely silent on the issue. The court stated in Wright that the
drawings offer little guidance unless accompanied by quantitative
926
measures.
This decision, like KCJ, does not analyze the patent at
917. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (describing how the district court was
correct in its finding on the written description issue).
918. Id. at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
919. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (“Although the patent drawings show
only identical half-shells . . . that does not compel the conclusion that the written
description of the ‘875 patent is so narrowly tailored as to preclude Lampi from
claiming non-identical half-shells in the ‘227 patent.”).
920. See Lampi Corp. v. Am. Power Prods., Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1378, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
921. Lampi, 228 F.3d at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
922. 223 F.3d 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
923. See KCJ, 223 F.3d at 1356, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (“The written
description supplies additional context for understanding whether the claim
language limits the patent scope to a single unitary [element] or extends to
encompass a device with multiple [elements].”) (citing Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.,
122 F.3d 1019, 1024, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
924. 222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
925. 569 F.2d 1124, 1127, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 332, 335 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
926. See Hockerson-Halberstadt, 222 F.3d at 956, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491
(“Absent any written description in the specification of quantitative values,
arguments based on measurement of a drawing are of little value.”).
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issue for compliance with the written description requirement.
927
Finally, in Singh v. Brake, the court remanded the case to the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences for a determination of the
written-description requirement because the Federal Circuit refused
to undertake the analysis in the first instance.
I.

Best Mode

Pursuant to Section 112, paragraph 1, a patent specification must
set forth the “best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
928
929
his invention.”
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the
Federal Circuit wrote that this requirement “creates a statutory
bargained-for-exchange by which a patentee obtains the right to
exclude others from practicing the claimed invention for a certain
time period, and the public receives knowledge of the preferred
embodiments for practicing the claimed invention.” The court
930
reiterated case law that focuses on a two-prong inquiry: “First, the
factfinder must determine whether, at the time of filing the
application, the inventor possessed a best mode for practicing the
931
invention.”
Second, the court wrote, “if the inventor possessed a
best mode, the factfinder must determine whether the written
description disclosed the best mode such that one reasonably skilled
932
in the art could practice it.”
The first prong focuses on the
inventor’s state of mind at the time of filing and is a subjective
inquiry, while the second prong comprises an objective inquiry that
focuses on the scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in
933
In view of these factual inquiries, the Federal Circuit
the art.
934
considers the best mode requirement to be an issue of fact.
In both Eli Lilly and Northern Telecom, the panels began their
respective analyses with the second prong of the test and clarified
that the requisite amount of information that an inventor must

927. 222 F.3d 1362, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
928. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (1994).
929. 222 F.3d 973, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
930. See, e.g., N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
931. Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 980, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614; see also United States
Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1388,
1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
932. Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (setting forth the
second prong of the inquiry into the best mode requirement); see also United States
Gypsum, 74 F.3d at 1212, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
933. Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
934. See N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068 (stating that the
determination of compliance with the best mode requirement is a matter of fact).
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disclose is contingent upon the scope of the claimed invention.
Accordingly, the court explained that an inventor need only disclose
the subject matter that is novel and critical to carrying out the best
936
mode of the invention. The court explained further that the bestmode requirement does not cover production details or routine
details, reasoning that such details do not refer to the quality or
nature of the claimed invention or to commercial and manufacturing
937
considerations.
Furthermore, while routine details may implicate
the quality and nature of the invention, they are readily apparent to
938
one of ordinary skill in the art.
The court reiterated these
boundaries on the best-mode requirement in Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., writing:
Requiring
inclusion
in
the
patent
of
known
scientific/technological information would add an imprecise and
open-ended criterion to the content of patent specifications, could
greatly enlarge the content of patent specifications and
unnecessarily increase the cost of preparing and prosecuting
patent applications, and could tend to obfuscate rather than
highlight the contribution to which the patent is directed. A
patent is not a scientific treatise, but a document that presumes a
939
readership skilled in the field of the invention.

In Ajinomoto, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s
940
finding that the patent complied with the best-mode requirement.
In so doing, the court pointed to the district court’s finding that the
alleged omitted information was information that one skilled in the
941
art would have recognized.
935. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (elaborating on the second prong of the best mode test);
see also N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1286, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068 (applying the best
mode requirements).
936. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
937. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (stating the “step or source or technique
considered ‘best’ in a manufacturing circumstance may have been selected for a non’best mode’ reason.”) (citing Wahl Instruments, Inc. v. Acvious, Inc., 950 F.2d 1575,
1581, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
938. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (explaining why
routine details need not be disclosed under the best mode test).
939. Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1332, 1346-47, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that disclosure is addressed to
those skilled in the art, not to the general public); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc.
v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(reiterating that patents are written in order to enable those skilled in the art to
practice the invention); In re Storrs, 245 F.2d 474, 478, 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 29697 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
940. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1347, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(finding that the patent could not be invalidated for violating the best mode
requirement).
941. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (explaining that the investor disclosed
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Similarly, in Eli Lilly, the court rejected the defendant’s two best942
mode attacks on the patent’s validity. First, the court addressed the
defendant’s assertion that the patentee had failed to disclose its
943
preferred method for synthesizing p-trifluoromethylphenol.
The
court began its analysis by reiterating that it must examine the scope
944
of the claimed inventions.
According to the court, neither of the
disputed covered p-trifluoromethylphenol or a method for
945
The fact that the claimed inventions involved the
synthesizing it.
use of p-trifluoromethylphenol did not raise a best-mode issue since
the claims did not provide the patentee with the right to exclude
others from practicing the alleged best mode method for synthesizing
946
p-trifluoromethylphenol. The Eli Lilly panel distinguished its facts
947
from Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd., Partnership, and Northern Telecom, Inc. v.
948
Datapoint Corp., where it was held that the inventors failed to
disclose unclaimed subject matter that was necessary for carrying out
949
In the present case, the inventor disclosed his
the invention.
preference for using p-trifluoromethylphenol to make the claimed
invention but was not required to disclose the unclaimed method for
950
synthesizing p-trifluoromethylphenol.
The court clarified its
holding by explaining that the best mode for carrying out the
claimed invention involves novel subject matter, and a method for
951
obtaining that subject matter regardless of whether it is claimed.
Because p-trifluoromethylphenol was commercially available at the
time the patentee filed its application, he did not need to disclose a
952
method for synthesizing p-trifluoromethylphenol.
the only mode known, thereby making it the best mode, and acknowledging that it
was recognized as such by those skilled in the art).
942. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 984, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that no facts existed upon which a jury could
find that the investor had failed to meet the best mode requirement).
943. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 981, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
944. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
945. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
946. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614 (explaining why the best mode
requirement did not mandate disclosure in the case).
947. 860 F.2d 415, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1692 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
948. 908 F.2d 931, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
949. See N. Telecom, 908 F.2d at 940-41, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1321 (agreeing
that the inventor knew that the best mode set forth in the application was not, in
fact, the best mode).
950. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 922 F.3d 973, 982, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing why there was no disclosure violation).
951. See Eli Lilly, 922 F.3d at 982, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (citing Applied
Med. Res. Corp. v. United States Surgical Corp., 147 F.3d 1374, 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1289, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
952. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615. The Eli Lilly Court also distinguished
Clayton v. Akiba, 214 U.S.P.Q. 374, 381 (Bd. Pat. App. 1982), explaining that in
Clayton, the intermediate compound was “itself admittedly a novel compound . . .
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The Eli Lilly panel addressed the defendant’s second argument
regarding violation of the best-mode requirement, namely, that the
patentee had failed to disclose its preferred solvent for recrystallizing
953
the fluoxetine hydrochloride compound. The court again began its
inquiry with a review of the scope of the claimed invention stating
that the two claims at issue respectively covered the compound
954
fluoxetine hydrochloride and a method for administering it.
The
court found no genuine issue that one of ordinary skill in the art
possessed the requisite knowledge to select a solvent for
recrystallizing fluoxetine hydrochloride, thus recrystallization served
as a routine detail that fell outside the scope of the best mode
955
disclosure. The court interpreted the defendant’s argument as one
that would require the patentee to disclose a preferred mode for
carrying out an unclaimed routine detail and flatly rejected the
956
argument as being in conflict with the scope of the claims at issue.
Instead, the court stressed that the intent of Section 112, paragraph
one is to prohibit concealment of the best mode of practicing the
957
claimed invention.
Finally, the court explained that section 112
requires only “an adequate disclosure of the best mode,” and that this
adequate disclosure requirement does not preclude some
958
experimentation.
In Northern Telecom, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s
959
decision that the inventors violated the best mode requirement.
The court did so by holding that the lower court misunderstood the
invention at hand and erred in its determination as to the scope of
960
the claimed invention—the pivotal best-mode inquiry. The Federal
Circuit determined the scope of the claimed invention using the
961
standard claim-construction analysis. Like the panel in Eli Lilly, the

and, thus, its preparation [was] part and parcel of ‘carrying out’ the invention.” Eli
Lilly, 222 F.3d at 982, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (citations omitted). In its
opinion, the court explained that p-trifluoromethylphenol was commercially
available and described in the prior art. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
953. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 983, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
954. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
955. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
956. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 983, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1616 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant’s contention also conflicted
with precedent and the purpose of the best mode requirement).
957. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.
958. See id. at 984, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1025-26 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
959. 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
960. See N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1287-88, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
961. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
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court distinguished Dana Corp. and Northern Telecom.
The court
explained that each of those cases involved a situation where the
patentee had omitted the best mode related directly to the claimed
963
invention. Unlike the present case, where the alleged omitted best
mode did not fall within the scope of the claims, in Dana Corp. and
Northern Telecom, the asserted best modes directly related to the
claimed utility of the invention and to a specific limitation in the
964
claims.
J.

Signature Requirement

In Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., the accused infringer
asserted that as a result of certain flaws in the application that led to
965
the patent-in-suit, the patent was invalid. The United States patent
966
In
originated from a Soviet Union Inventor’s Certificate.
particular, the defendant argued that at least one of the inventors
had not personally signed the application, but that it had been signed
967
by another in the inventor’s absence with authorization.
The
defendant argued that the inventor must sign the application, and
968
failure to do so rendered the patent invalid. The defendant further
asserted that the inventors could not fix this flaw in the application by
969
During the litigation, the patent owner submitted a
ratification.
declaration signed by all fourteen inventors that stated the
application filings signed by others with authorization occurred as a
result of “lack of knowledge of the technical requirements of U.S.
970
patent law and was made without any deceptive intent.”
The
defendant attacked this declaration through a handwriting expert,
and argued that at least six or seven of the signatures did not appear
971
to be authentic.
The district court, which required clear and
convincing evidence of fraud or inequitable conduct to invalidate the
patent on the basis of failure to comply with the signature rules, ruled
that technical errors made without deceptive intent could not serve as

962. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
963. See id. at 1288, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
964. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
965. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
966. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1332, 1343, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000)..
967. See id. at 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.
968. See id. at 1343, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
969. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336.
970. Id. at 1344, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
971. See Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1343, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (recognizing that comparing the
handwriting samples was difficult because they were written in different languages).
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the basis for holding the patent invalid or unenforceable.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding,
explaining that the “law does not bar the correction of defects when
973
the defect was not the product of fraud.” The Federal Circuit also
rejected the accused infringer’s argument that the district court
erroneously placed the burden of proof upon the party asserting
failure to comply with the signature requirement, and reiterated that
the burden of proving patent invalidity is upon the party who asserts
974
the defense.
Furthermore, the court referred to the standard for inequitable
conduct when describing the burden associated with invalidating a
patent based on a flawed signature. Relying on Kingsdown Medical
975
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., the court wrote that a moving party
must prove by clear and convincing evidence the defendant’s failure
to disclose or submission of false material information and an intent
976
to deceive.
Thus, in the absence of deceptive intent, technical
defects in an application, such as the signature requirement, can be
977
cured and do not invalidate a patent.
K. Indefiniteness
For a claim to satisfy the two requirements for compliance with
Section 112, paragraph 2, it must: (1) explain what the “applicant
regards as his invention,” and (2) describe the invention with
978
“sufficient particularity and distinctness.”
979
In Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., the Federal Circuit
considered whether the term “distance sufficient” defined the claim
with sufficient particularity and distinctness, where the patent
claimed a “mailer” with adhesive applied at a distance sufficient from
980
the edge of the paper to avoid interference with the printer rollers.
The PTO examiner had rejected the “distance sufficient” term as
981
indefinite several times but ultimately allowed the claim. To obtain
972. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (recounting the district court finding
that there was no deceptive intent present in the case).
973. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
974. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
975. 863 F.2d 867, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
976. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
977. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
978. Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1377, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2; IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT
PROSECUTION ch. 9.VIII, at 933 (2d ed. 1999)).
979. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
980. Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1099, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
981. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238 (noting that the examiner denied the
application because it was impossible to determine what distance was being claimed).
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allowance, the patentee had argued the term was a permissible
982
functional description.
The district court held that the examiner
allowed the claim because the term was limited by a specific IBM
printer mentioned in the preferred embodiment portion of the
983
specification.
Judge Michel, writing for the court, disagreed
because the examiner’s approval signified the “acceptance of the
‘distance sufficient’ limitation as functionally claimed and as properly
984
definite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶2.” The court noted “that there is
nothing wrong with defining the dimensions of a device in terms of
the environment in which it is to be used.”
985
In Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., the court considered what
evidence may be evaluated when considering a patent’s compliance
986
In reversing
with the “definiteness” requirement of Section 112.
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity on the
basis of indefiniteness, the court first reiterated that compliance with
Section 112, paragraph 2 creates a question of law reviewable de
987
novo.
The district court had invalidated the patent based on evidence
from the inventor’s deposition testimony that contradicted
988
The Federal Circuit
statements in the patent specification.
overruled the district court’s use of this evidence because an
inventor’s testimony obtained during litigation should not be relied
989
upon to invalidate claims under Section 112, paragraph 2. Basing
its holding on an interpretation of Section 112 requiring a claim to
be sufficiently definite, the court wrote:
Determining whether a claim is definite requires an analysis of
whether one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the
claim when read in light of the specification. If the claims read in
light of the specification reasonably apprise those skilled in the art
990
of the scope of the invention, § 112 demands no more.

982. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238.
983. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1238 (referring to an IBM 3800 computer).
984. Id. at 1111, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239. Judge Newman disagreed with the
court’s claim construction and dissented. Id. at 1118, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243
(Newman, J., dissenting).
985. 216 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
986. See Solomon, 216 F.3d at 1377, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 (finding that it
was inappropriate to consider evidence beyond the patent application).
987. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 (citing Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage
Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1378, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
988. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
989. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
990. Id. at 1378, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 (quoting Personalized Media
Communications, LLC v. ITC, 161 F.3d 696, 705, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880, 1888
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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The court noted that disregarding the inventor’s testimony
obtained during litigation was consistent with the logic of Markman,
because in both the claim-construction context and the definiteness
991
context, the inventor is not competent to construe the claims. The
court has the duty to construe the claims; therefore the inventor’s
992
testimony has no probative value.
The court further noted that extrinsic evidence is appropriate for
the PTO to review during the examination context because the
claims can be freely amended and an important function of patent
993
examinations includes insuring that claims are clear and accurate.
The court also distinguished the evidence appropriate for the court
994
to consider in evaluating patentability as opposed to validity. The
focus of the definiteness inquiry is whether the claims adequately
995
As such,
notify the public of the patentee’s right to exclude.
996
extrinsic evidence is irrelevant to the definiteness inquiry.
L. Patent Ownership
“The general rule is that an individual owns the patent rights to the
subject matter of which he is an inventor, even though he conceived
997
it or reduced it to practice in the course of his employment.” The
Federal Circuit has acknowledged two exceptions to the general rule.
First, an employer owns the rights to his invention if an express
contract creating that right exists; second, an employer may own the
invention if it hired the employee “to invent something or solve a
998
particular problem.” Although the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction
over disputes of patent ownership, the exceptions to the rule are
grounded in contract law, and as such are governed by state contract

991. See Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1379-80, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1279, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52
F.3d 967, 985, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (other
internal citations omitted).
992. See Solomon, 216 F.3d at 1379-80, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
993. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 (“’[A]n essential purpose of the patent
examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous.’”)
(quoting In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
994. See id. at 1379, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283.
995. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (citing United Carbon Co. v. Binney &
Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 233 (1942); 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 8.03, at 8-14
(1997)).
996. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (concluding that extrinsic evidence,
such as inventor testimony obtained in the context of litigation, has little, if any,
probative value and should not be considered in determining definitiveness).
997. Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222, 1224
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
998. See Banks, 228 F.3d at 1359, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224.
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999

principles.
1000
In Banks v. Unisys Corp., the Federal Circuit considered the issue
of patent ownership in the employer-employee context. Gerald
Banks was hired as an expert by Unisys to work on the Image Camera
1001
Project.
At the time of his hiring, he refused to sign a standard
1002
agreement assigning all patent rights to Unisys.
On his own time
and at his own initiative, Banks developed several patentable
1003
Unisys,
inventions for use with a high-speed document sorter.
without Banks’ knowledge, listed Banks as a co-inventor on three of
1004
six patents that were received and based on Banks’ work.
The
district court granted summary judgment on the patent ownership
issue, agreeing with Unisys that Banks was “employed to invent,” and
1005
Unisys argued
therefore Unisys owned the rights to the patents.
that the “employed to invent” exception does not require an express
agreement, and that an implied-in-fact contract existed between
1006
Banks and Unisys under the “employed to invent” rule.
The
Federal Circuit disagreed. Citing Banks’ refusal to sign the initial
employment agreement, as well as his refusal to sign a “Restricted
Information Obligation” form the last day of his employment, the
court found material issues of fact “about whether there was a
1007
meeting of the minds necessary for an implied-in-fact contract.”
Therefore, the court reversed the lower court’s decision to grant
1008
summary judgment.
M. Inequitable Conduct
Patent applicants and their legal representatives have a duty of
candor, good faith, and honesty in representations to the PTO
1009
A breach of this duty is
during prosecution of a patent application.
999. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224 (discussing the application of contract
principles to employee contracts where an employee is hired to invent).
1000. 228 F.3d 1357, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1001. See Banks, 228 F.3d at 1358, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1002. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1003. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223 (noting that the application of the
inventions involved the same principles as the image camera project).
1004. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223 (explaining that the subject matter of
the patent applications included optics designed by Banks).
1005. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1006. Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222, 1223
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (concluding that the fact that Banks did not sign the agreement was
irrelevant).
1007. Banks, 228 F.3d at 1360, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1008. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223.
1009. See Life Techs. v. Clontech Labs., 224 F.3d 1320, 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1186, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178,
33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1995); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1999)).
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considered inequitable conduct, and a patent may be rendered
1010
unenforceable on that basis.
“Inequitable conduct consists of
affirmative misrepresentations of material fact or the submission of
false material information during the prosecution of a patent, both
1011
coupled with an intent to deceive the PTO.”
The determinations
of materiality and intent are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
1012
standard.
Once the threshold levels of materiality and intent are
proven, it is within the trial court’s discretion to determine by
weighing the levels of materiality and intent if the principles of equity
1013
require the conclusion that inequitable conduct has occurred.
The greater the showing of one factor, the lesser the required
1014
showing of the other for a determination of inequitable conduct.
As to the standard of review, the Federal Circuit noted that it will only
overrule a lower court’s determination of inequitable conduct for an
1015
abuse of discretion.
1016
In Li Second Family Ltd. Partnership v. Toshiba Corp., the Federal
Circuit considered whether failure to disclose to the examiner a PTO
Board of Appeals decision that a related patent was not entitled to
the benefit of the earlier filing date of any of the patentee’s earlier
1017
applications, constitutes inequitable conduct.
The Board had
determined that the earlier ‘758 application was not entitled to the
benefit of an earlier filing date in an appeal from the examiner’s
1018
rejection of Li’s claim for the earlier filing date.
A different
examiner was responsible for the prosecution of the ‘102
1010. See Life Techs., 224 F.3d at 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (citing
LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1070, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (describing the effects of a breach of
the duty of candor, good faith, and honesty)).
1011. Id. at 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (“Materiality and intent to deceive
are distinct factual inquiries, and each must be shown with clear and convincing
evidence.”) (internal citations omitted).
1012. See id. at 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (discussing the standard of
review utilized by the Federal Circuit in reviewing district court inequitable-conduct
determinations).
1013. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
1014. See Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1378, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681, 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing N.V. Akzo v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours, 810 F.2d 1148, 1153, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1708 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
1015. See Life Techs. v. Clontech Labs., 224 F.3d 1320, 1324, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1186, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“We must reverse a discretionary ruling of the district
court when it is premised upon clearly erroneous findings of fact or on a
misapplication or misinterpretation of applicable law, or evidences a serious error in
judgment.”) (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d
867, 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
1016. 231 F.3d 1373, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1017. See Li Second Family, 231 F.3d at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685
(discussing Toshiba’s claim of inequitable conduct).
1018. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
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application—the application subject to the inequitable conduct
1019
claim.
While Li did disclose a genealogy chart showing the parent
applications to the ‘102 application, he disclosed nothing more,
1020
particularly the Board’s decision.
The Federal Circuit held that the
genealogy chart was not sufficient to disclose the Board’s decision
1021
regarding the priority date of the ‘758 application.
Compounding
his problems was the fact that Li had repeatedly argued to the
examiner that the ‘102 patent application was entitled to the benefit
1022
of the earlier filing date.
Turning to the materiality element, the Federal Circuit stated:
Because the effective filing date of each claim in a patent
application determines which references are available as prior art
for purposes of §§ 102 and 103, information regarding the effective
filing date is of the utmost importance to the examiner.
Consequently, an applicant’s misrepresentation that he is entitled
1023
to the benefit of an earlier filing date is highly material.

The Federal Circuit noted that the information on the effective
filing date was highly material in this case because the earlier filing
1024
The
date eliminated a reference specifically cited by the examiner.
Federal Circuit rejected Li’s argument that the reference was not
material to his patent application and that the application was
1025
patentable even without the benefit of the earlier filing dates.
The
court observed that concealing information from the PTO may be
1026
material regardless of whether it invalidated the patent.
A court need not base its finding of intent to deceive the PTO
solely on direct evidence, which is rarely available, and may instead
infer intent “from clear and convincing evidence of the surrounding
1019. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (indicating that Examiner
Larkins processed the ‘758 application while Examiner Saba examined the ‘102
application).
1020. See id. at 1378, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685.
1021. See id. at 1378-79, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685 (finding no error in the
district court’s determination of failure to provide adequate disclosure of the
previous Board decision).
1022. See Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1379, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681, 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting the inconsistency between Li’s
statements to the examiner and the Board decision).
1023. Li Second Family, 231 F.3d at 1379-80, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686.
1024. See id. at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (noting that the eliminated
reference disclosed an important feature of the disputed invention).
1025. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (emphasizing the materiality of the
missing priority date information and not the missing reference and noting that if
the missing reference was at issue, it would have been material).
1026. Id. at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687 (remarking that “the test for
materiality is whether a reasonable examiner would have considered the information
important, not whether the information would conclusively decide the issue of
patentability.”) (internal citations omitted).
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1027

circumstances.”
A court must weigh all evidence when
1028
determining intent, including evidence of good faith.
In Li, the
1029
court inferred intent from Li’s affirmative misrepresentations.
Li
argued that the inclusion of the patent reference in the genealogy
chart as well as his disclosure of the Board’s decision in a later filed
patent application was evidence of good faith and a lack of deceptive
1030
intent.
The court disagreed and concluded that the district court
did not commit clear error in finding that Li intended to deceive the
PTO. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding Li’s non-disclosure and misrepresentation
1031
constituted inequitable conduct.
1032
In Life Technologies, Inc. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., the patentees
failed to disclose the key role of an article in the motivation and
development of their invention and that another inventor was
1033
working with the technology involved with their invention.
The
inventors did disclose the Johnson article and even discussed it in the
written description of their patent application but did not disclose
1034
their reliance on the article or how it motivated them.
In
evaluating the district court’s application of the law, the court wrote:
“Thus the district court determined that the manner in which the
inventors used a disclosed prior art reference is material information
and must be revealed to the PTO. Because this factual finding was
premised upon a misapprehension of the legal standards of
1035
patentability, it is clearly erroneous.”
Turning to materiality, the Federal Circuit found that an inventor’s
subjective motivations are immaterial because the courts apply an
objective standard from the perspective of an individual of ordinary
1036
skill in the art.
The district court found that the inventors made
1027. Id. at 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687 (quoting Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1329, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1028. See Li Second Family Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1381, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681, 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1029. See Li Second Family, 231 F.3d at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686 (finding
the misrepresentations equivalent to deliberate concealment of the previous Board
decision).
1030. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
1031. Id. at 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1687.
1032. 224 F.3d 1320, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1033. See Life Techs., 224 F.3d at 1323-24, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1188-89 (noting
patentees’ failure to disclose its reliance on the Johnson article and the fact that Goff
also applied the technology used in the invention at issue).
1034. See id. at 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189-90.
1035. Id. at 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
1036. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190 (“Because patentability is assessed from
the perspective of the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art information
regarding the subjective motivations of inventors is not material.”).

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000

1559

material misrepresentations regarding the Johnson article, thereby
1037
rendering their patent obvious.
At the district court level, the
inventors argued that the Johnson article was irrelevant because a
person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a reasonable
expectation of success using Johnson’s teachings. However, the
Federal Circuit characterized this exchange as follows: “In effect, the
[district] court determined that inventors could not truthfully argue
lack of reasonable expectation of success as a basis for nonobviousness when they successfully used the prior art reference at
1038
issue.”
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
determination, believing the district court was impermissibly using
1039
hindsight in its analysis.
The examiner was free to accept or reject
1040
Accordingly, the
the inventors’ interpretation of the article.
district court committed clear error because the inventors made no
affirmative misrepresentations giving rise to a finding of inequitable
1041
conduct.
With regard to the inventors’ knowledge of Goff’s work, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court’s determination that this
1042
The
information was material also constituted clear error.
inventors knew only that Goff claimed to have reduced to practice a
similar invention and claimed to have presented the invention at a
1043
conference they did not attend.
The inventors lacked specific and
1044
definite information to prove Goff was a prior inventor.
Thus, the
court held that a reasonable examiner would not have considered the
information important in deciding whether to allow the application
1045
to issue, which is the standard for materiality.
In fact, the inventors
disclosed the limits of their knowledge in a telephone conversation
1046
The examiner’s decision not to act on this
with the examiner.
1037. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190.
1038. Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1186, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1039. See Life Techs., 224 F.3d at 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (determining
that expectation of success cannot be inferred from the inventor’s eventual success).
1040. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (determining that advocacy of an
interpretation by the inventor does not lead to a finding of misrepresentation).
1041. See id. at 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (finding no clear error because
“the inventors’ non-obviousness arguments were not affirmative misrepresentations
and cannot give rise to a determination of inequitable conduct”).
1042. See id. at 1326-27, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (noting that the information
possessed by the inventors regarding Goff’s work was limited).
1043. See id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
1044. See Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1327, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1186, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1045. See Life Techs., 224 F.3d at 1326-27, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191.
1046. Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (“[T]he examiner stated the
information had ‘no bearing on the patents issued or the instant application.’”).
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1047

information clearly showed a lack of materiality.
1048
In Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., the defendant claimed that the
patentee had engaged in inequitable conduct by failing to disclose
1049
material prior art during the prosecution of three patents.
Both
the patentee and his counsel acknowledged their familiarity with
much of the prior art cited by Bebop, however, they asserted that
(1) they had no intent to deceive the PTO; and (2) the prior art was
1050
not material.
The Federal Circuit held that the trial court’s finding
1051
of lack of intent was not clearly erroneous.
In addition, in order to
hold all three patents unenforceable due to an alleged pattern of
inequitable conduct, the court held that “we would have to find
inequitable conduct sufficient to hold at least one patent
unenforceable before considering whether to hold an entire group of
1052
related patents unenforceable.”
1053
In In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit
reiterated the difference between inequitable conduct and common1054
The court stated:
law or Walker Process fraud.
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Walker Process . . .
we have distinguished “inequitable conduct” from Walker Process
fraud, noting that inequitable conduct is a broader, more inclusive
concept than the common law fraud needed to support a Walker
Process counterclaim . . . Inequitable conduct in fact is a lesser
offense than common law fraud, and includes types of conduct less
1055
serious than “knowing and willful” fraud.

The court continued, elaborating on the differences between
Walker Process fraud and inequitable conduct:
A finding of Walker Process fraud requires higher threshold
showings of both intent and materiality than does a finding of
inequitable conduct. Moreover, unlike a finding of inequitable
1047. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191 (noting “such a strong statement
regarding the Goff information is highly probative of its immateriality”).
1048. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1049. See Speedplay, 211 F.3d at 1258-59, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (stating that
the party alleging a patent unenforceable must show the failure to disclose material
information by an offering of clear and convincing evidence).
1050. Id. at 1259, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (noting that the district court
accepted the patentee’s arguments).
1051. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994 (finding the lack of intent was supported
at trial by adequate evidence).
1052. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1994.
1053. 203 F.3d 800, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1054. See Spalding Sports, 203 F.3d at 806-07, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752
(discussing whether privileged communications between inventor and attorney are
abrogated by the crime-fraud exception on a showing of inequitable conduct).
1055. Id. at 807, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752-53 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v.
Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1098, 1105
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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conduct . . . a finding of Walker Process fraud may not be based upon
an equitable balancing of lesser degrees of materiality and intent.
Rather, it must be based on independent and clear evidence of
deceptive intent together with a clear showing of reliance, i.e., that
the patent would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or
omission. Therefore, for an omission such as a failure to cite a
piece of prior art to support a finding of Walker Process fraud, the
withholding of the reference must show evidence of fraudulent
intent. A mere failure to cite a reference to the PTO will not
1056
suffice.

The court concluded that inequitable conduct alone does not
1057
constitute common law fraud.
Wilson alleged that failure by
Spalding to disclose to a prior art reference in the invention record
1058
The court held that Wilson’s allegation that
constituted fraud.
Spalding failed to cite a reference, without more, did not constitute a
1059
prima facie showing of fraud.
1060
In Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharmaceutical Corp., the Federal Circuit
reversed a jury finding of inequitable conduct, finding lack of
1061
MOVA alleged that Upjohn
evidence of an intent to deceive.
misrepresented certain facts relating to experiments, withheld
adverse test data, and failed to ask the added inventors if they were
1062
aware of any information relating to patentability.
As to the first
allegation, that Upjohn had misrepresented the content of tested
1063
formulations, the court found no evidence of guilty intent.
MOVA’s second allegation claimed that the results from tests
conducted three years before the testing of the patented invention
were material, that Upjohn admitted having knowledge of the test,
1064
and that from these facts a jury could infer intent to deceive.
1056. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (quoting Nobelpharma AB, 141 F.3d at 107071, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106-07).
1057. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753.
1058. See id. at 802, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (responding to a motion to
compel discovery of the invention record made by Wilson in a suit brought by
Spalding).
1059. Id. at 808, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (noting that in order to overcome the
attorney-client privilege, a party need not conclusively prove fraud, but that Wilson did
not show any evidence of intent to commit fraud).
1060. 225 F.3d 1306, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1061. See Upjohn, 225 F.3d at 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (stating that the
requirement of disclosure of material prior art does not require an inventor to
disclose his entire knowledge regarding the field of the invention).
1062. See id. at 1312-13, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293.
1063. Id. at 1314, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292 (“There was no evidence that the
content of the formulations was intentionally withheld. The evidence before the jury
was not clear and convincing evidence of material withholding with culpable
intent. . . .”).
1064. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292 (asserting that Upjohn failed to disclose
the prior tests knowing they would be “fatal to patentability”).
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Upjohn argued that the tests were immaterial because they dealt with
subject matter outside of the claims of the patent and that there was
1065
no intent to deceive.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Upjohn,
holding that the failure to disclose the earlier tests “did not establish
intent to deceive, and that a reasonable jury’s verdict could not have
1066
been based thereon.”
Finally, MOVA alleged that two of the newly
named inventors had knowledge regarding the invention and that
1067
Upjohn
this knowledge should have been disclosed to the PTO.
stated that it disclosed in the specification the knowledge that MOVA
1068
referred to in its allegation.
The Federal Circuit agreed, finding
1069
no evidence of an intent to deceive.
In addition, the court stated
“[t]o require the inventor to describe his entire personal knowledge
in the field of the invention, however the knowledge was obtained,
would be an unmanageable assignment. It is prior art that must be
1070
disclosed, prior art that is material to patentability.”
1071
In Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co.,
the defendant argued that
although the patentee had disclosed one item of prior art, the
examiner had not considered the art—as evidenced by the line drawn
1072
through the reference by the examiner.
Hunt alleged the line
through the listed prior art imposed an obligation on Fiskars of
1073
explaining the significance of that item.
The Federal Circuit
disagreed and asserted that an applicant cannot commit inequitable
1074
In addition, the court
conduct where he cites to the reference.
held that Hunt failed to provide any evidence of intent, and that “the
inequitable conduct claim [was] ‘so lacking in substance as to
constitute a waste of the time and resources of all participants,’” and
1075
merited sanctions.

1065. See id. at 1314, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292-93.
1066. Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1314, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1067. The original patent application did not properly disclose the true inventors.
Upon discovering the error Upjohn corrected the named inventors.
1068. See Upjohn, 225 F.3d at 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (noting the product
in question was commercially available).
1069. See id. at 1314, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292-93.
1070. Id. at 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56).
1071. 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1072. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576 (stating that the
examiner manuals require the drawing of a line through a reference that is not to be
considered).
1073. Id. at 1327, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576 (explaining that Hunt argued “that
this placed on Fiskars the obligation to stress to the examiner the relevance of [the
prior art]”).
1074. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576 (“An applicant cannot be guilty of
inequitable conduct if the reference was cited to the examiner[.]”).
1075. Id. at 1328, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577-78.
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In Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding of no inequitable
1077
conduct.
The district court determined that withheld test data was
not material, that there was no evidence of intent to deceive, and that
Unocal had acted in good faith during the prosecution of the
1078
patent.
The Federal Circuit agreed, finding neither clear error nor
abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding of no inequitable
1079
conduct.
1080
In Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
the
Federal Circuit considered the patentee’s submission of a foreign
language reference along with a one-page partial translation to the
1081
PTO.
The court found no clear error in the district court’s
holding that the reference was not cumulative and established a prima
facie case of unpatentability, therefore making the reference
1082
material.
Intent presented a more difficult issue because the
patentee had submitted the entire untranslated reference to the
1083
In
PTO, which the patentee offered as evidence of good faith.
addition, the patentee noted that the PTO rules do not require the
1084
The
patentee to submit a translated version of foreign references.
district court nonetheless held that the patentee had willfully
1085
misrepresented the reference, and the Federal Circuit agreed.
The
district court found that the inventor, Dr. Yamazaki, knew the
1086
The
materiality of the reference because he could read Japanese.
district court also believed that Dr. Yamazaki failed to provide a more
complete translation because he knew from his experience with
patent prosecution that it would decrease Semiconductor’s ability to
1087
obtain the patent.
“The district court thus concluded that Dr.
1076. 208 F.3d 989, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1077. See Union Oil, 208 F.3d at 1002, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236 (describing the
district court opinion as “thorough and well reasoned”).
1078. See id. at 1001-02, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235-36 (noting that a district court
opinion will not be overturned without a finding of abuse of discretion).
1079. Id. at 1002, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
1080. 204 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1081. See Semiconductor Energy, 204 F.3d at 1371-72, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003
(noting that the original reference consisted of a twenty-nine page document in
Japanese).
1082. See id. at 1374, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (detailing the basis for the
district court’s findings).
1083. See id. at 1375, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
1084. See id. at 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1085. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007 (noting that the district court found the
Semiconductor’s witnesses to be uncredible).
1086. See Semiconductor Energy Lab Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368,
1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the inventor’s
native language was Japanese).
1087. See Semiconductor Energy, 204 F.3d at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006
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Yamazaki must have consciously decided which sections to reveal to
1088
the PTO through [Semiconductor’s] partial translation.”
Semiconductor (“SEL”) pointed to its technical compliance with
37 C.F.R. § 1.98 in providing the foreign language reference in its
1089
However, the court noted that “Rule 98 provides neither
defense.
a safe harbor nor a shield against allegations of inequitable
1090
conduct.”
In addition, the court stated:
By submitting the entire untranslated Canon reference to the PTO
along with a one-page, partial translation focusing on less material
portions and a concise statement directed to these less material
portions, SEL left the examiner with the impression that the
examiner did not need to conduct any further translation or
investigation. Thus, SEL deliberately deceived the examiner into
thinking that the Canon reference was less relevant than it really
was, and constructively withheld the reference from the PTO.
SEL’s submission hardly satisfies the duty of candor required of
1091
every applicant before the PTO.

Finally, the court noted that SEL’s argument—that the patent
office should not require the translation of all foreign references into
1092
“The duty of candor
English by the applicant—missed the point.
does not require that the applicant translate every foreign reference,
but only that the applicant refrain from submitting partial
translations and concise explanations that it knows will misdirect the
1093
examiner’s attention from the reference’s relevant teaching.”
Therefore, the court found no clear error with the district court’s
finding on materiality and intent and no abuse of discretion with its
1094
holding of inequitable conduct.
1095
In PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., the Federal
Circuit considered the materiality of falsehoods and omissions to the

(observing the inventor’s vast experience in the prosecution of patents and his
understanding of the contents of the entire reference).
1088. Id. at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
1089. See id. at 1375, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (arguing that technical
compliance with patent manuals should be taken into consideration when gauging
intent to deceive).
1090. Id. at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1091. Id. at 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1092. See Semiconductor Energy Lab Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368,
1378, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (referring to the inclusion of
the partial translation as an attempt to mask the contents of a full translation).
1093. Semiconductor Energy, 204 F.3d at 1378, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
1094. See id. at 1378, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008 (holding the patent to be
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct).
1095. 225 F.3d 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Two of the
authors were counsel to Pharmacia Biotech in this case.
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1096

PTO regarding inventorship.
The district court held that the
patentees demonstrated a “persistent course of material
representations, omissions, and half-truths to the PTO . . . on
1097
inventorship.”
The court noted that the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (hereinafter “MPEP”) “specifically notes that
information about inventorship is material under 37 C.F.R.
1098
§ 1.56[.]”
PerSeptive argued that the district court erred in
concluding that others should have been named as joint inventors to
the patent, and that the claims had been narrowed during
1099
prosecution, curing any inventorship problem with the application.
The Federal Circuit viewed PerSeptive’s arguments as missing the
point:
First, whether the inventorship of the patents as issued is correct
does not determine the materiality of the statements in this case,
just as whether concealed prior art would actually invalidate the
patent is irrelevant to materiality. Second, the materiality of
intentional false statements may be independent of the claims of
1100
the patent.

Ultimately, the Federal Circuit stated that “the issue is not
1101
inventorship per se, but misinformation about inventorship.”
The
inventor’s falsehoods, misrepresentations and omissions all dealt with
1102
Therefore, the inventors engaged in
inventorship, a material issue.
1103
inequitable conduct, and the patents are unenforceable.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman stated that “the court
cannot ignore the correct inventorship, for when inventorship is
correctly viewed as directed to that which is claimed, the information
that the district court held should have been disclosed to the
1104
In addition, Judge Newman believed
examiner is not material.”

1096. See PerSeptive, 225 F.3d at 1319-20, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003-04.
1097. Id. at 1320, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004 (quoting PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v.
Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D. Mass. 1998)).
1098. Id. at 1321, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (detailing rules of inventorship to be
used by examiners and noting that disputes regarding inventorship are material, and
the duty to disclose requires careful consideration on the part of applicants) (citing
MPEP § 2001.06(c) and § 2004).
1099. See id. at 1321-22, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005-06 (arguing that error in
naming of inventors originally eliminates the later finding of inequitable conduct).
1100. Id. at 1322, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (internal citations omitted).
1101. PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, 225 F.3d 1315, 1322, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1102. See PerSeptive, 225 F.3d at 1322, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (finding no
error in the district court’s decision regarding materiality).
1103. See id. at 1322-23, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (upholding the district
court’s finding of five specific instances of falsehoods, misrepresentations, and
omissions and finding no evidence that the district court abused its discretion).
1104. Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

1566

11/20/01 4:51 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1435

the “acts with which the panel majority impeaches the named
inventors are overstated if not irrelevant. By no stretch do they
represent clear and convincing evidence of material omission or
misrepresentation with intent to deceive the examiner as to
1105
inventorship.”
N. Certificates of Correction
Section 254 of the Patent Act, entitled “Certificate of correction of
Patent and Trademark Office mistake,” provides:
Whenever a mistake in a patent, incurred through the fault of the
Patent and Trademark Office, is clearly disclosed by the records of
the Office, the Director may issue a certificate of correction stating
the fact and nature of such mistake, under seal, without charge, to
be recorded in the records of patents. A printed copy thereof shall
be attached to each printed copy of the patent, and such certificate
shall be considered as part of the original patent. Every such
patent, together with such certificate, shall have the same effect
and operation in law on the trial of actions for causes thereafter
arising as if the same had been originally issued in such corrected
form. The Director may issue a corrected patent without charge in
1106
lieu of and with like effect as a certificate of correction.
1107

In Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., the Federal Circuit
considered for the first time the effect of a correction issued
subsequent to the filing of a lawsuit. Southwest, the patentee, had
obtained a certificate of correction from the PTO in order to add the
Program Printout Appendix (which the PTO mistakenly omitted) to
1108
the patent.
However, the lawsuit against Harlequin was filed two
1109
years before the certificate of correction was issued.
The Federal
Circuit held that “the certificate of correction that added the
Program Printout Appendix is not to be given effect in this precertificate lawsuit” and that it “is only effective for causes of action
1110
Judge Schall, writing for the court,
arising after it was issued.”
concluded that after the PTO issues the certificate, a court should
consider it as part of the original application in subsequent causes of
1105. Id. at 1330, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
1106. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
1107. 226 F.3d 1280, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1108. See id. at 1287 n.6, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1166 n.6 (noting that another
certificate of correction had been issued previously for the ’257 patent, and inserted
a missing comma).
1109. See id. at 1293, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1171. Southwest filed its lawsuit against
Harlequin on January 20, 1995, but the PTO did not issue the certificate of
correction until April 1, 1997. See id.
1110. Id. at 1294, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172 (recognizing that this holding was
based upon an interpretation of the language of § 254).
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1111

action.
The Harlequin court rejected a Third Circuit decision, Eagle Iron
1112
Works v. McLanahan Corp., issued before the Federal Circuit came
into being, which interpreted the same language in a sister statute, 35
1113
The court rejected that
U.S.C. § 255, in the opposite manner.
prior decision because the Federal Circuit had not adopted Third
1114
Circuit precedent, and because the Eagle Iron Works court did not
explain its holding with respect to the certificate-of-correction
1115
issue.
The Federal Circuit thus held that the patent without the
certificate of correction may be invalid for purposes of the lawsuit,
and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the
1116
patent’s validity without the certificate of correction.
However, the
court noted that any invalidity due to the missing Program Printout
1117
Appendix ceased upon the issuance of the certificate of correction.
O. Inventorship
A patent application must name all of the actual inventors and only
1118
Section 102(f) of the Patent Act states that
the actual inventors.
“[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not himself
1119
The Federal
invent the subject matter sought to be patented . . . .”
Circuit, relying upon a leading treatise, has explained section 102(f)
in the following manner:
[Section 102(f)] bars issuance of a valid patent to a person or
persons who derive the conception of the invention from any other
source or person. A corollary of this requirement is the rule of

1111. See Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1295, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the language of
§ 254 mandated that in causes of action arising after the issuance of a certificate of
correction, the patent together with the certificate, should be given the same effect
and operation in law as if the same had been issued originally in such corrected
form).
1112. 429 F.2d 1375, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 225 (3d Cir. 1970).
1113. See Harlequin, 226 F.3d at 1296, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (rejecting the
reasoning of Eagle Iron Works in supporting Southwest’s claim against Harlequin).
1114. See id. at 1296, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173 (citing Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 672, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302, 1304 (Fed. Cir.
1991), which found that decisions of other circuit courts are not binding for matters
within its exclusive subject matter jurisdiction).
1115. See id. at 1297, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (concluding that the effectiveness
of the certificate of correction was not supported by the language of 35 U.S.C. § 255).
1116. See id.
1117. See id. (reasoning that any causes of action arising after the date the
certificate of correction was issued will treat the certificate, including the Program
Printout Appendix, as part of the original patent, thus eliminating a finding of
invalidity based on the absence of the Program Printout Appendix).
1118. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2001).
1119. Id.

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

1568

11/20/01 4:51 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1435

proper joinder of inventors. The rule operates both as to
misjoinder (erroneous addition of a person who is not in fact a
joint inventor) and as to nonjoinder (failure to add a joint
inventor). Potentially, misjoinder and nonjoinder are as fatal to
the validity of a patent (or the effectiveness of a filed application)
1120
as a case of complete inventorship error.

A patent may be held invalid if a party proves, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the patentee failed to comply with section
1121
102(f).
The operation of the corrective process in 35 U.S.C. § 256
1122
may help to save the patent from invalidity.
1123
In Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., the Federal Circuit held that
Kimberly-Clark had failed to prove the patent invalid under § 102(f)
1124
Kimberly-Clark asserted that,
by clear and convincing evidence.
based upon the inventor’s deposition testimony, either the named
inventor was not the true inventor or someone else (perhaps
Solomon’s patent attorney) should have been joined as an
1125
inventor.
In finding that Kimberly-Clark failed to prove the
1126
the Federal Circuit
assertions by clear and convincing evidence,
also noted that the suggestion that Solomon’s attorney was the true
1127
inventor was misguided.
However, the court found the fact that
the attorney did not assume the role of inventor was not a ground for
1128
invalidating the patent.

1120. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 2.03, at 2-40 & nn.1-2; Solomon v. KimberlyClark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1121. See Pannu v. Idolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1349, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657,
1661 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (applying the “clear and convincing” standard where
nonjoinder in patent cases and where nonjoinder of parties is not at issue); see also
Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279,
1285 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying the “clear and convincing” standard as set forth in
Pannu).
1122. See Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1350, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 (stating that
whenever a person is named or not named in error in an issued patent, the involved
parties and assignees may use the remedies available under 35 U.S.C. § 256 to correct
the error and save the patent from invalidity).
1123. 216 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1124. See id. at 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (agreeing that the district court
correctly held that Kimberly-Clark failed to introduce clear and convincing evidence
that the claims were invalid under Section 102(f)).
1125. See id. at 1381-82, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (noting that although
Solomon’s testimony was vague and inconsistent at times, she steadfastly maintained
that she was the inventor and submitted evidence demonstrating that her prototype
was the foundation of the invention).
1126. See id. at 1381, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (finding Solomon’s evidence
compelling while there was a total absence of evidence in support of Kimberly-Clark’s
assertion that Solomon was not the inventor).
1127. See id. at 1382, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (clarifying that the attorney
should not be a competitor of the client or an inventor).
1128. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285 (suggesting that Kimberly-Clark failed to
understand the proper role of a patent attorney).
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1129

In Environ Products, Inc. v. Furon Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed
a jury finding regarding the true inventor in a dispute among three
1130
parties.
Two patents were issued, another application was pending
for the same invention and all three applications had been co1131
The trial dealt with the limited issue of
pending in the PTO.
inventorship, in the context of an invalidity defense to Environ’s
1132
infringement suit.
The district court accorded the asserted patent
the presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 and required
1133
Furon to prove inventorship by clear and convincing evidence.
The Federal Circuit began by noting that the burden is on the junior
applicants to establish prior invention by a preponderance of the
1134
evidence in a PTO administrative hearing.
Likewise, a district
1135
court proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 291 also would have required
1136
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
The issue, then, was the appropriate burden to place on the
alleged infringer when inventorship is raised as an invalidity
1137
The Federal Circuit held that the standard of proof
defense.
should not vary based upon the context of the suit. As between copending interfering patents, the junior patentee bears the burden, by
1138
a preponderance of the evidence, of pleading and proving priority.
Although the district court erred, the error was harmless because the
jury had determined Environ was the inventor by a preponderance of
evidence, precluding any finding that Furon was also the inventor
1139
under the preponderance of the evidence standard.
1129. 215 F.3d 1261, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1130. See id. at 1267, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043 (affirming the jury verdict and
remanding for further proceedings based on a finding of harmless error).
1131. See id. at 1265, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041.
1132. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042 (noting that “the challenge to
inventorship was raised as an invalidity defense to Environ’s charge of
infringement . . . under 35 U.S.C. § 271” rather than pursuant to §§ 291 and 282).
1133. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042.
1134. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (“In a interference . . . a junior party
shall have the burden of establishing priority by a preponderance of the evidence.”)
(citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.657(b) (1998) and Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 685-86, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934, 1938 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1135. See 35 U.S.C. § 291 (1994) (“The owner of an interfering patent may have
relief against the owner of another by civil action, and the court may adjudge the
question of the validity of any of the interfering patents. . . .”).
1136. See Environ Prods., Inc. v. Furon Co., 215 F.3d 1261, 1265, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1038, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble
Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 914, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1921, 1924 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1137. See id. at 1266, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (recognizing that this issue arises
in the instances where patent applications are co-pending).
1138. See id. at 1266 n.4, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042 n.4 (stating that this standard
of proof does not apply to other questions that may be in dispute).
1139. See id. at 1266-67, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1043 (finding the error harmless
because the error in weight of proof terminology in the instructions would not have
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In PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., the Federal
Circuit considered the materiality of falsehoods and omissions to the
PTO regarding inventorship. The district court held that the acts by
the patentees demonstrated a “persistent course of material
misrepresentations, omissions, and half-truths to the PTO . . . on
1141
inventorship.”
The court observed that the MPEP “specifically
notes that information about inventorship is material under 37 C.F.R.
1142
PerSeptive argued that the district court erred in
§ 1.56.”
concluding that other parties should have been named as joint
inventors to the patent, and the fact that the claims had been
narrowed during prosecution thereby cured any inventorship
1143
problem with the application.
The Federal Circuit believed the
arguments missed the point:
First, whether the inventorship of the patents as issued is correct
does not determine the materiality of the statements in this case,
just as whether concealed prior art would actually invalidate the
patent is irrelevant to materiality. Second, the materiality of
intentional false statements may be independent of the claims of
1144
the patent.

Ultimately, the Federal Circuit’s key concern was misinformation
1145
about inventorship, rather than inventorship per se.
The inventor’s
inequitable conduct, consisting of falsehoods, misrepresentations and
omissions concerning inventorship—a material issue—rendered the
1146
patents unenforceable.
Judge Newman’s dissent noted that when inventorship was viewed
as directed to that which is claimed, the information that the district
court believed should have been disclosed to the examiner was
1147
immaterial.
In addition, Judge Newman believed that the majority

changed the result).
1140. 225 F.3d 1315, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000). As noted above,
two of the authors were counsel to Pharmacia Biotech in this case. See supra note
1101.
1141. Id. at 1320, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004 (quoting PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v.
Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D. Mass. 1998)).
1142. See id. at 1321, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (citing MPEP §§ 2001.06(c),
2004).
1143. See id. at 1321-22, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1006.
1144. Id. at 1322, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (internal citations omitted).
1145. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (affirming the district court’s opinion
finding no clear error in the materiality of the named inventors’ actions).
1146. See PerSeptive Biosys., Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1322, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court’s
holding).
1147. See id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010 (Newman, J., dissenting) (taking
issue with the majority’s conclusion that PerSpective neglected to challenge the district
court’s finding of material misrepresentation and deceptive intent).
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treated the named inventors too harshly under the facts of the case
because there was not clear and convincing evidence that the
inventors’ acts constituted a “material omission or misrepresentation
1148
with intent to deceive the examiner as to inventorship.”
P. Double Patenting
The judicially-created doctrine of obviousness-type double
patenting embodies the legislative limitation on the duration of a
patentee’s right to exclude others from practicing a claimed
invention in order to prevent extensions on exclusive rights through
claims in a subsequent patent that are not patentably distinct from
1149
those in the earlier patent.
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories,
Inc., the Federal Circuit held a claim invalid under this doctrine of
1150
obviousness-type double patenting.
The obviousness-type double patenting inquiry, like many patentbased inquiries, requires a two-step analysis. First, the court construes
the claim in the earlier patent and the claim in the later patent, and
makes a determination as to whether the later claim encompasses the
1151
subject matter of the earlier claim.
The second part of the inquiry
requires the court to determine whether the differences in subject
matter between the two claims renders the claims patentably
1152
distinct.
Consistent with this analysis, the court began by
1153
After construing
construing claims of the earlier and later patents.
the claims, the court addressed and rejected the patentee’s argument
that the subject matter of the later claim would not be obvious to one
1154
of ordinary skill in the art.
The court explained that obviousnesstype double patenting is more concerned with the inventions that
claims define than with what one skilled in the art would
1148. See id. at 1330, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013.
1149. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 985, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also In re Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 943-44, 214 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 761, 766 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Schenller, 397 F.2d 350, 380, 158 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 210, 284 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (acknowledging the principle underlying
obviousness-type double patenting is to prevent unjustified timewise extension of the
“right to exclude” that a patent grants).
1150. See Eli Lilly Co., 222 F.3d at 988, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (holding
invalid Lilly’s attempt to extend term of exclusivity for an additional nine years
beyond the statutory term).
1151. See id. at 985, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (citing Georgia-Pac. Corp. v.
United States Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1326, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1593
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 972 F.2d 1272, 1279,
23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1152. See id. (citing Georgia-Pac. Corp., 195 F.3d at 1327, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1595; Gen. Foods Corp., 972 F.2d at 1279, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844).
1153. See id. at 985-86, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617-18.
1154. See id. at 986, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1618.
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recognize.
In addition, the court distinguished two of its prior decisions, In re
1156
1157
Baird and In re Jones, in which the court held that a species claim
is not necessarily obvious in light of a prior-art disclosure of a
1158
In the present case, the same party claimed a genus in an
genus.
earlier patent and then claimed a species in a later patent, while in
Baird and Jones, the prior art “merely disclosed a genus” and a
1159
subsequent patent claimed a species.
The court explained further
that because the earlier patent broadly disclosed and claimed the
right to exclude others from administering any of thousands of
compounds for the treatment of depression, the patentee could not,
now that the earlier patent had expired, disavow its earlier broad
disclosure and claims to argue that the selected class of compounds
1160
would not have been obvious.
The court continued its analysis, explaining that it had construed
the respective claims and determined that the earlier claim covered
1161
In
the use of fluoxetine hydrochloride claimed in the later claim.
the second prong of the inquiry, the court held that the differences
between the claims were not patentably distinct as past precedent had
already established that a “later genus is not patentable over an
1162
earlier genus claim.”
In early 2001, the Federal Circuit accepted a petition for rehearing
1163
en banc in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.
The en banc court
vacated the panel’s original decision and reassigned the opinion to
the panel for the purpose of revising the section concerning double
1164
patenting.
The panel reaffirmed that the claim at issue was invalid
due to obviousness-type double patenting, using a different analysis
1165
Specifically, the panel re-phrased the first
to reach the same result.
step of the two-step analysis employed in an obviousness-type double

1155. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618 (quoting In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005,
1013, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 474, 481 (C.C.P.A. 1964)).
1156. 16 F.3d 380, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
1157. 958 F.2d 347, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1158. See Eli Lilly, 222 F.3d at 986, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
1159. See id. at 986, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
1160. See id. at 986-87, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618-19 (discussing the “expansive
right of exclusivity,” the “written description requirement” and the “enablement
requirement” of patent claims).
1161. See id. at 987, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (indicating that the court would
proceed to resolve the issue of whether the two claims were patently distinct).
1162. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1619 (citations omitted).
1163. See 251 F.3d 955, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1164. See id. at 958, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (reaffirming the district court’s
determination of the issue of best mode).
1165. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
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1166

patenting case.
Focusing on a different earlier patent than in the
original opinion, the court concluded that “[T]he only difference
between claim 1 of the ‘213 patent and claim 7 of the ‘549 patent is
that the former addresses a method of treating anxiety in humans
with fluoxetine hydrochloride while the latter claims a method of
using fluoxetine hydrochloride to block serotonin uptake in
1167
animals.”
After determining the differences between the claims, the court
proceeded to the next step, resolving whether the differences
1168
rendered the claims patently distinct.
On this point, the court
concluded that the inhibition of sertonin uptake is a natural result of
1169
the administration of fluoxetine hydrochloride.
As a result, “the
limitation of claim 7 of the ‘549 patent directed to blocking serotonin
uptake by use of fluoxetine hydrochloride is an inherent
characteristic of the administration of fluoxetine hydrochloride for
1170
Thus, the earlier
any purpose, including the treatment of anxiety.”
claim anticipated the later claim and no patentable distinction
1171
existed.
Lastly, the court noted that the fact that the later claim
was directed to animals rather than humans was not a patentable
1172
distinction, as humans are a species of the animal genus.
Judge Newman dissented from the court’s refusal to consider the
1173
Judge Newman believed that the law of double
case en banc.
patenting should be limited to the situation where “neither patent is
prior art against the other, usually because they have a common
1174
priority date.”
Therefore, Judge Newman concluded that the law
of double patenting could not be applicable in this case because the
‘213 patent was filed nine years after the effective filing date of the
1175
now invalid ‘549 patent.
In addition, the ‘549 patent was listed as
1166. See id. at 968, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878 (“First as a matter of law, a court
construes the claim in the earlier patent and the claim in the later patent and
determines the differences.” (quoting Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 195 F.3d 1322, 1326, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590, 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
1167. Id. at 969, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1168. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1169. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 970, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1879 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (analyzing evidence submitted by Barr Laboratories).
1170. Id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1171. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (finding factual similarities between the
present case and Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
1172. See id. at 971, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (reciting the principle that later
genus claim is anticipated by an earlier species claim and not patently distinct)
(citations omitted).
1173. See id. at 972, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1174. Id. at 973, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (Newman, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the en banc panel misapplied and misstated the law of double patenting).
1175. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 973, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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prior art against the ‘213 patent.
Ultimately, Judge Newman
concluded that the panel erred in holding that ‘213 claim that was
issued prior to the ‘549 claim but filed nine years later rendered the
1177
‘549 claim obvious.
Q. Subject Matter (Plants)
1178

In Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. the Federal
Circuit considered whether plants and seeds for new varieties of
hybrid and inbred corn are patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
district court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
noting that in the past fifteen years, the Patent and Trademark Office
had granted patents on new and unobvious varieties of seed-grown
1179
plants.
The defendants argued that seeds and seed-grown plants
are not protectable under Section 101 of the Patent Act because
Congress provided for protection of this subject matter under the
1180
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA).
The Federal Circuit, in
ruling on an interlocutory appeal, affirmed the district court’s denial
1181
of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
The Pioneer court relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in
1182
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the Court concluded that Congress
1183
intended the statute to encompass a broad subject matter.
Hence,
the district court held that an individual who develops a new plant
variety may “have recourse to patenting under Title 35 or to
1184
registration under the PVPA.”
In fact, Pioneer held both a patent
1185
on the plants and a certificate under the PVPA.
The court noted
that the PVPA does not remove seeds and seed-grown plants from the
patent statute because the conflicting laws do not invalidate either
1186
statute.
Seeds and seed–grown plants are patentable under Section
1865, 1867 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1176. See id. at 974, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
1177. See id., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867 (Newman, J., dissenting) (finding
insufficient support for the majority’s conclusion).
1178. 200 F.3d 1374, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1179. See id. at 1376, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (citing the district court opinion
in In re Hubbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985)).
1180. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (citing the Plant Variety Protection Act,
7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. (1970)).
1181. See Pioneer, 200 F.3d at 1375, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1182. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
1183. See id.
1184. Id. at 1377, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42.
1185. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374,
1378, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (comparing the application
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 7 U.S.C. § 2321).
1186. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442 (reasoning that the two statutes merely
create different rights and obligations).
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III. INFRINGEMENT
A person infringes a valid and enforceable U.S. patent when he
makes, sells, offers for sale, or imports, without authorization, any
patented invention within the United States during the term of the
1188
patent.
The Federal Circuit has established a two-step analysis for
1189
determining when infringement has occurred.
First, the claim
must be properly interpreted (“construed”) to determine its meaning
1190
and scope.
Second, a court should compare the properly
construed claim to the accused product to determine whether the
accused product contains every element of the properly construed
1191
claim.
A. Claim Construction
At least since 1995, it has been clear that, as a matter of law, the
interpretation and construction of patent claims is reserved
1192
exclusively for the court.
As a consequence, the Federal Circuit
reviews questions of claim construction de novo, without the
requirement of any deference to the district judge below who initially
1193
construed the claim.
Nevertheless, the standard of de novo review
does not require the court of appeals to ignore the district court.
Former Chief Judge Archer, author of the Markman decision and two
other recent Federal Circuit opinions, stressed that this de novo review
1194
requires careful consideration of the trial court’s work.
In other
words, the Federal Circuit will give as much respect to a district
court’s claim construction as it deserves, but it also signals that the
judges of the Federal Circuit will not, under the guise of de novo
appellate review, rigidly ignore what has occurred in the district
court.
1187. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443 (holding patentable subject matter under
Section 101 includes seed and seed-grown matter).
1188. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) (defining patent infringement).
1189. See, e.g., Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836,
1838 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
1190. See id.
1191. See id.
1192. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321 (1996).
1193. See Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1451, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (affirming the
district court’s decision upon de novo review).
1194. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 20, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

1576

11/20/01 4:51 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1435
1195

For example, in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., the Federal
Circuit insisted that to interpret an asserted claim, a court must first
examine the intrinsic evidence on the record, including the patent
1196
itself, the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history.
1197
While there is a “hierarchy among the intrinsic evidence,” claim
construction takes on a special and primary function, for it is through
the claim language that the patent applicant must “distinctly claim[]”
1198
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”
Thus, in some cases, the Federal Circuit has described the analysis of
intrinsic evidence as “begin[ning] with the claim language itself,” and
utilizing the “ordinary and accustomed” understanding of the claim
term as a presumptive, “default meaning”:
The claim term’s ordinary and accustomed meaning initially serves
as a default meaning because the patentee may act as a
lexicographer and ascribe a different, or modified, meaning to the
term. The court, therefore, must examine a patent’s specification
and prosecution history to determine whether the patentee has
given the term an unconventional meaning. If the patentee has
not done so, the term’s ordinary and customary meaning
1199
controls.

Similarly, the court in Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve,
1200
Inc. recognized that where the claim language is facially clear, an
evaluation must look only at whether other aspects of the intrinsic
1201
A
evidence deviate from the clear language of the claims.
deviation may be necessary in instances when a patentee decides to
be his own lexicographer and uses terms in a context outside their
ordinary meaning or in circumstances in which the patentee, by
amendment or through argument to distinguish or overcome a
1202
reference, renders untenable a potential claim construction.
In the rare instance where the intrinsic evidence (claims,
specification, and prosecution history) does not yield a firm
construction of the claim at issue, only then may courts turn to

1195. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1196. See id. at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576 (citing Markman, 52 F.3d at 979,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1329).
1197. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 865, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1652 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying a hierarchical analysis to
the intrinsic evidence in Vitronics).
1198. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
1199. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 955, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
1200. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1201. See id. at 865, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
1202. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
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extrinsic evidence as a claim-construction tool.
The roles of the
different types of intrinsic evidence, as well as the roles that extrinsic
evidence and certain canons of construction may play in claim
interpretation are discussed below.
1.

Claim language
1204
A
Claim construction starts with the actual words of the claim.
claim term should be given its “ordinary meaning” unless the
1205
specification or the prosecution history indicates otherwise.
Consistent with the Federal Circuit’s increasing use of presumptions
in claim construction inquiries, some cases explicitly invoke “a ‘heavy
1206
presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language.’”
However, it is not entirely clear where to obtain the ordinary
meaning of a term appearing in a fully integrated patent document.
Despite the fact that patents should be interpreted from the vantage
1207
point of the ordinarily skilled professional, the overwhelming trend
in recent Federal Circuit cases is to find the ordinary meaning of
claim terms in general-purpose dictionaries, and to treat that
dictionary definition as controlling unless the specification or
prosecution history of the patent provides a basis for overcoming the
1208
heavy presumption in favor of the dictionary definition.
Despite
1203. See, e.g., Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1204. See Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1814, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1205. See Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420, 1427, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1206. Kraft Foods, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817 (quoting
Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1207. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1650, 1654-55 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“‘As a general rule, the construing court
interprets words in a claim as one of skill in the art at the time of invention would
understand them.’” (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
114 F.3d 1547, 1555, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 1997))); HockersonHalberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 955, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1487, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“As a starting point, the court gives claim terms their
ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art.”); Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1380, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Although we recognize that ‘which the applicant
regards as his invention’ is subjective language, . . . once the patent issues, the claims
and written description must be viewed objectively, from the standpoint of a person
of skill in the art.”); see also Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214
F.3d 1302, 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that when
a patentee chooses to be his own lexicographer by redefining a term in the
specification, “the written description in such a case must clearly redefine a claim
term ‘so as to put a reasonable competitor or one reasonably skilled in the art on
notice that the patentee intended to so redefine that claim term.’” (quoting Process
Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029,
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1999))).
1208. See, e.g., Vanguard Prod. Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 234 F.3d 1370, 1372,
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the trend toward consulting ordinary, general-purpose dictionaries to
obtain the ordinary meanings of a claim term, the Federal Circuit
normally treats dictionaries as extrinsic evidence—but views them as a
1209
special kind of extrinsic evidence.
Thus, the court frequently has
warned against giving dictionaries excessive weight in claim
construction so as to avoid converting dictionary definitions into
1210
technical terms of art that have legal significance.
The best source
for understanding a technical term is the specification from which it
1211
arose, and if necessary, information from the prosecution history.
Furthermore, the court has warned that, although it is permissible to
consult dictionaries to determine the meaning of certain claim terms,
the courts should not employ this practice if the dictionary defintion
contradicts any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the
1212
patent documents.
It is important to note the difficulty in
reconciling the notion that dictionaries cannot contradict the
intrinsic evidence, with the approach of giving claim language a
presumptive, dictionary meaning before consulting the remainder of
1213
the intrinsic evidence.
In 2000, the Federal Circuit continued its trend of increasing use
of dictionaries for claim construction in a number of its published
1214
decisions. In Vanguard Products Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp., the
panel majority held that a claim for a gasket requiring two “integral”
layers was properly construed using the dictionary defintion of
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the district court’s
finding that the ‘854 patent uses the term “integral” in its ordinary dictionary
meaning and finding no evidence contrary to this interpretation in the specifications
or prosecution history); Cortland Line Co., Inc. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 1356, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734, 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting the meaning of the term
“plate” directly from WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 901 (1990));
Optical Disk Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1335, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the dictionary definition provides the
ordinary meaning of a term).
1209. See Vanguard Prod. Corp., 234 F.3d at 1372, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1089 (insisting
that a dictionary is permissible as extrinsic evidence but should not broaden the
scope of a term when the specification or prosecution history show that the inventor,
or the common usage in the field of the invention, have given the term a limited or
specialized meaning).
1210. See Multiform Dessicants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478, 45
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that dictionary definitions are
relied upon as they are often viewed as the least controversial source of extrinsic
evidence).
1211. See id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433 (explaining that meanings that evolve
during claim restriction and examination reveal intent of the inventor and the
patent examiner).
1212. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 866 n.*, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1653 n.*(Fed. Cir. 2000).
1213. See id. at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1214. 234 F.3d 1370, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000). One of the
authors was counsel to Parker Hannifin Corporation in this case.
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1215

“integral.”
The court reached this conclusion over the dissent of
Chief Judge Mayer, who noted that in his view, the applicants had
disclaimed layers joined by anything but a one-step process during
1216
prosecution of the patent.
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess
1217
Technologies, Inc., the court looked primarily to Webster’s New World
Dictionary for the ordinary meanings of the terms “inner,” “expose,”
1218
In Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v.
and “integral” in claims for a flooring panel.
1219
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., where the patent claim (drawn to a hospital
bed) called for a “cushion,” the court affirmed the district court’s
construction of “cushion” as meaning “a structure that provides basic
support and comfort,” by looking to Webster’s Third New International
1220
1221
Dictionary.
In Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics,
the court
looked again to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (as well as a
confirmatory technical dictionary) to determine the “ordinary
meaning” of the claim terms “ramped” and “decreasing” in a patent
directed to a method and apparatus for improving the quality of
1222
compact discs.
1223
the panel
In Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Industries, Inc.,
disagreed as to the proper use of dictionaries in claim construction.
At issue was the meaning of the claim term “a stop for preventing
upward flexing of the peripheral edge beyond a predetermined
amount located forward of the body and above and substantially
inward of the peripheral edge” of the flexible disc, in a patent

1215. See id. at 1372, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (noting that the district court,
using a dictionary, properly found the term “integral” to mean “formed as a unit with
another part”).
1216. See id. at 1373, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting) (taking
note of applicants who had filed an amendment, prior to the notice of allowance,
distinguishing their one-step system from other multi-step systems and effectively
placing this information in the prosecution history on which the public should be
able to rely).
1217. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1218. See id. at 967, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 (agreeing with the district court’s
construction of terms and noting the consistency of the definitions in the patent
description with the dictionary definitions).
1219. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1220. See id. at 1340-42, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 (finding consistency between
the trial court’s construction of the term “cushion” and its meaning within both the
dictionary and the the intrinsic evidence that the patent provided).
1221. 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1222. See id. at 1338, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298 (indicating that to determine
the meaning of the term “ramped,” the court referenced WEBSTERS THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY and the MODERN DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS, and to
determine the meaning of the term “decreasing,” it relied upon WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, when the patent specification provided evidence of
“an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term”).
1223. 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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claiming a vacuum system for cleaning swimming pools.
The
majority, citing no dictionary but invoking principles of “common
usage,” concluded that this limitation did not include a stop
1225
extending to (or beyond) the peripheral edge of the flexible disc.
Dissenting on this point, Judge Bryson cited four different
1226
dictionaries to demonstrate that the word “substantially” may, in
context, mean “very much” or “far,” as the majority held (such that
the claim would require the stop to be “very much inward” or “far
inward” from the edge). In Judge Bryson’s view, the dictionary
provided another, better definition: “largely,” “essentially, or in the
main,” such that the claim element would require the stop to be
“mostly or mainly inward of the peripheral edge of the flexible
1227
disc.”
The majority should have looked at alternative sources to
determine which meaning to adopt, he concluded, because the
differing dictionary definitions themselves demonstrated an
ambiguity, including the written description and prosecution
1228
history.
1229
The panel in Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.
expressed a somewhat less exalted view of dictionaries. After stating
the rules for evaluating the intrinsic evidence, the panel noted that if
the totality of the intrinsic evidence explains the claim limitations
1230
clearly, the claim has been construed.
Extrinsic evidence may help
1231
resolve the lack of clarity if the claim limitation is still ambiguous.
In an explanatory footnote, the panel noted that dictionaries, a form
of extrinsic evidence, may be considered together with the intrinsic
1232
evidence.
It is difficult to reconcile the notion that dictionaries are extrinsic
1224. Id. at 1413-14, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1225. See id. at 1414, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (stating the term’s common
usage negates the possibility that a stop which is “substantially inward” of an edge
could simultaneously extend to that edge).
1226. See id. at 1418, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (listing
WEBSTER’S NEW 20TH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1817 (1983); WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1454 (1962); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1428
(6th ed. 1990); and WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1176 (1983)).
1227. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149 (Bryson, J., dissenting).
1228. See Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206 F.3d 1408, 1418, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Bryson, J., dissenting) (looking to
claim language, written descriptions and prosecution history to determine the
meaning of a term that could have multiple meanings).
1229. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1230. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53 (noting further that if the claim
language is clear on its face, then that language is controlling unless the prosecution
history and written description call for deviation).
1231. See id. at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53 (remarking, however, that
“[s]uch instances will rarely, if ever, occur”).
1232. See id. at 866 n.*, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 n.*.
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evidence, or even the notion that they “may sometimes be considered
along with the intrinsic evidence,” with the more prevalent view that
the ordinary meaning of a claim term is to be presumptively
determined by reference to the dictionary before consulting the
specification and prosecution history in order to determine whether
1233
the patentee has used the term otherwise.
Arguably, the use of
general purpose dictionaries to obtain the presumptive ordinary
meaning of a claim term is inconsistent with several other Federal
Circuit decisions, such as Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group
1234
International, Inc., which stress that to begin an inquiry, the court
should determine the meaning of a claim term as an individual of
1235
Hockerson-Halberstadt,
ordinary skill in the art would understand it.
in turn, relied on the Federal Circuit’s 1996 decision in Hoechst
1236
Celanese Corp. v. BP Chemicals Ltd., which held that unless the patent
or prosecution indicate that the patentee intended a different
meaning, the definition of a technical claim term should be based
upon the meaning that an individual who is knowledgeable in the
1237
field of the invention would give to that term.
It is not certain that the definition of a term in a general-purpose
dictionary will always provide the “ordinary and accustomed
meaning” of that term as one who is educated in the field of the
invention would understand it. At a minimum, one would expect to
find that meaning in a specialized dictionary in the relevant art, not
1238
in a general-purpose dictionary.
A prime example of this
shortcoming in dictionary definitions is illustrated in Apple Computer,
1239
Inc. v. Articulate Systems, Inc.,
where the court could not easily
define, by reference to a general purpose dictionary, the claim term
1240
Instead, the Apple
“windows,” as used in a computer application.
court immediately had to turn to the written description and the use
of the same term in prior-art references cited in the patent
1233. See supra notes 934-938 and accompanying text.
1234. 222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1235. See id. at 955, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v.
BP Chem., Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126, 1129 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
1236. 78 F.3d 1575, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1237. See id. at 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
1238. Cf. Optical Disc Corp. v. DelMar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1335, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (relying first on WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, and then on the MODERN DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS to
determine the meaning of the claim term “ramped” in a patent directed to an
improved process and apparatus for making compact discs).
1239. 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1240. See Apple, 234 F.3d at 21, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057 (recognizing that the
court did not use a general purpose dictionary to define the claim term at issue).
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1241

specification.
In any event, the ordinary meaning rule is not conclusive in every
case. Rather, it creates, at most, a presumption that the ordinary
meaning (whether derived from a dictionary or elsewhere) is the
1242
correct one. Hockerson-Halberstadt v. Avia Group International, Inc. is
one case where the presumption was overcome with the use of
intrinsic evidence. The claim, directed to an article of outer
footwear, called for a “central longitudinal groove in the underside of
the heel part extending forwardly through the heel part into the
underside of the sole part to divide the lower surface of the heel part
1243
into a pair of fins.”
The court concluded that in the course of
prosecuting the patent, the applicant modified the ordinary meaning
1244
of “groove,” by disclaiming a particular interpretation of the term.
During prosecution, the applicant submitted drawings comparing the
features of his invention to a hypothetical combination of two prior1245
He noted that his invention provided a narrower
art patents.
groove than in the prior art to maximize the amount of the
underneath surface of the footwear used for cushioning and
1246
support.
The court thus concluded that “groove” in the claim in
suit could not simply be any “long and narrow structure,” but instead
had to be one that was narrower than the groove widths in the prior1247
art patents that the applicant distinguished.
The court called the
patentee’s contrary arguments “a request for a mulligan that would
erase from the prosecution history the inventor’s disavowal of a
1248
particular aspect of a claim term’s meaning.”
As there is a presumption in favor of a claim’s ordinary meaning,
presumptions also play a prominent role in the construction of
1249
In
“means-plus-function” or “step-plus-function” claim elements.
1241. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057 (defining the term “windows” by looking
to the written description of the patent and functioning of the computer
application).
1242. 222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1243. Hockerson-Halberstadt, 222 F.3d at 955, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (quoting
the claim language).
1244. See id. at 956, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-91 (conceding that the ordinary
meaning of “groove” in the claims and specification was “a long and narrow
structure”).
1245. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
1246. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491 (distinguishing the applicant’s invention
and insisting that the narrower groove serves an entirely different purpose than the
groove in the prior art).
1247. See Hockerson-Halberstadt v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 956, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 1491 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting the ordinary meaning of
the term as used in the claim).
1248. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
1249. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital
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1250

Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., the court found that use of the
term “means” in a patent claim created a presumption of a meansplus-function claim, requiring the applicant to demonstrate that the
properly construed claim limitation recites definite structure to
perform the claimed function in order to rebut the presumption.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the claim term
“plastic envelope closing means” was in means-plus-function format,
because the claim term used the word “means” and failed “to recite
sufficient structure for closing the envelope that would otherwise
1251
rebut that presumption.”
1252
Similarly, in Watts v. XL Systems, Inc., the court reiterated and
expanded upon its prior holdings, concluding that the failure to use
the word “means” in a claim element created a “rebuttable
1253
presumption”
that 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6 did not apply.
Demonstrating that the claim element “recite[s] a function without
reciting sufficient structure for performing that function” rebuts that
1254
presumption.
The Watts court, in analyzing a claim element that
required two joints to be “sealingly connected,” first held that the
absence of “means” in this claim gave rise to a presumption that
1255
Section 112, paragraph 6 did not apply.
Next, the court examined
the claim language and concluded that the presumption was not
rebutted because the claim limitation “refers to terms that are
reasonably well understood in the art as names for structure that
1256
perform the recited function of sealing.”
Specifically, the court
noted the language in the claim limitation requiring “a second end
formed with tapered external threads” and “a first end” having
“tapered internal threads,” concluding that “[t]hese terms clearly
have reasonably well understood meanings in the art as names for
1257
structure.”
The court drew further confirmation from the written
description, explaining that these interlocking threads would
1258
Accordingly, the court concluded
perform the “sealing” function.
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof . . . .”).
1250. 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1251. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
1252. 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1253. Watts, 232 F.3d at 880, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
1254. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
1255. See id. at 881, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (noting that the limitation does
not include the word “means” and therefore is not a means-plus-function limitation).
1256. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (noting that one with knowledge in the
art easily would recognize the terms and their functions).
1257. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
1258. See Watts v. XL Systs., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 881, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836,
1839 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging the clarity of the specification that the
interlocking threads perform the sealing function).
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that Section 112, paragraph 6 did not apply, and proceeded to
1259
construe the claims in the customary way.
Another case involving means-plus-function claims, Ishida Co., Ltd.
1260
v. Taylor,
highlighted some of the differences between the
customary way of construing claims and the manner in which claim
construction takes place under Section 112, paragraph 6. In Ishida,
the claim in suit contained a means-plus-function claim element
requiring the function of “stripping and sealing” to be performed by
1261
some means disclosed in the specification.
The district court
consulted the specification, which depicted two “structurally very
different” embodiments that were to perform the claimed
1262
function.
The appellant, Taylor, argued that the district court
erred in not creating a single claim construction to cover all the
embodiments of the invention as shown in the specification, a task
1263
the court described as “impossible.”
In support, the court noted
1264
two prior cases, Serrano v. Telular Corp., and Micro Chemical, Inc. v.
1265
Great Plains Chemical Co.,
in which patents disclosed alternative
structures for accomplishing the recited function, yet the courts were
not required to craft a singular claim construction that would cover
1266
each.
1267
In Clearstream Wastewater Systems v. Hydro-Action, Inc., another case
addressing construction of a means-plus-function claim element, the
court rejected the argument that the patentee’s criticism of a priorart device in the written description foreclosed consideration of the
elements of that prior-art device as “corresponding structure” for
1268
purposes of Section 112, paragraph 6.
The court noted that in a
combination claim, a claim limitation often may read on the prior art
1269
The court
since old elements are part of the combination claims.
1259. See id. at 881-82, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839 (applying the principles of
standard claim construction).
1260. 221 F.3d 1310, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1261. See Ishida, 221 F.3d at 1316, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
1262. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
1263. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452 (rejecting appellant’s theory).
1264. 111 F.3d 1578, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1265. 194 F.3d 1250, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Two of the
authors of this article were counsel for Micro Chemical, Inc. in this case.
1266. See Ishida, 221 F.3d at 1316, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53 (citing cases
interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 as requiring the identification of alternative
structures that perform the function, but not requiring a single claim construction to
cover all embodiments).
1267. 206 F.3d 1440, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1268. See Clearstream, 206 F.3d at 1445-46, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189-90 (noting
that while the written description avoids the conclusion that prior-art cannot
perform the appropriate function, even while pointing out the disadvantages of
prior-art).
1269. See id. at 1445, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
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concluded that, despite the fact that the written description
highlighted the disadvantages of the prior-art system, an element of
that system could be considered as “corresponding structure” in the
1270
combination claims at issue.
The court nonetheless noted that in
certain situations, it would construe a means-plus-function limitation
as covering only new elements but those certain situations would have
to involve a clear teaching away from the prior art, or a clear
disavowal of the prior art as “corresponding structure” capable of
performing the claimed function, such as a statement that the prior1271
art structure was “incapable” of performing the claimed function.
Beyond the limited area of means-plus-function claim elements,
the court in 2000 dealt with a handful of recurring issues of claim
construction: the use of claim preambles, the role of singular and
plural claim terms, the role of “open” and “closed” claim terms, the
use of “about” as a qualifier for a numerical claim element, and the
order of steps in a method claim.
1272
The panel in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Systems, Inc.
addressed the use of claim preambles in interpreting patent claims.
Apple contended, based on a claim preamble, that two claims in suit
required that the claimed computer windows contain “data” on which
1273
a user may operate.
The court rejected that argument, applying its
previously announced rule that “[l]anguage in a claim preamble . . .
acts as a claim limitation only when such language serves to ‘give
meaning to a claim and properly define the invention,’ not when the
preamble merely states a purpose or intended use of the
1274
invention.”
The court treated the term “data” as referring to “a
purpose or intended use of the windows of the claimed invention”
and not as a claim limitation because in examining the claims as a
whole and in light of the written description, the recitation of “data”
1275
is not used to define the invention.
In 2000, the Federal Circuit decided two cases dealing with the
rules for interpreting claim elements phrased in the singular or

1270. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189-90 (noting that “a claim may consist of
all old elements and one new element, thereby being patentable”).
1271. See id. at 1445-46, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189 (differentiating Clearstream
from other cases where written descriptions clearly indicate the impossibility of priorart performing the necessary functions).
1272. 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1273. See Apple, 234 F.3d at 22, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1062.
1274. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063 (quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479,
31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
1275. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1063 (recognizing the recitation of “data” did
not give meaning to these claims).
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plural. In Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., the court
examined a claim that specifically recited the language “reproducing
1277
in a material object.”
While the claim preambles and some
references elsewhere in the specification referred, somewhat
1278
ambiguously, to multiple “material objects” or “a plurality of blank
1279
material objects,”
the court concluded that the totality of the
specification required that the reference to a plurality be understood
as referring to a “supply” of blank material objects that can consist of
1280
one material object.
In support, the Interactive Gift Express court
1281
cited its prior decision in Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc. for
the proposition that the basis of a claim construction must be the
written description in its entirety, notwithstanding any isolated
1282
conflicting passages.
1283
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., the claim was drawn to
a process for “‘controlling an immunizable disease’” in birds, calling
for “‘injecting a vaccine . . . into the egg embodying the embryo . . .
wherein said injection is made during the final quarter of the
incubation period whereby the embryo has developed immunologic
1284
competence.’”
The question for the court was whether the process
required inoculation of an entire population of birds (and effective
immunization of a high percentage of treated birds), or whether the
1285
method required only the inoculation of a single bird.
The court
held that inoculation of a single bird would suffice for infringement,
because the claim language and the rest of the specifications were
1286
phrased in the singular.
Descriptions of “singular injections” into
“individual eggs,” without more, did not limit the claims to cover only
inoculations of an entire flock of birds; as use of the singular form of
1287
a word does not preclude a meaning that encompasses the plural.
1288
In Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products, Inc.,
the court
1276. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1277. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 868, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654
(emphasis in original).
1278. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
1279. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
1280. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1281. 149 F.3d 1335, 1345, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1282. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 868, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
1283. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
1284. Id. at 1348, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1285. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
1286. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (indicating that the process which was
patented involved “immunization of an individual egg, rather than a process for
entire populations of birds”).
1287. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted).
1288. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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addressed the distinction between “open” and “closed” claim
1289
elements.
The claim element in Lampi called for a “housing having
two half-shells,” and the issue on appeal was whether the term
“having” meant that the device had to have at least two half-shells (an
“open” claim), or whether it had to have only two half-shells (a
1290
“closed” claim).
The district court construed the term as a “closed”
claim, such that the accused device could not infringe because it
1291
included five parts, not just the two called out by the claim.
Disagreeing with the district court, the Federal Circuit applied the
rule established by the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, that
transitional phrases, such as “having,” must be interpreted with
reference to the specification in order to resolve whether open or
1292
The court concluded that the
closed language is intended.
specification indicated that the patentee’s intent was for the word
1293
“having” to be open.
1294
Vehicular Technologies Corp. v. Titan Wheel International, Inc. dealt
with the most prevalent “open” and “closed” terms used in patent
1295
drafting: “comprising” and “consisting of.”
In discussing why the
trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit
noted that the claim language expressly required two springs,
1296
Moreover, the use of
whereas the accused product had only one.
the introductory phrase, “consisting of,” emphasized the limitation
because in patent law the phrase “consisting of” is used to indicate
1297
restriction or exclusion.
A drafter should use the phrase
1298
“consisting of” to indicate “I claim what follows and nothing else.”
Hence, the drafter, by using the term “consisting of,” limited the
1299
claim to “two concentric springs and nothing else.”
1300
In Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Company, Inc., the court addressed
1289. See Lampi., 228 F.3d at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1290. See id. at 1375-76, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1291. See id. at 1375, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1292. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453 (referring to M.P.E.P. § 2111.03
(7th ed. rev. 2000)).
1293. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1294. 212 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1295. See id. at 1382, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1296. See id. at 1382-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1297. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (citing Parmle Pharm Co. v. Zink, 285
F.2d 465, 469, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271, 275 (8th Cir. 1961), and JOHN LANDIS,
MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING 11-13 (1974)) (clarifying that use of the term
“comprising” would have indicated an open-ended construction).
1298. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (comparing the use of the term
“comprising” to signify “I claim at least what follows and potentially more”).
1299. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
1300. 205 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the practice of using the term “about” to describe a numerical range
1301
in a patent claim.
The claim at issue in this preliminary-injunction
case was drawn to a porcelain composite for dental restoration
1302
products.
The claim required the composition to have a “maturing
temperature of from about 750° to about 1050° C and a coefficient of
thermal expansion of from about 12 x 10–6/°C to about 17.5 x 10–
6/°C,” but then claimed the elements of the composition in specific
1303
weight percentages unmodified by “about.”
The panel noted that
it could not give a precise construction to a term such as “about,” but
1304
instead would rely on the factual situation presented.
On that
basis, the panel upheld the district court’s claim construction: “claim
1 uses the word ‘about’ to qualify the values of many variables . . . . In
contrast, the claim recites precise ranges for the weight of dental
compositions. Under these circumstances, the district court correctly
limited the weight ranges to those recited precisely in the table of
1305
claim 1.”
1306
Finally, in Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., the court
discussed the requirements of a method claim, and the circumstances
in which a method claim will be limited to methods which perform
1307
each of the steps in a specified order.
The Federal Circuit
disagreed with the district court’s finding that the claims required
1308
The
“step one of the claim to be performed prior to step four.”
steps of a method claim ordinarily are not construed to require
performing the steps in a particular order, “[u]nless the steps of a
method actually recite an order” or “when the method steps
1309
implicitly require that they be performed in the order written.”
In
examining the claim language, the remainder of the specification,
and the prosecution history, the court found no support for the
notion that the method claims required the performance of step 1
1310
prior to step 4.
The court emphasized the fact that, were the
method claim so limited, it “would not read on the preferred
embodiment,” resulting in a construction that is “rarely, if ever,

1301. See id. at 1381, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089 (noting that this method is a
common claiming practice).
1302. See id.
1303. Id. at 1379, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087 (emphasis in original).
1304. See id. at 1381, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
1305. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
1306. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1307. See id. at 875-76, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660-61.
1308. See id. at 875, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660.
1309. Id. at 875-76, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1660-61.
1310. Id. at 876, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (“In this case, nothing in the claim
or the specification directly or implicitly requires such a narrow construction”).
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1311

correct.”
2.

Specification (written description)
Beyond the claims themselves, a second aspect of intrinsic evidence
that is fundamental to patent claim construction involves the patent
specification.
Section 112, paragraph 1 requires a patent
specification to contain a written description of the invention in clear
and concise terms so that any individual skilled in the relevant art can
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode of carrying out his
1312
invention.
Recently, some judges of the Federal Circuit have
begun demanding more statutory exactness in their terminology,
requiring the use of “written description” instead of “specification,”
because Paragraph 2 of Section 112 makes clear that the “claims” are
1313
considered part of the specification, not separate from it.
Recent Federal Circuit decisions have reflected some uncertainty
regarding the proper use of the specification in construing patent
claims. On the one hand, one line of decisions reflects an
application of the axiom that a court may not introduce a limitation
1314
from the written description into the claim.
Another line of cases
suggests that the court should always consult the specification (or
written description) before arriving at a construction of a patent
1315
claim.
Several panels have noted that there is a “fine line” between
the permissible use of the specification for claim-construction
purposes, and the impermissible “importation” of a limitation from
1316
the specification to a claim.
1311. Id. at 876-77, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661-62 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
1312. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (1994) (stating that a patent specification should also
include the manner and process of using the invention).
1313. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (1994) (“The specification shall conclude with one or
more claims . . . .”). Compare Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In construing a claim, a court principally
consults the evidence intrinsic to the patent, including the claims, the written
description, and the relevant prosecution history.”) (emphasis added) (citing Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576), with Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at
865, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (“‘It is well settled that, in interpreting an asserted
claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent
itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution
history.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1576).
1314. See, e.g., Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1109-10,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1315. See, e.g., Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951,
955, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that a court “must”
always look to the specification); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1577 (insisting that a court “always” consult the specification).
1316. See, e.g., Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 865-66, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
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Some panels have attempted, without much success, to give
definition to this “fine line” by clarifying that the purpose of looking
to the specification is to ascertain the meaning of the claim term as it
used in the context of the entire invention and not for the purpose of
1317
“merely” limiting a claim term.
Although this phraseology stresses
the importance of understanding claims in their full context, it is
otherwise of little help to courts and litigants because the “fine line”
between “mere” importation and contextual construction is often
illusory, and certainly not predictive. Thus, it is not surprising that
despite the seemingly hard-and-fast rule against importing limitations
from the patent specification, several decisions from the Federal
Circuit in 2000 could easily be understood as endorsing the
importation of limitations from the specification.
1318
For example, in Watts v. XL Systems, Inc., the panel interpreted a
method claim requiring “tapered external threads [to be]
dimensioned” to be limited to only the method for doing so set forth
1319
in the specification, the use of “misaligned taper angles.”
In Kemco
1320
Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co.,
the panel disclaimed reading a
1321
The
limitation into the claims from the preferred embodiment.
court nonetheless looked to the specification to determine what
structure the “closing means” limitation referred to in a means-plus1322
function element of a claim to “tamper-evident” security envelopes.
1323
And in Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
the claim language
referred broadly to “dissolving polydextrose in water,” without any
reference whatsoever to the catalyst that was to be used in the
dissolving process. Nonetheless, the claim was properly construed as
limited to polydextrose dissolved in water using citric acid as a
1324
catalyst.
The panel in Cultor explained that limiting a claim to the
preferred embodiment set forth in the specification had to be done
1325
on a case-by-case basis.
1652; SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1927, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1317. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
1318. 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1319. Id. at 882-83, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1320. 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1321. See id. at 1362-63, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (finding no support in the
written description to support Kemco’s expansive interpretation of what structures
correspond to the closing means limitation).
1322. See id. at 1360, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308.
1323. 224 F.3d 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1324. See id. at 1330-31, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209-10.
1325. See id. at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210 (explaining that the specificity
of the description of the invention and the prosecution history dictates whether the
court should limit a claim to the specific embodiment presented in the
specification); see also Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958,
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In view of this language from Cultor, it is clear that the “rule” that a
limitation cannot be imported from the specification is not actually a
rule at all, but simply the conclusion that is reached in certain cases.
But, where the application of a principle “depends in each case” on
1326
case-specific factors, that principle has no predictive value.
Obviously, both Cultor and Watts, as well as several prior Federal
1327
Circuit cases, recognize that in certain cases it is permissible, even
mandated, to limit a claim to “the specific embodiment presented in
1328
the specification.”
The reason that these two lines of authority are
in actual or potential conflict becomes clear when one considers the
consequences of the “bar” on importing limitations from the
1329
specification into the claim.
If the specification must be consulted
before arriving at a correct understanding of a claim, as numerous
Federal Circuit cases require, a court cannot possibly determine
whether a limitation has been impermissibly “imported” from the
specification into a claim until the claim has received a fixed
1330
meaning, a process which requires the use of the specification.
The court would have to find some other source of information,
966, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Although claims must be
read in light of the specification of which they are a part, . . . it is improper to read
limitations from the written description into a claim. . . .”) (citations omitted); Kemco
Sales, 208 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1314 (“‘[T]his court has consistently
adhered to the proposition that courts cannot alter what the patentee has chosen to
claim as his invention, that limitations appearing in the specification will not be read
into claims, and that interpreting what is meant by a word in a claim ‘is not to be
confused with adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the specification, which
is improper.’” (quoting Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1348, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1199, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
1326. See Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210 (noting that lower
courts and litigants have no stringent rule that would help to predict how a court will
construct their claims).
1327. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1302, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069-70 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (involving a claim that called for a
cover “including” a restriction ring required permanent attachment of the ring to
the cover, in light of specification and drawings, which described only permanently
attached rings); Wang Labs., Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1383, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The only embodiment described in
the ‘669 patent specification is the character-based protocol, and the claims were
correctly interpreted as limited thereto.”); O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar Co., 115 F.3d 1576,
1581, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777, 1781 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that the claim term
“passage” does not include “smooth-walled, completely cylindrical” passage because
of statements contained in the written description); General Am. Transp. Corp. v.
Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 770, 772, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1803, 1805-06
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (limiting the definition of the claim element because the teaching
in the specification “is not just the preferred embodiment of the invention; it is the
only one described”).
1328. Cultor, 224 F.3d at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210.
1329. See, e.g., Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1109-10,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (enunciating the rule against
introducing limitations from the specification into the claim).
1330. See id.
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extrinsic to the patent, that would give definition to the claims prior
to consulting the specification (or written description).
Although the court should avoid extrinsic evidence unless all of the
intrinsic evidence fails to yield a fixed meaning for the claims, one
place that some Federal Circuit panels have looked for such an initial
1331
meaning is the dictionary.
This approach, however, yields the
strange result that a dictionary definition—considered by all to be
extrinsic evidence—obtains a mongrel status in which it is preferred
over intrinsic evidence such as the specification and prosecution
history. Thus, it would seem preferable for the court to eliminate any
vestiges of a hard-and-fast rule that limitations can never be imported
from the specification into the claims, for unreflective application of
such a “rule” would be inconsistent with the court’s prior decisions.
Indeed, its application could actually prevent the proper required
consideration of the specification in certain cases. The divide in the
cases is deep, and the lack of useful guidance so manifest, that
1332
resolution of this divide may have to await en banc treatment.
Other doctrines or presumptions involving the use of the
specification are somewhat less controversial. The court, on several
occasions, has resorted to the axiom that a claim construction that
would not read on the preferred embodiment is “rarely, if ever,
correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary
1333
support . . .”
The reasoning behind this presumption is that it is
highly unlikely that an inventor would simultaneously set forth the
“preferred” mode of his invention in the written description and at
the same time draft claims to the invention that did not capture that
“preferred embodiment.” This “rule” allows for an exception in cases
of “highly persuasive evidentiary support,” where the drafting of the
claims leaves little doubt that the preferred embodiment was not to
be covered by the claims, because the objective meaning of a claim
may change from application to issuance with amendments or
1331. See supra notes 928-962 and accompanying text (explaining Federal Circuit
panels’ decision to use dictionary definitions to determine initial meaning of claims).
1332. See supra notes 1034-1048 and accompanying text (discussing in depth the
Federal Circuit’s conflicting decisions regarding the rule and its application).
1333. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1550, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1612 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“[A] claim interpretation that would exclude the inventor’s device is rarely
the correct interpretation; such an interpretation requires highly persuasive
evidentiary support. . . .”); Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575,
1581, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“We share the district
court’s view that it is unlikely that an inventor would define the invention in a way
that excluded the preferred embodiment, or that persons of skill in this field would
read the specification in such a way.”).
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arguments during prosecution. Until 2000, however, the exception
was merely a hypothetical one, as the Federal Circuit had never
explicitly encountered a case where this “highly persuasive
evidentiary support” had been made out.
The exceptional “highly persuasive evidentiary support” was
demonstrated in Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific International,
1334
Inc., where the claim was drawn to a “gamma unit” (also known as a
“gamma knife”), a medical device used for treating brain tumors
1335
through focused doses of radiation.
The claim in suit, as well as
the written description, originally described a unit where the
radiation sources were oriented between latitudes of 0° and 45°.
After an obviousness rejection, the claim in suit was amended to
specify that the radiation sources were oriented “only within a zone
extending between latitudes 30°-45°, as seen from said diametrical
1336
plane.”
The preferred embodiment set forth in the written
description, however, remained unchanged.
The patentee, Elekta, argued that the term “extending between
1337
latitudes 30°-45°” should be understood as a ceiling. Elekta further
argued that its proffered construction had to be the correct one,
because limiting the latitudes to a range of 30° to 45° would “fai[l] to
1338
cover the preferred embodiment.”
The court agreed that the
preferred and only embodiment disclosed in the specification, which
disclosed radiation sources and beam channels oriented between the
latitudes of 0° and 45°, would not be covered by the claims under the
accused infringer’s claim construction. Nonetheless, because the
totality of intrinsic evidence demonstrated that the applicant had
amended the claim to limit the claimed latitudes to “the zone which
is exclusively 30°-45°,” the court concluded that this is “the rare case
in which such an interpretation [i.e., one which excludes the
1339
preferred embodiment from the claims] is compelled.”
Although not technically part of the “specification” (which is by
1340
definition limited to the written description and the claims), other
1334. 214 F.3d 1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1335. See id. at 1304, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911 (explaining that in a gamma
unit, “multiple radiation beams are aimed at a single focal point on a patient’s
brain”, and when the beams meet at the focal point, their “combined energy destroys
abnormal brain tissue.”).
1336. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
1337. See id. at 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (explaining that the term
“extending” should be understood as meaning “reaching” so that the claim would
cover latitudes of 0° to an upper boundary of between 30° and 45°).
1338. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
1339. Id. at 1308, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
1340. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1, 2 (1994) (providing the guidelines for the written
description and the claims of the specification).
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textual aspects of the patent document, such as the title and the
abstract, are sometimes invoked for claim-construction purposes. In
1341
Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co.,
the court rejected the
accused infringer’s attempt to limit the claimed invention, a mailertype business form, to business forms designed for use on an IBM
1342
3800 printer.
Having already noted that the claims would not be
limited to the preferred embodiment because the specification
referred generally (in one place) to “a printer used to process the
mailers” and specifically (in the preferred embodiment) to the use of
an “IBM 3800 printer,” the court also rejected the accused infringer’s
effort to rely on the title of the patent—“Pressure Seal Adhesive
Pattern for IBM 3800 Printers”—in holding that “the bar on
importing limitations from the written description into the claims
1343
applies no less forcefully to a title.”
As with the supposed “bar” on
“importing” limitations from the written description into the claims,
this “bar” on reading limitations into the claims from the title is less
rigid than one might suspect from this pronouncement, as the
Federal Circuit has, on at least two prior occasions, utilized the title of
1344
a patent as an important claim-construction tool.
Another panel confronted a similar issue in Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic
1345
Concepts, Inc.,
where the court—against the argument of the
patentee—utilized the abstract of the disclosure as a claimconstruction tool on a par with the written description itself. The
patentee, citing a rule of the Patent and Trademark Office providing
that the abstract of a patent “shall not be used for interpreting the
1346
scope of the claims,” urged that it would be improper for the panel
to consider the abstract in determining whether the district court
Rejecting this
correctly construed the claims of the patent.
argument, Judge Bryson, writing for the panel, ruled that Section
1.72(b):
1341. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1342. See id. at 1111, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239.
1343. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1239 (“[I]f we do not read limitations into the
claims from the specification that are not found in the claims themselves, then we
certainly will not read limitations into the claims from the patent title.”)).
1344. See Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (using the title of the patent at issue
to bolster the court’s claim interpretation); Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner,
778 F.2d 775, 780, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 773, 777-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (suggesting that
the court should not overlook the title of the patent when interpreting claims). Two
of the authors were counsel to The Lubrizol Corporation in the Exxon Chemical
Patents case.
1345. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1346. Id. at 1341 n*, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 n.1 (citing 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.172(b)(1996)).
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governs the conduct of patent examiners in examining patent
applications; it does not address the process by which courts
construe claims in infringement actions. We have frequently
looked to the abstract to determine the scope of the invention, . . .
and we are aware of no legal principle that would require us to
disregard that potentially helpful source of intrinsic evidence as to
1347
the meaning of claims.”

One can easily see the tension between this holding and the
seemingly absolute bar on the use of the patent title announced in
Moore U.S.A., given that this case states that a patent’s title could be a
“potentially helpful source of intrinsic evidence as to the meaning of
1348
claims.”
One might also detect some tension between the panel’s
rejection of Patent Office claim-interpretation rules in Moore U.S.A.
and the panel’s reliance on Patent Office claim-interpretation
1349
principles in Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc., where the
court looked to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure to interpret
1350
the transitional phrase “having.”
3.

Prosecution history
Like the specification or written description, the prosecution
history is one of the three aspects of intrinsic evidence that must be
1351
Both the Federal Circuit
considered in construing a patent claim.
and the Supreme Court have stressed that the prosecution history, if
in evidence, is “always relevant to a proper interpretation of a
1352
claim.”
There is a “clear distinction between such a use and the
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel which estops later expansion
1353
While
of a claim’s protection under the doctrine of equivalents.”
the more significant developments in 2000 with regard to
prosecution history came in the context of the doctrine of
1354
equivalents, in which prosecution history estoppel doctrine creates
the most significant limitation on application of the doctrine of
1347. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 n.1.
1348. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 n.1 (comparing the title to the abstract
to illustrate that both are useful sources for determining the meaning of a claim).
1349. 228 F.3d 1365, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1350. See id. at 1376, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
1351. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966) (referring to the
prosecution history at times as the “file history” or the “file wrapper”).
1352. SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 718 F.2d 365, 376, 218
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 678, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added); see also Graham, 383
U.S. at 33 (acknowledging that the law is well settled that the invention is construed
in light of the claims and with reference to the file wrapper in the Patent Office).
1353. Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 883, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1841
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
1354. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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equivalents, the Federal Circuit in 2000 nonetheless continued using
prosecution history in the law of claim construction.
The use of prosecution history in claim construction is similar to
the use of the specification or written description in claim
construction. In other words, the ordinary meaning of a claim term
controls, unless there is some clear indication in the specification or
in the prosecution history that another meaning should be ascribed
to the claim term. The panel in Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v.
1355
Compuserve Inc. lumped the specification (or written description)
and the prosecution history together as “the rest of the intrinsic
evidence” in endorsing this approach to claim construction:
If the claim language is clear on its face, then our consideration of
the rest of the intrinsic evidence is restricted to determining if a
deviation from the clear language of the claims is specified. A
deviation may be necessary if ‘a patentee [has chosen] to be his
own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their
ordinary meaning.’ . . . A deviation may also be necessary if a
patentee has ‘relinquished [a] potential claim construction in an
amendment to the claim or in an argument to overcome or
distinguish a reference.’ . . . If however the claim language is not
clear on its face, then our consideration of the rest of the intrinsic
1356
evidence is directed to resolving, if possible, the lack of clarity.

This approach suggests an initial analysis and presumption in favor
of the ordinary meaning of the claim language, followed by a review
of the specification and prosecution history to determine if a
deviation from that ordinary meaning is appropriate.
It remains for resolution on a case-by-case basis, what sort of
showing in the prosecution history will amount to a lexicographer’s
re-definition, or a relinquishment, to overcome the ordinary
understanding of the claim language itself. Thus, for example, in
1357
Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
the court rejected
Samsung’s argument that the claim term “plasma etching” excluded
etching via ion bombardment, despite some language in the
prosecution history suggesting that the applicants were distinguishing
1358
their invention from ion bombardment etching.
The court relied
on the “heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim
1355. 231 F.3d 859, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647 (Fed. Cir. 2000), opinion withdrawn
and superseded in part by, 256 F.3d 1323, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1356. Id. at 865, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652 (citations omitted) (quoting
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979,
52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
1357. 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1358. See id. at 1294-95, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074-75.
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language,”
and concluded that the isolated statements did not
“demonstrat[e] that the patentees—with reasonable clarity and
definiteness . . .—defined ‘plasma etching’ as excluding ion
1360
bombardment.”
The Northern Telecom court repeatedly stressed that
the prosecution history would have to contain statements that
“exclude the possibility of ion bombardment” being covered by the
claims, “clearly call for a narrower definition,” or provide “a special
1361
definition . . . with reasonable clarity and precision.”
1362
Similarly, in Vanguard Products Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp., the
1363
product claims were drawn to a gasket having two “integral” layers.
The accused infringer urged that the two layers could not be made
“integral” by any process other than co-extrusion, which was said in
the prosecution history to be “fundamental” and “require[d]” for the
1364
claimed invention.
The panel majority rejected the accused
infringer’s argument, ruling that the dictionary definition of
“integral” prevailed, and that “[t]he method of manufacture, even
when cited as advantageous, does not of itself convert product claims
1365
into claims limited to a particular process.”
Chief Judge Mayer
dissented. In his dissenting opinion, he urged judgment as a matter
of law for the defendant, without remand for a new trial under his
claim construction, in light of the fact that the same prosecution
history representations would have “act[ed] as an estoppel barring
the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the material that was
1366
surrendered during prosecution.”
This lends credence to the
notion that the law as it currently exists provides few generally
applicable or predictable standards for the use of prosecution history
1367
in claim construction.
Yet another presumption that the Federal Circuit has created in
connection with patent claim construction, that is arguably at odds
with the the “reasonable clarity and definiteness” standard set forth in
Northern Telecom, provided the rule of decision in Watts v. XL Systems,
1368
Inc.
In Watts, the court identified statements in the prosecution
1359. Id. at 1295, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075 (quoting Johnson Worldwide
Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1607, 1610 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
1360. Northern Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1294-95, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1361. Id. at 1295, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1362. 234 F.3d 1370, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000). As noted above,
one of the authors was counsel to Parker Hannifin Corp. in this case.
1363. See id. at 1372, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
1364. Id. at 1371-74, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089-91 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
1365. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089-90.
1366. Id. at 1374, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
1367. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
1368. 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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history which, if applicable to the claim in suit, would have required a
1369
deviation from the “ordinary understanding” of the claim term.
The panel rejected the patentee’s argument that the prosecution
history in question did not apply to the claim in suit, noting that “it
[was] irrelevant whether Watts’ prosecution history remarks were
directed to claim 18 specifically because there is no clear indication
1370
that they were not.”
In other words, for claim-construction
purposes, prosecution-history remarks directed at language that
appears in claim A will be presumed to apply to the same language
appearing in claim B absent the patentee’s submission of a “clear
indication” to the contrary.
4.

Extrinsic evidence
When the Federal Circuit, in 1995, decided Markman v. Westview
1371
Instruments, Inc.,
it rendered extrinsic evidence irrelevant to the
1372
large majority of claim construction cases.
Under the prevailing
rule, “if the meaning of the claim limitations is apparent from the
totality of the intrinsic evidence, then the claim has been construed.
If however a claim limitation is still not clear, we may look to extrinsic
1373
This is an exceptional
evidence to help resolve the lack of clarity.”
1374
circumstance, as such instances will rarely occur.
Taking this rule into account, one type of extrinsic evidence,
1375
dictionaries, has assumed a vaunted place in claim construction.
Some panels of the Federal Circuit have treated dictionary definitions
as so exalted that they seem to be on a par with the claim language
itself. The “ordinary meaning” approach that has gained increasing
popularity relies largely on dictionaries to establish the “default”
1376
meaning of patent claims.
The remainder of this discussion of extrinsic evidence will focus on
truly extrinsic evidence, such as expert and inventor testimony about
1369. See Watts, 232 F.3d at 882, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (noting that in
constructing a claim, a court principally consults the evidence intrinsic to the patent,
including the claims, the written description, and the relevant prosecution history).
1370. Id. at 883, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841.
1371. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370
(1996).
1372. See Markham, 52 F.3d at 986, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335 (providing
extrinsic evidence is designed to clarify ambiguities in claim terminology).
1373. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 866, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1652-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok,
Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339, 1346, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(discussing the use of extrinsic evidence in clarifying claim limitations).
1374. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
1375. See supra notes 927-961 and accompanying text.
1376. See supra notes 932-940 and accompanying text (discussing that courts may
consult a dictionary prior to considering the rest of the intrinsic evidence).

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000

1599

the meaning of claim terms.
Despite the seeming rarity of
considering extrinsic evidence for claim interpretation, the Federal
Circuit has left the door wide open for judges to consider extrinsic
1377
evidence to “understand” the particular art or technology at issue.
1378
At issue in Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.
was the
meaning of “chromosome DNA fragment of a donor bacterium” in a
patent drawn to a method of modifying the genetic structure of
1379
bacteria in order to increase production of amino acids.
The
panel’s entire discussion of the issue of claim construction (and
infringement under that claim construction) occurred without any
reference to the patent and prosecution history. Instead, the Federal
Circuit’s affirmance rested on the “extensive expert testimony on all
1380
the issues and arguments raised by ADM.”
Astonishingly, despite
the Federal Circuit’s previously stated views that extrinsic evidence
will “rarely, if ever” be the basis for a patent claim construction, the
panel in Ajinomoto affirmed the district court’s claim construction
entirely on the basis of extrinsic evidence, expert testimony and the
accused infringer’s (and its supplier’s) own usage of the
1381
terminology.
Perhaps the panel had already concluded in its own
collective mind that the intrinsic evidence did not provide sufficient
clarity for the claims, but there is no evidence on the face of the
Ajinomoto opinion that this was the case.
The panel adopted a somewhat more typical approach to the use of
extrinsic evidence in claim construction in Aqua-Aerobic Systems, Inc. v.
1382
Aerators Inc., although the opinion contains some curious dicta. In
Aqua-Aerobic, the dispute was over the meaning of claim clauses
requiring “preventing passage of atmospheric air” and “preventing
the flow of atmospheric air” in a patent covering a mixer to be used
1383
in water-treatment plants and tanks.
The patentee argued that the
clauses should be construed as “permitting the passage of more than
a minuscule or negligible amount of air,” while the accused infringer
1377. See Interactive Gift Express, 231 F.3d at 866, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653
(asserting that the consultation of extrinsic evidence is appropriate to ensure the
judge’s understanding of technical aspects of the patent remains consistent with the
understanding of those knowledgeable in the art).
1378. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1379. See id. at 1348, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
1380. See id. at 1349, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (explaining that the basis for its
affirmance was that “the district court’s claim construction and related conclusions
are supported by the testimony of experts and fully in accord with ADM’s and ABP’s
own usages”).
1381. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (affirming district court’s holding on the
strength of the extrinsic evidence).
1382. 211 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1383. See id. at 1244, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
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urged that the specification required the invention to “exclude all
1384
atmospheric air.”
The court started its discussion of claim
construction by noting that “[t]he expert witnesses for both sides
agreed that persons of skill in this field would understand that the
1385
structure depicted in the ‘771 patent is not air-tight.”
The district court, believing that prior Federal Circuit cases barred
consideration of extrinsic evidence, declined to rely on this agreed1386
Concurring with the district court’s
upon expert testimony.
construction of the patent claim elements, the Federal Circuit
concluded that that construction was consistent with the teachings of
the specification, which do not allow more than a very small amount
1387
of air to enter and pass through the mixer.
Were the claims
interpreted otherwise by reference to the extrinsic evidence, the
construction would be “directly contrary to the limitations in the
1388
claims and the description in the specification.”
Even so, the court
noted in dicta that “expert testimony that is admissible in the
proceeding [under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence] may
be considered by the court and given weight appropriate to its
1389
But what does “given weight appropriate to its content”
content.”
mean? If this language was meant to state a standard for admissibility
of expert evidence for claim-construction issues, its development is
obviously going to have to await future cases. Coincidentally, Judge
Newman, joined in both cases by the now-late Senior Judge Smith,
authored both Ajinomoto and Aqua-Aerobic.
1390
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States involved the trial court’s overuse
of extrinsic evidence, resulting in a reversal of the judgment. Dow’s
patent claimed a system for filling vacant underground mines in
1391
order to prevent the collapse of the overlying land.
One claim
element called for:
injecting said suspension [a] combination of a carrier liquid and
solids] into said void through [a] conduit at an injection rate which
is sufficiently low such that initially upon entrance into [the] void
from [the] conduit the velicity of the suspension is below its
minimum linear velocity and at least a portion of said solid
1384. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568 (setting forth summaries of the
respective arguments of the parties involved in the action).
1385. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1386. See id. at 1244-45, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1387. See id. at 1245, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1388. Aqua-Aerobic Systs., Inc. v. Aerators Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 1245, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1389. Id. at 1244, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
1390. 226 F.3d 1334, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1391. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
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particles are deposited to form a mound which decreases the crosssectional area of [the] void and sufficiently high to propel the
suspension over [the] mound at a velocity at least equal to its
minimum linear velocity to carry particles over [the]
1392
mound . . . .

The written description set forth a formula for determining “the
1393
minimum rate at which the suspension must be injected.”
In construing this claim element, the Court of Federal Claims (the
trial court in patent-infringement claims against the government)
relied heavily on one of Dow’s witnesses who testified that the
formula was irrelevant, calling it the “brute strength” formula and
analogizing the formula to “driving a car through a brick wall at 100
1394
miles per hour when one knows that 10 miles per hour will work.”
The Court of Federal Claims agreed with this testimony and explicitly
1395
stated that “the formula was irrelevant.”
According to the Federal
Circuit, the trial court failed to weigh the instrinsic evidence
1396
sufficiently; in fact, the intrinsic evidence was largely ignored.
1397
In Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,
the court
found unpersuasive Samsung’s reliance on an article that the
inventor of a patent wrote at about the same time as the application
1398
for the patent at issue.
Samsung argued the court should import
into the patent the definition of “plasma etching” contained in the
1399
The court rejected that argument, noting that “extrinsic
article.
evidence is rarely, if ever, probative of a special and particular
1400
definition of a limitation found in a [patent] claim.”
The court
reasoned that definitional statements in the patent claim terms could
modify the ordinary meaning of the claim terms, but reference to
extrinsic evidence should never alter those claim terms, for that
would allow the public record of the patent to be changed for
purposes of litigation, thus abrogating the notice function of the
1401
patent documents.
The court ultimately concluded that the article
did not even support the definitional point for which it was proffered
1392. Id. at 1340, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018 (quoting the language used in the
patent).
1393. Id. at 1340, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.
1394. Id. at 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019.
1395. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1014, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1396. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019 (noting the flaws in the trial court’s
infringement analysis).
1397. 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1398. See id. at 1295-96, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
1399. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
1400. Id. at 1295, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1401. See id. at 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

1602

11/20/01 4:51 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1435

1402

and thus rejected Samsung’s argument.
One knotty question that has continued since the Federal Circuit’s
1995 Markman decision is this: Since a patent is to be interpreted (at
least according to some panels) from the vantage point of one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art, how should courts use extrinsic
evidence, such as expert or inventor testimony, to gauge how one of
ordinary skill in the art would read the claim? In other words, since a
judge is not one of ordinary skill in the relevant art, can he or she rely
on extrinsic evidence in order to understand how that ordinarily
skilled professional might read the claims? The answer is unclear.
The court can probably admit the evidence under Federal Rule of
1403
Evidence 702, under the standard of helpfulness to the trier of
1404
It is not clear, however, whether the court can rely on that
fact.
testimony to support its claim construction.
1405
In Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
which was primarily an
invalidity case, the panel noted that the Federal Circuit had “not
specifically addressed the types of evidence that may be considered in
analyzing whether a claim complies with the ‘which the applicant
1406
regards as his invention’ portion of [Section 112, paragraph 2].”
The court concluded that it should be the same type of evidence that
may be used to ascertain whether a claim satisfies the definiteness
1407
“Despite this general rule,”
portion of Section 112, paragraph 2.
which focuses on the intrinsic evidence of claims and specification,
the panel in Solomon stated in a footnote that certain circumstances
require review of evidence beyond the claims and written description,

1402. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076-77; see also id. at 1076, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1076 (rejecting as unpersuasive Samsung’s reliance on similar statements
made by the inventors in prosecuting a related Japanese patent application).
1403. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).
1404. See Aqua-Aerobic Sys., Inc. v. Aerators, Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 1244, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]xpert testimony that is
admissible in the proceeding . . . may be considered by the court and given weight
appropriate to its content.”) (citations omitted). Query, however, whether Rule
702’s reference to “the trier of fact” precludes its applicability to claim-construction
issues, which are viewed as questions of law). See, e.g., Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461, 1465 (1996)
(describing the first issue in a patent case, construing the patent, as a question of law
the court should determine, and further characterizing the second issue, whether
infringement occurred, as a question of fact for a jury to resolve).
1405. 216 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1406. Id. at 1378-79, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2).
1407. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280-82 (stating that the standard set forth in
§ 112, ¶ 2 “depends on whether those skilled in the art would understand the scope
of the claim when the claim is read in light of the specification”).
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because determining the perspective of one of skill in the art may
involve reference to extrinsic evidence including the prior art and
1408
witness testimony.
There is good reason to believe that a future
panel might follow a similar standard in a case presenting a more
straightforward issue of claim construction, because the “which the
applicant regards as his invention” language of Section 112,
paragraph 2, is the language that sets forth the elements that a patent
claim must describe. Following a similar path for claim-construction
purposes would also be in accord with the well-settled principle that
claims should be construed the same way for both validity and
1409
infringement analyses.
In the end, the continuing tensions in the Federal Circuit’s
decisions with respect to use of extrinsic evidence seem to fall into
1410
three categories: (i) the role of dictionaries in claim construction ;
1411
(ii) the situations where extrinsic evidence will be allowed; and (iii)
the tension between the claim-construction vantagepoint of one of
ordinary skill in the art and the disfavor of extrinsic evidence such as
1412
testimony from those who are skilled in the art.
5.

Canons of construction
Finally, beyond the issues of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the
Federal Circuit has often applied what one might call “canons of
construction” in order to assist the claim-construction task. Each of
these canons can be understood much like the various other
“presumptions” (discussed above) that the Federal Circuit applies in
claim construction. A “canon of construction” is little more than
saying that if a certain condition is present, then it should be
presumed (subject to rebuttal) that a certain claim construction
should follow. For example, the presumption in favor of a claim
term’s “ordinary meaning” presumes, subject to rebuttal, that each
word in a claim was used in a manner consistent with its ordinary
meaning (which sometimes, but not always, means its “dictionary
1413
definition”).
Similarly, the means-plus-function claim element
1408. See id. at 1378-79 n.4, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283 n.4.
1409. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1363, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Claims must be interpreted the same way for
determining infringement as was done to sustain their validity.”).
1410. See supra notes 927-961 and accompanying text (summarizing federal cases
addressing claim construction issues).
1411. See supra notes 1089-1132 and accompanying text (examining the types and
amount of evidence required by courts in patent cases).
1412. See supra notes 1353-1366 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of
equivalents).
1413. See supra notes 923-925 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s
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presumption assumes, subject to rebuttal, that the use of the term
“means” in a claim element requires that element to be understood
as a means-plus-function element subject to Section 112, paragraph 6,
and that the absence of the term “means” takes it out of the ambit of
1414
that paragraph.
Other “canons of construction” can be
understood in much the same way.
One well-established canon of construction is the rule that “‘claims
should be read in a way that avoids ensnaring prior art if it is possible
1415
to do so.’”
This is an easily understandable presumption: since the
patent office issued the patent after an interactive exchange with the
applicant and an administrative evaluation of patentability, the patent
1416
itself is entitled to a substantial presumption of validity.
Therefore,
1417
a claim construction that would “ensnar[e] prior art” (i.e., render
the patent invalid) is likely incorrect, since the patent office should
be presumed to have done its job correctly and not to have issued
invalid patents or claims.
The canon is merely a presumption, as two recent cases from the
Federal Circuit demonstrate. In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate
1418
Systems, Inc., the panel noted the canon that the claims should be
construed to preserve validity, but concluded that in the instant case
it was impossible to do so because the only claim construction that
was consistent with the claim’s language and written description
1419
rendered the claim invalid.
Similarly, in Elekta Instrument S.A. v.
1420
O.U.R. Scientific International, Inc.,
the patentee argued that to
adopt the accused infringer’s construction of the patent would
1421
render the independent claim in suit invalid as inoperative.
Putting aside the issues of validity and operability, the panel
concluded that the canon was inapplicable in any event, because the
1422
In
claim “is susceptible of only one reasonable construction.”
interpretation of dictionary definitions).
1414. See supra notes 1249-1268 and accompanying text (describing the use of a
means-plus-function argument).
1415. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1057, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1556, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1743 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
The authors’ law firm was counsel to Eastman Kodak in the latter case.
1416. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
1417. See Apple, 234 F.3d at 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1057.
1418. 234 F.3d 14, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1419. See id. at 24, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1064 (explaining that in this instance,
the axiom does not apply and the claim is simply invalid).
1420. 214 F.3d 1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1421. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1422. Id. at 1309, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914. The panel declined to reach the
issues of validity and also found the record was unclear on the issue of operability.
See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914.
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short, the canon of construction favoring claim constructions
preserving the validity of the patent over those that do not applies
only where the intrinsic (and perhaps even extrinsic) evidence leaves
the claims truly unambiguous, i.e., “susceptible of only one
1423
reasonable construction.”
As a result, it will be the rare case where
this canon is anything but confirmatory of the correct construction of
a patent claim.
Another canon of construction is the doctrine of claim
differentiation, which “creates a rebuttable presumption that each
1424
claim in a patent has a different scope.”
Again, this canon is
understandable as a presumption, since it is more likely than not that
the patent applicant, in prosecuting separate claims in his
application, did not intend two of them to be superfluous to one
1425
another.
However, that is not always the case. Indeed, it is not
impossible, when one understands how patents get prosecuted to
allowance, to see how overlapping claims might eventually issue. For
example, the applicant might amend a claim so that, even though it
uses different words than another claim in the patent, the claim ends
1426
up coextensive with the other claim.
Or the applicant might make
a statement in the prosecution history that defines a term in an
independent claim so narrowly that it renders narrowing language in
1427
a dependent claim to be superfluous.
For these reasons, claim
differentiation has to be at most a rebuttable presumption, and
certainly not a conclusive one.
This point was illustrated in Kraft Foods, Inc. v. International Trading
1428
Co., where the patent was drawn to food-packaging trays.
The first
claim (claim 1) of the patent called for a “back panel” comprised of a
1429
Claim 2 also called for a “back
“flat relatively stiff planar sheet.”
panel” (specifically, a “protecting back panel”), but did not expressly

1423. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (holding the canon was inapplicable in
the instant case).
1424. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1014, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
1425. See, e.g., id. at 1342, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020 (noting that accepting
inventor’s stated intent of a broader scope in an independent claim eliminated
perceived redundancy of a second, dependent claim).
1426. See Kraft Food, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 1368-69, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814, 1818-19 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining that the doctrine’s
rebuttable presumption can be overcome by the written description and procedural
history).
1427. See Dow, 226 F.3d at 1341, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019 (determining that in
situations where this arises, the limitations stated in a dependent claim should not
ordinarily be read into an independent claim).
1428. See Kraft, 203 F.3d at 1368, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
1429. See id. at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
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1430

require the panel to be “relatively stiff.”
The district court
recognized the doctrine of claim differentiation, but concluded that
the written description and the prosecution history rebutted this
1431
presumption.
The Federal Circuit agreed, noting that claim
differentiation “only creates a presumption that each claim in a
patent has a different scope; it is ‘not a hard and fast rule of
1432
construction.’”
The panel went on to note that the fact “that the
claims are presumed to differ in scope does not mean that every
limitation must be distinguished from its counterpart in another
1433
claim, but only that at least one limitation must differ.”
Similarly, the court in Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies,
1434
Inc., found the presumption overcome on the record in that case,
holding that the terms “inner layer” and “inner body portion” meant
the same thing in different claims, as did the terms “border” and
1435
“integral contrasting border” as used in different claims.
The
panel in Tate Access Floors also noted that “the doctrine of claim
differentiation cannot broaden claims beyond their permissible
1436
scope,” which is a curious statement as it presents the question of
whether the doctrine of claim differentiation can play a useful role in
determining the “permissible scope” of claims, when the “permissible
scope” is already fixed before the doctrine of claim differentiation is
applied.
A related (but nonetheless distinct) canon of construction is the
principle that a word or phrase used throughout a patent should
ordinarily be given a consistent meaning throughout. In CAE
1437
Screenplates Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co. KG, the issue was the
correct interpretation of the claim term “bottom plane” in a
1438
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the patentee’s
patent.
argument that this “bottom plane” did not require the presence of a
physical structure, but merely defined an area of space, noting that
all other references to a “plane” in the patent required a physical

1430. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817-18.
1431. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
1432. Id. at 1368, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (quoting Comark Communications,
Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
1433. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
1434. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1435. See id. at 967-69, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518-20 (comparing the claims
terms used in the different claims).
1436. Id. at 968, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519.
1437. 224 F.3d 1308, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1438. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804 (explaining that the claim term referred
to a covering device used to screen contaminants from paper slurry).
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structure.
At the same time, the panel noted that “[i]n some cases,
a claim term can be given a different meaning in the various claims of
1440
the same patent, when a patent so provides.”
It is perhaps only a
slight exaggeration to say that this principle amounts to a lukewarm
“rule” that the same claim term generally will be given the same
meaning throughout a patent, except when it will not. As with some
of the Federal Circuit’s other rules and presumptions, this one seems
little more than a statement of the likely result over a large number of
cases, and not a rule that can be applied in any useful or predictable
way by courts or litigants.
B. Infringement
Generally, an accused device or method can infringe a claim in two
ways—literally, or under the doctrine of equivalents. To establish a
claim of literal infringement, a patentee must be able to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that every single limitation of his
patent claim is literally, exactly present in the accused device or
1441
method.
As a consequence, any deviation from the claim
limitation will preclude a finding of literal infringement.
If the patentee cannot sustain a claim of literal infringement, he
may nonetheless be able to sustain a claim of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents allows
infringement to be found, even when all of the elements of the
patent are not literally present in the accused device or method,
where there is equivalence between the elements of the accused
1442
device and the claimed elements of the patented invention.
For example, a hypothetical patent claim to a carrot cake which
called for specific quantities of flour, sugar, carrots, raisins, and
butter would be literally infringed by a cake actually containing the
same elements in the called-for quantities. That same patent claim
1439. See id. at 1317, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810 (“Given this character of the side
planes, there is little reason to believe that the third component ‘forming’ the
grooves, the bottom plane, does not also refer to a groove structure, particularly
when all three groove components include the term ‘plane.’”).
1440. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810.
1441. See KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1358, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1835, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Literal infringement of a claim occurs when
every limitation recited in the claim appears in the acused device, i.e., when ‘the
properly construed claim reads on the accused device exactly.’” (quoting Amhil
Enter., Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1471, 1476 (Fed.
Cir. 1996))).
1442. See id. at 1359 (“Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires that
the accussed product contain each limitation of the claim or its equivalent.”) (citing
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1875).
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might be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents by a cake actually
containing all of the same elements in the called-for quantities,
except that an identical quantity of margarine was substituted for the
called-for quantity of butter. Likewise, the same claim might be
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents by a cake actually
containing all of the same elements in the called-for specific
quantities, except for somewhat less sugar.
But the vagaries
engendered by these “might bes” under the doctrine of equivalents
have proven to be frustrating for courts and litigants alike.
The court’s most significant infringement opinion in 2000, the en
banc ruling in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
1443
Ltd., imposed some discipline on the vagaries of the equivalence
analysis. This decision is the focus of much of our discussion of the
doctrine of equivalents for the year 2000, and it will be the focus of
the Supreme Court in its October 2001 Term.
1.

Literal infringement
As noted above, an infringement inquiry consists of two steps—
legal claim construction, followed by factual comparison of the
accused device or method to the terms of the properly construed
1444
When it comes to questions of literal infringement, the
claim.
disputes are largely resolved at the legal, claim-construction step, for
often there is no dispute between the parties as to the structure or
1445
steps performed by the accused device or method.
Consequently, a
fair number of literal-infringement claims should be amenable to
summary judgment—if the literal-infringement claim involves a legal
determination of patent claim construction and an application of
that legal determination to the undisputed material facts of what the
accused device is (or what the accused method does), then there
should be no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and application
of these undisputed material facts should demonstrate that one party
or the other is entitled to judgment of literal infringement, or no
1443. 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
1444. See Purdue Pharm. L.P. v. Faulding, Inc. 230 F.3d 1320, 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1486 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654,
669, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (clarifing that claim
construction is a question of law reviewed de novo while comparing the properly
construed claims to the accused device is a question of fact reviewed for clear error).
1445. See e.g., Paul R. Michel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to
Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1187-88 (1999) (“[O]nce the
asserted claims of a patent have been construed fully as to any disputed terms, the
existence of literal infringement can frequently be determined as a matter of law
because the structure and operation of the accused device are rarely subject to
genuine evidentiary dispute.”) (footnotes omitted).
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literal infringement, as a matter of law.
As Judge Michel wrote in a
recent edition of this Law Review, “The role of summary judgment in
modern patent cases is difficult to overestimate. Recent changes in
claim construction methodology have increased the number of issues
and, indeed, the number of cases amenable to final disposition on
1447
summary judgment.”
Judge Michel’s statement is borne out by the cases. Of the Federal
Circuit’s ninety-four published patent opinions in the year 2000, fiftyone of them addressed issues of literal infringement. Of those fiftyone cases, the district court resolved the literal-infringement issues on
1448
a motion for summary judgment in thirty of them.
Three others
came up to the Federal Circuit on judgments of no literal
infringement, to which the patentees’ stipulated, after the district

1446. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (listing the criteria for granting summary judgment).
1447. Michel, supra note 1445, at 1187.
1448. See Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Bottom Line Mgmt. v. Pan Man, Inc., 228
F.3d 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v.
Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1208 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 224 F.3d 1374, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000); CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Heinrich Fiedler GmbH & Co., 224
F.3d 1308, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1804 (Fed. Cir. 2000); KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic
Concept, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hilgraeve
Corp. v. McAfee Assoc., Inc., 224 F.3d 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Rotec Indus., Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Zacharin v. United States, 213 F.3d 1366, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Vehicular Tech., Inc. v. Titan Wheel Int’l,
Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Bayer AG v. Elan
Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Aqua-Aerobic Sys., Inc. v. Aerators Inc., 211 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2000); STX, LLC v. Brine, Inc., 211 F.3d 588, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co.,
Inc., 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Optical Disk Corp.
v. Del Mar Avionics, Inc., 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Clearstream Wastewater Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Action, Inc., 206 F.3d 1440, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2000); IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d
1422, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v.
Hoffinger Indus., Inc., 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 203 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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court construed the patent claims as a matter of law.
Although it
may be a mistake to extrapolate those figures across the entirety of
the Federal Circuit’s patent caseload (in part because summary
judgment records may provide “cleaner” or superior vehicles for the
court to issue published opinions, whereas “black box” jury verdicts
may be less attractive candidates for full published-opinion
dispositions), the numbers are nonetheless striking and indicate just
how many patent-infringement disputes are now amenable to
disposition on summary judgment.
A cursory affidavit from an expert will not prevent summary
judgment in patent cases. In Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom
1450
Ltd., the patent term at issue called for “a time-space-time (TST)
1451
In response to Northern Telecom’s (NorTel’s) motion for
switch.”
summary judgment, in which it asserted that its accused device did
not infringe the Collins patents, NorTel stated that “Collins [the
patentee] asserted that NorTel’s [accused] DMS switches have either
a JNET or an ENET switching fabric, and that both JNET and ENET
1452
are TST switches.”
Collins also produced an expert declaration
1453
The Federal Circuit held that the
that the “JNET is a TST.”
expert’s conclusory assertion was insufficient to defeat summary
judgment, reasoning that “[a] party may not avoid that rule by simply
framing the expert’s conclusion as an assertion that a particular
1454
critical claim limitation is found in the accused device.”
Thus, the
expert’s testimony was effectively disregarded because Collins’ expert
framed his conclusion without any “explanation of why JNET’s
1455
structure renders it a TST switch in his view,” and because, “[t]o
1449. See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 864, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1647, 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the parties entered into a
stipulation after the district court provided construction of claim limitations, but that
district court made no findings of fact regarding infringement); HockersonHalberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 954, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1487, 1489 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting appellant stipulated to non-infringement after
district court’s claim construction); Canton Bio-Medical, Inc. v. Integrated Liner
Techs., Inc., 216 F.3d 1367, 1369, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(noting that appellant agreed that appellees’ method for binding “uncured”
elastomers did not literally infringe on patented covering process).
1450. 216 F.3d 1042, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1451. See id. at 1044, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1452. Id. at 1046, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
1453. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. Collins’ expert also asserted that NorTel’s
ENET has “data memories” that are “interconnected in a switched matrix,” and that
“[s]uch a switching matrix is called a space switch.” See id. at 1048, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1148 (emphasis in original). This assertion was also found insufficient to
defeat summary judgment. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
1454. Id. at 1046, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (citations omitted).
1455. Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N. Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 1046, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the extent that [Collins’ expert’s] construction of the term ‘TST
switch’ can be discerned from his several submissions to the district
court, his construction was broader than the one we have
1456
adopted.”
Although the court noted that the sufficiency of an
expert affidavit to defeat summary judgment is a question of regional
1457
circuit law,
the court also laid out some ground rules for a
sufficient expert affidavit:
When, as here, the construction of a critical claim limitation is in
dispute, a party may not avoid summary judgment simply by
offering an opinion of an expert that states, in effect, that the
critical claim limitation is found in the accused device. Although
such testimony of an expert witness may be proper during trial
when the opposing party can challenge the factual basis of the
expert’s opinion during cross-examination, . . . the affidavit of an
expert submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
must do more by “set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. . .” Thus, the expert must set forth the
factual foundation for his opinion—such as a statement regarding
the structure found in the accused product—in sufficient detail for
the court to determine whether that factual foundation would
support a finding of infringement under the claim construction
adopted by the court, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor
1458
of the nonmovant.

Nonetheless, there remain some cases where there is truly a
material dispute as to the precise structure, qualities, or operation of
the accused product or process, such that a factfinder will have to
1459
address the issue. In Hilgraeve Corp. v. McAfee Associates, Inc.,
Hilgraeve held a patent on a computer virus protection program and
alleged that McAfee’s virus detection product, VirusScan, infringed
1460
The district court’s claim construction required data
on it.
“storage” to occur after the data was “screened,” noting that “the
critical issue in the infringement analysis is whether VirusScan
screens before, or after, the time at which incoming data is present
on the destination storage medium and accessible by the operating
1461
system and other programs.”
The parties submitted affidavits
about the operation of VirusScan from experts who had tested
1456. Id. at 1047, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
1457. See id. at 1048, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147.
1458. Id. at 1047-48, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147 (citations omitted) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
1459. 224 F.3d 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1460. Id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
1461. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658 (indicating that neither party
disputed the district court’s claim construction).
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VirusScan and interpreted its source code. The Federal Circuit
concluded that summary judgment was improper because these
1462
experts’ testimony was in conflict on material factual issues.
Even beyond summary judgment cases, it remains clear that the
lion’s share of infringement disputes in patent cases are claimconstruction disputes, not truly factual ones, as illustrated in Hill-Rom
1463
1464
Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., which arose after a bench trial. After
holding in Section II of its opinion that the claim term “cushion”
necessarily carried with it the requirement of having “supporting”
1465
and “comforting” qualities, the panel, in Section III of its opinion,
1466
addressed the parties’ factual infringement contentions.
The court
noted that “Hill-Rom’s principal theory of infringement is answered
1467
The
by the district court’s claim construction, which we adopt.”
court also rejected Hill-Rom’s “alternative argument,” which was truly
a factual one: Hill-Rom urged that—even under the district court’s
claim construction—the accused hospital beds still infringed because
the inflatable bladders on the bed, while they do make a patient “less
comfortable” than the patented bed, nonetheless “can still be said to
1468
provide basic support and comfort.”
The court rejected this
“alternative argument” in short order as contrary to the district
court’s findings that the accused bladders “do not provide basic
1469
comfort and support for the patient.”
Compared to the number of presumptions, doctrines, and rules
applicable to patent claim construction, the Federal Circuit’s patent
opinions in 2000 yielded relatively few elucidations of similar
doctrines applicable to the factual second step of literal infringement
analysis. One such doctrine that was the subject of some discussion
in 2000, however, was the “rule” that the presence of additional
elements in the accused device (or additional steps in the accused
method) will not avoid a finding of infringement. In Tate Access
1462. See id. at 1352-54, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659-61 (reversing grant of
summary judgment, based on differences in expert’s descriptions of appellees’ virus
protection software).
1463. 209 F.3d 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1464. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437 (demonstrating how the factual
infringement inquiry is typically largely grounded in disputes not over facts, but
about the legal construction of patent claims).
1465. See id. at 1340-42, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439-41 (rejecting Hill-Rom’s
arguments and holding that the trial court correctly construed the term “cushion” to
mean a structure that provides basic support and comfort).
1466. See id. at 1342, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1441.
1467. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1468. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441.
1469. Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 F.3d 1337, 1342, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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1470

Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies, Inc., where the patent was drawn
to a floor panel having an “integral” border, the accused infringer
argued that the border on its accused floor panel was not “integral”
1471
because it must be painted.
The Federal Circuit disagreed since
“the addition of paint does not eliminate a limitation or inherent
feature of the claim, Maxcess may not avoid infringement by merely
1472
adding paint to the border of its floor panel.”
1473
Likewise, in Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., the
panel explained that this general rule applies unless the claims are
properly construed to exclude the possibility of an additional
element, noting that “if a patent requires A, and the accused device
or process uses A and B, infringement will be avoided only if the
1474
Statements
patent’s definition of A excludes the possibility of B.”
that merely note a distinction between A and B are not helpful to
avoid infringement because what matters is that that A and B must be
mutually exclusive, not that the patent describes A and B as
1475
different.
Such “mutually exclusive” claim drafting often appears in patent
claims containing numerical limitations. Thus, in Jeneric/Pentron, Inc.
1476
v. Dillon Co., Inc., where the patent claims required “a two-phase
dental porcelain composition with 0-1% cerium oxide,” there was no
1477
infringement by a composition containing 1.61% cerium oxide.
The patentee nonetheless argued that the accused infringer’s
composition contained “0-1%” cerium oxide, because the total
1470. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1471. See id. at 970, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520.
1472. Id. (comparing Suntiger, Inc. v. Blublocker Corp., 189 F.3d 1327, 1336, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811, 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court erred
by finding different color coating on lens changed an inherent property) with
Insituform Techs. Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098, 1106, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1602, 1608 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that adding elements will prevent a
finding of literal infringement where the claim is specific and adding elements
eliminates an inherent feature of the claim)).
1473. 215 F.3d 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1474. Id. at 1296-97, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065.
1475. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1065 (“The addition of features does not
avoid infringement, if all the elements of the patent claims have been adopted.”); see
also Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1057, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1434, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Adding features to an accused device will not result in
noninfringement if all the limitations in the claims, or equivalents thereof, are
present in the accused device.”); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.3d 700,
703, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 965, 967 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“It is fundamental that one
cannot avoid infringement merely by adding elements if each element recited in the
claims is found in the accused device.”)).
1476. 205 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1477. See id. at 1382-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (agreeing with the district
court’s determination that Jeneric had not shown a reasonable likelihood of success
on literal infringement).
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amount of cerium oxide was best understood as consisting of two
components:
“The first—0.92% of cerium oxide—acts as an
antigreening agent and, thus, falls within the 0-1% range of claim 1.
The remaining—0.69% of cerium oxide—acts as an opacifying or
fluorescing agent in a third phase outside the claimed two-phase
1478
matrix.”
Here, the ordinary principle, that additional elements in
the accused infringing product do not prevent infringement, was
inapplicable, because the patentee had specified a precise range of
1479
percentages in the claim.
Jeneric’s infringement theory essentially
proposes that the precisely claimed ranges do not limit the amount of
porcelain compositions, but this theory would read out of claim 1 the
1480
express claim ranges.
Issues under the second, factual prong of the infringement analysis
are more prevalent with respect to infringement of “means-plusfunction” claim elements under Section 112, paragraph 6 of the
1481
Patent Act.
Infringement of such a claim element requires the
factfinder to determine that the “structure, material, or acts
described in the specification” corresponding to the “means or step
for performing a specified function,” or “equivalents thereof,” are
1482
present in the accused device.
“[E]quivalents thereof” under
Section 112, paragraph 6 will literally infringe a means-plus-function
claim element and it is therefore theoretically possible for an
equivalent (under the Doctrine) of an equivalent (under the statute)
1483
to infringe a means-plus-function claim element.
The Federal
1484
reiterated the
Circuit, in Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co.,

1478. Id. at 1382, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
1479. See id. at 1282-83, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (rejecting any attempt to
carve out a portion of cerium oxide according to functions not recited in the claim).
1480. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
1481. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (“An element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital
of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed
to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification
and equivalents thereof.”).
1482. Id.
1483. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting use of term “equivalent” in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6
differs from use of term in “doctrine of equivalents,” as term is used in 35 U.S.C. §
112, ¶ 6 can lead to literal infringement, whereas doctrine of equivalents is a
different type of patent infringement); Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d
1009, 1021 n.4, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1118 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Plager, J.,
additional views) (citing David R. Todd, How Modern Treatment of 35 U.S.C. § 112(6)
Has Caused Confusion: Hilton Davis v. Warner-Jenkinson and the Right to a Jury on the
Issue of Patent Infringement Under the “Equitable” Doctrine of Equivalents, 1996 BYU L.
REV. 141, 156 & n.74).
1484. 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308, reh’g en banc denied, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12710 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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approach to infringement analysis under Section 112, paragraph 6 in
a discussion that aptly captures both the infringement standard
under Section 112, paragraph 6 and the overlap and interplay
between the “equivalents” of Section 112, paragraph 6 and
“equivalents” under the doctrine of equivalents:
In order for an accused structure to literally meet a section 112,
paragraph 6 means-plus-function limitation, the accused structure
must be either the same as the disclosed structure or be a section
112, paragraph 6 “equivalent,” i.e., (1) perform the identical
function and (2) be otherwise insubstantially different with respect
to structure. . . . Under a modified version of the function-wayresult methodology described in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co.
v. Linde Air Products Co., . . . two structures may be “equivalent” for
purposes of section 112, paragraph 6 if they perform the identical
function, in substantially the same way, with substantially the same
result. . . .
If an accused structure is not a section 112, paragraph 6
equivalent of the disclosed structure because it does not perform
the identical function of that disclosed structure and hence does
not literally infringe, it may nevertheless still be an “equivalent”
under the Doctrine of Equivalents. Thus, if one applies the
traditional function-way-result test, the accused structure must
perform substantially the same function, in substantially the same
way, to achieve substantially the same result, as the disclosed
structure. A key feature that distinguishes “equivalents” under
section 112, paragraph 6 and “equivalents” under the doctrine of
equivalents is that section 112, paragraph 6 equivalents must
perform the identical function of the disclosed structure . . . .
Because the “way” and “result” prongs are the same under both
the section 112, paragraph 6 and Doctrine of Equivalents tests, a
structure failing the section 112, paragraph 6 test under either or
both prongs must fail the Doctrine of Equivalents test for the same
1485
reason(s). . . .

Thus, in Kemco, the court concluded that the district court had
correctly held that no reasonable jury could have found the accused
envelope to be infringing, either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents:
[B]oth the accused and disclosed structures perform the identical
function, which is to close the envelope. However, unlike the
disclosed flap, which closes by folding over the envelope, the duallip structure closes the accused envelope in a different way by
meeting together and binding via the internal adhesive. The
1485. Id. at 1364, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315-16 (citations and footnote omitted).
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accused structure’s different way of closing also yields a
substantially different result. The first and second sealing means in
the disclosed structure are ultimately attached to the outside of the
envelope. In contrast, the first sealing means in the TripLok
envelope is internally attached to the two lips of the dual-lip
1486
structure, thereby sealing the envelope.

As a result of these substantial differences of “way” and “result,” the
accused dual-lip structure was held to be neither a section 112,
paragraph 6 equivalent nor an equivalent under the doctrine of
1487
equivalents.
Two cases from 2000 addressed the specific acts that will constitute
patent infringement. Section 271(a) of the Patent Act provides that
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
1488
therefor, infringes the patent.”
Until recently, the definition of
infringement was limited to making, using, or selling the patented
invention, but offers to sell and importation were added as acts of
1489
infringement as of January 1, 1996.
Thus, the patent bar has only
recently had to grapple with proving infringement by importation,
and in particular the relationship of process patents to infringement
by importation. This has meant coming to grips with some relatively
new statutes that help to define specific acts of infringement.
1490
In Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., the statutory issue
of first impression was the meaning of Section 271(g) of the Patent
Act, which provides:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers
to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is
made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as
an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the
1491
product occurs during the term of such process patent. . . .

The accused infringer, Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM), argued
that its imported bacteria were not imported “without authority,”
1486. Id. at 1365, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
1487. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316 (holding “the dual-lip structure is not a
section 112, paragraph 6 equivalent of a fold-over flap because the ‘way’ and ‘result’
are substantially different; accordingly, the dual-lip structure also can not be an
equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents”).
1488. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
1489. See Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4089, 4988 (codified as 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a))(revising definition of infringement to include offers to sell or import
patented materials).
1490. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 1957 (U.S. 2001).
1491. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1994).
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because a Soviet Union authority had authorized ADM’s purveyor to
use the patents exclusively to manufacture the bacteria in several
Scandinavian and nearby countries, and to sell and use the produced
bacteria non-exclusively everywhere else in the world, except the
1492
United States and Japan.
The Federal Circuit rejected ADM’s
argument, stating that Section 271(g) applies to unauthorized actions
within the United States and it is irrelevant that authorization to
1493
produce the product came from outside of the United States.
When the process used abroad is the same as the process that the
patent in the United States covers, liability for infringement arises
1494
only upon importation, sale or offers, or use in the United States.
Consequently, the court held ADM liable for infringement when
ADM imported its particular bacteria strain because the process that
1495
ADM used was the same as a process covered by a U.S. patent.
Another relatively new statututory provision, Section 295 of the
1496
Patent Act, was addressed by the Federal Circuit for the first time
in 2000. This section is likely to be a particularly useful statute for
patent holders in infringement-by-importation cases. For example, in
Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties and Food Ingredients GmbH v. International
1497
Trade Commission,
the Federal Circuit noted that this burdenshifting mechanism serves two purposes—it “works for the benefit of
the patentee” by shifting the burden (upon a sufficient showing) to
the accused infringer to prove that his accused process was in fact not
1492. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1347-48, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (noting that
the license “to A.C. Biotechnics granted the exclusive right to use the licensed strain,
knowledge and patents for the purpose of manufacturing of L-threonine in the
territory [Belgium, Denmark, Finland, FRG, Holland, Iceland, Luxemburg, Norway,
and Sweden] and the non-exclusive right to use and sell L-threonine, thus produced
in the territory and the zone of non-exclusive right [worldwide except the U.S.A. and
Japan]”) (citation omitted).
1493. See id. at 1348, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340.
1494. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340 (indicating the point at which
infringement occurs under § 271(g) of the Patent Act).
1495. See id. (noting that importation occurred without authorization of the patent
holder).
1496. See 35 U.S.C. § 295 (1994), providing that:
In actions alleging infringement of a process patent based on the
importation, sale, offer for sale, or use of a product which is made from a
process patented in the United States, if the court finds—
(1) that a substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the
patented process, and
(2) that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to determine the process
actually used in the production of the product and was unable to so
determine,
the product shall be presumed to have been so made, and the burden of
establishing that the product was not made by the process shall be on the
party asserting that it was not so made.
1497. 224 F.3d 1356, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1951 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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infringing, and “it also serves the needs of the court as a mechanism
for enforcing its processes and orders” by “provid[ing] the trial court
1498
with a potent weapon to use against a non-cooperative defendant.”
In Nutrinova, an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the International
Trade Commission found, as a matter of fact, that the patent holder
1499
(Nutrinova) had “failed to satisfy the second prong of § 295.”
Notwithstanding Nutrinova’s submission of test results which it said
were inconclusive (because they did not remove the possibility that
post-processing treatment might have changed the residual byproducts), in the ALJ’s view, “Nutrinova could, in fact, reasonably
determine from testing whether the acesulfame potassium produced
1500
at that facility was manufactured by the [patented] process.”
The
court noted that this finding was not erroneous, but supported by
substantial evidence, because the Section 295 inquiry “is not
determined subjectively by the plaintiff, but is determined objectively
1501
by the court.”
The court punctuated its discussion of Section 295 with an
interesting footnote, noting the possibility that Section 295 provides
that the burden shifts “if the court finds” the two prongs satisfied, the
panel said: “It is possible that § 295 does not apply to proceedings
before the ITC, since the statute on its face applies to courts, not
1502
agencies.
The court further noted that since the Commission did
not raise this point, it is treated as waived for purposes of this
1503
opinion.
Thus it remains plausible that, in a future case where the
issue is not waived, the Federal Circuit could hold that Section 295
(or, for that matter, any other patent statute addressed to “courts”)
does not apply to proceedings before the International Trade
1504
Such a
Commission (ITC), which is not, technically, a “court.”
result, however, would render a highly useful statute inapplicable to
an institution which deals exclusively with imports—a context where
the burden-shifting mechanism of Section 295 is most salutary, since
the accused infringer is often not even subject to the jurisdiction of

1498. Id. at 1360, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
1499. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
1500. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
1501. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954.
1502. See id. at 1359-60 n.1, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954 n.1 (pointing out the
language of § 295 that states that the burden shifts “if the court finds” the two prongs
satisfied).
1503. See Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingredients GmbH v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 224 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 n.1, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1951, 1954 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
1504. See 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994) (discussing composition of the International
Trade Commission).
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the ITC for discovery and other purposes (the ITC has in rem, not in
1505
personam, jurisdiction).
Not applying Section 295 to ITC proceedings would also arguably
be inconsistent with the approach taken by the Federal Circuit in
1506
Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., where the court held that ITC
proceedings were “litigation” as that term was used in a license
1507
Indeed, if Section 295 were held
agreement between the parties.
not to apply to the ITC, it would yield the strange result that its
burden-shifting mechanism would be forbidden to the ITC, but could
be applied by the Federal Circuit (which is indubitably a “court”),
1508
which reviews ITC decisions.
The better view is the one that the
ITC seemingly adopted. The ITC did not even raise this as an issue
in the Nutrinova case, thus indicating that the ITC considers itself
bound by Section 295 as a court.
2.

Infringement by equivalents
The most significant infringement developments in 2000 came,
without a doubt, in the area of infringement by equivalents. The
doctrine of equivalents (sometimes abbreviated as the “DOE”)
prevents an accused infringer from avoiding liability for patent
infringement by making only minor or insubstantial changes to an
invention covered by the claims of a patent, thereby avoiding literal
1509
infringement while retaining the invention’s “essential identity.”
As Judge Learned Hand wrote over fifty years ago, the doctrine of
equivalents is utilized “to temper unsparing logic and prevent an
1510
The doctrine
infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention.”
is hotly contested, as it must strike a delicate balance between
1505. See 19 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994) (stating, for example, that the ITC may invoke
the aid of any U.S. court in requiring attendance and testimony of witnesses).
1506. 231 F.3d 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1507. See id. at 1331, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-79 (concluding that the term
“litigation” in the governing law clause of the license agreement includes section 337
procedings at the ITC).
1508. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6) (1994) (“The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . to review the final
determinations of the United States International Trade Commission relating to
unfair practices in import trade, made under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
(19 U.S.C. 1337)”); see also Texas Instruments, 231 F.3d at 1328, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1676 (stating that “the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over ITC
determinations made under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930”).
1509. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Grover Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 399 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)).
1510. Id. at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting Grover Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)) (in turn quoting Royal Typewriter
Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 517, 518 (2d
Cir. 1948)).
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ensuring that the patentee enjoys the full benefit of his patent
without opportunistic poaching by competitors, while at the same
time ensuring that the public receives “‘fair notice’ of the patent’s
1511
scope.”
Or, as the Supreme Court has put it: “There can be no
denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied broadly,
conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the
1512
statutory claiming requirement.”
In 1996 and 1997, the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court
attempted to resolve some of these inherent conflicts. In retrospect,
neither effort was terribly successful. In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
1513
Warner-Jenkinson Co., the Federal Circuit held that, in addition to
1514
the well-established function-way-result test, a product or process
may also infringe if it contains an element with “insubstantial
1515
The authors of a prior
differences” from the claimed element.
Area Summary in this Law Review remarked that the Federal Circuit
in Hilton Davis held that “there is simply no definitive test for
1516
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.”
The Federal
Circuit in Hilton Davis did recognize the evidentiary value of evidence
such as “copying,” “independent development,” and “designing
around,” but refused to impose any threshold evidentiary showing as
1517
1518
a prior requirement.
Over vehement dissents from Judge Plager,
1519
among others, the en banc court refused to impose an “equitable”
1511. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting London v. Carson Pirie Scott &
Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1458-59 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
1512. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
1513. 62 F.3d 1512, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (per
curiam), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
1514. See id. at 1518, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (noting a product or process will
infringe a patent claim under the doctrine of equivalents if it performs substantially
the same function as the claimed device or process, in substantially the same way, to
achieve substantially the same result).
1515. See id. at 1517-18, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-45 (noting that in recent
decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stressed the significance
of the “insubstantial differences” standard).
1516. Michael L. Leetzow et. al., 1996 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 46
AM. U. L. REV. 1675, 1762 (1997).
1517. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1527, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53 (stating that
neither evidence of copying, nor independent development, nor “designing around”
has relevance to the state of mind of the accused infringer in a doctrine of
equivalents analysis because infringement is a strict liability offense).
1518. See id. at 1536, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (Plager, J., dissenting) (opinion
joined by Chief Judge Archer and Judges Rich and Lourie) (differing with the
majority as to whether the function-way-result test is a proper analysis). Judge Plager
offers an alternative to assess substantiality, such that “other objective indicia may be
considered, such as the known interchangeability of the accused and claimed
elements by persons reasonably skilled in the art; whether there is evidence of
intentional copying; and whether there is evidence of an attempt to design around
the patented matter.” Id., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
1519. See id. at 1545, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661 (Lourie, J., dissenting) (opinion

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000

1621

limitation or threshold on application of the Doctrine, such that a
finding of “fraud on the patent” or knowing copying would be
1520
required before a judge could apply the doctrine of equivalents.
Relatedly, the court also concluded that application of the doctrine
of equivalents was a factual question of infringement for a properly
1521
instructed jury.
This conclusion, too, was met with stern objection
1522
from dissenters.
The Supreme Court took the case, and, in 1997, reversed the
1523
judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
The most
significant developments in the Supreme Court’s opinion were: (1)
creation of a presumption that any amendment to a patent claim
invokes prosecution-history estoppel, which would become conclusive
unless the patentee could establish that the amendment was not
1524
made for “a substantial reason relating to patentability;”
(2)
confirmation that the Federal Circuit’s long-standing “all elements
rule” imposed a significant and required limitation on application of
1525
the doctrine of equivalents; and, (3) suggestion that the doctrine
of equivalents could not be allowed such free play as to “vitiate” a
1526
The Supreme Court also rejected
claim element “in its entirety.”
Warner-Jenkinson’s attempt to impose other limitations on the
doctrine of equivalents, such as the “equitable” role envisioned by
Judge Plager, a threshold requirement of “proof of intent” to copy or
1527
infringe, or an “independent experimentation” defense.
The
Supreme Court also refused to limit the Doctrine to “equivalents that
joined by Judges Rich and Plager) (dissenting because trial judge did not properly
instruct jury on doctrine of equivalents); id. at 1550, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672-73
(Nies, J., dissenting) (opinion joined in part by Chief Judge Archer) (dissenting
because Supreme Court precedent indicates that under the “doctrine of
equivalents,” questions of law and fact still exist and the meaning of the words of the
claim must be defined by the court).
1520. See id. at 1519-20, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47 (holding lack of
substantial differences, rather than the accused infringer’s motives or intent, triggers
application of the doctrine of equivalents).
1521. See id. at 1522, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648-49 (emphasizing that
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact for a jury and for a
judge in a bench trial).
1522. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1543,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1666 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (per curiam) (Plager, J.,
dissenting) (noting that doctrine of equivalents is equitable in nature and, since
juries do not exercise equitable powers, the doctrine of equivalents was not a factual
question of infringement for a properly instructed jury, contrary to the majority’s
holding).
1523. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (leaving
the heart of the en banc court’s ruling largely intact even after the reversal).
1524. Id. at 33.
1525. See id. at 28-30.
1526. See id. at 39 n.8.
1527. See id. at 35-40.
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are disclosed within the patent itself,” reasoning that evaluation of
equivalency should occur at the time of infringement rather than at
1528
the issuance of the patent.
The Court did not otherwise disturb the en banc court’s
determinations, but noted its concern that the doctrine of
equivalents has “taken on a life of its own, unbounded by the patent
1529
claims,” and that it expected that “[a] focus on individual elements
and a special vigilance against allowing the concept of equivalence to
eliminate completely any such elements should reduce considerably
the imprecision of whatever language is used” to describe the
equivalence analysis, whether it be the “triple identity test” (function1530
way-result) or the “insubstantial differences” test.
The court
declined to “micromanag[e] the Federal Circuit’s particular word
choice for analyzing equivalence,” and instead left it with the power
1531
to refine the equivalence test by using case-by-case determinations.
We have noted the increasingly important role of summary
judgment in literal infringement cases. The same is true in doctrine
1532
of equivalents cases.
The Supreme Court, in Warner-Jenkinson,
presaged the importance of summary-judgment practice in
equivalents cases:
With regard to the concern over unreviewability due to black-box
jury verdicts, we offer only guidance, not a specific mandate.
Where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could
determine two elements to be equivalent, district courts are obliged
to grant partial or complete summary judgment. . . . Of course, the
various legal limitations on the application of the doctrine of
equivalents are to be determined by the court, either on a pretrial
motion for partial summary judgment or on a motion for judgment
as a matter of law at the close of the evidence and after the jury
verdict. . . . Thus, under the particular facts of a case, if prosecution
history estoppel would apply or if a theory of equivalence would
entirely vitiate a particular claim element, partial or complete
judgment should be rendered by the court, as there would be no
1533
further material issue for the jury to decide.
1528. See id. at 37 (discussing the proper time for evaluating infringements).
1529. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28-29
(1997) (explaining that the doctrine of equivalents has been broadened by patent
claims).
1530. See id. at 40 (providing various methods and tools that courts can employ to
limit the doctrine of equivalents).
1531. See id. (placing confidence in the Federal Circuit to refine the equivalents
test).
1532. See supra Part I.A.1 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of
summary judgment in the Federal Circuit).
1533. 520 U.S. at 39 n.8 (citations omitted).
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This is easier said than done. Recent decisions have confirmed the
difficulty of successfully applying the “function-way-result” test or the
“insubstantial differences” test to resolve equivalence infringement
1534
1535
cases on summary judgment.
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Deere & Co.,
the panel reversed a summary judgment of noninfringement and
remanded for a trial under Section 112, paragraph 6 equivalents and
under the doctrine of equivalents, concluding that the district judge
had impermissibly resolved conflicting issues of material fact on
1536
summary judgment.
Judge Plager, long the Federal Circuit’s
leading spokesman for limiting and rationalizing the doctrine of
equivalents, wrote a concurring opinion that aptly sums up many of
the perceived problems with the doctrine of equivalents as it had
been operating:
I join the opinion and concur in the conclusion that this case must
be returned for trial, but I do so without enthusiasm. If the trial
judge sat as the trier of fact, I would find his assessment of the facts
unimpeachable. But he does not. Instead, under the rules as we
now have them, and because the patentee’s lawyer did a good job
of building a record of arguably disputable facts, the matter (unless
settled) will now go to a jury before whom there will be a lengthy
and costly battle of the experts. The jury will then pick a winner; it
may be the judge’s winner, or it may not. In either event, the case
provides a textbook example of the insubstantial nature of the
“insubstantial differences” test, and its marginally legitimate child,
“substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result,”
1537
on which the outcome will turn. May the best lawyer win.

The court confronted similar problems in the course of reversing a
1538
grant of summary judgment in Optical Disk Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics.
One of the issues in the case, which involved compact disc (CD)
technology, was whether the claims’ requirement of a “ramped
trailing edge” was met by an equivalent in the accused device, a
double-step trailing edge (which had a different geometric shape
than the single-step “ramped trailing edge” called out by the
1539
claims).
The district court analogized the case to Tronzo v. Biomet,

1534. See, e.g., Vehicular Tech. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1383,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1844-45 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring) (“This
case presents the difficult problem of performing a doctrine of equivalents analysis
on the limited facts available for a motion of summary judgment.”).
1535. 224 F.3d 1374, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1536. See id. at 1380, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311 (explaining the court’s rationale
for reversing the district court’s decision).
1537. Id. at 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311 (Plager, J., concurring).
1538. 208 F.3d 1324, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1539. See id. at 1330, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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1540

Inc., essentitally concluding that where a patent calls for a specific
geometric shape in a claim element (e.g., “ramped trailing edge,” or,
as in Tronzo, a “conical” cup implant for a hip bone), that element
cannot be equivalent to a different geometrical shape (e.g., a double1541
step trailing edge, or, as in Tronzo, a hemispheric implant).
The Federal Circuit rejected the analogy, concluding that Tronzo
used the conventional doctrine of equivalents law, which included
1542
The court
the “all elements” or “all limitations” rule.
acknowledged that an expert for the patent holder submitted a
declaration and inspection report indicating his belief that the
double-step trailing edge of the accused CDs was equivalent to the
1543
ramped trailing edge of the patent.
On much the same reasoning,
the court also reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment of no equivalents infringement on another claim
1544
element.
1545
which did not
Similarly, in Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co.,
involve summary judgment but instead involved preliminaryinjunction practice, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s
1546
denial of a preliminary injunction.
The district court had found
no realistic likelihood of success on the plaintiff’s infringement claim,
and as to literal infringement, the Federal Circuit discussed the issue
1547
and agreed with the district court.
As to whether the patentee had
demonstrated a realistic likelihood of demonstrating infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit declined even
1548
to reach the issue.
The court noted that although it affirmed the
district court’s decision to deny the preliminary injunction, it did not
use the doctrine of equivalents to reach the issue of infringement

1540. 156 F.3d 1154, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1541. See Optical Disk, 208 F.3d at 1336-37, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297 (clarifying
the district court’s conclusions pertaining to specific geometric shapes).
1542. See id. at 1337, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297 (rationalizing that Tronzo stated
no such black-letter rule).
1543. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298
Its function is to change the thermal profile at the ablative surface of the dyepolymer disc master in the region of the trailing edge of the pit being
formed in that surface, by means of progressively reducing the energy
delivered to that surface in that region, to result in controlling the shape of
the trailing edge of that pit
Id.
1544. See id. at 1337-39, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298-99 (discussing the reversal of
the district court’s summary judgment).
1545. 205 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1546. See id. at 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1547. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
1548. See id. at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (noting that the District Court
did not conduct an equivalents analysis).
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because it is a factual inquiry that is seldomly made clear on an
1549
incomplete record.
This suggests that it will be the rare case
indeed when a patent holder will be able to establish a substantial
likelihood of success in an infringement case where his lone theory of
infringement is under the doctrine of equivalents. Jeneric also
underscores the difficulty of making a conclusive infringement-byequivalents determination on anything less than a full trial record,
whether it be at the preliminary-injunction stage or on a motion for
1550
summary judgment.
By contrast, summary rejection of infringement claims is much
easier on preliminary records when the issue can be resolved by
applying one of the legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents.
1551
Thus, in Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., the court was able to affirm a
summary judgment of noninfringement under the doctrine of
equivalents on two grounds: First, the district court correctly
concluded that no reasonable jury could find the elements of the
accused fishing reel to be insubstantially different from the
1552
corresponding claimed limitation in the patent.
Second, the
patentee had, during prosecution, noted that a prior-art reel,
disclosed in the Duffelen patent, was “‘completely different than
1553
applicant’s reel both in structure and function.’”
Noting that the
Duffelen patent disclosed a reel “very similar” to the accused reel, the
court concluded that Cortland’s statement makes clear that the
1554
fishing reels were made using Duffelen’s teachings.
This latter
conclusion—essentially
an
application
of
argument-based
prosecution-history estoppel—foreshadowed the Federal Circuit’s en
banc elaborations of the doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel,
1555
which came later in the year.
Indeed, the most significant developments in 2000 for the law of
equivalents involved not so much the application of the doctrine
itself, but limitations upon its application such as prosecution-history
estoppel, the all-elements rule, prior-art estoppel (as we have named

1549. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (explaining the court’s reasons for not
using the doctrine of equivalents to deny the preliminary injunction).
1550. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (noting that the issue of infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents is a “highly factual inquiry”).
1551. 203 F.3d 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1552. Id. at 1359, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
1553. Id. at 1360, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739 (quoting the language in the
prosecution history).
1554. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739.
1555. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 564,
568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing the
doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel).
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it), an applicant’s failure to prosecute broader claims that he might
have otherwise successfully prosecuted, and—an issue that will be
taken up by the Federal Circuit en banc in 2001—“dedication to the
public.” We address the significant developments in each of these
five areas below.
a.

Prosecution-history estoppel

The doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel—also known, albeit
1556
in more archaic usage, as “file-wrapper estoppel” —limits the scope
of patent protection available to a patentee under the doctrine of
equivalents. It is, as the Federal Circuit describes, “one tool that
prevents the doctrine of equivalents from vitiating the notice
1557
function of claims.”
It precludes a patentee using the doctrine of
equivalents from obtaining coverage of subject matter that the
patentee has relinquished during the prosecution of the patent
1558
application.
Importantly, prosecution-history estoppel will bar a
claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents regardless of
whether the accused device or process meets the function-way-result
test or the “insubstantial differences” test. For that reason, it is said
that “[t]he doctrine of equivalents is subservient to [prosecution1559
history] estoppel.”
Additionally, since the court evaluates
prosecution-history estoppel on an objective reading of the
1560
prosecution history, and because it “is a question of law subject to
1561
prosecution-history estoppel can
review without deference,”
provide a useful and litigation-saving threshold bar to an
infringement-by-equivalents claim which trial and appellate courts
can evaluate on motions for preliminary injunction or for summary
judgment. The Federal Circuit noted that “[h]aving prosecution
history estoppel as a purely legal issue is consistent with fostering
certainty as to a patent’s scope, a consideration that is important for
1556. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30 (1997).
1557. Festo Corp., 234 F.3d at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (en banc) (citing
Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1526, 1529-30 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1558. See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1376, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1559. Festo, 234 F.3d at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting Autogiro Co. v.
United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400-01, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 705 (1967)).
1560. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1254, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1555-56, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1616 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade Comm’n, 867 F.2d 1572,
1576, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1995, 1998 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1561. KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1835, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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1562

reliance by those in the marketplace.”
The policy reasons behind prosecution-history estoppel are largely
grounded in the public-notice function of patents. “The logic of
prosecution history estoppel is that the patentee, during prosecution,
has created a record that fairly notifies the public that the patentee
has surrendered the right to claim particular matter as within the
1563
reach of the patent.”
Thus, because the prosecution history of a
patent—beyond the initial application—consists primarily of
amendments and arguments made by the applicant, the Federal
Circuit has recognized two related, but nonetheless distinct, varieties
1564
of prosecution-history estoppel:
estoppel by argument
and
1565
estoppel by amendment.
“Argument-based estoppel” is the less controversial of the two
strains of prosecution-history estoppel. Under the doctrine of
argument-based estoppel, “[a]rguments made voluntarily during
prosecution may give rise to prosecution history estoppel if they
1566
evidence a surrender of subject matter.”
In KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic
1567
Concepts, Inc., the patent applicant amended his claim by adding
two new clauses, and supplemented that amendment with remarks
that clearly indicated that the air mattress he was claiming had to
1568
have airflow “throughout the entirety of the lower chamber.”
The
Federal Circuit concluded that the remarks “reflect a clear and
unmistakable surrender of mattresses without airflow ‘throughout the
1569
entirety of the lower chamber.’”
The Federal Circuit applied the same “clear and unmistakable
surrender” standard, applied from the viewpoint of a “reasonable
competitor,” in another doctrine of equivalents case decided in 2000,
1570
Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp.
Bayer, which was
1562. Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1254, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720 (citing Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) for the proposition that
“allowing claim construction to be a question of law promotes both uniformity and
certainty in the meaning of a patent’s claims”).
1563. Festo, 234 F.3d at 564, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (providing the
underlying rationale of prosecution-history estoppel).
1564. See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373,
1377, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Haynes Int’l, Inc. v.
Jessop Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1579, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652, 1657 (Fed. Cir.
1993), for the proposition that a wide range of activities can give rise to prosecution
history estoppel, including arguments submitted to obtain the patent).
1565. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-34
(1997) (describing the theory of estoppel by amendment).
1566. Festo, 234 F.3d at 568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1567. 223 F.3d 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1568. See id. at 1359, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841-42 (noting that the applicant
had surrendered claims to any air mattress that did not have this characteristic).
1569. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
1570. 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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authored by Judge Schall (later the author of Festo) involved Bayer’s
1571
patent on a high-blood-pressure medication.
Bayer’s patent
claimed “an effective amount of nifedipine crystals with a specific
2
surface area of 1.0 to 4 m /g, in admixture with a solid diluent, to
1572
result in a sustained release of nifedipine.”
In connection with
amendments to the patent claim that added the specific-surface-area
2
range of “1.0 to 4 m /g,” Bayer made “affirmative statements about
2
1573
the superiority of the 1.0 to 4 m /g range.”
Bayer went so far as to
call its claims directed to “‘a special form of nifedipine, namely,
2
1574
having a specific surface area of 1.0 to 4 m /g’.”
“In short, through
its statements to the PTO and the declarations it filed, Bayer made
statements of clear and unmistakable surrender of subject matter
2
1575
outside the claimed SSA range of 1.0 to 4 m /g.”
The Federal Circuit also held that this “clear and unmistakable
surrender” standard was to be evaluated “with respect to how a
competitor would reasonably view the ‘446 patent’s prosecution
1576
history.”
Rejecting Bayer’s claim that an expert declaration created
a genuine issue of material fact on how a competitor would view the
prosecution history, the court concluded that
testimony as to what a reasonable competitor would conclude from
the prosecution history cannot create a genuine issue of material
fact so as to bar summary judgment. Such testimony is only a tool,
which the judge can use at his or her discretion, to aid in the legal
1577
determination of prosecution history estoppel.

The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would transform
prosecution-history estoppel into a question of fact, in turn making
the standard of review more deferential than the well-established de
novo review applicable to prosecution-history estoppel issues. In turn,
such a holding would “hamper the promotion of uniformity by
binding this court to the deference required with respect to fact
1578
findings at the trial level.”
Although the court did not explicitly
mention it, treating prosecution-history estoppel as a purely legal
issue which is evaluated from an objective standpoint allows district
1571. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
1572. Id. at 1246, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
1573. Id. at 1252, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
1574. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
1575. Id. at 1253, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.
1576. Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1254, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1711, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1577. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720.
1578. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720 (“[I]f claim construction had underlying
factual inquiries, the goal of national uniformity would be frustrated”) (citing Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1173-74
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
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courts free rein to grant summary judgment of noninfringement.
Concomitantly, such treatment prevents patentees from automatically
avoiding summary judgment by submitting expert affidavits, as Bayer
1579
sought to do in that summary judgment case.
The more controversial arm of prosecution-history estoppel,
amendment-based estoppel, was addressed in Festo. In 1988, Festo
Corporation sued Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (also
known as SMC Corporation) and SMC Pneumatics, Inc. in federal
1580
court in Massachusetts.
Festo’s claim was that SMC had infringed
two of its patents relating to magnetically coupled rodless cylinders,
which are used to repeatedly move articles a short distance, most
1581
typically in assembly lines.
The judge on summary judgment, and
later a jury, found infringement of both patents under the doctrine
1582
SMC appealed, and a panel of the Federal Circuit
of equivalents.
(Judges Rich, Newman, and Michel) affirmed, relying in part on its
1583
Prosecution-history
then-recent en banc decision in Hilton Davis.
1584
estoppel was not an issue on this first appeal.
1585
SMC petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which
was granted by the Supreme Court following its decision in the
1586
Warner-Jenkinson case.
The Supreme Court vacated the Federal
Circuit’s judgment, and remanded to the Federal Circuit for further
1587
This grantconsideration in light of the Warner-Jenkinson decision.
vacate-remand order, colloquially known as a “GVR,” allowed the
Federal Circuit to give further consideration to its decision in Festo
with the benefit of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Warner1588
Jenkinson.
The Supreme Court issued GVR orders in two other
1579. See id. (noting submission of affidavit of Professor Jorda).
1580. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 172 F.3d 1361, 1364,
50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1386 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 187 F.3d 1381, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1999), rev’d, 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (2001).
1581. See id., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
1582. See id. at 1365, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
1583. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 862, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming lower court’s decision).
1584. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1161.
1585. The relevant question presented in SMC’s petition for certiorari was: “In a
patent case, can the statutory requirement for patent claims (35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2)
and the statutory restriction for correcting them (35 U.S.C. § 251, ¶ 4) be nullified
by the judicially created doctrine of equivalents?” See Festo, 172 F.3d at 1365, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (quoting SMC’s petition for certiorari).
1586. Warner-Jenkinson Corp. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
1587. See Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. v. Festo Corp., 520 U.S. 1111
(1997).
1588. See generally Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163 (1996) (delineating the
Supreme Court’s GVR practices); Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193 (1996)
(same).
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1589

equivalents cases at or around the same time.
1590
The Federal Circuit ordered further briefing on the case, and
heard reargument. In connection with rebriefing and reargument,
SMC urged that the “new” presumption established by the Supreme
court in Warner-Jenkinson applied to bar Festo’s infringement claims
1591
under the doctrine of prosecution-history estoppel.
SMC also
submitted additional materials, not previously part of the trial and
appeal record, dealing with possible estoppel under one of the two
1592
patents in suit.
On April 19, 1999, the same panel (Judges Rich,
Newman, and Michel) issued a new opinion dealing with the doctrine
1593
With respect to one patent, it reinstated its earlier
of equivalents.
judgment, and with respect to the other patent, the panel ruled that
the new evidentiary materials submitted by SMC—which the Federal
Circuit decided to allow into the record “[i]n full implementation of
1594
the GVR” —needed to be considered by the district court to
determine “whether [the Warner-Jenkinson] presumption has arisen,
whether it can be rebutted, and the scope of any resultant
1595
estoppel.”
The “scope” of any particular prosecution-history estoppel has
been a divisive issue in the Federal Circuit almost since that court’s
1596
inception in 1982.
In the court’s first significant doctrine of
1597
the Federal
equivalents case, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
Circuit noted that some of the regional circuit courts of appeals
(which had jurisdiction over most patent-infringement cases prior to
the creation of the Federal Circuit) had “expressed the view that
virtually any amendment of the claims creates a ‘file wrapper
1589. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. 1111 (1997); United States v.
Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. 1211 (1997).
1590. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 117 F.3d 1385,
1386 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1591. See Festo, 172 F.3d at 1372, 1374, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392, 1394.
1592. See id. at 1378-80, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397-98 (evaluating SMC’s
arguments).
1593. See id. at 1361, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
1594. Id. at 1380, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
1595. Id., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398.
1596. See Note, To Bar or Not to Bar: Prosecution History Estoppel After WarnerJenkinson, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2330, 2331 (1998) (“The Federal Circuit has struggled
to answer [questions regarding the scope of prosecution-history estoppel] for some
time, and has been unable to do so in a consistent manner.”); Paul J. Otterstedt,
Unwrapping File Wrapper Estoppel in the Federal Circuit: A New Economic Policy Approach,
67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 405, 407 (1993) (“The Federal Circuit is currently divided over
whether the narrowing of claims during prosecution bars all resort to the doctrine of
equivalents.”). See generally Glen K. Beaton, File Wrapper Estoppel and the Federal Circuit,
68 DENV. U. L. REV. 283, 284 (1991) (reviewing the policy of prosecution-history
estoppel).
1597. 717 F.2d 1351, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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estoppel’ effective to bar all resort to the doctrine of equivalents, and
to confine patentees ‘strictly to the letter of the limited claims
1598
granted.’”
The panel in Hughes Aircraft rejected this “wooden
1599
application of estoppel,” choosing instead to follow a case-by-case
approach to estoppel, whereby,
[d]epending on the nature and purpose of an amendment, it may
have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small
to zero. The effect may or may not be fatal to application of a
range of equivalents broad enough to encompass a particular
accused product. It is not fatal to application of the doctrine
1600
itself.

But this was not the uniform approach of the Federal Circuit, as
another case decided just ten and a half months after Hughes Aircraft,
1601
Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., demonstrates. Kinzenbaw was decided by
1602
a five-judge panel of the Federal Circuit consisting of then-Chief
1603
Judge Markey and Judges Friedman, Rich, Davis and Baldwin.
Interestingly, the five-judge Kinzenbaw panel included all three judges
from the Hughes Aircraft panel—Chief Judge Markey and Judges Davis
and Baldwin. The five-judge Kinzenbaw panel unanimously held—
and arguably contrary to Hughes Aircraft—that by “intentionally
narrow[ing] his claims in order to avoid the examiner’s rejection and
obtain the patent,” the patentee was properly estopped from
“avoid[ing] that limitation upon the claims through the doctrine of

1598. Id. at 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481 (quoting Nationwide Chem. Corp. v.
Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 719, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 261 (5th Cir. 1978)).
1599. Id. at 1362, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.
1600. Id. at 1363, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.
1601. 741 F.2d 383, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1602. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1996)
In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing and determination of
cases and controversies by separate panels, each consisting of three
judges . . . . The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
determine by rule a procedure for the rotation of judges from panel to panel
to ensure that all of the judges sit on a representative cross section of the
cases heard and, notwithstanding the first sentence of this subsection, may determine
by rule the number of judges, not less than three, who constitute a panel.
Id. (emphasis added).
Although several of the Federal Circuit’s early cases, such as Kinzenbaw, involved
five-judge panels, that practice—though still authorized by statute and by court
rule—has fallen into disuse in the past several years. But see 1 DONALD R. DUNNER ET
AL., COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5.01, at
5-4 (2000) (opining, seemingly contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) and Federal Circuit
Rule 47.2(a), that “the court’s rules no longer provide for such augmented panels”).
1603. The Federal Circuit is the only court of appeals entitled to sit in sub-en banc
panels consisting of five judges. See FED. CIR. R. 47.2(a) (“Cases and controversies
will be heard and determined by a panel consisting of an odd number of at least
three judges, two of whom may be senior judges of the court.”).
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1604

equivalents.”
Although the patentee (Deere) “attempt[ed] to
avoid the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel on the ground that
[the inventor’s] limitation of his claims . . . was unnecessary to
1605
distinguish the prior art,”
the Kinzenbaw panel “decline[d] to
undertake the speculative inquiry whether, if [the inventor] had
made only that narrowing limitation in his claim, the examiner
1606
nevertheless would have allowed it.”
It was obvious that Hughes Aircraft and Kinzenbaw were not easily
reconcilable. As three commentators, writing in the second of these
Area Summaries published in the American University Law Review,
noted at the time:
The Federal Circuit’s continued reluctance to define the precise
boundaries of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel
exemplifies the court’s unease in dealing with certain issues that
were outside of the former CCPA’s jurisdiction. Prior to this past
year, the Federal Circuit applied two divergent lines of authority
dealing with prosecution history estoppel. The first, following the
lead case of Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, states that under
some circumstances, statements made during prosecution can be
ignored for purposes of estoppel. The second, following the lead
case of Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., holds the patentee more firmly to
the representations he has made to the PTO. No test is able to
predict adequately which line of authority the court will apply in a
1607
given case.

The authors concluded that:
“[t]he Federal Circuit’s continued statements that it will be guided
in this area by ‘equitable and public policy principles’ and the facts
of the case are so broad and diffuse that they are essentially useless
as precedent. No one can predict the outcome of a future case that
the court will evaluate under this anti-rule. . . . The court’s vague
language in reality reflects the Federal Circuit’s inability to
articulate the criteria on which its decisions are actually based. The
court’s continued reluctance to engage in the task of defining
1608
those criteria may be the single largest failing of the court.”
1604. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 933.
1605. Id., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 933.
1606. Id., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 933.
1607. Douglas A. Strawbridge et al., Patent Law Developments in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 861, 887-88 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
1608. Id. at 888-89 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, other commentators had noted,
or been critical of, the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent approaches to prosecutionhistory estoppel. See, e.g., 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.05[3][b], at 18-492
(1998) (noting the development by the Federal Circuit of two lines of authority on
the scope of prosecution-history estoppel); Gregory J. Smith, The Federal Circuit’s
Modern Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Infringement, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 921
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Despite these divergent lines of authority, however, it is undeniable
that most (although not all) of the Federal Circuit’s post-Hughes
Aircraft-and-Kinzenbaw published decisions followed the “flexible”
approach of Hughes Aircraft rather than the “absolute bar” approach
1609
of Kinzenbaw.
On June 9, 1999, less than two months after the panel’s decision on
remand from the Supreme Court, and while a petition for rehearing
en banc was pending in the Federal Circuit in Festo, one of the Festo
1610
panel members, Judge Rich, died.
While it is uncertain what effect,
if any, Judge Rich’s departure had on the outcome of the Festo en banc
poll, it unquestionably did not reduce the number of votes required
to accept the case for en banc review. His passing reduced by one the
1611
number of active judges who could have participated in such a poll
from eleven to ten, but six votes in favor of en banc review were still
1612
required.
A majority of eleven active judges would have been six
judges, but a majority of ten active judges also would have required
1613
Nonetheless, it is possible that Judge Rich’s passing may
six votes.
have eased the way for the remaining members of the court to take
up the issue. For not only was Judge Rich a legendary figure in the
history of the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court, the Circuit
Court of Patent Appeals (CCPA), but he was also the last active
member of the Federal Circuit from the Kinzenbaw panel, as well as
the author of another early Federal Circuit decision arguably
1614
applying a complete-bar approach to prosecution-history estoppel.
(1989); Note, To Bar or Not to Bar: Prosecution History Estoppel After Warner-Jenkinson,
111 HARV. L. REV. 2330, 2336 (1998) (comparing the two approaches and arguing
that any attempt to harmonize them would be flawed).
1609. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (ruling that prosecution-history estoppel does not
absolutely bar any equivalents to limitation added by amendment, nor does it bar a
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents); Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding
that an amendment of a patent claim during prosecution does not automatically bar
all equivalents for the element that is the subject of the amendment); see also Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 612-15, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1908-10 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Michel, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (collecting Federal Circuit cases from 1983-2000 applying flexible estoppel).
1610. See Bart Barnes, Giles S. Rich Dies at 95: Oldest Active Federal Judge in U.S. History:
As an Authority on Patent Law, He Helped Establish Legal Precedents for the Biotechnology
and Computer Industries, WASH. POST, June 11, 1999, at B6.
1611. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (providing that “a majority of the circuit judges in
regular active service” must agree to hear a case en banc) (emphasis added).
1612. See id. (indicating that a case will be accepted for en banc review only “if a
majority of the judges in regular active service agree to hear it en banc.”).
1613. See, e.g., United States v. Leichter, 167 F.3d 667, 667 (1st Cir. 1999) (“We
construe this language [in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) and FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)] to require
that an absolute majority of the court’s active judges vote in favor of the petition.”).
1614. See Prodyne Enter., Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc., 743 F.2d 1581, 223
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Whatever the effect of Judge Rich’s passing, the Federal Circuit
granted en banc review in Festo on August 20, 1999, only two months
1615
after his death.
The court’s en banc order in Festo posed five
questions:
1. For the purposes of determining whether an amendment to a
claim creates prosecution history estoppel, is “a substantial reason
1616
limited to those amendments made to
related to patentability,”
overcome prior art under § 102 and § 103, or does “patentability”
mean any reason affecting the issuance of a patent?
Warner-Jenkinson,
2. Under
should
a
“voluntary”
claim
amendment—one not required by the examiner or made in
response to a rejection by an examiner for a stated reason—create
prosecution history estoppel?
3. If a claim amendment creates prosecution history estoppel,
under Warner-Jenkinson what range of equivalents, if any, is available
under the doctrine of equivalents for the claim element so
amended?
4. When “no explanation [for a claim amendment] is
1617
thus invoking the presumption of prosecution
established,”
history estoppel under Warner-Jenkinson, what range of equivalents,
if any, is available under the doctrine of equivalents for the claim
element so amended?
5. Would a judgment of infringement in this case violate WarnerJenkinson’s requirement that the application of the doctrine of
equivalents “is not allowed such broad play as to eliminate [an]
1618
element in its entirety.”
In other words, would such a judgment
of infringement, post Warner-Jenkinson, violate the “all elements”
1619
rule?

In response to this order, the court received supplemental briefs,
including amicus curiae briefs, and heard oral argument on March 29,
1620
2000.
Eight months to the day later, on November 29, 2000, the en banc
1621
court issued its decision in Festo.
In response to en banc question 1,
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Judge Rich’s opinion was joined by Judges
Friedman and Cowen, both of whom are now Senior Judges on the Federal Circuit.
1615. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 187 F.3d 1381, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1616. Warner-Jenkinson Corp. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997).
1617. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33.
1618. Id. at 29.
1619. Festo, 187 F.3d at 1381-82, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960.
1620. See T. Whitley Chandler, Note, Prosecution History Estoppel, the Doctrine of
Equivalents, and the Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 477 n.56 (2000)
(recounting the chronology of Festo).
1621. See 234 F.3d 558, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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the court concluded that the term “a substantial reason related to
patentability,” as used in Warner-Jenkinson, “is not limited to
overcoming or avoiding prior art, but instead includes any reason
1622
which relates to the statutory requirements for a patent.”
Thus, an
1623
1624
amendment made to satisfy the Patent Act’s utility, best mode,
1625
and claiming requirements will also give rise to prosecution-history
1626
The court viewed this result as more in keeping with “the
estoppel.
functions of prosecution history estoppel—preserving the notice
function of the claims and preventing patent holders from
recapturing under the doctrine of equivalents subject matter that was
1627
surrendered before the Patent Office.”
Given the breadth of that
result, it is difficult to imagine that any kind of claim amendment,
other than one to make a minor ministerial or scrivening change, will
not give rise to estoppel.
With regard to en banc question 2, the court concluded that a
“voluntary” claim amendment—just as with one made in response to
an examiner’s request or rejection—should give rise to prosecution1628
history estoppel as to the amended claim element.
Both voluntary amendments and amendments required by the
Patent Office signal to the public that subject matter has been
surrendered. There is no reason why prosecution history estoppel
should arise if the Patent Office rejects a claim because it believes
the claim to be unpatentable, but not arise if the applicant amends
1629
a claim because he believes the claim to be unpatentable.

Indeed, the court viewed its holding as to “voluntary” amendments
as “consistent with the doctrine of argument-based estoppel,” under
which a patentee’s arguments, comments and representations to the
Patent Office, even though the choice and scope of those arguments
is made voluntarily, will nonetheless serve to estop the patentee from
later asserting claim scope that is inconsistent with those prior
1630
voluntary remarks via the doctrine of equivalents.
The court also
1622. See id. at 566, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
1623. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (“Whosoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process . . . may obtain a patent therefore . . . .”) (emphasis added).
1624. See id. § 112 (“The specification . . . shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
1625. See id. (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention.”).
1626. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 567, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (reviewing the
statutory requirements for obtaining a patent).
1627. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1628. See id. at 568, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1629. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871-72.
1630. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. For examples of cases in which
“[a]rguments made voluntarily during prosecution may give rise to prosecution
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viewed its holding on question 2 as consistent with Warner-Jenkinson,
where the Supreme Court noted that the patent’s lower pH limit of
6.0 was apparently a voluntary amendment, but “[n]evertheless . . .
1631
could give rise to prosecution history estoppel.”
The en banc court’s answer to question 3 was the most controversial
of its holdings, for here the court overruled the entire Hughes Aircraft
line of “flexible bar” cases: “When a claim amendment creates
prosecution history estoppel with regard to a claim element, there is
no range of equivalents available for the amended claim element.
Application of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim element is
1632
completely barred (a ‘complete bar’).”
The court concluded that
“the question of the scope of equivalents available when prosecution
history estoppel applies to a claim element has not been directly
addressed or answered by the Supreme Court, at least in
circumstances where the claim was amended for a known
1633
patentability reason.”
The court first addressed several pre-WarnerJenkinson Supreme Court decisions applying prosecution history
estoppel, concluding that in none of them had the court “analyze[d]
the actual scope of equivalents that might be available when
prosecution history estoppel applied, i.e., the extent of the subject
1634
matter surrendered by amendment.”
Here, the majority
responded to the dissenting opinion of Judge Michel, who claimed
that several prior Supreme Court decisions had in fact allowed some
range of equivalents even where prosecution-history estoppel applied,
concluding that in the cases cited by Judge Michel, “the range of

history estoppel if they evidence a surrender of subject matter,” see KCJ Corp. v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1351, 1359-60, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1841-42
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that voluntary supplements to a claim amendment which
narrow the claim, preclude the recapturing of subject matter by the doctrine of
equivalents); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1252-53, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that it would be reasonable
for a competitor to believe that the disputed subject matter had been surrendered
given the prosecution history as a whole); Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan
Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1377, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(noting activities that may give rise to prosecution history estoppel); Southwall
Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1583, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1682
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (“We must examine the character of the assertions made in the
prosecution history in addition to the result of those assertions . . . when determining
whether they create an estoppel.”); Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int’l
Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1174, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
1631. Festo, 234 F.3d at 568-69, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (citing WarnerJenkinson, 520 U.S. at 34, for the proposition that a voluntary amendment may give
rise to prosecution-history estoppel).
1632. Id. at 569, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1633. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872.
1634. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
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equivalents available to an amended claim element simply was not
1635
before the Supreme Court in th[ose] cases.”
Having concluded that the Supreme Court had not previously
passed on the question, the en banc majority went on to
“independently decide the issue,” invoking its congressionally
1636
mandated duty “to resolve issues unique to patent law.”
The court
noted the divergent lines of authority headed by Hughes Aircraft and
1637
Kinzenbaw, and concluded that the “flexible bar” represented by
the Hughes Aircraft decision should be repudiated in favor of the
complete bar of Kinzenbaw, a conclusion reached “after nearly twenty
years of experience in performing our role as the sole court of
appeals for patent matters,” during which “the notice function of
patent claims has become paramount, and the need for certainty as
1638
to the scope of patent protection has been emphasized.”
This
experience, the Federal Circuit said, led it to conclude that “the
flexible bar approach [makes it] virtually impossible to predict before
1639
the decision on appeal where the line of surrender is drawn.”
The
majority concluded that “the current state of the law regarding the
scope of equivalents that is available when prosecution history
estoppel applies is ‘unworkable’” and “‘poses a direct obstacle to the
1640
realization of important objectives.’”
By contrast, the majority
concluded that the complete bar “enforce[s] the disclaimer effect of
1641
a narrowing claim amendment,” “serves the definitional and notice
1642
functions” of patent claims, and “eliminates the public’s need to
speculate as to the subject matter surrendered by an amendment that
1643
The bar
narrows a claim for reasons related to patentability.”
therefore “lend[s] certainty to the process of determining the scope
1644
of protection afforded by a patent.”
With respect to en banc question 4, the majority concluded that
“[w]hen no explanation for a claim amendment is established, no
1635. Id. at 570-71, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-74 (addressing the dissenting
arguments of Judge Michel). For Judge Michel’s dissent, see 234 F.3d at 601-05, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899-1902.
1636. Id. at 571-72, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874-75.
1637. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 572-73, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875-76 (noting that the
Federal Circuit has followed both the “strict rule of complete surrender” approach
and the “flexible bar approach to prosecution history estoppel”).
1638. Id. at 574-75, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
1639. Id. at 575, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877.
1640. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1877-78 (discussing the “traditional
justification[s] for overruling a prior case” (alteration in original) (quoting Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989))).
1641. Id. at 575, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
1642. Id. at 576, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878-79.
1643. Id. at 577, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879.
1644. Festo, 234 F.3d at 578, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
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range of equivalents is available for the claim element so
1645
amended.”
The court viewed this question as already answered by
the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson: “Where no explanation is
established, . . . prosecution history estoppel would bar the
1646
application of the doctrine of equivalents as to that element.”
The
court found it unnecessary to reach en banc question 5, whether a
judgment of infringement by equivalents in the present case would
violate the “all-elements” rule. In other words, according to of
Warner-Jenkinson, it would have been superfluous to inquire whether a
judgment of infringement by equivalents would “eliminate [an]
1647
element in its entirety” from the patent claims.
Judge Plager, who assumed senior-judge status the day after Festo
1648
Although he joined
was decided, filed a brief concurring opinion.
the opinion and judgment of the court, he viewed the en banc
1649
decision as “a second-best solution to an unsatisfactory situation.”
In keeping with several of his prior criticisms of the application of the
1650
doctrine of equivalents,
he noted that the “insubstantial
differences” standard announced in Hilton Davis was “a wonderfully
indeterminate phrase, lending itself to making every decision under
the doctrine an individualistic choice, if not simply a flip of the
1651
coin.”
Judge Plager’s preferred solution, as he noted in Hilton
Davis, “would be to declare the doctrine of equivalents—a judgemade rule in the first place—to have its roots firmly in equity, and to
acknowledge that when and in what circumstances it applies is a
question of equitable law, a question for which judges bear
1652
responsibility.”
No other Federal Circuit judge joined Judge
Plager’s concurring opinion, so with his subsequent election of
senior-judge status, the Federal Circuit appears to have lost—at least
as far as en banc decision-making goes—its principal spokesman for an
“equitable” doctrine of equivalents. Note, however, that Judge
1645. Id. at 578, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
1646. Id. at 578, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997)).
1647. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29).
1648. See id. at 591-95, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890-93 (Plager, J., concurring).
1649. Festo, 234 F.3d at 591, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890 (Plager, J., concurring).
1650. See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1537,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1661 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting) (“[I]t may
be asked why the court needs to undertake this inquiry into the doctrine of
equivalents at all. Is something broke that needs fixing? The short answer is yes.”);
Caterpillar Inc. v. Deere & Co., 224 F.3d 1374, 1381, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Plager, J., concurring) (criticizing the “insubstantial
differences” test and arguing that the current rules will create a “lengthy and costly
contest of the experts”).
1651. Festo, 234 F.3d at 591, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890 (Plager, J., concurring).
1652. Id. at 593, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891 (Plager, J., concurring).
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Lourie, who joined Judge Plager’s Hilton Davis dissent but not his
Festo concurrence, remains.
Indeed, Judge Lourie wrote his own concurring opinion in Festo,
despite having authored several opinions supporting a flexible bar
1653
rather than a complete bar,
in which he had “followed what
1654
seemed to be the strongest line of precedent at that time,”
he
concluded that,
in light of experience, and recognizing the Congressional
requirement for precision in claims, . . . I am persuaded that when
we have the opportunity en banc to depart from an unworkable rule
by holding patent applicants to their actions in the PTO, we should
do so. Adoption of a firmer rule today is in the best interest of the
1655
patent system.

Judge Michel, joined by Judge Rader, filed a lengthy dissent from
the court’s disposition of en banc question 3 (the flexible-bar-versus1656
Judge Michel viewed the majority’s decision
complete-bar issue).
as disturbing the balance struck by the Supreme Court between “a
patentee’s need for meaningful protection against copying and the
public’s need for notice as to the effective scope of a patentee’s
1657
claims.”
In his view, the complete bar paid insufficient attention to
whether a reasonable competitor would view the prosecution history
1658
as surrendering any equivalents for amended claim elements.
Judge Michel also concluded that the majority’s complete-bar
holding was flatly contrary to two Supreme Court cases from the late
nineteenth century which, on his reading, allowed some range of
equivalents even though prosecution-history estoppel was held to
1659
apply, as well as six other Supreme Court decisions that suggest a
more flexible approach to prosecution-history estoppel was
1660
The majority dismissed all of these Supreme Court
mandated.
1653. See id. at 595, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893-94 (Lourie, J., concurring) (citing
examples of cases in which he claimed to have followed the “strongest line of
precedent”).
1654. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893-94 (Lourie, J., concurring).
1655. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (Lourie, J., concurring).
1656. See id. at 598-619, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896-1913 (Michel, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
1657. Id. at 598, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896 (Michel, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1658. See id. at 600, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (Michel, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority’s “concept of prosecution history
estoppel is hardly an ‘estoppel’ at all”).
1659. See id. at 601-605, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898-1902 (Michel, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (discussing Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis,
102 U.S. 222 (1880) and Hurlbut v. Schillinger, 130 U.S. 456 (1889)).
1660. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 605-08, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902-04 (Michel, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S.
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cases as either not actually involving prosecution-history estoppel or
1661
being otherwise inapposite.
Judge Michel further viewed the
“complete-bar” line of cases as not actually being another “line of
1662
authority,” but at best an aberration represented by two cases—
1663
Kinzenbaw and Prodyne Enterprises, Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz.
Conceding
that both Kinzenbaw and Prodyne “contain language which, taken
alone, is arguably consistent with the complete bar imposed by the
1664
court today,”
Judge Michel nonetheless urged that “neither
opinion departs from” Hughes Aircraft, for “each opinion purports to
follow and quotes [Hughes Aircraft]” and in fact (despite the arguably
1665
contrary language) applies a flexible bar, not an absolute one.
Finally, Judge Michel stated his view that the majority’s opinion
would reduce the settled expectations of patent holders by
diminishing their value: “I feel that today’s ruling will upset basic
assumptions regarding the effective scope of patents, and will unfairly
1666
disrupt commercial relations based on those assumptions.”
Judge Rader also filed a separate opinion dissenting in part,
principally focusing on the role of after-arising technology in
1667
In Judge Rader’s view, the complete bar of
equivalents analysis.
the majority’s opinion at a minimum should not apply to after-arising
technology because a patentee cannot possibly surrender in
1668
prosecution that of which he does not (and could not) know.
77 (1900); Royer v. Coupe, 146 U.S. 524 (1892); Phoenix Caster Co. v. Spiegel, 133
U.S. 360 (1890); Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593 (1886); Sutter v. Robinson, 119
U.S. 530 (1886); and Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U.S. 408 (1883)).
1661. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 570-71, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-74 (concluding
that the “range of equivalents available to an amended claim element simply was not
before the Supreme Court in the cases Judge Michel cites, and the Supreme Court
did not discuss the issue presented in en banc Question 3”).
1662. See id. at 610, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (rejecting the majority’s
proposition that there are two lines of authority regarding prosectuion-history
estoppel).
1663. 743 F.2d 1581, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1664. Festo, 234 F.3d at 610, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (Michel, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
1665. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906 (Michel, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1666. Id. at 619, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (Michel, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1667. See id. at 619-20, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (Rader, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1668. Id. at 620, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (Rader, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) stating that:
The court reasons today that it will not inquire about the scope of an
estoppel because it cannot with certainty ascertain the scope of the
applicant’s surrender. Although that premise is questionable for the reasons
enunciated by Judges Michel and Linn, one thing is beyond question: That
premise does not apply to after-arising technology. Because after-arising
technology was not in existence during the patent application process, the
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Judge Linn, who joined the Federal Circuit after en banc
consideration had been ordered in Festo, but before oral argument,
also filed an opinion dissenting in part as to en banc question 3. His
1669
opinion was also joined by Judge Rader.
Although Judge Linn
joined the majority’s conclusions on the other en banc questions, he
broke from the majority on the issue of the complete bar by
1670
amendment.
Judge Linn focused on the purposes of the patent
system, the policies behind the doctrine of equivalents, and the fact
that patent claims must use ordinary language to describe difficult
concepts, making the level of precision demanded by the majority
1671
elusive, if not impossible.
But perhaps his most significant
contribution was to point out the striking conflict between the
majority opinion and the Warner-Jenkinson opinion that it purported
to implement:
If the doctrine of equivalents is completely barred when no reason
for an amendment can be discerned from the prosecution history,
and it is likewise completely barred when a reason is stated, what is
the point of exploring the “reason (right or wrong) for the
[examiner’s rejection of the claim prior to its being amended] and
the manner in which the amendment addressed and avoided that
[rejection?]” Thus, adoption of a rebuttable presumption of
estoppel for an amendment that was made for an unknown reason
necessarily presupposes the possibility that no estoppel will apply
where the reason for the amendment is known, or where that
1672
presumption is rebutted.

The majority opinion had no good answer to this apparent conflict
between Warner-Jenkinson and its own abolition of the flexible-bar
approach to estoppel by amendment.
Judge Newman also filed an opinion dissenting in part. She, too,
pointed out the tension between the Supreme Court’s remand order
in Warner-Jenkinson, linking the reason for an amendment with the
question of prosecution-history estoppel, and the majority’s
approach, making the reasons for an amendment far less central to

applicant could not have known of it, let alone surrendered it.
Id.
1669. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (Rader, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Similarly, Judge Dyk, who joined the majority opinion in Festo,
became a member of the Federal Circuit after argument but before decision.
1670. See Festo, 234 F.3d at 620, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (Linn, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
1671. See id. at 626, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919 (Linn, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1672. Id. at 625, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918 (Linn, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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1673

the estoppel analysis.
Judge Newman also noted that the
disapproved Hughes Aircraft decision dealt with the application of the
1674
doctrine of equivalents to “later-developed technology.”
Finally,
Judge Newman dealt with the complex issues of public policy raised
by the doctrine of equivalents, noting that while the Doctrine does
tend to diminish incentives for competitors, it also encourages
competitors to make real and substantial patentable innovations
1675
instead of simply nibbling around the edges of the claims.
As of the initial writing of this Area Summary, the final chapter of
Festo is yet to be concluded. On April 9, 2001, after much
complicated and public wrangling over positional conflicts of
1676
interest,
Festo filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court of the United States, urging that the Court accept the
case to resolve two issues:
(1) Whether every claim-narrowing amendment designed to
comply with any provision of the Patent Act—including those
provisions not relating to prior art—automatically creates
prosecution history estoppel regardless of the reason for the
amendment; and
(2) Whether the finding of prosecution history estoppel completely
1677
bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents.
1678

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 18, 2001,
received briefing during Summer 2001, and will hear arguments
during October Term 2001.
While there were ample reasons for the Supreme Court to exercise
its discretion to accept Festo for review, there were at least as many
reasons against such review. For one, the Supreme Court in WarnerJenkinson said that it was leaving the development of the law of
equivalents largely to the Federal Circuit, in the exercise of its
specialized and congressionally mandated jurisdiction to administer
the patent laws. For another, because the Festo approach is a new
one, it might have been more appropriate for the Court, at a
1673. See id. at 630, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1922 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1674. See id. at 635, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
1675. See id. at 640, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1676. See, e.g., Jonathan Ringel, Conflict Gives Bork a Starr Turn: Kirkland & Ellis
forced to give up role in Festo, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 16, 2001, at 6 (discussing the firm’s
conflict of interest in representing Honeywell, a company which stands to financially
benefit from overturning Festo).
1677. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co. (2001) (No. 00-1543).
1678. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 121 S. Ct. 2519
(2001).

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000

1643

minimum, to defer ruling at this time and await a future case, so that
the Supreme Court’s deliberations would benefit from a body of
Federal Circuit (and lower-court) experience in interpreting and
applying the Festo rules.
Finally, although it is at least arguable (for the reasons stated by
Judges Michel and Linn) that the Festo decision conflicts with the
Supreme Court’s approach in Warner-Jenkinson, the complete bar
announced in Festo does what the Federal Circuit has rarely done in
its history, i.e., rather than announcing a vague and unpredictable
“totality of the circumstances”-type test, it goes a long way toward
creating an actual rule that can be applied predictably and (more or
1679
less) uniformly by courts and litigants alike.
And there is little
doubt that the present Supreme Court is much more favorably
disposed to bright-line rules such as the one adopted by the Festo
1680
majority than to murky, multifactor, case-by-case inquiries.
Because Festo was pending in the Federal Circuit for most of the
year, there were few opportunities for the court to apply Festo in 2000,
and the court—consistent with its prior practice of not backing up its
docket in anticipation of en banc rulings such as Markman and Hilton
Davis—continued to issue prosecution-history estoppel rulings
throughout the year. Since the judges deciding these cases, and
writing these opinions, presumably had an inkling of how Festo was
1681
going to come out in the end, it is interesting to look back on the
court’s pre-Festo prosecution-history estoppel rulings and see how
consistent the pre-Festo rulings were.
There was, indeed, a
remarkable foreshadowing of Festo in results, if not approaches,
because most pre-Festo panel decisions rested on alternative
prosecution-history estoppel grounds. For example, in Hilgraeve Corp.
1682
v. McAfee Associates, Inc., the panel ruled that an amendment made
1683
by Hilgraeve resulted in prosecution-history estoppel.
However,
1679. See, e.g., Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Const., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323
n.2, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450-53 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting, in the context of the
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) on-sale bar, that the Federal Circuit’s “standard of the totality of
circumstances has been criticized as unnecessarily vague”).
1680. See, generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (examining the Supreme Court Justices’ divisions over
rules and standards in the 1991 term and the implication for the Court’s apparent
centrism); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2177 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s replacement of the Chevron doctrine with a
“totality of the circumstances” test); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989) (exploring the “dichotomy between general
rules and personal discretion within the narrow context of law that is made by the
courts”).
1681. Oral arguments in the case took place in March 2000.
1682. 224 F.3d 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1683. See id. at 1355, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661-62.
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the panel’s rationale was grounded primarily in the arguments that
Hilgraeve made to the PTO in connection with that amendment,
1684
rather than the fact of the amendment itself.
It appears that the
court followed similar belt-and-suspender strategies in other pre-Festo
1685
equivalents cases, including KCJ Corp. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. and
1686
Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corp.,
both of which
grounded their estoppel decisions in an amalgam of estoppel-byamendment and estoppel-by-argument rationale. Since the line of
estoppel-by-argument cases was discussed, but not otherwise put at
issue in Festo, it was safe for pre-Festo panels to ground their decisions
not merely on estoppel by amendment, but also in the estoppel-byargument line of authorities, even though Festo’s estoppel-byamendment holding would have yielded the same result in cases like
Hilgraeve, KCJ, and Bayer.
b.

The all-elements rule, or the anti-vitiation rule

“[T]he second legal limitation on the doctrine” of equivalents is
the “all elements rule,” variously known as the “all limitations rule” or
1687
The “all elements
the rule against vitiation of a claim element.
rule,” which holds that there can be no infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents if even one element of a claim or its
equivalent is not present in the accused device, is the same rule
served by Warner-Jenkinson’s principle that an infringement-byequivalents claim cannot be “allowed such broad play as to effectively
eliminate that element in its entirety,” or “vitiate the central functions
1688
of the patent claims themselves.”
Aside from the first legal
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, that of prosecution-history
estoppel, the anti-vitiation rule was invoked by several Federal Circuit
cases in 2000.
Although the panel in Elekta Instrument, S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l,
1689
Inc. remanded for the district court to consider equivalence in the
first instance, the panel nonetheless offered significant dicta (or,
more positively viewed, guidance for the district court on remand)
1690
regarding application of the anti-vitiation rule.
In Elekta, the
1684. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1661.
1685. 223 F.3d 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1686. 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1687. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 587,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1887 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that the “all elements” rule
should be used if prosecution history estoppel does not bar the application of the
doctrine of equivalents).
1688. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
1689. 214 F.3d 1302, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1690. See id. at 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913 (discussing the elements that
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Federal Circuit reversed a summary judgment of literal infringement
in favor of the patent owner, concluding that the gamma knife
claimed in the Elekta patent was limited to those having radiation
sources “only within a zone extending between latitudes 30°-45°, as
1691
seen from the diametrical plane.”
After concluding—contrary to
the district court’s claim construction—that the 30°-45° range stated
in the claim was the exclusive range for location of the radiation
1692
sources and not merely an upper limit for their positions,
the
Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment of literal
infringement and (effectively) ordered summary judgment of no
1693
literal infringement in favor of the accused infringer.
Although
the panel nominally remanded for consideration of Elekta’s
equivalents claim, it offered the following in a footnote: “We note,
however, that in light of our claim construction, a finding of
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents would seemingly
vitiate the clear limitation ‘only within a zone extending between
1694
latitudes 30°-45°‘ in claim 1.”
Thus, the court opined that any
claim of equivalents that would capture radiation sources not within
the latitudes of 30°-45° would effectively rub out that numerical claim
1695
limitation.
The court reached a similar result, on similar reasoning, in Moore
1696
U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co.
There, the patent claim, a
mailer-type business form, required paper adhesive strips which
extend “a majority of the lengths” of the longitudinal margins of the
1697
patented form.
The accused form had strips that extended 47.8%
1698
of its longitudinal margins.
The panel concluded that:
the applicant’s use of the term ‘majority’ is not entitled to a scope
of equivalents covering a minority for at least two reasons. First, to
allow what is undisputedly a minority (i.e., 47.8%) to be equivalent
to a majority would vitiate the requirement that the ‘first and
second longitudinal strips of adhesive . . . extend the majority of
the lengths of said longitudinal marginal portions.’ . . . If a
minority could be equivalent to a majority, this limitation would
hardly be necessary . . . Second, it would defy logic to conclude that
should be considered when interpreting patent claims).
1691. Id. at 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
1692. See id. at 1309, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 (holding that the district court
erred when construing the claim to cover gamma units outside the range between
30°-45°).
1693. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915.
1694. Id. at 1309 n.2, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914 n.2.
1695. See id. at 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913.
1696. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1697. See id. at 1105, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235 (quoting the patent language).
1698. See id. at 1106, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
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a minority—the very antithesis of a majority—could be
insubstantially different from a claim limitation requiring a
1699
majority, and no reasonable juror could find otherwise.

Citing the Federal Circuit’s prior decision in Sage Products Inc. v.
1700
Devon Industries, Inc., the court in Moore U.S.A. suggested that this
result was the inevitable consequence of “the inherent narrowness of
1701
Judge Newman dissented on this point,
the claim language.”
concluding:
Whether 47.8% is equivalent to a majority is a question of fact, and
could not be decided adversely to the patentee as a matter of law.
The evidence of identity of function, way, and result, and of
insubstantial difference, was not disputed on summary judgment;
1702
the question requires findings of fact, not summary disposition.
1703

The panel in Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Industries, Inc., also
bottomed much of its “vitiation” holding on Sage Products. The patent
there, drawn to a vacuum cleaner for a swimming pool, required a
“stop” structure to be located “substantially inward” of the peripheral
1704
edge of a disc.
The panel held that the accused device could not
literally infringe this claim element, because it had weight arms that
1705
“clearly extend at least to the peripheral edge of the flexible disc.”
Relying on Sage Products, the court concluded that this same evidence
1706
also prohibited a finding of infringement by equivalents.
These
cases may reach the correct result, but this aspect of “vitiation”
doctrine—like so many areas of the Federal Circuit’s case law—lends
itself only to case-by-case adjudication, not broad application. The
very essence of a claim of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is that one or more of the limitations of the written claim
1707
is not literally met by the accused product or process.
Thus, the
1699. Id. at 1106, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235-36.
1700. 126 F.3d 1420, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1701. Moore U.S.A, 229 F.3d at 1106, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1702. Id. at 1119, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1703. 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1704. See id. at 1414, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1146.
1705. Id. at 1415, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146.
1706. Id. at 1416, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147 (quoting Sage Products, 126 F.3d at
1424, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107).
[L]ike the patent at issue in Sage Products, the ‘382 patent contains “clear
structural limitations,” including a limitation that the stop be located
“substantially inward” of the peripheral edge of the disc. Given the proper
construction of this limitation, a verdict of infringement under the [doctrine
of equivalents] would reduce the claims to nothing more than “functional
abstracts, devoid of meaningful structural limitations on which the public
could rely.”
Id.
1707. See id.
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“equivalent” is, by definition, something that is not literally within the
scope of the claim element in question. In some sense, then, every
finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents could be
said to “vitiate” a claim element because it does not require one (or
more) elements to be literally present. In the words of Sage Products,
a finding of equivalence will always, in some sense of the term, vitiate
1708
a “clear structural limitation” in the patent.
Precise numerical or
spatial limitations are seemingly the easiest examples of patent claims
for which Sage Products’ anti-vitiation rule can be applied. Even so, it
is clear from Warner-Jenkinson itself, in which the lower 6.0 pH limit
was in play under the doctrine of equivalents, that not all numerical
limitations in a patent claim will inherently invoke the rule against
vitiation. More help in this area is desperately needed from the
Federal Circuit.
c. Prior-art estoppel
The doctrine of equivalents cannot be applied in such an
expansive manner that it allows patentees to recapture prior art by a
1709
Indeed, where an accused
reflexive application of the doctrine.
device reads on the prior art, that—“in and of itself,” without regard
to whether infringement is alleged literally or by equivalents—
1710
“mandates a finding of noninfringement.”
Thus, the Federal
Circuit has created a “hypothetical claim” mechanism for evaluating
whether a claim of infringement by equivalents would invade the
prior art. Under “hypothetical claim” analysis, the patentee alleging
a claim of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents must
“propos[e] a hypothetical claim that is sufficiently broad in scope to
literally encompass the accused product or process . . . If that
[hypothetical] claim would have been allowed by the PTO over the
prior art, then the prior art does not bar the application of the
1711
doctrine of equivalents.”
We have given this doctrine the
shorthand nickname of “prior-art estoppel.”
Under proper
hypothetical-claim analysis, “the accused infringer must come forward
1708. Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1425-26, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108.
1709. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,
683-85, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1947-49 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that “a
patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage
which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims”).
1710. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoki Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 570, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Smith v. Magic City Kennel
Club, 282 U.S. 784 (1931) and Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 683-85, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947-49).
1711. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1364-65, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1896 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original).
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with evidence that the hypothetical claim reads on the prior art.”
“[O]nce the patentee makes out his prima facie case of infringement
by equivalence, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the
patentee to show that the hypothetical claim does not read on the
1713
prior art.”
Although the hypothetical-claim analysis was originally designed to
cabin patentees’ reliance on the doctrine of equivalents, it has gained
some currency with patentees as a methodology to “freely redraft
1714
granted claims.”
In Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Brothers Chemical
1715
Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination
that the patentee’s equivalence claim was barred by prior-art estoppel
on two independent bases. First, the court agreed with the district
court that “Ultra-Tex used hypothetical analysis to ‘freely redraft’ its
claim by impermissibly broadening and narrowing it at the same
1716
time, a practice our case law clearly forbids.”
As the court noted,
quoting its prior opinion in Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Systems,
1717
Inc., “‘one cannot, in the course of litigation and outside of the
PTO, cut and trim, expanding here, and narrowing there, to arrive at
a claim that encompasses an accused device, but avoids the prior art.
1718
Slight broadening is permitted at that point, but not narrowing.’”
Second, and aside from the prohibition on narrowing a claim to
simultaneously avoid prior art yet capture the accused device, the
court concluded that Ultra-Tex’s hypothetical claim described a
process that had been in public use more than one year prior to the
application’s filing date, and thus would be invalid under the public1719
use bar of Section 102(b).
This was the first time that the Federal
Circuit had invalidated a hypothetical claim under Section 102(b),
1720
but it was hardly a shocking result.
To the extent that Ultra-Tex and Streamfeeder state a rule, for
hypothetical-claim analysis, that “[s]light broadening is permitted . . .
but not narrowing,” the rule is halfway useful. An absolute
prohibition on “narrowing” a claim for hypothetical analysis is
1712. Id. at 1365, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
1713. Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d at 1365, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896.
1714. Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Sys., Inc., 175 F.3d 974, 983, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1515, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1715. 204 F.3d 1360, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1716. Id. at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
1717. 175 F.3d 974, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA), 515 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1718. Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (quoting
Streamfeeder, 175 F.3d at 983, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521).
1719. See Ultra-Tex, 204 F.3d at 1366, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
1720. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897 (“An invalidating public use is just as
damaging to the patentability of a proposed hypothetical claim as any other type of
prior art.”).
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relatively clear and predictably informs the public, litigants, and
courts that a particular sort of hypothetical claim will prove
unsuccessful. But to the extent that there is a legally significant
difference between permissible “[s]light broadening” and
“impermissibly broadening” a claim in hypothetical analysis, the
distinction is elusive and standardless. While the line between
“slight” and “impermissible” broadening necessarily requires case-bycase adjudication, that line is neither obvious from the case law nor
applicable before the fact in a useful, predictive fashion.
The court also addressed hypothetical-claim analysis in Moore
1721
U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., a decision that was primarily
grounded in the anti-vitiation rule. There, the patentee offered a
hypothetical claim to support its contention that the claim language,
requiring adhesive strips that extend the “majority of the lengths” of
the margins of the patented mailer, could have been patentably
broadened by a hypothetical claim where the language “about half of
the length of the first face, or essentially the entire length” replaces
“the majority of the lengths of said longitudinal marginal portions” in
1722
the claim.
The court rejected this hypothetical claim as
establishing a valid equivalents claim in view of its holding, under the
all-elements rule, that claim language requiring a “majority” cannot
capture an accused device having only a “minority.”
Such an analysis is not divorced from the claim language, but
rather must be anchored in the limitation for which a range of
equivalents is sought . . . A hypothetical claim analysis cannot
operate to the exclusion of the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel or the All Limitations Rule . . . Given our holding that
the All Limitations Rule bars Moore’s desired scope of equivalents,
Moore’s poorly-articulated hypothetical claim analysis must also
1723
fail.

Thus, as Moore U.S.A. makes clear, proving the absence of a prior-art
estoppel by hypothetical-claim analysis may be a necessary condition
for establishing a claim of infringement by equivalents, but it is
plainly not a sufficient one.

1721. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1722. Moore U.S.A., 229 F.3d at 1105-06, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
1723. Id. at 1106-07, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
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Failure to prosecute broader claims

Another judge-made limitation on the doctrine of equivalents has,
not surprisingly, proven to be similarly elusive. In 1997, in Sage
1724
Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries Inc., the Federal Circuit barred a
patentee from relying on the doctrine of equivalents in an attempt to
capture “a relatively simple structural device” not literally covered by
the claims, not involving after-arising technology, and foreseeable by
1725
“[a] skilled patent drafter.”
As the court reasoned in Sage Products:
If Sage desired broad patent protection for any container that
performed a function similar to its claimed container, it could have
sought claims with fewer structural encumbrances. Had Sage done
so, then the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) could have
fulfilled its statutory role in helping to ensure that exclusive rights
issue only to those who have, in fact, contributed something new,
useful, and unobvious. Instead, Sage left the PTO with manifestly
limited claims that it now seeks to expand through the doctrine of
equivalents. However, as between the patentee who had a clear
opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the
public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its
failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration of its
1726
claimed structure.

Judge Rader’s concurrence in Vehicular Technologies Corp. v. Titan
1727
Wheel International, Inc.,
addressed the application of the Sage
Products bar to a summary judgment of nonequivalence. The
Vehicular patent was directed to a locking differential for use in
automobiles. One of the elements of that locking differential was “a
spring assembly consisting of two concentric springs bearing against
1728
one end of [a] pin.”
The accused device used one spring in
1729
The panel held that the district court
conjunction with a plug.
properly granted summary judgment of noninfringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, largely in view of the claim’s use of the closed
1730
term “consisting of two concentric springs.”
Judge Rader concurred, but on a substantially different ground.
After noting that the case “presents the difficult problem of
performing a doctrine of equivalents analysis on the limited facts
1724.
1725.
1726.
1727.
1728.
1729.
1730.

126 F.3d 1420, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1425, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107.
Id., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1107.
212 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1379, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842.
Id. at 1383, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845.
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available for a motion of summary judgment,”
he nonetheless
joined the majority’s disposition “because this case fits well within this
1732
court’s reasoning in Sage Products . . . .”
As he noted, “a skilled
patent drafter would readily foresee the limiting potential of the
‘consisting of two concentric springs’ limitation. [He] would not
confront the need for particularly subtle or ambiguous language to
describe inventive features that are complex, or were never described
1733
before in scientific discourse.”
Foreshadowing his later dissent in
1734
Festo, Judge Rader also found it significant that “this limitation does
not call into question issues of after-arising technology which, by
1735
definition, cannot be foreseen at the time of claim drafting.”
Judge Rader also pointed out that Vehicular had asserted its
infringement claim against Titan
within the two-year period allowed for reissuing a patent under 35
U.S.C. § 251. Section 251 permits a patentee, who “through error
without any deceptive intent . . . claim[s] more or less tha[n] he
had a right to claim,” to enlarge the patent claims within two years
1736
of the grant of the original patent.
He concluded that Vehicular,
“as in Sage, . . . fits the circumstances for restricting the application
1737
of the doctrine of equivalents without further fact finding.

The Sage Products estoppel doctrine has sound policy justifications.
Yet, and particularly because Judge Rader’s views in Vehicular
Technologies were not shared by the other Judges, the Sage Products bar
remains somewhat fuzzy. Its notion of “foreseeable alterations” seems
more conclusory than broadly applicable and thus difficult to
administer at the margins, at least at an appellate level.
“Foreseeability,” in tort and damages law, typically presents a fact
1738
question for the jury.
The Sage Products bar does not seem to go so
1731. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (Rader, J., concurring).
1732. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845 (Rader, J., concurring).
1733. Vehicular Techs., 212 F.3d at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
1734. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 619,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
1735. Vehicular Techs., 212 F.3d at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
1736. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader, J., concurring) (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 251 (1994)).
1737. Vehicular Technologies, at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
1738. See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir.
2000) (noting that “[a] foreseeability determination in and of itself is also a question
of fact for resolution by the finder of fact.”); cf. First Interstate Bank of Arizona, N.A.
v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
“[f]oreseeability is a question of fact in many contexts. However, in defining the
boundaries of duty, foreseeability is a question of law for the court.” (quoting Nichols
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far as to impose an absolute prohibition on capturing, through the
doctrine of equivalents, anything that existed at the time of the
patent application—although in both Sage Products and Vehicular
Technologies, the court and Judge Rader, respectively, took pains to
ground their analyses in substantial part on the fact that the accused
device was not after-developed technology. Such a bar would be at
least predictable and easily applicable, even if perhaps overbroad (a
charge that might appropriately be leveled at Festo, as well). But the
most intriguing suggestion in Judge Rader’s concurrence from
Vehicular Technologies involves the interplay between the reissue statute
and the doctrine of equivalents. According to Judge Rader, it seems
fair to patentees, consistent with the notice function of patents that
protects competitors, and workable in practice, to forbid a patentee
from resorting to the doctrine of equivalents if the patentee knows
(or should know) of the accused technology during the two-year
reissue period, during which the patentee would be allowed to obtain
(or at least attempt) reissue of claims that would literally cover the
1739
accused device.
Though it is not presently the law (but simply the
view of a single judge), it will be interesting to follow this argument to
see if it becomes Federal Circuit law in the years to come.
e.

Dedication to the public

One final legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents—the
doctrine of dedication to the public—is, at this writing, the subject of
a pending en banc determination in the Federal Circuit. The origins
of this debate in the Federal Circuit are recent, being rooted in the
1740
In Maxwell, a panel
court’s 1996 ruling in Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.
of the court (Judges Lourie, Skelton, and Schall) held that “subject
matter disclosed but not claimed in a patent application is dedicated
1741
to the public.”
Two years later, another panel of the court (Judges
Newman, Rich, and Smith) in YBM Magnex, Inc. v. United States
1742
International Trade Commission,
limited Maxwell to its “particular
1743
In reality, though, the panel in YBM Magnex simply held, in
facts.”
v. Keller, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1672, 1686 (1981))).
1739. Vehicular Technologies, 212 F.3d at 1384, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (Rader,
J., concurring).
1740. 86 F.3d 1098, 1112, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1115 (1997) (finding the defendant liable for claim infringment but
remanding the case to recalculate damages).
1741. Id. at 1106, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (quoting Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1562-63, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500, 1504 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
1742. 145 F.3d 1317, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1843 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1743. See id. at 1321, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (“Maxwell is not the only case
that has held, on particular facts, that unclaimed subject matter is deemed
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polite language, that Maxwell was wrongly decided.
Most notably,
the YBM Magnex panel viewed Maxwell as inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
1745
Linde Air Products Co.,
which held that an asserted equivalent
disclosed in the specification (manganese silicate) actually supported
the patentee’s case for equivalency because “the patent itself fully
discloses that welding compositions composed chiefly of manganese
silicate and prepared according to the teachings of the patent are
equivalent to those in which the alkaline earth metals [called for by
1746
the claim] are the principal constituents.”
According to the panel
in YBM Magnex, “[t]he Supreme Court sustained this conclusion
against the Court’s dissenters, who urged that ‘what is not specifically
1747
This argument, however, had
claimed is dedicated to the public.’”
already been answered in Maxwell, where the court explained that in
Graver Tank, compositions including manganese silicate had been
claimed, but the Supreme Court had, in the prior term, “affirmed the
district court’s decision in which it held these broad claims to be
invalid on the ground that many metal silicates embraced by the
1748
claims, but not disclosed in the specification, were inoperative.”
Thus, after YBM Magnex, the Federal Circuit had two divergent
lines of authority. One line, with Maxwell and Unique Concepts, Inc. v.
1749
Brown anchoring the poles, holds that any subject matter that has
been disclosed in a patent application, but not claimed, is dedicated
1750
to the public.”
Another, with YBM Magnex carrying the flag, and
ostensibly supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Graver Tank,
holds, in the words of a recent Area Summary in this law review, that
“the doctrine of equivalents criteria must be applied to the specific
1751
While
facts of the case, thereby producing individualized results.”
abandoned.”).
1744. Id. at 1320, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846. (“The statement made in Maxwell
must be received, as it was given, in light of precedent and its context. The
[International Trade] Commission’s interpretation of Maxwell would place Maxwell
into conflict with Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent.”).
1745. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
1746. Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 86 F. Supp. 191, 199-200, 75
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 231, 238 (N.D. Ind. 1947).
1747. YBM Magnex, 145 F.3d at 1321, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846 (quoting Graver
Tank, 339 U.S. at 614, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 332 (Black, J., dissenting)).
1748. Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1107, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001,
1006-07 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1749. 939 F.2d 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1750. See Maxwell, 86 F.3d at 1106, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006; see also Miller v.
Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) (“[T]he claim of a specific device or
combination, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on
the face of the patent, are, in law, a dedication to the public of that which is not
claimed.”).
1751. Robert J. McManus et al., Survey of Patent Law Decisions in the Federal Circuit:
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those authors viewed the Federal Circuit’s decision in YBM Magnex as
1752
a decision that “clarified its holding in Maxwell v. J. Baker,” we view
YBM Magnex as not clarifying, but only serving to muddy the court’s
body of precedent. Thus, YBM Magnex makes the Federal Circuit’s
decisions seem less grounded in law and more grounded in the
preferences of the particular panel assigned to hear the case.
In one decision from 2000, Judge Michel, writing for the panel in
1753
Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., tried valiantly to mediate
the conflicting views by seeking to portray Maxwell and YBM Magnex
as coherent members of a uniform body of law:
Likewise, while Moore argues that the written description’s
teaching that the length of the first and second strips may be about
“half the length” of the longitudinal marginal portions gives rise to
a scope of equivalents that would cover a “minority,” our case law
reveals that Moore is mistaken. In Maxwell v. J. Baker, . . . , we
explained the contrary principle that “subject matter disclosed in
the specification, but not claimed, is dedicated to the public” in
determining infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. . . .
Having fully disclosed two distinct embodiments, one in which the
first and second longitudinal strips extend a majority of the length
of the longitudinal marginal portions, and one in which they do
not, Moore is not entitled to “enforce the unclaimed embodiment
1754
as an equivalent of the one that was claimed.”

But by quoting the broadly applicable, absolute “rule” of Maxwell in
tandem with YBM Magnex’s description of the holding of Maxwell, the
panel in Moore U.S.A. left little doubt that it was siding with the
Maxwell view of the world. Little wonder that Judge Newman, the
1755
author of YBM Magnex, dissented on this point.
On January 24, 2001, in Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E.
1756
Service Co., Inc., a case that had been argued on December 7, 1999
before a panel of Judges Newman and Rader and Senior Judge
Archer, the Federal Circuit “sua sponte order[ed] that the case be
heard en banc” to address the following questions:
(1) Whether and under what circumstances a patentee can rely
upon the doctrine of equivalents with respect to unclaimed subject
1998 In Review, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1319, 1422 (1999).
1752. Id. at 1420.
1753. 229 F.3d 1091, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1754. Id. at 1107, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1236.
1755. Id. at 1119-20, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The panel majority also states that Moore dedicated to the
public all embodiments less than the majority of the length. There is no support for
such statement. Neither prosecution history estoppel nor prior art was asserted as
limiting equivalency to over 50% of the length.”).
1756. 238 F.3d 1347, 1349, [U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) citation not available].
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matter disclosed in the specification.
(2) Whether in this case the jury’s finding of infringement should
be reversed because the patentee was foreclosed from asserting the
doctrine of equivalents with respect to unclaimed subject matter
1757
disclosed in the specification.

At this writing, briefing in Johnson & Johnston has been completed,
1758
and oral argument was held on October 3, 2001.
The Federal Circuit’s path from Maxwell to YBM Magnex to Johnson
& Johnston ought to be a cautionary tale for the court. Regardless of
whether Maxwell was correctly decided, the panel in YBM Magnex
ought not to have tried to eviscerate the prior panel decision in
Maxwell by confining it to its facts, or by attempting to re-define the
holding. Instead, the YBM Magnex panel should have either followed
the prior panel decision, as it is obligated to do under Federal Circuit
1759
precedent, or, as the court’s rules allow, sought en banc review of
the issue either when Maxwell was decided in 1996, or when YBM
1760
Magnex came before the court.
And it is equally unfortunate that
the full court did not exercise its prerogative to resolve this facially
apparent conflict en banc when YBM Magnex was first decided by the
panel. But what panels of the court should not do is what, it appears,
the panel in YBM Magnex did—it effectively swept aside the prior
panel decision because it disagreed with that decision, and left intact
for three years two obviously conflicting strands of authority, which
only serves to confuse courts and litigants. Lower courts and litigants
(actual and potential) alike cannot effectively conduct their affairs
when every case to come before the Federal Circuit has the potential
to turn not upon predictable and effective legal rules or prior panel
decisions, but upon the particular panel members’ views of the
“totality of the circumstances” and the potential that prior panel
decisions will be “limited to their facts,” whatever they might be. As
Justice Scalia wrote, those are the sorts of tests “most beloved by a
court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who
1761
want to know what to expect).”
1757. Id. at 1347.
1758. See id.
1759. See, e.g., Newell Co., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1417, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“This court has adopted the rule that prior
decisions of a panel of the court are binding precedent on subsequent panels unless
and until overturned in banc.”).
1760. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (stating that an en banc hearing should be ordered
when it is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decision); FED.
CIR. R. 35.
1761. United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2178 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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The costs of this uncertainty to litigants are manifest, but the price
to the court may ultimately be more costly: a loss of public
confidence in its decisions. At a minimum, the court should
demonstrate a willingness to use its en banc procedures more
frequently so that the full court can effectively police the consistency
and predictability of the court’s jurisprudence. That, in turn, ought
to make individual panels less likely to ignore (or distinguish away to
a vanishing point) prior panel decisions.
3.

Other infringement doctrines
In 2000, the Federal Circuit addressed a handful of other
infringement doctrines, including inducing infringement under
Section 271(f) of the Patent Act, infringement by the filing of an
abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, and willful infringement. Additionally, in one case the court had
the occasion to discuss exceptions to findings of patent infringement.
a.

Inducing infringement
1762

the Federal
In Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd.,
Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment holding that the
defendant, NorTel, did not induce infringement of the two patents in
1763
suit.
Noting that the plaintiff had to “show a direct infringement
of the [two] patents” in order to establish liability for inducing
1764
infringement,
the court upheld the summary judgment on the
basis that it had affirmed the summary judgment of no direct
1765
infringement.
b.

Infringement under the Hatch-Waxman Act

The Hatch-Waxman Act amended and modified the Federal Food,
1766
1767
as well as the patent laws.
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
Under the amended FDCA, a pharmaceutical manufacturer may
submit an Abrreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) in order to
seek expedited approval from the Food and Drug Administration
1762. 216 F.3d 1042, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1763. See id. at 1049, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148-49.
1764. See id. at 1048, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148.
1765. Arthur A. Collins, 216 F.3d at 1049, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. (“Because
there is no evidence of direct infringement, an essential element of induced
infringement, we need not reach Collins’s assertion that the district court committed
legal error in other aspects of its analysis of the induced infringement claim.”).
1766. See Pub. L. No. 52-675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1994)).
1767. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (defining patent infringement in the context of
drugs and biological products).
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(FDA) of a generic version of a previously approved (i.e., “listed”)
1768
drug.
A generic-drug manufacturer may file an ANDA if the active
ingredient of the generic drug is the “bioequivalent” of the listed
1769
drug.
In the course of submitting an ANDA, the generic-drug
manufacturer must certify to at least one of the following statements
concerning the listed drug:
• the listed drug is not patented;
• the listed drug’s patent has expired;
• the expiration date of the listed drug’s patent; or
• the listed drug’s patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug” disclosed in the
1770
ANDA.
If the generic-drug manufacturer files the last of these
certifications (known as a “Paragraph IV certification” in view of its
statutory location), the applicant must notify the patent’s owner of
1771
the certification.
An ANDA certified under Paragraphs I or II is approved
immediately by the FDA, once it has determined that the generic
1772
drug satisfies all applicable scientific and regulatory requirements.
An ANDA certified under Paragraph III cannot be certified until the
1773
applicable patent expires.
But the notice required under
Paragraph IV allows the patent holder forty-five days from receipt to
bring suit for infringement under Section 271(e)(2)(A) of the Patent
1774
Act.
A Paragraph IV certification thus cannot be approved, if suit
is brought, until (i) the court decides that the patent is invalid or not
infringed; (ii) the patent expires; or (iii) thirty months from the
1775
notice (subject to court approval).
Because of the need to “tee up”
the validity and infringement issues for prompt judicial resolution
upon the filing of a Paragraph IV certification, Congress has deemed
a Paragraph IV certification itself to be an act of infringement, “if the
purpose of such a submission is to obtain approval under the [FDCA]
to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . .
claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before
1776
the expiration of such a patent.”
If the patent holder prevails in

1768.
1769.
1770.
1771.
1772.
1773.
1774.
1775.
1776.

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV).
See id. § 355(j)(2)(B).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(A), (B)(i).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(A), (B)(ii).
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)-(III).
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
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that infringement suit, he “is entitled to an order that FDA approval
of the ANDA containing the paragraph IV certification not be
1777
effective until the patent expires.”
In many ways, an infringement case premised on the filing of an
ANDA resembles a garden-variety patent-infringement case, as
illustrated by the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Upjohn Co. v. Mova
1778
Pharmaceutical Corp. and Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co. v. Danbury
1779
Pharmacal, Inc.
At the same time, such an infringement case is
somewhat artificial because it is premised on a “hypothetical inquiry”
into “what the ANDA applicant will likely market if its application is
1780
approved, an act that has not yet occurred.”
In Bayer AG v. Elan
1781
Pharmaceutical Research Corp., the court affirmed a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the generic-drug manufacturer, rejecting the
patent holder’s arguments that genuine issues of material fact existed
as to whether the generic manufacturer’s biobatch infringed the
1782
The reason that the biobatch (a batch of the
patent in suit.
1783
proposed generic drug made and tested for the ANDA process )
created no genuine issues, according to the court, was that the
“hypothetical inquiry” called for by Section 271(e)(2)(A) “is properly
grounded in the ANDA application and the extensive materials
1784
typically submitted in its support.”
Where “the ANDA ‘is to sell [a]
well-defined compound,’ then the ‘ultimate question of infringement
1785
The specification of the generic
is usually straightforward.’”
manufacturer’s ANDA specified that the drug manufactured
pursuant thereto would avoid the literal language of the patent
claims, found to be dispositive by the Federal Circuit for two reasons:
first, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides an ANDA applicant with
immunity from allegations of infringement for “acts that are
necessary in preparing an ANDA,” such as “[t]he production of a
biobatch, and the submission of a [certificate of quality and analysis]
1786
regarding this biobatch.”
Second, in light of all the criminal and
1777. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co. v. Royce Lab., Inc., 69 F.3d 1130, 1135, 36
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1778. 225 F.3d 1306, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1779. 231 F.3d 1339, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1780. Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1569, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1257, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1781. 212 F.3d 1241, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1710 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1782. See id. at 1248, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715.
1783. See id. at 1246, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
1784. Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1248, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715 (quoting Glaxo, 110
F.3d at 1569, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263).
1785. Id. at 1249, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715-16 (quoting Glaxo, 110 F.3d at 1569,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263).
1786. Id. at 1249, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
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civil penalties attendant to the submission of a false ANDA, and the
fact that a generic manufacturer is prohibited by law “from selling
any product that does not meet its ANDA’s requirements,” the court
must conclude that the generic manufacturer “is bound by this
specification,” and thus must measure allegations of infringement
1787
against that specification.
The court distinguished its prior
1788
in which the Federal
decision in Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd.,
Circuit “approved of the district court looking to a biobatch for help
in deciding the issue of infringement,” as one where “the biobatch . .
. was properly considered because the ANDA specification in that
case did not define the compound in a manner that directly
1789
addressed the issue of infringement.”
c.

Willful infringement

A competitor who has actual notice of an existing patent has an
1790
Failure
affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringing that patent.
to exercise that level of care can result in a finding of willful
infringement, particularly in cases tried by a jury. If a properly
instructed jury finds willful infringement, it is difficult to disturb that
finding on appeal, since willful infringement “turns on
1791
considerations of intent, state of mind, and culpability.”
The
punitive consequences of a finding of willful infringement are
significant, as such a finding authorizes (though it does not mandate)
the trial judge to enhance damages, up to three times the actual
1792
damages awarded.
Appellate review of jury findings of willful infringement is limited.
1793
Thus, for example, in Stryker Corp. v. Davol Inc., the court affirmed a
verdict of willfulness as supported by substantial evidence, with little
1794
need for discussion of the point.
Likewise, in Ajinomoto Co. v.
1795
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
the Federal Circuit upheld a district
1787. See Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1249-50, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1716.
1788. 110 F.3d 1562, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1789. Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1250, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717.
1790. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418, 425 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1791. National Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1188, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1792. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating that the minimum
damages assessed must include a reasonable royalty for use plus interest and costs).
1793. 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1794. Id. at 1259, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (“[T]he jury reasonably could have
credited the testimony that Davol’s reliance on the opinions of counsel was not
reasonable, and that it did not in fact follow those opinions, and that the designs for
the accused devices were finalized before obtaining an opinion of counsel.”).
1795. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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judge’s finding of no willful infringement in similar short order.
Challenges to the district court’s granting or denial of enhanced
damages under the second paragraph of Section 284 may be treated
less deferentially; even though that paragraph of Section 284 grants
1797
the district court substantial discretion,
the Federal Circuit
demands a certain level of rational explanation by the district courts
in exercising that discretion. Thus, in Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess
1798
Technologies, Inc.,
the court vacated that portion of the district
court’s judgment denying the patent holder an award of attorneys’
fees after a jury finding of willful infringement. While noting that
such a willfulness finding “‘does not mandate that damages be
1799
increased or that attorneys fees be awarded,’” the court concluded
that it could not let the denial of fees stand without requiring an
explanation from the district judge as to why he denied fees in the
1800
face of the jury finding of willfulness.
Although the Federal
Circuit’s cases do not use the term, one could easily view this
procedural rule as a “presumption” similar to those created in the
areas of claim construction and infringement analysis. That is, where
willful infringement is found, it will be presumed that enhanced
damages will attach. Thus, the district court will be obliged to
provide a reasoned explanation, based on the facts and circumstances
of the case, for finding that the presumption has been overcome and
enhanced damages are not appropriate.
d.

Exceptions to infringement
1801

In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., the accused infringer
of a patent claiming a method for controlling immunizable diseases
1796. Id. at 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
The [district] court referred to the representations made to ADM by ABP
and Genetika’s subsequent failure to enforce the condition in the
Biotechnics license, and declined to impute bad faith to ADM’s dealings with
ABP. The district court observed that ADM mounted a substantial, albeit
unsuccessful, challenge on the issues of validity and infringement. We do
not discern clear error in the district court’s finding on the issue of no willful
infringement.
Id.
1797. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed”).
1798. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1799. Id. at 972, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (quoting Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d
1566, 1573, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1800. Tate Access Floors, 222 F.3d at 972, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (“On remand,
the district court is directed to consider whether Maxcess sought the opinion of
counsel or otherwise exercised due care, and whether there was a reasonable basis
for concluding that the accused floor panel did not infringe the claims of the . . .
patent.”).
1801. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
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in birds urged that its acts of infringement—tests performed on
birds—“did not infringe because they were scientific experiments and
did not result in the sale of any machines, and therefore were either
merely de minimis, or exempt under the experimental use
1802
exception.”
The panel majority, noting that the Federal Circuit
“has construed both the experimental use and de minimis exceptions
1803
very narrowly,”
concluded that the defendant’s usages of the
patented invention fell under neither exception. The court in Embrex
noted that “[b]inding precedent from the United States Court of
Claims” had previously acknowledged a “narrow defense to
infringement performed ‘for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or
1804
for strictly philosophical inquiry’
[but that the defendant’s tests
1805
The
were] performed . . . expressly for commercial purposes.”
defendant’s “chief commercial purpose was to demonstrate to its
potential customers the usefulness of the methods performed by its in
1806
ovo injection machines.”
Judge Rader concurred separately. In his view, “the Patent Act
leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental use excuses for
1807
Judge Rader viewed the per curiam majority’s
infringement.”
approach as conflating the two concepts, when “clarity call[ed] for
1808
separate analyses.”
As to the de minimis exception, Judge Rader
pointed out that “[s]ince its inception, this court has not tolerated
the notion that a little infringement—de minimis infringement—is
1809
acceptable infringement or not infringement at all.”
Rather than
try to force-fit notions of de minimis infringement into Section
1810
271(a), whose language admits of no such exception, Judge Rader
concluded that “the statute accommodates concerns about de minimis
1811
And as to the
infringement in damages calculations.”
“experimental use” exception, Judge Rader noted that both the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court—most notably in the area of
1802. Id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1803. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1804. Id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (quoting Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 937, 940 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1805. Id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
1806. Id. at 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
1807. Id. at 1352, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165 (Rader, J., concurring).
1808. Id.
1809. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1352-53, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
1810. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (“[W]hoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United States . . .
during the term of the patent therefore, infringes on the patent”).
1811. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
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infringement under the doctrine of equivalents—“have recently
1812
reiterated that intent is irrelevant to infringement.”
Since intent is
irrelevant, there is, according to Judge Rader, no “reason to excuse
infringement because it was committed with a particular purpose or
1813
intent, such as for scientific experimentation or idle curiosity.”
Judge Rader has the better of this argument as an original matter,
for there seems to be no statutory basis for these apparently judicially
constructed exceptions. But the panel majority has precedent on its
side, and in an appellate court, that—more than logic—is power.
Thus, if Judge Rader’s view is ever to hold sway in the Federal Circuit,
it appears that either the court en banc or the Supreme Court will
have to intervene.
IV. REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
Overall, the Federal Circuit broke little new ground regarding
remedies in 2000; rather, its cases tended to address specific factual
situations in traditional damages contexts, and to apply existing rules
to those situations. One area of interest was the subject of future
damages and future price erosion, where the Federal Circuit did to
some degree reach out past its prior, seminal decision in Lam, Inc. v.
1814
Johns-Manville Corp.
A. Damages
1.

General damages
1815
the district
In Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
court awarded damages calculated as a royalty of $1.23/kg of
threonine produced by the defendant’s infringing use of certain
strains of genetically modified bacteria for the period May 1993 to
1816
ADM challenged the award for the period
March 1998.
subsequent to November 1996, when it allegedly switched, the day
after the trial concluded, to a different bacterial culture which was
1817
non-infringing when compared to the previous culture.
ADM had
not told the court about the change in strain, despite the year-and-ahalf gap between the end of the trial and the rendering of judgment,

1812. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Rader, J., concurring).
1813. Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Rader, J., concurring).
1814. 718 F.2d 1056, 1069, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
1815. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1816. See Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1349-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333. See generally
35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
1817. See id. at 1349, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

1663

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000
1818

and moved to amend the judgment to reflect the change.
The
district court denied the motion, and the Federal Circuit, reviewing
the denial of the motion to amend under an abuse-of-discretion
standard, affirmed, noting that the facts before the district court fully
supported the damage award over the entire period, based on the
1819
record evidence.
ADM had within its power the ability to inform
the district court, and its opponent, of the change in strain, but had
affirmatively taken steps prior to trial to prevent discovery of its shift
to the new bacterial culture, and had produced a trial witness who
1820
dissembled on the point during his testimony.
In this light, the
district court did not run afoul of its “broad discretion” under Rule
59(e) by denying ADM’s motion without a further hearing on the
alleged non-infringement of the later culture, when that issue could
1821
have been presented and resolved concurrently in the first trial.
2.

Lost-profits damages
Several Federal Circuit decisions in 2000 addressed lost-profits
1822
damages. In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies, Inc., Tate
Access succeeded in securing a jury verdict of literal infringement
and non-invalidity for its ‘491 patent, which was directed to an
1823
elevated floor panel with a laminate floor covering.
Maxcess
contended that Tate Access failed to prove the absence of noninfringing alternatives, and also failed to prove that it would have
captured all of Maxcess’s infringing sales “but for” the infringement,
particularly given that the parties each sold their respective products
1824
through exclusive dealerships.
Tate Access noted that its own
patented floor panel and Maxcess’s Duratrim floor panel were the
only two available panels that had self-formed recessed edges, and
that all other panels had add-on trims that made them non1825
acceptable substitutes.
The Federal Circuit held that there was substantial evidence
supporting the jury’s finding that Tate Access was entitled to lost

1818. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (discussing the time periods in which
ADM claimed to use the infringing strain).
1819. See id. at 1350-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342 (noting that ADM had no
explanation for its silence in finding no abuse of discretion).
1820. See id. at 1349, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (highlighting the testimony of
ADM’s group leader, and final witness, who gave no indication that a change in
strains was planned for the next day).
1821. See id. at 1350-51, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
1822. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1823. See id. at 963, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
1824. See id. at 970, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1825. See id. at 971, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
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profits, and that the district court therefore had not erred in denying
1826
JMOL as to lost profits.
The court recited the tried and true “but
for” standard: “To recover lost profits, a patentee must show a
reasonable probability that, ‘but for’ the infringement, it would have
1827
made the sales made by the infringer.”
The court also noted that a
useful but non-exclusive way to prove lost profits was to satisfy the
1828
four-part Panduit test.
The court concluded, agreeing with Tate Access, that no noninfringing substitutes for the patented floor panel were available,
because customers who wanted a panel with recessed edges could
choose only the Tate Access product or the infringing Maxcess
1829
Duratrim panel.
Substantial evidence of the non-acceptability of
panels with add-on trim existed, including Maxcess’s own product
brochure, which said that applied or add-on trims were not
1830
acceptable for purchasers of the Duratrim panel.
Given the
absence of any acceptable non-infringing substitutes, the court
agreed that there was a reasonable probability that Tate Access would
1831
have made the sales made by Maxcess.
1832
In Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co., the court affirmed a
jury verdict of infringement relating to a circular blade paper cutter
1833
covered by Fiskars’ patent.
The jury also awarded Fiskars lost
profits of $114,760, which Hunt challenged on the ground that
Fiskars would not have made the sales Hunt did make, because
1834
Fiskars failed the “but for” lost profits test.
Hunt stressed that 90%
of its sales were made to Staples, which as a matter of internal policy,
preferred to deal with a single supplier who would provide a full line
1835
of paper cutters, linear as well as rotary.
Because Fiskars (unlike
Hunt) did not make a full line of paper cutters, Hunt argued that
Fiskars would not have made any sales of the rotary paper cutters to

1826. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1827. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1828. The Panduit test “requires that the patentee establish: (1) demand for the
patented product; (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes; (3)
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand; and (4) the amount
of the profit it would have made.” Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (citing Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 557 F.2d 1152, 1156 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
726, 730 (6th Cir. 1978)).
1829. See Tate Access Floors, 222 F.3d at 971, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (detailing
the similarities between the Tate Access panel and the Maxcess Duratrim panel).
1830. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1831. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
1832. 221 F.3d 1318, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1569 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1833. See id. at 1324, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1834. See id. at 1324-25, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574-75.
1835. See id. at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
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1836

Staples.
The court disagreed, concluding that there was, in fact, substantial
1837
evidence supporting the verdict of lost-profits damages.
The trial
evidence showed that no single supplier would have been able to
provide a full line of paper cutters without infringing, for no noninfringing substitute was commercially available for Fiskars’ rotary
1838
cutter.
But, applying the deferential JMOL review of the jury’s
verdict, the district court concluded that the jury had enough
evidence from which to conclude that Hunt’s customer, Staples,
would in fact have purchased its supply of rotary cutters from Fiskars
1839
but for Hunt’s infringement, and the Federal Circuit agreed.
Even
so, the court offered no explanation as to where Staples would obtain
linear cutters, and did not explicitly reject Hunt’s contention that
Staples would only deal with one full-line supplier. This theory could
have prevailed in a trial court, but was not likely to provide a basis for
reversal on appeal. As in Tate Access, the argument and proof on this
Panduit element was too weak.
1840
In Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., Embrex was awarded
damages for Service Engineering’s infringement of the ‘630 patent,
1841
Embrex was the exclusive licensee of
including direct damages.
the ‘630 patent, which was directed to a method of inoculating birds
against disease by injecting vaccines into a specified region of an egg
1842
before hatching.
On receiving the ‘630 patent license, Embrex
began designing machines to perform the innoculation in large-scale
1843
Service Engineering tried to interest
industrial chicken farms.
Embrex in using its equipment in the practice of the method, but
1844
Embrex refused.
Service Engineering then worked with two other
companies to design around the ‘630 patent, resulting in an
infringement suit by Embrex against all three, which was resolved by
1845
a settlement and dismissal.
Service Engineering, however, continued to build a machine to
practice the patented innoculation method, leading to the

1836. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1837. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1838. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1839. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
1840. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
1841. See id. at 1345-46, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
1842. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
1843. See id. at 1346, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162 (explaining Embrex’s
production process).
1844. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162 (discussing Service Engineering’s
attempts to work with Embrex).
1845. See id. at 1345-46, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
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development of a prototype and tests by retained consultants.
While preparing the prototype and running the tests, Service
Engineering offered to sell the machines to a U.S. company and to a
1847
Canadian company, effectively depriving Embrex of the sales.
1848
Embrex again filed suit, alleging willful infringement of the ‘630
patent, breach of the settlement agreement, and violation of Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. The jury returned a verdict for Embrex on
breach of contract, infringement and willfulness, awarding $500,000
1849
in direct damages.
Service Engineering challenged the award on
the ground that there was no evidence that it had practiced the
claimed method, but had only offered to sell machines that
1850
performed the method, which by law is not a sale of the process.
The court agreed, and vacated the direct damage award, finding that
“SEC’s offer to sell its machines cannot supply adequate evidentiary
1851
support for a compensatory damage award.”
Although not technically a patent case, one decision issued by the
Federal Circuit in 2000 applied analogous state contract-damages law
1852
principles in a license dispute. In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, Dray
1853
After the
exclusively licensed his patents to U.S. Valves in 1991.
business relationship with U.S. Valves deteriorated, Dray began
manufacturing and selling valves himself, including the patented
1854
technology.
U.S. Valves sued for breach of contract, claiming that
Dray sold valves covered by the licensed patents, with Dray
1855
counterclaiming for damages for unpaid royalties.
After a bench
trial the district court found that Dray had sold valves in violation of
the license and issued a permanent injunction against further sales by
1856
Dray and awarded $241,351 in damages.
The court vacated the damages award, finding numerous errors
under controlling state contract law in the method the district court
1846. See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1346-47, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162-63
(acknowledging attempts by Service Engineering to avoid infringement of the ‘630
patent).
1847. See id. at 1347, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163 (noting Service Engineering’s
solicitation of orders).
1848. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1849. See id. at 1347, 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163, 1165.
1850. See id. at 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
1851. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165; see also Joy Tech. Inc. v. Flakt Inc., 6
F.3d 770, 773, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that
sales of equipment capable of performing a patented process is not direct
infringement of a patent).
1852. 212 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1853. See id. at 1370, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
1854. See id. at 1370-71, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835-36.
1855. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835-36.
1856. See id. at 1369-70, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
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1857

had used to arrive at the amount.
The problem was that Dray had
developed another valve model—a sliding ring valve—that was not
established at trial to be covered by the licensed patents or the
license. Dray sold his ring valve at various times along with his
1858
original valve, which did fall within the license.
Yet the damages
award did not differentiate between the two. The district court, not
having determined the number of valves sold by Dray that were
covered by the license, used summary figures alleged to show Dray’s
1859
shipments and invoices as a base for the award.
But because these
summary figures included both infringing and noninfringing valves,
the Federal Circuit sent the case back for a proper determination by
1860
the district court.
3.

Price-erosion damages
1861
In Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Manufacturing Co., the jury awarded both
past price-erosion and future price-erosion damages in Fiskars’ favor.
1862
Hunt challenged both awards as “speculative and contradictory.”
Financial and marketing officers and accounting witnesses for both
sides presented damages evidence to the jury. Fiskars’ damages
expert testified as to the effect of Hunt’s past infringement on
Fiskars’ prices for the patented circular blade paper cutters, and the
1863
effect this price erosion would have in the future.
The expert
apparently applied the Panduit factors, adopted by the Federal Circuit
1864
as noted in Rite Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.
Hunt responded that Fiskars’ damage expert had failed to take into
account that Fiskars would have sold fewer cutters had it not reduced
1865
Hunt
its prices in the face of Hunt’s competing, infringing cutter.
also challenged the Fiskars’ expert testimony that Fiskars’ sales of
rotary cutters would have grown at a ten percent rate, despite the fact
that the overall growth rate of the industry was one percent.
According to the testimony of a member of Fiskars’ marketing
department, Fiskars had experienced this substantial growth rate in
the sales of its rotary cutters and therefore the witness estimated the
future growth rate and described the price reduction Fiskars had
1857. See id. at 1370, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
1858. See U.S. Valves, 212 F.3d at 1375, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839.
1859. See id. at 1374-75, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
1860. See id. at 1374-75, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838-39.
1861. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839-40 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1862. 221 F.3d at 1324-25, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574-75.
1863. Id. at 1324, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
1864. 56 F.3d 1538, 1545, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (reciting the Panduit four-factor test).
1865. See Fiskars, 221 F.3d at 1325, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

1668

11/20/01 4:51 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1435

been obliged to make to remain competitive in response to Hunt’s
1866
infringing sales.
The Federal Circuit tersely rejected Hunt’s challenge, stating that
“[o]n these conflicting positions and arguments, there was substantial
evidence whereby a reasonable jury could have reached the damages
1867
verdicts reached.”
In support of that statement, the court cited its
1868
prior decision in Brooktree Corporation v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
for the proposition that a jury’s award of damages will be upheld
unless “‘grossly excessive or monstrous,’ clearly not supported by the
evidence, or based only on speculation or guesswork.” The court also
1869
cited the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Smith v. Rowe
for the
proposition that “[d]amages assessed by a jury are largely
discretionary with it . . . To reverse the judgment of the trial court,
the appellate court must conclude that the verdict was so ‘gross’ or
‘monstrously excessive’ that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting it to stand.”
Fiskars appeared to be less rigorous in its consideration of the
future price-erosion evidence than the Lam court had been. This
may presage a more receptive view of future price-erosion damages
awarded by a jury, under substantial-evidence appellate review—
especially the acceptance of an estimate of future growth rate rather
than projected figures, as was used in Lam.
4.

Future profits damages
1870
In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, the Federal Circuit agreed with the
district court’s refusal to award future damages in view of the fact that
it had enjoined Dray from selling the valves covered under the license
1871
agreement at issue.
The court found that any future harm arising
from the infringement would be speculative at best since the district
court had enjoined Dray from producing any additional infringing
1872
products.
Also, the license agreement gave no basis to award
damages for future sales; it did not mention future sales, but instead
set up an ongoing arrangement in which the parties would apportion
1873
future revenues from the continuing sale of licensed valves.

1866.
1867.
1868.
1869.

See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
Id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
977 F.2d 1555, 1579-80, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1401, 1418-19 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
761 F.2d 360, 368 (7th Cir. 1985).

1870.
1871.
1872.
1873.

212 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
See id. at 1375, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
See id. at 1375-76, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
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Moreover, the termination date of the agreement was unknown.
Without any way to determine future profits, the court held that any
1875
award of damages for future profits would be wholly speculative.
U.S. Valves tried to avoid this problem with high-tech
computations: it presented expert testimony on lost future profits
1876
calculated with a computer-forecasting model.
While the Federal
Circuit noted that the record did not make clear whether the district
court had actually used the evidence, or tested it under the Daubert v.
1877
1878
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.
or Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
standards, it found that “[w]ithout such assurance, and in the light of
the impossibility of calculating at the time of the simulation the life of
1879
the license agreement, this testimony also appears conjectural.”
The court stated that “[s]peculative or contingent profits, as opposed
to those a plaintiff would certainly earn but for the default, are
recoverable only when the record permits estimation of probable
1880
profits with reasonable certainty.”
The record failed in that respect
and the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of future
1881
damages.
B. Enhanced Damages
The Federal Circuit considered a number of cases raising
enhanced-damages issues in 2000.
These cases continue to
demonstrate the fact-specific nature of enhanced damages awards
under the flexible and unpredictable “totality of the circumstances”
standard for willfulness and exceptional-case determinations.
1882
In Stryker Corp. v. Davol, Inc., a court reviewed the district court
finding that Davol had willfully infringed certain claims of Stryker’s
‘402 patent, which was directed to a endoscopic surgical suction
1883
irrigator.
The district court denied a JMOL motion and motion for
new trial brought by Davol, and awarded enhanced damages and
1884
costs to Stryker for pre-verdict infringement.
The district court’s
first judgment was for a reasonable royalty and prejudgment interest,
1874. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (“The agreement was to last until ‘the
expiration of the patent or subsequent improvement patents . . .’”).
1875. See id. at 1375-76, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1876. See id. at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1877. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
1878. 526 U.S. 137, 151-52 (1999).
1879. 212 F.3d at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1880. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1881. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1882. 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1883. See id. at 1254-55, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134-35.
1884. See id. at 1259, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138-39.
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1885

together with enhanced damages of fifty percent of that amount.
1886
The court then entered a permanent injunction.
Based on Davol’s
continued willful infringement of the ‘402 patent during the period
between the jury verdict and entry of the injunction, the district court
awarded additional reasonable royalty damages and prejudgment
interest, and then doubled those amounts as the quantum of
1887
enhanced damages.
Davol contended that the district court had
1888
abused its discretion in awarding enhanced damages.
The court
disagreed, concluding that the district court properly considered the
evidence of Davol’s culpability and correctly applied the
1889
enhancement factors.
The court found that the district court was
well within its discretion in enhancing the pretrial infringement
damages by fifty percent and doubling damages for post-verdict
1890
infringement until entry of the permanent injunction.
1891
In Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,
Ajinomoto
cross-appealed the district court’s finding that Archer-DanielsMidland (ADM) had not willfully infringed the patent, which led in
1892
turn to the court’s refusal to award enhanced damages.
Based on
(1) ADM’s knowledge of the ‘765 patent at the time it bought the
infringing bacterial strain (culture 3) from ABP for use in the United
States, (2) ADM’s knowledge that Ajinomoto held exclusive rights
under the U.S. patent, and (3) ADM’s assertion that it failed to
obtain counsel’s opinion before begining its infringing activities,
Ajinomoto contended that the district court clearly erred in failing to
find the case exceptional and declining to award enhanced
1893
damages.
However, the court found no clear error on willful
infringement, and affirmed the district court’s withholding of
1894
enhanced damages.
1895
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies, Inc.,
Maxcess
appealed a jury finding that it had willfully infringed the ‘491 patent.
1885. See id. at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1886. See id. at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1887. See id. at 1256-57, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
1888. See Stryker, 234 F.3d at 1259, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1889. See id. at 1259-60, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (“The paramount
determination in deciding to grant enhancement and the amount thereof is the
egregiousness of the defendant’s conduct based on all the facts and the
circumstances.”) (citing Read Corp. v. Portee, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1426, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1890. See id. at 1260, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1891. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1892. See id. at 1351-52, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342-43.
1893. See id. at 1351-52, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342-43.
1894. See id. at 1352, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343.
1895. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000

1671

The district court had denied Tate Access’s motion to amend the
judgment to increase damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284, and Tate
1896
Access cross-appealed from that denial.
Maxcess contended that
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to
enhance damages because it was a close case. According to Maxcess,
there was evidence that the ‘491 patent was invalid, and Maxcess
believed in good faith that its floor panel did not infringe the
1897
patent.
The court vacated the denial of Tate Access’s motion for
enhanced damages, because the district court abused its discretion
when it refused to award enhanced damages without articulating any
reason for refusing to make the award. While a finding of willful
infringement does not mandate that damages be increased, following
an express finding of willful infringement a trial court should provide
1898
reasons for not increasing the damage award. The court specifically
instructed the district court “to consider whether Maxcess sought
counsel’s opinion or otherwise exercised due care, and whether there
was a reasonable basis for concluding that the accused floor panel did
1899
not infringe the ‘491 patent.”
C. Attorneys’ Fees
Several of the Federal Circuit’s year 2000 cases addressed attorneys’
fee awards, usually under the exceptional-case provision of 35 U.S.C.
§ 285. Again, these cases are consistent with the court’s typical
practices, and focus on specific facts and circumstances, with a willful
infringement finding or invalidity of the patent in suit the usual basis
for the exceptional-case holding.
1900
In Stryker Corp. v. Davol, Inc., Davol appealed a jury verdict of
willful infringement. After entry of a permanent injunction, and a
refusal of Stryker’s request for attorneys’ fees for pre-verdict
infringement, Davol began selling a modified version of the irrigator
1901
that had been found to infringe by the jury.
The court awarded
attorneys’ fees, costs, and reasonable royalties for post-injunction
infringing sales, and then tripled those royalties as enhanced
1902
damages for willfulness.
Stryker, however, cross-appealed the denial of its attorneys’ fees for
pre-verdict infringement. The Federal Circuit rejected that challenge
1896.
1897.
1898.
1899.
1900.
1901.
1902.

See id. at 961, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
See id. at 971-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
See id. at 1256-57, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
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1903

and affirmed the district court’s ruling.
Stryker argued that it was
entitled to its pre-infringement attorneys’ fees due to Davol’s alleged
deliberate copying and litigation behavior. The district court’s
approach in enhancing damages for pre-trial infringement by fifty
percent, and doubling damages for infringement after the verdict
and before entry of the permanent injunction was, in the court’s
view, a reasonable measurement of the culpability of Davol’s conduct.
Relying on the discretionary nature of the district court’s reasonable
measurement, the Federal Circuit concluded that Stryker’s request
1904
for additional attorneys’ fees was not an abuse of discretion.
The
award of attorneys’ fees in relation to Davol’s contemptuous conduct
was also affirmed on Davol’s direct appeal. Considering the
conclusory nature of the opinion of counsel used by Davol to justify
selling the revised device and the minor changes made to the original
device, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding the compensatory royalty damages,
1905
attorneys’ fees and costs.
1906
In Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., the court reviewed a district court trial
finding that Chance’s patents in suit were invalid for obviousness,
1907
Ruiz cross-appealed the denial
even though they were infringed.
of its motion for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. Whether a
case is “exceptional” under Section 285, which allows for the award of
reasonable attorneys’ fees, is a question of fact reviewed under a
1908
“clearly erroneous” standard.
The prevailing party has the burden
1909
of proving the case exceptional by clear and convincing evidence.
Only if the prevailing party satisfies its initial burden of proving an
exceptional case does the district court even consider whether to
1910
award attorneys’ fees.
Ruiz had based its request for an exceptional-case finding on the
1903. See id. at 1259-60, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1904. See id. at 1260, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
1905. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139; see also Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v.
Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik AG, 903 F.2d 1568, 1578, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1913, 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it awarded attorneys’ fees and increased damages for flagrant
contemptuous conduct).
1906. 234 F.3d 654, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1907. See id. at 660, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163 (finding that the patent was
infringed, but vacating the finding that the patent was invalid for obviousness and
remanding with instructions to make factual findings on obviousness in accordance
with the four factor test set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
1908. See Ruiz, 234 F.3d at 669, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
1909. Id. at 669, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171.
1910. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (“If the district court applied the correct
legal standard and did not clearly err in its factual findings, then we review the
court’s decision whether or not to award attorney fees for abuse of discretion.”).

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000

1673

alleged inequitable conduct of Chance in failing to submit
information that had, in part, been relied upon by the district court
1911
in finding the patents invalid for obviousness.
The district court,
however, found that the prior-art information was properly disclosed
in the specification of the patents in suit and that there was no
1912
evidence of intent to deceive.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s judgment of no liability for attorneys’ fees because, “at
1913
the very least the court’s findings are not clearly erroneous.”
1914
In Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc.,
Yamanouchi, the owner of a patent for the anti-ulcer drug
famotidine, brought an infringement action under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A) against Danbury, who had filed an Abbreviated New
1915
The
Drug Application (ANDA) for a generic version of the drug.
district court, granting Yamanachi’s JMOL motion after a bench trial,
held for the patent owner, finding that the patent was not invalid as
obvious and was willfully infringed, and awarded attorneys’ fees and
1916
costs for the filing of a baseless ANDA.
The district court found
1917
that Danbury, in its paragraph IV certification in the ANDA, had
not shown any motivation to combine selected portions of various
prior-art compounds to create the specific compound famotidine.
“The district court characterized Danbury’s obviousness case as
largely hindsight, speculation and argument without adequate
1918
foundation.”
That finding in turn led to the district court’s finding

1911. See id. at 660, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (noting that failure to disclose
information will be measured in terms of the information’s materiality and the intent
to deceive, in determining whether the nondisclosure amounted to inequitable
conduct).
1912. See id. at 670, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (discussing the district court’s
conclusion that the language in the specifications of the patents and the materials in
the patent file wrapper history were sufficient for proper disclosure).
1913. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171 (noting that Ruiz had not offered clear and
convincing evidence of the intent to deceive or of the materiality of the withheld
information).
1914. 231 F.3d 1339, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1915. See id. at 1342, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman
Act, also known as The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,
provides that an ANDA can be filed with the Food and Drug Administration to
obtain expedited approval to market a generic drug); see also Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)
(1994)).
1916. See id. at 1341-43, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642-44.
1917. See id. at 1342-43, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (explaining that an ANDA
proponent must certify one of four things: that the previously approved drug is not
patented (paragraph I certification); its patent has expired (paragraph II
certification); its patent will soon expire on a specific date (paragraph III
certification); or its patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture,
use, or sale of the new drug” covered by the ANDA (paragraph IV certification)).
1918. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643.
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that Danbury had willfully infringed the patent, which in turn
qualified the case as exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and
supported the attorneys’ fees award.
In addition, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(4) independently provided a basis for an attorneys’ fee
1919
award to the prevailing party in an exceptional ANDA-based case.
The award of fees for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), is
not, as the Federal Circuit noted, limited to cases involving infringing
commercial sales because “[t]he mere act of filing an ANDA
1920
constitutes infringement.”
Danbury appealed the award of
attorneys’ fees and the court, finding no abuse of discretion in the
award, affirmed.
Although the district court had found Danbury’s conduct to be
willful infringement, such a finding was not, in the Federal Circuit’s
1921
view, necessary to the fees award.
The Hatch-Waxman Act, the
court stated, imposes a duty of care on a party making an ANDA
certification, such that, in a case initiated by a Section 271(e)(2)
filing, the case may become exceptional if the ANDA filer makes
1922
baseless certifications.
The court agreed that the conclusion of a baseless certification was
not clearly erroneous, pointing to particular district court findings:
that Danbury’s case for obviousness presented at trial contained
“glaring weaknesses,” leading to a JMOL at the close of its evidence
1923
1924
on obviousness;
that the ANDA certification notice
and
supporting affidavits, on which Danbury relied to show a good faith
1919. See id. at 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. Section 271(e)(4) states that
“[f]or an act of infringement described in paragraph (2) . . . a court may award
attorneys’ fees under section 285.’” Section 285, in turn, provides ‘[t]he court in
exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” The
“paragraph (2)” infringement specified in § 271(e)(4) is the filing of an ANDA.
Id.
1920. Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646 (explaining that
a submission of an ANDA can qualify as an infringement if the purpose of the ANDA
is to gain approval to market or manufacture the generic drug).
1921. Id. at 1347, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
An ANDA filing by its very nature is a ‘highly artificial act of infringement,’
therefore, the trial court need not have elevated the ANDA certification into
a finding of willful infringement . . . Rather, Danbury’s misconduct in filing a
wholly unjustified ANDA certification and misconduct during the litigation
that followed warranted the district court’s finding that this case was
exceptional.
Id.
1922. See id. at 1347, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (noting that a paragraph IV
filing requires “a certification, in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his
knowledge, [that] each patent . . . for which the applicant is seeking approval . . . is
invalid.”) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)).
1923. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
1924. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that the person filing for an
ANDA send notice to the patentee of “the factual and legal basis” of invalidity).
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belief in invalidity, suffered “similar weaknesses,” viz. that it did not
present a prima facie case of invalidity, and made “no reference to
famotidine’s potency, safety and lack of side effects, among other
1925
distinguishing properties accompanying its unusually high activity;”
that Danbury’s expert could not tell from famotidine’s chemical
structure whether it would be toxic and could not predict its freedom
from side effects or its potency; and that, “when Danbury proceeded
in the face of these weaknesses, its certification amounted to baseless
1926
and unjustified misconduct.”
According to the court, Danbury, in
certifying the alleged invalidity, had disregarded its duty to exercise
1927
due care.
An additional factor that the court noted, in stating that the district
court must look to the totality of the circumstances in determining a
case to be exceptional, was Danbury’s introduction into evidence of a
1993 legal opinion from its patent attorney containing a basic
chemistry error that was critical to the conclusion of obviousness.
Danbury’s expert was forced to concede the flat incorrectness of the
1928
opinion due to that error.
All in all, the court agreed that the
district court properly found Danbury’s ANDA filing “without
1929
adequate foundation and speculative at best.”
The question remains whether Yamanouchi will have a chilling
effect on generic drug ANDA filers who seek to challenge the validity
of a patent covering the proprietary drug product, consistent with the
Hatch-Waxman Act’s underlying philosophy.
At a minimum,
Yamanouchi cautions generic-drug manufacturers to put a rigorous
case together before starting down the ANDA road, lest they risk
paying the other side’s legal bills.
1930
In Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., Syntex manufactured a
drug it sold under the TICLID brand. Syntex held patents both on
1931
the drug itself and on the process of making it.
Hoffmann-La
Roche (Roche) was the exclusive distributor of TICLID. Torpharm
and other generic drug manufacturers filed an ANDA to the generic
1925. Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1347, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
1926. Id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
1927. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (concluding that the district court’s
finding that Danbury’s certification was baseless was not clearly erroneous).
1928. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (pointing out that Danbury’s expert
admitted at trial that the lawyer’s “interpretation of the [‘408] patent was patently
incorrect and that the [‘408] patent nowhere described the formulation relied upon
by [the lawyer]”) (quoting Yamanouchi Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc.,
21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
1929. See id. at 1348, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (quoting Yamanouchi Pharm.
Co., Ltd. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
1930. 213 F.3d 1359, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1931. See id. at 1361, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
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1932

form of the TICLID brand drug.
Roche and Syntex then sued,
alleging that in manufacturing the generic product, the companies
1933
used a process that infringed various Syntex patents.
In the pleadings, Syntex and Roche alleged that before suit they
sought information from each defendant as to how the generic drug
material was being made, to “assist Roche and Syntex in confirming
whether each defendant’s synthesis . . . is within the lawful scope of
1934
one or more claims of the Syntex Patents.”
They also alleged that
while the generic manufacturers provided samples, no defendant
1935
provided any process information.
Further, the plaintiffs pled that
there was no analytical technique which could be used to determine
if the generic drug was made by use of the claimed process, and that,
in the absence of that information, Syntex and Roche were forced to
“resort to the judicial process and the aid of discovery to obtain
under appropriate judicial safeguards such information as is required
to confirm their belief and to present to the court evidence that
each . . . defendant infringes one or more claims of the Syntex
1936
Patents.”
A pre-filing attempt to reverse-engineer the process of
1937
manufacture from the samples was unsuccessful.
After suit was filed, the parties entered into settlement discussions,
which led to the execution of a non-disclosure agreement and
Torpharm’s disclosure to Roche and Sytex of the process used to
1938
make its generic drug.
Roche and Syntex concluded that the
process did not infringe the process patents, and they voluntarily
1939
dismissed the case.
1940
Torpharm then moved for an award of sanctions under Rule 11,
1932. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
1933. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
1934. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
1935. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (noting that Torpharm refused to
provide process information because of a confidentiality agreement with the
manufacturer of the drug).
1936. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (quoting from Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v.
Genpharm, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 367, 372 (D.N.J. 1999)).
1937. See id. at 1361-62, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847 (“[P]laintiffs could not
ascertain the process and could not determine whether it infringed the Syntex
process patents”) (quoting from Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Genpharm, Inc., 50 F.
Supp.2d 367, 372 (D.N.J. 1999)).
1938. See Hoffman-La Roche, 213 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1848. During the
settlement negotiations, a Torpharm representative questioned whether Roche
should pay Torpharm’s legal costs. A Roche representative responded that Roche
would not do so, arguing that Torphram was responsible for the costs because
Torphram had not complied with Roche’s pre-filing inquiries. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1848.
1939. 213 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.
1940. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (providing for sanctions for bringing improper
or frivolous suits).
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and for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, asserting that the suit
was baseless and that Roche and Syntex had brought the suit in bad
faith. The district court denied sanctions and attorneys’ and baseless1941
suit fees.
The court denied Rule 11 sanctions because, although
Roche’s and Syntex’s “pre-filing inquiry with respect to defendant
1942
Torpharm was unsuccessful, it was reasonable.”
The district court
similarly refused to find the case “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285,
because Torpharm had not met its “burden of establishing that this is
an exceptional case. . . . Even if plaintiff’s pre-suit investigation was
unreasonable, an unreasonable investigation alone does not
demonstrate that the ensuing litigation was vexatious, unjustified, or
1943
brought in bad faith.”
Torpharm appealed, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed. Reviewing the refusal to award Rule 11 sanctions
under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the court agreed with the
district court that Roche’s and Syntex’s prefiling inquiry with respect
to Torpharm was reasonable, and that their attempts to ascertain
whether the processes used were infringing were the best they could
1944
manage under the circumstances.
Torpharm’s position was that, because Roche and Syntex were
unable to obtain and set forth in their complaint facts showing
1945
infringement, they should not have filed suit at all.
Although
Hoffman and Syntex “could have assumed non-infringement” when
“[a]t the end of the plaintiff’s pre-suit investigation it had neither
evidence of infringement nor non-infringement . . ., that they chose
to file suit and engage in discovery instead does not subject them to
1946
sanctions,” as the district court had noted.
The Federal Circuit
stated that if Torpharm had initially disclosed the manufacturing
process under the cover of a nondisclosure agreement, as it
subsequently did, Torpharm “could have avoided this litigation and
1947
the expenses incurred in defending it.”
The court remarked that
“[i]t is difficult to imagine what else Roche and Syntex could have
1941. See id.
1942. 213 F.3d at 1362, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1848.
1943. 213 F.3d at 1362-63, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848 (quoting Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Genpharm, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373 (D.N.J. 1999)).
1944. See id. at 1363, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849 (“[A]n appellate court should
apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s rule
11 determination.”) (quoting Cooter and Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405
(1990)).
1945. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849 (rejecting Torpharm’s position and
noting that Torpharm did not point to any other options, other than filing suit,
available to Roche and Syntex).
1946. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849 (quoting Hoffman-La Roche, 50 F. Supp.
2d (BNA) at 373).
1947. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
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done to obtain facts relating to Torpharm’s alleged infringement of
1948
their process patents.”
Turning to 35 U.S.C. § 285, the Federal Circuit reviewed the
district court’s refusal to find the case exceptional as a factual
1949
The district
finding, reviewable under the clear-error standard.
court found that Torpharm had not carried its burden to show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that Roche and Syntex’s suit was
1950
“vexatious, unjustified or brought in bad faith.”
The court stated
that rejection of Torpharm’s Rule 11 claim, based on affirmance of
the district court’s ruling that Roche and Syntex made a reasonable
pre-filing inquiry, also supported the district court’s finding that the
1951
case was not exceptional.
Torpharm presented no facts showing
that when Roche and Syntex filed their complaint, they had reason to
believe that their patents did not cover the processes used to make
Torpharm’s generic drug. Absent that, the court found no reason to
overturn the district court’s conclusion of no bad faith or baseless
1952
claims.
Contrasted with Yamanouchi, Hoffman-La Roche demonstrates that it
is far better to be the patentee than an ANDA-filing generic drug
manufacturer, at least for purposes of Section 285. Hoffman-La Roche
stands for the proposition that it is permissible to go forward and sue
for infringement of a process patent where analysis will not disclose
the process, or where no other information about the process is
available, and the patentee has not concluded that the process is not
being used. In these circumstances, not knowing one way or the
other is sufficient to satisfy Rule 11 and avoid an exceptional-case
finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285, even if time, events, and later
information prove the accusation of infringement wrong, and
certainly so where, as in Hoffman-La Roche, the patentee has tried but
failed to obtain relevant information from the accused infringer.
1953
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies, Inc.,
the jury
returned a willful-infringement verdict, but the district court denied
Tate Access’s motion for attorneys’ fees, leading to a cross-appeal of
that denial. The Federal Circuit vacated in part the district court’s

1948. Hoffman-La Roche, 213 F.3d at 1363, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1849.
1949. See id. at 1365, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850 (noting that § 285 provides for
the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in exceptional cases, and that the
district court’s determination of whether a case is exceptional is a factual finding
only reviewed for clear error).
1950. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
1951. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
1952. See id. at 1365-66, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
1953. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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denial of Tate Access’s motion for damages and attorneys’ fees and
remanded without reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments
1954
relating to attorneys’ fees.
In view of the jury’s finding of willful
infringement, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
award attorneys’ fees, because it failed to articulate any reasons for its
1955
refusal.
The case was returned to the district court with specific
instructions for that court to consider whether Maxcess had obtained
a competent opinion of counsel or otherwise exercised due care, and
whether there was a reasonable basis for concluding the accused floor
1956
panel was non-infringing.
1957
In Embrex Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,
the jury returned a
verdict of willful infringement in an infringement action that arose
after settlement of earlier litigation. The jury, in a special verdict,
found that Service Engineering had acted in bad faith and had
breached the agreement, which supported the award of attorneys’
1958
fees.
The district court awarded attorneys’ fees under the terms of
the settlement agreement as well as under 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and
1959
285.
Service Engineering appealed, arguing that the district court
erred because the award of fees was based in part on the willfulness
verdict, which was in turn flawed because of an erroneous jury
1960
instruction.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s award
1961
of attorneys’ fees in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
The court likewise found no clear error in the district court’s finding

1954. See id. at 972, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (noting but not relying on Tate
Access’ argument that, because Maxcess willfully infringed and engaged in vexatious
litigation, Tate Access was entitled to increased damages and attorneys’ fees).
1955. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (noting that while an express jury
finding of willful infringment does not automatically dictate that attorneys’ fees and
enhanced damages will be awarded, after such a finding the lower court must
provide reasons for refusing to award such fees).
1956. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
1957. 216 F.3d 1343, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1958. See id. at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
1959. See id. at 1347, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
1960. See id. at 1350, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165 (noting that while the court
requires proof of willfulness by clear and convincing evidence, the jury was instructed
that willfulness could be proved by the lower standard of preponderance of the
evidence). Embrex maintained that Service Engineering had waived its right to
appeal the instruction for failure to object at trial. The court determined that
Service Engineering had not waived its appeal, as the jury instructions had been
“plain error.” See id. at 1350-51, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165-66 (relying on Fourth
Circuit precedent allowing appeal of jury instructions in the absence of a timely
objection only when there is “plain error”) (citing Rice v. Community Health Ass’n,
203 F.3d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 2000)).
1961. See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1351, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (noting that even
if the SEC’s argument that the fee award was erroneous because it was based on
erroneous jury instructions was valid, the settlement agreement provided for
attorneys’ fees and costs).
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that the case was exceptional, under 35 U.S.C. § 285, nor an abuse of
discretion in setting the amount of attorneys’ fees on that ground as
1962
well.
1963
In Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Industries Inc., Hoffinger crossappealed the district court’s refusal to award attorneys’ fees as to the
claims surrounding the ‘068 patent, which Hoffinger had been found
1964
not to infringe on summary judgment.
The district court denied
fees on the ground that Zodiac and its expert had a good-faith belief
1965
that Hollinger infringed through sale of its accused pool cleaners.
The Federal Circuit affirmed that denial as well within the district
court’s discretion, relying on the record evidence that Zodiac had
hired an expert and secured an opinion of infringement before filing
1966
The district court had heard and witnessed testimony from
suit.
the expert during trial, and had the opportunity to observe his
demeanor. Under those circumstances, the court concluded, “it
cannot be said that the ‘record contains no basis on which the district
court rationally could have made its decision or . . . [that] the judicial
1967
action is arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable.’”
1968
In Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop Inc., Speedplay, the licensee of several
clipless bicycle pedal and cleat patents, sued Bebop, the
manufacturer of a competing clipless pedal system, for patent and
trademark infringement.
Bebop counterclaimed, seeking a
declaration that the patents were invalid. The ‘894 Speedplay patent
was found invalid because the invention was “on sale” more than one
year before the patent was filed, but the district court denied Bebop’s
1969
motion for attorneys’ fees.
Bebop appealed the denial of fees,
1962. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (noting that the SEC did not carry its
burden of showing that the district court committed clear error).
1963. 206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1964. See id. at 1410-13, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143-45 (reiterating the district
court’s finding on summary judgment that Hoffinger did not literally or under the
doctrine of equivalents (DOE) infringe the ‘068 patent, and did not literally infringe
the ‘382 patent). The case proceeded to trial on the issue of infringement of a third
patent, the ‘382 patent, and the jury found it was willfully infringed under the DOE.
Both parties then moved for a JMOL, and the district court, granting Hoffinger’s
motion, found that he had not infringed the ‘382 patent. See id. at 1410, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143.
1965. See id. at 1413, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
1966. See id. at 1417, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (utilizing an abuse of discretion
standard of review).
1967. Id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (quoting Cambridge Prods. Ltd. v. Penn
Nutrients, Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1968. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The patents at
issue concerned clip-less bicycle pedal and cleat asssemblies, which allow bicyclers to
secure their feet to the pedals and transmit more power to the wheels by applying
both pushing and pulling force. See id. at 1248, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1985-86.
1969. See id. at 1260, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986.
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urging that Speedplay had acted inequitably and had failed to
conduct an adequate investigation before bringing suit, making the
defeated infringement accusation under the ‘894 patent rise to the
1970
level of an exceptional case under 35 U.S.C. § 285.
The Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that Speedplay did not
engage in inequitable conduct. As to the inadequate investigation,
although the district court’s “on sale” invalidity ruling was based on
an invoice Speedplay delayed in producing at trial, the court
concluded that this conduct was less extreme than other cases where
1971
fees were awarded under Section 285.
1972
In Automated Business Companies, Inc. v. NEC America, Inc.,
the
district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement, after
which NEC moved for sanctions against ABC, the plaintiff-patentee.
NEC Corp. was the parent of NEC USA, which in turn was the parent
of NEC America, the defendant. In a meeting between NEC Corp.
personnel and ABC’s counsel, ABC described its basis for alleging
infringement: the description of the NEFAX 790 unit in a facsimile
1973
machine buyer’s guide.
NEC explained that the information in the
guide was incorrect and showed ABC why the new NEC product, the
1974
After the meeting, ABC stipulated that
FAX 791, did not infringe.
none of the accused devices, the original units and the new FAX 791,
infringed. When asked to dismiss the case with prejudice, ABC
refused, proposing a dismissal without prejudice or that discovery
1975
continue to determine if any other NEC products infringed.
NEC America moved for summary judgment of non-infringement
on the old and new units. ABC admitted non-infringement but
maintained that the action should remain docketed for ABC to
determine if any other product infringed. The district court granted
1970. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986 (noting that Bebop contended that it
incurred unnecessary legal costs preparing for a trial on a patent that was
subsequently found to be invalid).
1971. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1995 (distinguishing Eltech Systs. Corp. v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 810, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1969 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(noting that a fee award was affirmed because the trial court had evidence that the
patentee knew that its suit was unfounded). The court also distinguished Judin v.
United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784, 42 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(explaining that an imposition of sanctions was upheld because the patentee had not
obtained a sample of the allegedly infringing device before bringing an infringement
action) and Hughes v. North Am. Inc., 724 F.2d 122, 124, 220 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 707,
709 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that a fee award was upheld because the patentee had
resisted the defendants’ efforts to have the patent declared invalid despite the fact
that the patentee had widely sold the product for more than two years before the
date of the patent application).
1972. 202 F.3d 1353, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1973. See id. at 1354, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
1974. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
1975. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
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NEC America’s motion for summary judgment, and NEC America
moved for sanctions, which the district court granted under 35 U.S.C.
1976
§ 285.
The district court found that circumstances demonstrated
that ABC’s litigation was baseless, and awarded fees, including fees
1977
On
paid by NEC America’s grandparent company, NEC Corp.
appeal, ABC did not challenge the finding of the case as exceptional,
or the discretionary decision to award fees, but did question the
amount of the fees awarded. ABC’s point was that only the fees paid
by the prevailing party NEC America, not NEC Corp., should have
1978
been included in the award.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding
that for purposes of the attorneys’ fees award, the degree of
1979
participation or control of NEC Corp. was not a critical factor.
In
determining the compensatory quantum of an award under Section
285, the Federal Circuit noted that a trial court should not be, and in
the past has not been, limited to reimbursement of only the actual
1980
Where a company’s
amount paid by the injured named party.
closely related grandparent company assisted in the defense of an
infringement action, and assumed some of the legal expenses, that
company is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, even though that
1981
company was not a named party.
D. Pre-Judgment Interest
1982

In C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., the plaintiff brought suit against
a competitor and restaurant chain for patent infringement and
1983
various torts, including misappropriation of trade secrets.
The
district court found the patent in suit invalid under 35 U.S.C. §
102(b) as being on sale more than one year before the patentapplication date, and dismissed the trade-secret allegations against
1976. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (noting that NBC moved for sanctions
on three grounds: failure to perform a pre-filing investigation as required by Rule 11,
initiation of an improper lawsuit, and filing and pursuing a baseless lawsuit which
would warrant an exceptional case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285).
1977. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602 (noting that the district court rejected
NBC’s first two bases for sanctions, but found against ABC on the third, the
exceptional case finding).
1978. See Automated Business Companies, 202 F.3d at 1355, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1603.
1979. See id. at 1355-56, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603 (reviewing the award under
an abuse of discretion standard and noting that NEC Corp. was a participant in
settlement meetings and had paid ABC’s legal fees).
1980. See Automated Bus. Co., 202 F.3d at 1355-56, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
1981. See id. at 1356, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603 (affirming the full attorneys’ fees
award after finding no abuse of discretion or other error in the district court’s
award).
1982. 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1983. See id. at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
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1984

Pizza Hut on statute-of-limitations grounds.
The trade-secret claim against IBP proceeded to trial. The jury
awarded C&F Packing $10.9 million in unjust-enrichment damages,
1985
and $5.1 million in prejudgment interest.
IBP moved for JMOL
and, after its motion was denied, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
damages award, but reversed the award of prejudgment interest
1986
under controlling Illinois law.
Under Illinois law, a party may
generally recover prejudgment interest only by express agreement, by
statutory authorization, or if it is “warranted by equitable
1987
considerations.”
There being no express agreement or statutory
basis for interest, IBP urged that the equity exception could not be
justified because IBP had no fiduciary or confidentiality obligations
1988
The court disagreed. The court also rejected C&F’s
to C&F.
attempt to rely upon patent and trademark cases in support of the
prejudgment interest award on the ground that those cases have no
1989
application to trade-secret cases.
E. Permanent Injunctions
The court’s year 2000 cases addressing permanent injunctions
stayed the traditional course: if the manufacturing patentee wins
against an accused infringer, the patentee is (barring extraordinary
circumstances) entitled to a permanent injunction.
1990
In Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Technologies Inc., the district
court entered judgment following a jury verdict of willful
infringement in favor of Tate Access. Tate Access cross-appealed
1991
from the denial of its motion for entry of a permanent injunction.
The court concluded that because the jury’s finding of literal
infringement was supported by substantial evidence, and because
Maxcess had represented that it would not oppose the entry of a
permanent injunction, the district court’s refusal to order a
permanent injunction was an abuse of discretion, and on remand
1992
ordered the district court to grant the requested injunction.
1984. See id. at 1300-01, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
1985. See id. at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867-68.
1986. See id. at 1305, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (noting that the district court
had awarded the prejudgment interest “as a matter of fairness and equity”).
1987. See id. at 1305-06, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1988. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1305-06, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1989. See id. at 1305, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (noting that the cases relied on
by the district court involved parties who had fiduciary relationships).
1990. 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1991. See id. at 961, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514.
1992. See id. at 971-72, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (noting that Tate Access also
argued that there was no strong public policy against an injunction).
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1993

In U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, the district court, after a bench trial,
found that Dray had violated his license agreement with U.S. Valves
and permanently enjoined Dray from selling valves covered under
the license agreement. The license agreement related to valves
covered by Dray’s ‘282 and ‘514 patents for internal piston valves,
which regulate the flow of molten plastic in an injection-molding
1994
process.
On appeal, Dray contended that the injunction awarded
more relief than was justified by the license agreement because it
permanently enjoined Dray from selling the valves covered by the
1995
license agreement.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding that
the injunction, properly understood, enjoined only sales of valves
covered under the license agreement according to the license’s
terms. The life of the injunction thus spanned only the life of the
license terms, or until expiration of the patents. Once the patents
expire, the court said, the license protection of the patented valves
1996
lapses, and the injunction ends.
The wording of the injunction,
under the terms of the license, thus gave fair and precise notice of
1997
what was covered, and of what the injunction actually prohibited.
Because the district court’s injunction was neither indefinite nor
1998
effective in perpetuity, it was proper in law.
F.

Post-Injunction Infringement/Contempt
1999

the fact that Davol made postIn Stryker Corp. v. Davol, Inc.,
permanent injunction sales of devices that were allegedly modified to
2000
avoid infringement was at issue.
Davol received an oral opinion of
counsel, committed to writing eight days before entry of the
permanent injunction, advising that the modified Hydro-Surg Plus
1993. 212 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1994. See id. at 1370, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
1995. See id. at 1376, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (noting that the injunction
stated that “Dray is permanently enjoined from selling the dry valve (including the
continuation-in-part valves) covered under the license agreement between Dray and
U.S. valves.”).
1996. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (noting that upon expiration of the
patents, the valves are no longer “covered by the license agreement”).
1997. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840 (“[T]he wording of the injunction gives
‘fair and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits’” (quoting
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 424, (1974))).
1998. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1840.
1999. 234 F.3d 1252, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2000. See id. at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (remarking that the district
court had entered a permanent injunction against Davol’s infringement on
December 23, 1998, and within one week, Davol was selling modified versions of the
irrigator). Davol’s modifications included changing the method by which the motor
was attached, replacing a spike in the original design with a narrower spike, and
adding clips used to attach the irrigator to an IV pole. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1136.
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suction irrigator did not infringe the ‘402 patent. The opinion
noted, however, that Stryker might assert infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents, that sales of the modified irrigator would
likely be said to violate any permanent injunction that might be
2001
issued, and that Stryker might move to hold Davol in contempt.
The opinion further stated that it was more likely than not that the
district court would consider allegations of infringement by the
modified irrigator in a contempt proceeding, and that, while it could
not state with certainty that there was no risk whatsoever, the risk in
2002
selling the revised irrigator was “well within acceptable limits.”
The district court found the new irrigator insubstantially modified
from the enjoined design after entry of the injunction, and awarded
attorneys’ fees, costs, and reasonable royalties for the post-injunction
2003
infringing sales, tripling those royalties for willful infringement.
Davol appealed, and the court, applying the abuse-of-discretion
standard of appellate review, affirmed both the contempt finding and
2004
the awards of damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
Reviewing the district court’s decision to proceed via a contempt
hearing, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the differences between
the original infringing product and the redesigned irrigator were not
so marked that a wholly new infringement case was warranted. The
Federal Circuit found contempt proceedings were appropriate
because the new device did not raise “substantial open issues” of
2005
infringement.
In the contempt proceedings, Stryker submitted
evidence, including unrefuted anecdotal evidence that hospitals
using the modified irrigator were not using the modification that
allegedly caused the new irrigator to avoid infringement. Davol also
conceded that it had not investigated whether customers would
actually follow the instructions provided with the product to use the
2006
modifications necessary to avoid infringement.
The court
2001. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
2002. Id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
2003. See id. at 1256-57, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (detailing the evidence Davol
offered when ordered to show cause that he was not in contempt of the injunction).
Davol asserted that adding clips to the original design was a substantial change, and
supported his assertion with affidavits from medical professionals which stated that
the added clips were necessary for the new design. See id. at 1257, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1136. Stryker countered this evidence, pointing to several occassions when
hospitals had used the new design without the clips. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1136.
2004. See id. at 1259-60, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (noting that Davol appealed
the award of enhanced and supplemental damages, and Stryker cross-appealed the
District Court’s denial of attorneys’ fees after it found the case to be exceptional).
2005. See id. at 1260, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139.
2006. See Stryker, 234 F.3d at 1256, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
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concluded that the district court had thus properly found
2007
contempt.
The court also found no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s award of treble damages, attorneys’ fees and costs,
particularly considering the conclusory nature of the opinion of
counsel used by Davol to justify selling the revised device, and the
2008
minor changes made to the original device.
V. ALTERNATE SOURCES OF LIABILITY
A. Licenses/Construction and Validity
The court considered several license issues in its decisions
2009
rendered in 2000. In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., Texas
Instruments (TI) sought to enjoin Tessera from continuing to
participate in a U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)
investigation that Tessera had commenced against TI and Sharp, on
2010
the basis of a license agreement between TI and Tessera.
The
license provided that “if such disputes, controversies, claims or
differences cannot be settled between the parties, any litigation
2011
relating to this Agreement shall take place in California.”
The
Federal Circuit, reversing the district court, held that “litigation,” as
used in the license agreement, included ITC proceedings, and
reversed the district court’s conclusion on the likelihood-of-success
2012
prong of the preliminary-injunction anlaysis.
2013
In Dow Chemical Company v. United States,
the government was
licensed to use Dow’s subsidence-control-material patents, with
2014
In 1975,
royalty payments to be made as stated in the agreement.
2007. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136.
2008. See id., 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136 (noting that in Spindelfabrik SuessenSchurr v. Shubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 903 F.2d 1558, 1578, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1921 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the court found that the lower court
had not abused its discretion in trebling damages and awarding attorneys’ fees).
2009. 231 F.3d 1325, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674 (Fed. Cir. 2000). All four of the
authors were counsel to Texas Instruments Incorporated in this case.
2010. See id. at 1326, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (noting that the license
agreement contained a governing law clause and a provision governing venue).
2011. Id. at 1327, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1675.
2012. See id. at 1330-32, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678-80 (asserting that the
governing law clause in this case, as in any patent license agreement covers patent
dispute issues). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see supra Part I.D.
2013. 226 F.3d 1334, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2014. See id. at 1336, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015. The court stated specifically
that:
the terms of the license provided for (i) a royalty-free right to use the
invention for government purposes on federal lands only; (ii) a royalty-free
right to use the invention for government purposes to cover up to 2.5
million cubic feet of mine filling material on other than federal land; and
(iii) thereafter, to use the invention at a royalty rate that would not exceed
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Dow requested an accounting of royalties due from the government
under the license, and negotiations continued during the remainder
of 1975 and into 1976. In December 1976, the government informed
Dow that it had not, in fact, practiced the covered invention, and as a
result, no royalty payments were due. Dow asked the government to
2015
reconsider.
In 1978, the government told Dow that there were
“seriously litigable issues” as to validity, infringement and the viability
2016
The government stated that no royalty payments
of the license.
would be made, that this was the government’s final decision, and
2017
that no further reconsideration would occur.
Five years later, in
January 1983, Dow filed suit seeking a reasonable royalty for the
government’s infringement of the licensed patent, and in the
2018
By letter
alternative sought damages for breach of the license.
dated January 10, 1985, Dow told the government it was terminating
the license effective as of the date of the breach of contract or the
2019
date of notice, whichever was earlier.
The Court of Federal Claims found that the patent was not invalid
and was therefore infringed by the government. Consequently, the
government’s non-payment of royalties and repudiation of the license
constituted material breaches of the license that warranted voiding
the contract ab initio—leading to an award of patent damages on the
basis of unlicensed infringement, instead of breach-of-contract
2020
damages.
The government appealed the Court of Federal Claims
decision, including the judgment that the license was void ab initio
2021
and the method of assessing damages.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that although the government
had repudiated the license, the contract should not be treated as
rescinded, or that rescission should be allowed as a remedy. The
2022
court reversed the determination that the license was void ab initio.
Applying basic contract law principles, however, it found that the
government’s material breach and repudiation of the license gave
25% of a reasonable commercial rate to be agreed upon by the parties.
See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
2015. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
2016. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015.
2017. See id. at 1337, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016 (noting that Dow again asked
the government to reconsider its decision regarding royalty payments).
2018. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
2019. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
2020. See id., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016.
2021. See Dow, 226 F.3d at 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016 (noting that the
government also appealed the judgment as to the validity and infringment of the
patent).
2022. See id. at 1345-46, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1022-24 (discussing how recission of
an equitable contract can void a contract).
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Dow the right to either terminate the license or to continue to treat it
2023
as outstanding.
Dow’s letter of January 1985 effected a termination
of the license, which confirmed the propriety of calculating damages
under Section 1498 only for a period subsequent to the
2024
termination.
For the period prior to termination, the provisions of
the agreement were applicable in calculating damages for breach of
contract. Following termination, damages under Section 1498 were
2025
proper.
The court remanded to the Court of Federal Claims for a
2026
proper recalculation of the damages.
The Federal Circuit decided serveral other license-related cases,
2027
Speedplay, Inc. v.
including Prima Tek II, LLC v. A-Roo Company,
2028
2029
Bebop, Inc., and Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.
Each
of these cases addressed issues related to standing to sue and are
2030
discussed earlier in this Area Summary.
B. Trade Secrets
The Federal Circuit decided two cases involving significant issues of
trade secret misappropriation in 2000. In C&F Packing Co. v. IBP
2031
Inc., C&F sued IBP and Pizza Hut for trade-secret misappropriation
involving a process for making and freezing precooked sausage for
pizza toppings. Precooked sausage made under the protected
process had the appearance, taste and other characteristics of freshly
2032
In 1985, Pizza Hut agreed to buy C&F’s
cooked sausage.
precooked sausage, on the condition that C&F divulge its secret
2023. See id. at 1345, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1023 (citing the government’s denial
to pay royalties and its challege to the legality of the license, which made the lack of a
termination clause in the license immaterial).
2024. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1994).
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without a license
of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the
owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United
States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire
compensation for such use and manufacture.
Id.
2025. See Dow, 226 F.3d at 1347-48, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1024-25 (noting that the
method used by the Court of Federal Claims to calculate damages was too
speculative).
2026. See id. at 1347-48, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025 (asserting that the Court of
Federal Claims should have used a more conventional and proven method to
compute damages).
2027. 222 F.3d 1372, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2028. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2029. 228 F.3d 1338, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2030. See supra Part I.A.2.
2031. 224 F.3d 1296, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2032. See id. at 1299, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (noting that C&F’s precooked
sausage exceeded competitors’ in price and quality).
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2033

process to several other Pizza Hut suppliers.
In exchange for the
process disclosure, Pizza Hut promised to purchase a large quantity
2034
of precooked sausage from C&F.
C&F disclosed the process under
confidentiality agreements with those other companies. By 1986,
Pizza Hut’s other suppliers had learned the C&F process, and Pizza
Hut told C&F it would not purchase any more sausage without drastic
2035
price reductions.
In 1989, Pizza Hut started talks with IBP about purchasing
2036
precooked sausage pizza toppings.
Pizza Hut furnished IBP, under
a confidentiality agreement, information about C&F’s sausage
process via documents and personal discussions with IBP employees.
IBP also hired a former supervisor in C&F’s sausage plant as a
production superintendent, who used information from C&F while
2037
helping IBP refine its process.
In its Second Amended Complaint, filed in May 1993, C&F added,
inter alia, trade-secret misappropriation claims against Pizza Hut and
2038
The district court dismissed C&F’s misappropriation claim
IBP.
against Pizza Hut in January 1994, on the basis of a statute-oflimitations defense: the court determined that Kansas law, which had
a 3-year statute of limitations, and not Illinois law, which had a 5-year
2039
statute of limitations, controlled.
C&F’s trade-secret claim against
IBP proceeded to trial. In December 1998, a jury determined that
IBP had misappropriated C&F’s trade secrets, awarding $10.9 million
2040
for unjust enrichment and $5.1 million in prejudgment interest.
2041
The district court denied IBP’s JMOL motion, and IBP appealed.
Applying Illinois state court standards for JMOL, as is required in
the Seventh Circuit, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial with
2042
IBP contended that for C&F to
respect to the trade-secret verdict.
show it had trade secrets that could be misappropriated, it had to
2033. Pizza Hut’s ostensible motivation was to ensure that back-up suppliers were
available. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
2034. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866 (stating that C&F filed an application for
a patent for its process for making pre-cooked sausage in 1985).
2035. See id. at 1299, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866-67 (observing that C&F had
invested $4.5 million in a new plant for Pizza Hut).
2036. See id. at 1300, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
2037. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
2038. See id. (noting that claims against Pizza Hut also included fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with
business expectancy).
2039. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1300, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867-68 (finding
that C&F should have known of the misappropriation as early as March, 1986).
2040. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867.
2041. See id. at 1301, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69 (stating that C&F’s claims
would still be time barred under Kansas’s five-year statute of limitations).
2042. See id. at 1301-02, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868.
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corroborate the existence of the trade secret [process] with evidence
beyond the testimony of interested parties, basing this theory on the
“analogous context” of patent-priority contests. The court rejected
this analogy on the grounds that patent-law requirements do not set
the standard for detecting the existence of a trade secret; rather, the
trade-secret law of the relevant state—here, the Illinois Trade Secrets
2043
Act
and Illinois common law—controls in misappropriation
2044
cases.
The court then concluded that, under Illinois law, the jury
was presented with substantial evidence that C&F possessed trade
2045
secrets.
Addressing damages, IBP complained that the damages finding did
not properly account for IBP’s costs, and assumed IBP would make
no profit without using the misappropriated trade secrets. Opposing
expert testimony was offered to the jury on the effect of the
misappropriated trade secrets on profits. The jury chose to believe
C&F’s expert, with IBP’s profits being calculated by the jury from
IBP’s own financial reports and reasonably extrapolated for those
2046
years where the figures were not available.
A jury instruction
expressly directed the jury to deduct IBP’s costs, and the record did
not show that the jury ignored that instruction. As a result, the panel
concluded that there was no manifest error or unreasonableness in
2047
the jury’s assessment of damages.
2048
In Vanmoor v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,
Vanmoor brought suit for
infringement of the ‘331 patent, directed to a construction for a
cartridge used to dispense caulking compound, and further alleged
misappropriation of trade secrets relating to the cartridge. The
district court, on summary judgment, found that the ‘331 patent was
invalid under Section 102(b) of the Patent Act, and that no trade
secrets had been misappropriated because Vanmoor had failed to
present anything beyond conclusory allegations that the
manufacturers had violated their confidentiality agreements with
2043. See id., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868; 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/2(d)
(West 1995).
2044. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1302, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868-69
(mentioning that both Illinois statutory law and common law emphasize the
characteristic of secrecy when defining “trade secret”).
2045. See id. at 1303, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1869 (stating that the evidence
presented fit the six-factor test for determining the existence of a trade secret).
2046. See id. at 1304, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870-71 (noting that under Illinois
law, “[d]amages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the
unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in
computing actual loss”).
2047. See C&F Packing, 224 F.3d at 1304-05, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (holding
that the jury’s award of damages was not unreasonable or manifestly erroneous).
2048. 201 F.3d 1363, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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2049

him.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the summary judgment of no tradesecret misappropriation, agreeing with the district court that
Vanmoor’s conclusory allegations were insufficient to create a
2050
genuine issue of material fact.
The manufacturers contended that
they did not use or disclose any information received from Vanmoor
under the confidentiality agreements they entered into with
Vanmoor. They supported their position with documentary evidence
that the agreements were entered into in October/November 1994
and that the accused products had been manufactured to
specifications that remained unchanged since before October
2051
1994.
C. RICO
For the first time, the Federal Circuit in 2000 addressed the
application of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
2052
Organizations (“RICO”) Act
to inequitable procurement and
enforcement of United States patents. In Semiconductor Energy
2053
Laboratories Co., Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., Samsung alleged
RICO counterclaims under the federal and New Jersey RICO
2054
The district court granted summary judgment dismissing
statutes.
the RICO counterclaims, even although it allowed Samsung’s
inequitable-conduct defense with respect to the ‘636 patent, and
ultimately found that patent unenforceable due to inequitable
2055
conduct.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s unenforceability holding, finding no abuse of discretion, and
2056
also affirmed the RICO summary judgment ruling.
Samsung’s RICO claim was undeniably creative. It urged that
Semiconductor Energy Laboratories (SEL) had committed predicate
2057
Samsung
acts of mail fraud in its prosecution of the ‘636 patent.
alleged that SEL made material misrepresentations to, and withheld

2049. See id. at 1365, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378 (stating that the motion for
summary judgment was supported by evidence illustrating that manufacturing
specifications and methods of operation were identical to those manufactured, used,
and sold).
2050. See id. at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
2051. See id. at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379-80 (observing that Vanmoor
offered no evidence to support a claim for trade secret misappropriation).
2052. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
2053. 204 F.3d 1368, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2054. See id. at 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
2055. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002.
2056. See id. at 1371, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002-03.
2057. See id. at 1379, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
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material references from, the PTO using the U.S. mail.
The
Federal Circuit stated that it would apply its own law to determine
whether SEL’s conduct before the PTO qualified as mail fraud for
purposes of the predicate acts required of the federal RICO
2059
statute.
The Federal Circuit held as a matter of law that
inequitable conduct before the PTO would not qualify as an act of
mail fraud or wire fraud for purposes of the predicate-act
requirements, since such inequitable conduct does not “defraud” the
government of any “property” as those terms are used in the federal
2060
mail or wire-fraud statutes.
Because the failure of Samsung’s mailfraud claim meant that it had failed to establish a “predicate act” for
purposes of the federal RICO Act, the district court’s grant of
summary judgment dismissing Samsung’s federal RICO claims was
2061
affirmed.
With respect to Samsung’s counterclaim under New Jersey’s state
RICO statute, the court was faced with different issues. Although the
New Jersey act was modeled after the federal statute, the qualifying
predicate acts under the state law were different and arguably
2062
For example, fraudulent
broader than the federal predicate acts.
practices and making false statements to PTO examiners in violation
2063
of federal penal provisions would satisfy the New Jersey statute.
SEL contended that summary judgment regarding the New Jersey
statute should be affirmed not on substantive grounds, but on the
2064
ground of federal preemption.
The Federal Circuit agreed that
the federal patent laws preempted Samsung’s New Jersey RICO
counterclaims, consistent with its ruling in Abbott Laboratories v.
2065
Brennan, that state abuse-of-process claims were preempted by the
federal patent laws.
Semiconductor is likely to dispose of any further attempt to apply
federal (or state) RICO laws to inequitable-conduct-based
procurement and enforcement allegations relating to U.S. patents.

2058. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009 (stating that under Supreme Court
precedent and federal patent law, an issued patent is property).
2059. See id. at 1380, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009-10.
2060. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009-10 (stating that a patent application that
has not yet matured into a patent cannot be defined as “government property”).
2061. See Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
2062. See id. at 1380-81, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
2063. See id. at 1381, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010-11 (discussing Samsung’s
argument that the patent statute does not expressly exclude RICO remedies).
2064. See id., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
2065. 952 F.2d 1346, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

ROSENBERGPPAUTHOR

2001]

11/20/01 4:51 PM

PATENT LAW DECISIONS IN 2000

1693

D. Antitrust
Patent issues often come to the Federal Circuit hand-in-hand with
antitrust issues.
In its only major pronouncement on the
patent/antitrust interface in 2000, the Federal Circuit continued in
its view that it, and not the regional circuits, will make antitrust law
related to patents, at least in appeals that reach the Federal Circuit.
2066
In In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation,
a
group of independent service organizations (“ISOs”) brought suit
against Xerox, claiming that its refusal to sell patented parts and
copyrighted manuals and to license copyrighted software violated the
2067
federal antitrust laws.
The district court granted summary
judgment for Xerox, and the ISOs appealed. The Federal Circuit
affirmed, holding that the ISOs had not raised any genuine issue as to
any material fact and that Xerox was entitled to judgment as a matter
2068
of law.
The ISOs’ complaint alleged that Xerox violated the Sherman
2069
Act
by setting prices on its patented parts for ISOs which were
higher than the prices charged to end-users of the copiers, which
were designed to force ISOs to raise their prices and in turn
eliminate ISOs as competitors in the relevant market for high-speed
copier and printer servicing. Xerox had counterclaimed for patent
and copyright infringement, and contested the ISOs’ antitrust claims
as relying on injury caused solely by Xerox’s lawful refusal to sell or
2070
license patented parts and copyrighted software.
Citing
2071
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,
the court confirmed
that it would apply Federal Circuit law to the ISOs’ antitrust claims
arising from Xerox’s refusal to sell its patented parts, but it would
apply Tenth Circuit law to the ISOs’ antitrust claim based on Xerox’s
2072
refusal to sell or license its copyrighted manuals and software.
Initially, the court noted that intellectual property rights do not
confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws, but at the same time
2066. 203 F.3d 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2067. See id. at 1324, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853-54 (noting that Xerox
counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement).
2068. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856 (stating that “Xerox’s refusal to sell or
license its copyrighted works was squarely within the rights granted by Congress to
the copyright holder and did not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws”).
2069. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
2070. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1324, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1854.
2071. 141 F.3d 1059, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
2072. See In Re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1325, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1854 (noting that when reviewing a district court’s decision regarding
antitrust law, the Federal Circuit will look to the regional circuit law in which the
district court sits).
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the antitrust laws do not negate the patentee’s statutory right to
2073
exclude others from patent property.
A patent does not, without
more, demonstrate market power for purposes of the antitrust
2074
laws.
And even where market power exists, the court said, that
does not impose on the patent owner an obligation to license the use
2075
of that property to others.
The ISOs did not allege a Walker Process violation. Nor did they
allege that the counterclaims were shams. Instead, they alleged that
the patents were being misused by Xerox illegally trying to leverage
its (presumably legitimate) dominance in the equipment and parts
2076
market into dominance in the service market.
In support, the ISOs
2077
relied upon Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,
a
tying case where no patent had been asserted in defense to the
antitrust claims against Kodak. The panel noted, however, that absent
any claims of illegally tying the sale of Xerox’s patented parts to
2078
The court
unpatented products, Kodak did not resolve the issue.
stated that Kodak did nothing to limit the right of a patentee to refuse
to sell or license in markets within the scope of the statutory patent
2079
grant.
The ISOs also relied upon the Ninth Circuit’s holding on remand
in Image Technical Services, which adopted a rebuttable presumption
that the exercise of the statutory right to exclude provides a valid
business justification for consumer harm which required an
evaluation of the patentee’s subjective motivation for refusing to sell
2080
or license its patent and products for pretext.
The court refused to
2073. See id. at 1325, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854-55.
2074. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854-55.
2075.
[A] patent owner who brings suit to enforce the statutory right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention, is exempt from
the antitrust laws, . . . unless the infringement defendant proves one of two
conditions: . . . he may prove that the asserted patent was obtained through
knowing and willful fraud within the meaning of Walker Process Equipment . . .
[o]r he may demonstrate that the infringement suit was a mere sham to
cover what is actually no more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor.
Id. at 1326, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1845-55 (internal citations omitted).
2076. See id. at 1326-27, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855-56.
2077. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
2078. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1327, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1855-56 (indicating that a patent holder is not allowed to use its statutory
right “to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in a market beyond the
scope of the patent”).
2079. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855-56 (observing that absent exceptional
circumstances, a patent holder may have the right to stop competition completely in
more than one antitrust market).
2080. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Tech. Serv., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a jury must reject
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follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Image Technical Services. Under
Nobelpharma, the Federal Circuit law has held that unless a patentinfringement suit was objectively baseless, an antitrust defendant’s
2081
subjective motivation is immaterial.
Therefore, so long as the
anticompetitive effect of refusing to sell or license a patented
invention does not illegally extend beyond the statutory patent grant,
no inquiry into subjective motivation is necessary, even though that
2082
refusal may have some anticompetitive effect.
Concluding that
Xerox’s refusal to sell its patented parts did not exceed the scope of
the patent grant, the inquiry was over; Xerox was under no obligation
to sell or license its patented parts, and did not violate the antitrust
2083
laws by refusing to do so.
With respect to the ISOs’ copyright-based antitrust allegations, the
panel initially noted the lack of United States Supreme Court or
Tenth Circuit guidance regarding the antitrust implications of a
2084
unilateral refusal to sell or license copyrighted expression.
That
left the court in the position of having to predict where the Tenth
Circuit would come out on the point, so it looked to and evaluated
2085
the strength of other circuits’ precedent.
Reviewing the Fourth
2086
Circuit’s decision in Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp.,
the First Circuit’s decision in Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems
2087
Support Corp., and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Image Technical
2088
Service, the court concluded that the First Circuit’s approach was
most consistent with both the antitrust and copyright laws, and would
be most likely followed by the Tenth Circuit in considering the effect
of Xerox’s unilateral right to refuse to license or sell copyrighted
2089
manuals and diagnostic software under the antitrust laws.
The
First Circuit followed the rule that an author’s desire to exclude
others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid

the presumptively valid business judgment as pretextual)).
2081. See id. at 1327-28, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
2082. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856 (asserting that the party accused of
infringment bears the burden to prove exceptional circumstances).
2083. See id. at 1328, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856.
2084. See id. at 1328, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856-57 (noting that the Supreme
Court has ruled that a property right granted by federal copyright law cannot extend
beyond congressional intent).
2085. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1328, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1857.
2086. 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
2087. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
2088. 203 F.3d at 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
2089. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1329, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1857-58 (arguing that the First Circuit conducted the most thorough
analysis in the area of copyright law).
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business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.
The
Federal Circuit refused to examine Xerox’s subjective motivation in
asserting its right to exclude under the copyright laws for pretext, in
the absence of any evidence that the copyrights were obtained by
unlawful means or were used to gain monopoly power beyond the
2091
statutory copyright granted by Congress.
E. Trade Dress/Lanham Act
2092

In Speedplay Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., Speedplay alleged that Bebop, in
addition to infringing several Speedplay patents, was also infringing
Speedplay’s trade dress for clipless pedal and cleat assemblies for
bicycles under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Following a bench
trial, the district court entered judgment against Speedplay on all
claims in its amended complaint, including the trade-dress
2093
allegations. Speedplay appealed.
The court, applying Ninth Circuit trade-dress law, affirmed. Under
Ninth Circuit law, Speedplay was required to prove that its trade-dress
was distinctive and non-functional, and that consumers were likely to
confuse Bebop’s pedals with Speedplay’s pedals. The district court
found that Speedplay had proved its design was distinctive, but did
2094
not prove non-functionality or likelihood of confusion.
Applying the Ninth Circuit’s standard of review for a trial court’s
finding, the district court’s finding that there was little likelihood of
confusion was held to be not clearly erroneous: Despite Speedplay’s
contrary evidence, the district court correctly found, based on the
record, that the two products were sold in distinct markets, and that
the isolated instances of actual confusion were entitled to little weight
under the circumstances. The court therefore did not need to reach
the district court’s alternative ground of decision, that the design of
2095
the pedals was functional and not in the nature of trade dress.

2090. See id. at 1328, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857.
2091. See id. at 1329, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858.
2092. 211 F.3d 1245, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1984 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2093. See id. at 1249, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1986 (asserting that the district court
found the patent invalid because the invention was on sale for a year before the
patent application was filed).
2094. See id. at 1258, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993 (citing Disc Golf Ass’n v.
Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1005, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132, 1134 (9th
Cir. 1998) (observing that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ applies the “clearly
erroneous” standard of review)).
2095. See id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993 (holding that the district court’s ruling
on trade dress was correct).
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Copyright

The Federal Circuit’s only significant discussion of copyright issues
in 2000 came in the context of alleged antitrust violations for refusal
to license copyrighted works in In re Independent Service Organizations
2096
Antitrust Litigation.
G. Trademark
2097

In Cortland Line Company, Inc. v. The Orvis Company, Inc.,
the
district court granted summary judgment of no trademark
infringement, and of non-infringement of Cortland’s ‘003 patent.
Although affirming the patent non-infringement holding, the
Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment of no
2098
trademark infringement and remanded.
Cortland sued Orvis, alleging infringement of the registered mark
CASSETTE; Orvis defended on the grounds of genericness and fair
use. The district court agreed that fair use under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(6)(a) had been shown, granted summary judgment, and
2099
declined to reach the genericness issue.
The Federal Circuit
2100
applied Second Circuit law in reviewing the summary judgment.
To establish a fair-use defense, Orvis had to prove that its use of
2101
“cassette” was used only descriptively, fairly and in good faith.
The
court stated,
Cortland raises disputed issues of material fact on whether the
trademark CASSETTE is descriptive of specific characteristics
exhibited by both Cortland’s CASSETTE Reels and the Orvis Rocky
Mountain Reel. For example, evidence of record indicates that
before Cortland’s use of the term cassette, the fishing reel market
used other terms to describe similar products, including spare,
extra, or cartridge spools. [Cortland further] asserts that no
manufacturer had used the term cassette to describe either fishing
2102
equipment or spare cartridge spools.

Cortland also alleged “that Orvis used the disputed term in a
trademark sense by referring to the Rocky Mountain Reel as a
2096. See 203 F.3d at 1322, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852; see also supra Part V.D.
2097. 203 F.3d 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
2098. See id. at 1353, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1735 (stating that claims asserted by
the plaintiff did not cover the specific device).
2099. See id. at 1360-61, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
2100. See id. at 1360-61, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (stating that since the issues
of the case were not exclusive to patent law, the Federal Circuit will apply the law of
the regional circuit).
2101. See id. at 1361, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (stating that with respect to fair
use, genuine issues of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment).
2102. Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
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2103

cassette type reel.”
There was also evidence of actual customer
confusion, including past customer inquiries, product compatibility,
and questions on electronic bulletin boards. In addition to the
disputed facts on the extent of use of the mark and actual confusion,
the intent underlying Orvis’ use—whether Orvis used the mark in
2104
good faith—was also in dispute.
Additionally, the district court had
stated in its opinion that “[h]ow often Orvis used the term ‘cassette’
2105
and in what context is a matter of some debate.”
In addition to remanding for further proceedings on the disputed
fair-use issues, remand for consideration of generic-ness was also
ordered, as the determination over whether a mark is generic is
2106
relevant to the existence of an enforceable trademark.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit in 2000 continued and expanded its role as
perhaps the most important court for United States (and
international) business. However, the court also continued its
practices—which can be enormously frustrating for business planning
and settled expectations—of limited en banc review, inconsistent
panel-to-panel adjudications, fluid totality-of-the-circumstances tests,
and pliable “presumptions.” It is said by some who practice before
the Federal Circuit that this is the result of its being a court disposed
to “do equity” in individual cases, but the price of such individualized
decision-making is ultimately paid by the public at large.

2103.
2104.
2105.
2106.

Cortland Line Co., 203 F.3d at 1361, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
Id., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
See id. at 1361-62, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740-41.
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ADDENDUM
As practitioners, our clients often ask us, “When can we expect a
decision?” For years, we have been trying to answer these and other
similar questions anecdotally, rather than with any systematic or
studied information on which to base our guesses. In an attempt to
provide our impressionistic augery with some empirical support, we
have tried, in the tables and discussion that follow, to provide a
statistical “snapshot” of the Federal Circuit’s work in the year 2000,
based on our study of the court’s 92 published patent opinions from
last year. We recognize, of course, that any such statistical study has
its limitations. First, the universe of opinions being surveyed consists
of the court’s published, patent opinions. Our survey fails to account
for the presumably much shorter disposition time of unpublished
patent opinions, or “Rule 36” affirmances, or the other areas of the
court’s work (government employment cases, government contract
cases, etc.). Second, in many cases, the statistics set forth below are of
limited predictive value, since they are based on a statistically
insignificant number of data points. Finally, every case is unique, and
treating each decision as a data point for statistical averages may not
be fair or accurate in every case. Nevertheless, we have found many
of the results set forth below to be enlightening, and for that reason
we are sharing them with the bench, bar, and other persons
interested in the work of the Federal Circuit.
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TABLE 1
PUBLISHED PATENT OPINIONS BY JUDGE,
JANUARY 1, 2000 - DECEMBER 31, 2000

Judge

#
authored

#
on panel

#
separate
opinions

Mayer
Newman
Michel
2107
Plager
Lourie
Clevenger
Rader
Schall
Bryson
Gajarsa
2108
Linn
2109
Dyk

7
9
7
5
11
4
12
6
8
10
4
0

23
21
22
22
27
22
34
20
23
26
9
3

Cowen
Skelton
Friedman
Smith
Archer

0
0
2
0
2

Rich

2110

Per
Curiam

2
5
1
2
4
0
4
0
1
1
1
0

#
authored
generating
separate
opinions
1
1
1
0
2
1
2
1
0
3
0
0

%
author
(3judge
panel)
31.8
45.0
33.3
23.8
42.3
19.0
36.3
26.3
36.3
40.0
50.0
0.0

0
6
8
4
14

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

—
0.0
25.0
0.0
14.3

—

1

—

—

—

5

—

—

3

—

2107. Judge Plager assumed Senior status on November 30, 2000.
2108. Judge Linn assumed his seat on the Federal Circuit on January 1, 2000.
2109. Judge Dyk assumed his seat on the Federal Circuit on June 9, 2000.
2110. Judge Rich, who passed away on June 9, 1999, was a member of the panel
hearing oral argument in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1334, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Dow Chemical was argued on December 4,
1997, before a panel consisting of then-Chief Judge Archer and Judges Rich and
Gajarsa. The case was decided on September 6, 2000, by the remaining two
members of the panel. See FED. CIR. R. 47. 11.
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Table 1 sets forth some raw numbers about the ninety-two
published patent opinions issued by the Federal Circuit during 2000,
listed by judge.
The first column (“# authored”) reflects the number of majority
patent opinions each judge published in 2000. Thus, Chief Judge
Mayer authored seven majority patent opinions that were published
in 2000, Judge Newman wrote nine, and so on. Judges Rader, Lourie,
and Gajarsa led the way with twelve, eleven, and ten opinions
respectively. Judges Clevenger, Plager, and Schall trailed with four,
five, and six, respectively. Five cases were decided per curiam.
The second column (“# on panel”) sets forth the number of times
each judge was on a panel for one of those ninety-two cases decided
in 2000. One interesting discovery from our statistical work is that,
while nine of the ten “established” judges (i.e., those active on the
court prior to 2000) participated in anywhere from twenty to twentyseven of the published patent opinions, one judge—Judge Rader—
participated in thirty-four of the published decisions, a difference
that is arguably statistically significant. One possible explanation for
this difference—assuming that all active judges are likely to
participate in roughly the same number of cases during the course of
a year—is that Judge Rader is somewhat more likely than his
colleagues to request that the panel publish its disposition, which a
single judge may do under Circuit Rule 47.6(b). (We posit this as
theory, not fact.)
The third column (“# separate opinions”) lists the number of
separate opinions (concurrences and dissents) that each Federal
Circuit judge filed in 2000. Two observations about this column are
in order. First, these numbers reflect a high degree of unanimity in
reasoning and result—only twenty-one separate opinions were filed in
2000 (and in only fifteen cases—the en banc Festo case alone
generated six separate opinions aside from the majority opinion, and
2111
another case, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Deere & Co.,
generated both a
concurring and a dissenting opinion in addition to the majority
opion).
Second, three judges—Judges Newman, Lourie, and
Rader—are most likely to write separately in patent cases, far more
than their colleagues, statistically speaking.
Because of the small number of separate opinions issued by
Federal Circuit judges in 2000, the fourth column (“# authored
2111. 224 F.3d 1374, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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generating separate opinions”) may not prove much at all. It is
meant to indicate the authoring judge for the majority in the fifteen
cases where separate opinions were filed. Here, Judge Gajarsa led the
way, with three opinions that occasioned a separate statement from
another judge.
The final column (“% author (3-judge panel”)) on Table 1
indicates, based on the published patent opinions from 2000, how
likely it was that a particular Federal Circuit judge would be the
author of the resulting opinion in a particular case argued before a
three-judge panel. (For purposes of this column only, we have
excluded the court’s en banc decision in Festo.) In a hypothetical
world where opinions are randomly and evenly assigned, one would
expect that each judge on a three-judge panel would wind up writing
33.3% of the opinions. What stands out as significant (if not entirely
surprising) is that Judges Linn, Newman, Gajarsa and Lourie each
authored over 40% of the opinions in patent cases in which they were
involved. Of course, those four judges also are the four active judges
who came to the Federal Circuit already having a significant patent
background prior to their appointments.
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TABLE 2
SEPARATE OPINIONS IN PATENT CASES 2000

Judge

Concur
in
Opinion

Mayer
Newman
Michel
Plager
Lourie
Clevenger
Rader
Schall
Bryson
Gajarsa
Linn
Dyk

0
0
0
2
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0

Concur
Concur
in
in part,
Judgment Dissent
in part
0
0
2
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0

Cowen
Skelton
Friedman
Smith
Archer

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

Court

5

3

6

7

Dissent

2
1
0
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0

Table 2 sets forth a breakdown of the twenty-one separate opinions
by type and by authoring judge. Again, because of the relative
paucity of separate opinions, these statistics may not carry much
meaning. It is worth noting that these figures again include the six
separate opinions in Festo, two of which were styled as concurrences,
and four of which were styled as partial concurrences and partial
dissents. Again, these numbers illustrate the Federal Circuit’s largely
unanimous nature—only seven dissents, and six partial dissents, were
filed all year, with Judges Lourie (three dissents), Newman (one
dissent, two partial dissents), Mayer (two dissents), and Rader (one of
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each) leading the way.
TABLE 3: DISPOSITION TIME BY JUDGE (IN DAYS)
JANUARY 1, 2000 - DECEMBER 31, 2000
Avg. time
when
writing
separately

Avg. time
when on
panel

203
289
245
172
167
—
167
—
137
150
245
—

138
250
164
184
139
169
163
189
128
137
155
112

Mayer
Newman
Michel
Plager
Lourie
Clevenger
Rader
Schall
Bryson
Gajarsa
Linn
Dyk

83
318
131
204
138
208
143
163
101
131
187
—

Avg. time
Per
unanimous
Opinion
authored
81
329
115
204
145
109
139
147
101
110
187
—

Cowen
Skelton
Friedman
Smith
Archer

—
—
67
—
704

—
—
67
—
704

—
—
—
—
—

—
200
175
273
217

—

—

—

1007

Per
Curiam

159

95

n/a

n/a

Court

170

154

205

170

Judge

Rich

Avg. time
per
opinion
authored
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Table 3 sets forth average statistical information regarding the
length of time it takes the Federal Circuit and its judges to dispose of
published Federal Circuit patent appeals. This table is at the same
time the most interesting of these statistics, and also perhaps the one
most subject to the criticism that every case is unique and demands
unique treatment, and thus cannot be “averaged” together with other
cases to yield meaningful results.
Because the Federal Circuit does not publish the date of argument
on the face of its opinions, we obtained from the public docket
records available in the Federal Circuit clerk’s office the date of
argument for each of the ninety-two published patent opinions. We
then calculated the difference, in days, between oral argument and
decision, and utilized those calculated figures in our statistics. (For
the insatiably curious, leap day—February 29, 2000—was counted
when the argument took place prior to that date and the decision
rendered afterward.)
The first column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per opinion authored”)
lists, in days, the average time from argument to decision for each
judge of the Federal Circuit. Thus, for the seven published patent
opinions Chief Judge Mayer authored in 2000, the average amount of
time from argument to decision was eighty-three days (slightly less
than three months), while for the nine published patent opinions
authored by Judge Newman, the average time from argument to
decision was 318 days (about ten and a half months). The average
time of disposition for all ninety-two Federal Circuit published patent
opinions was 170 days, or a bit less than six months. It should be
noted that outliers can have a disproportionate impact on the
statistical averages in this and other columns on Table 3. Thus, to use
an extreme example, Judge Archer’s average of 704 days from
argument to decision is affected greatly by his authoring of Dow
2112
Chemical Co. v. United States,
which was argued on December 4,
1997. The publication of this decision was quite possibly delayed by
the intervening death of panel member Judge Rich (on June 9,
1999), but was ultimately issued by the remaining two judges on the
panel on September 6, 2000. Taking away the Dow case—which was
1007 days from argument to judgment—Judge Archer’s average time
per opinion authored would drop from 704 to 401, which is the
number of days from argument to disposition for the only other case
he authored in 2000.
The second column on Table 3 (“Avg. time per unanimous
2112. 226 F.3d 1334, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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opinion authored”) is meant to account for one type of delay in
publication not attributable to the author of the majority opinion—
the authoring and issuance of a separate concurring, or dissenting,
opinion. In most—but not all—cases, limiting the relevant data set to
unanimous opinions decreases the average disposition time per
judge. The most notable effect can be seen in the average disposition
time for Judge Clevenger, whose 208-day overall average dropped to
109 days when one non-unanimous opinion—which took 505 days
from argument to disposition—is removed from the calculus. The
average time for the entire court for issuance of unanimous
published patent opinions was 154 days after argument, or about five
months.
The third column (“Avg. time when writing separately”) supplies
the average time from argument to disposition when the judge in
question has written a separate opinion. This data may suffer from
some inadequacies: first, it is based solely on the limited number of
separate opinions in published patent cases in 2000. Second, it
cannot account for the unknown factor of how long the author of the
majority opinion took to prepare the draft opinion which occasioned
the separate concurrence or dissent. Here, the overall court average
is 205 days, or about seven months.
The fourth and final column on Table 3 (“Avg. time when on
panel”) supplies the average time from argument to disposition
whenever a certain judge is on the panel hearing the case. We have
supplied this statistic on the assumption that the time a nonauthoring judge spends reviewing one of his or her colleagues’ draft
opinion, even if it does not ultimately occasion a separate opinion,
may have some influence on the disposition time. For active judges,
the results range from 112 days for Judge Dyk (on limited data, since
he took the bench in June 2000) to 250 days for Judge Newman. The
court average, as earlier noted, was 170 days from argument to
decision for published patent cases.

